Re: Who decides? The state or the individual?
joefromchicago wrote:Suppose Worker and Boss decide that the limitations on information that they both have frequently cause them to enter into bad bargains, and so they have both freely ceded a portion of their liberty right to a third party mediator, whose job is to decide upon the terms of Worker's employment, based upon all relevant factors, including those unknown to both Worker and Boss. For Worker and Boss, this is an advantageous bargain, and so both are happy to have their liberty right limited in this particular situation. Is that acceptable to a natural-rights libertarian, or would you contend that it is never proper for free individuals to freely cede a portion of their liberty to a third-party?
In principle, that's no different than two companies contracting to settle their disputes through arbitration. I see no problem with that. I'm pretty sure a sufficiently shrewd lawyer can make up some trick scenario where voluntarily surrendered liberty traps me in a paradox. I'm also sure you're a shrewd lawyer.
Setanta mentioned John Stuart Mill earlier. Mill's solution to the problem you described, exposed at some length in his
Principles of Political Economoy, is that workers start up their own companies and run them as workers' cooperatives. That way, whatever an individual loses with its worker's hat on, it gains with its owner's hat on. By Mills description, workers' cooperatives were profitable and expanding at the time he wrote, and theiresults were encouraging. There are only few of them left nowadays. Evidence, perhaps, that the problem you describe isn't much of a problem anymore?
joefromchicago wrote:I think (1) is not necessarily true,
You said the other day that you'd like to read in the libertarian literature more. So perhaps you'd be interested in looking at the libertarian case for the proposition. Specifically, there are two essays I found interesting: Friedrich Hayek,
The Use of Knowledge in Society (1945), and Herbert Spencer:
Over-Legislation (1853). If I only had time for one, I'd read Hayek.
joefromchicago wrote:That may very well be true, although I'm not sure why utilitarianism is boring from a philosophical viewpoint. I find it very interesting, albeit very mistaken