fishin wrote:Calling lawmaking "mediation" is bending the concept to extremes.
Well, let's not get too caught up in the nomenclature. I only chose the term "mediator" because I couldn't think of a better term for something that inserts itself in media res in a contract negotiation. I could have called it an "intervenor" just as easily.
We have laws right now that limit one's ability to contract. Are those laws impermissible infringements on the liberty to contract?
The motives or abilities of individual legislators are immaterial to the issue at hand.
Thomas wrote:I disagree with your premise: Just because Worker and Boss have chosen to join a political society, that doesn't mean they have chosen the state as the arbitrator of their disputes. They have merely chosen it as the protector of their lives, their liberty and their property.
But, in my example, they did choose the state to act as their "mediator." Furthermore, even if neither explicitly chose the state to act as the "mediator," they both "chose" (in a Lockean fashion) to abide by the decisions of the state.
Does every limitation on the freedom to contract destroy that freedom?
For instance, suppose that, instead of negotiating a labor contract, Boss and Worker are negotiating the terms of a contract for Worker to kill Boss's wife. Is a law that prohibits such contracts destructive of either Boss's or Worker's freedom to contract?
It's getting harder and harder for me to figure out your philosophical position, Thomas. You claimed elsewhere that you are a utilitarian, but here you adhere to a Lockean natural rights position. Now, it's true that, in the end, natural rights advocates and utilitarians often end up in the same place, but they get there by radically different paths. The two are fundamentally irreconcilable, and so adhering to both is not an option. One simply cannot be a natural rights utilitarian, any more than one can be a Christian atheist.
If he, nevertheless, decides to operate a business, and thus take advantage of the state's protections that permit him to remain in business, why is it improper for the state to expect Boss to adhere to certain standards that advance the state's interests as well?
As I mentioned above, one cannot consistently be both a natural rights libertarian and a utilitarian.
I'm not denying that, set. But what would happen if you you were to double or triple the minimum wage? Do you deny that this would contribute to inflation as well?
The next saturday morning you're standing in line at walmart and the pot-bellied 40 something in front of you with the cart holding a case of Pennzoil 10W30, a case of Bud Lite and a case of ammo and he's wearing a Disneyland tshirt, pretend that you understand his plight.
dyslexia wrote:The next saturday morning you're standing in line at walmart and the pot-bellied 40 something in front of you with the cart holding a case of Pennzoil 10W30, a case of Bud Lite and a case of ammo and he's wearing a Disneyland tshirt, pretend that you understand his plight.
How would pretending to understand his plight make me support the minimum wage?
Thomas wrote:dyslexia wrote:The next saturday morning you're standing in line at walmart and the pot-bellied 40 something in front of you with the cart holding a case of Pennzoil 10W30, a case of Bud Lite and a case of ammo and he's wearing a Disneyland tshirt, pretend that you understand his plight.
How would pretending to understand his plight make me support the minimum wage?
It wouldn't.
dyslexia wrote:Thomas wrote:dyslexia wrote:The next saturday morning you're standing in line at walmart and the pot-bellied 40 something in front of you with the cart holding a case of Pennzoil 10W30, a case of Bud Lite and a case of ammo and he's wearing a Disneyland tshirt, pretend that you understand his plight.
How would pretending to understand his plight make me support the minimum wage?
It wouldn't.
okay. How would truly understanding his plight (by your definition of "truly") make me support the minimum wage?
I'm not denying that, set. But what would happen if you you were to double or triple the minimum wage? Do you deny that this would contribute to inflation as well?
Where does Locke say the state is entitled to make decisions about their their work contract? Where does Locke say individuals have to abide by every decision the state makes? I'm getting a sense you may be mixing up Locke and Hobbes here.
joefromchicago wrote:Does every limitation on the freedom to contract destroy that freedom?
I wouldn't necessarily express it in such absolute terms as "every" and "destroy". But yes: on the margin, every limitation destroys some of their freedom of contract.
joefromchicago wrote:For instance, suppose that, instead of negotiating a labor contract, Boss and Worker are negotiating the terms of a contract for Worker to kill Boss's wife. Is a law that prohibits such contracts destructive of either Boss's or Worker's freedom to contract?
Yes it is. But that's okay if the law is narrowly tailored to enforce the equal natural rights of Mrs. Boss, whose protection is a compelling state interest. If you can show me how the labor contract infringes on the natural rights of others in ways comparable to a hit job, I may change my mind.
It is never improper for the state to expect something. The question is what it may do if its expectation proves wrong.
In this case, the state may refrain from awarding to Boss the medal of honor that it might otherwise have awarded to him. It may create a product label saying "worker-friendly company", specify work conditions for firms who wish to feature it, and prohibit Boss to display the label on his products. The state may decide to quit doing business with Boss's firm altogether. It may do all these things -- but it may not force boss at gunpoint to pay the higher wage.
I agree with Max Weber that what defines a state is its socially accepted monopoly on violence. The permissible use of this violence is constrained to the protection of people's lives, liberty and property against force and fraud by others. A wage that disappoints the state's expectations does not rise to this level.
Maybe, maybe not. But enough about me -- what about your approach? Are you going to suggest one? Or do you just want to play Socrates, asking me questions and waiting until my arguments stumble over their own feet?
I'm not sure if Locke says anything specifically about work contracts, but he does say a fair amount about obedience to the state
Thomas wrote:It is never improper for the state to expect something. The question is what it may do if its expectation proves wrong.
"Wrong" in what sense? In a natural rights sense, or in a utilitarian sense?
Thomas wrote:[...] It may do all these things -- but it may not force boss at gunpoint to pay the higher wage.
But, as you yourself pointed out before, Boss isn't forced to pay any wage at all, since he always has the option of not employing anyone.
Thomas wrote:I agree with Max Weber that what defines a state is its socially accepted monopoly on violence. The permissible use of this violence is constrained to the protection of people's lives, liberty and property against force and fraud by others. A wage that disappoints the state's expectations does not rise to this level.
According to whom?
I am inclined, in that instance, to agree with John Rawls's approach. We should have the kind of government that we'd all agree to if we knew nothing of our own interests. Would a Rawlsian government permit minimum wage/maximum hour legislation? I'm pretty sure that it would.
Reason and social science are not cutting it, and numbers cannot describe the soul and character of a people.
Fair enough. None of these two sections convinces me that minimum wage laws fall within the limited scope of legitimate violence that government has according to Locke. But you have convinced me that, after the government has violated Boss's rights, Locke thinks Boss has no remedy but to try to get a different legislature elected. Unlike later thinkers in his tradition (such as Blackstone), Locke does not appear to discuss legitimate grounds for civil disobedience, rebellion, and the like. But just because minorities can't do anything when the majority makes the state transgress against their rights, that doesn't mean these transgressions are okay. They are still violations of natural law.
joefromchicago wrote:Thomas wrote:It is never improper for the state to expect something. The question is what it may do if its expectation proves wrong.
"Wrong" in what sense? In a natural rights sense, or in a utilitarian sense?
"Wrong" in the sense of mistaken. As in: "Ted Kennedy expected Boss to pay $7/h; boss actually paid $5. Hence, Ted Kennedy erred in his expectation about boss."
Let me revise my sentence then: "The government must not force Boss at gunpoint to pay a higher wage to Worker, or to lay him off, or not to hire him in the first place, or to do any choice of those three."
The permissible use of this violence is constrained (...) according to Locke: He says natural law, in a state of nature, allows Worker to thwart any attempts of Boss to actively kill him. But it allows him no more retaliation than is necessary to protect his "life, health, liberty, and possessions" (Second Treatise, sections 6 and 7). Boss's low-wage job offer does not transgress against any of these. Worker can either take the offer and be better off, or he can leave it and be off the same as before. Either way, Boss does not violate any of Worker's rights. Hence, the law of nature gives Worker no rightful power to retaliate against Boss's low-wage job offer in a state of nature. When Worker leaves the state of nature and subjects himself to a government, he surrenders to it all rightful power of punishment that he had in the state of nature (Section 130). But he cannot surrender to government any righful powers that he didn't previously have (section 135). Summing up, Boss violated none of Worker's natural rights by making him a low-wage job offer; Worker had nothing to rightfully punish Boss for. Because Worker had no such right, he couldn't transfer it to government when he left the state of nature. It follows that under Locke's Natural Law, government cannot rightfully punish Boss for not paying worker a minimum wage.
I, on the other hand, am pretty sure that it wouldn't. Remember that Rawls's government ends up maximizing the economic welfare of the worst-off. Which stakeholder is the worst off under minimum wage regulations? Not the employers: We can safely assume they are richer than the workers who work for them, or whom they lay off. Not the workers who get a raise, either. The worst-off stakeholders in minimum wage legislation are those workers who get laid off, their employers no longer finding it profitable to employ them. I'm certain Rawls's governement would enact other methods of income redistribution. Examples might include a progressive income tax or the Earned Income Tax Credit. As an individual citizen, Rawls probably has voted for politicians who raised the minimum wage. But if you test the minimum wage against Rawls's philosophy, it fails it, just as it fails the Lockean test.
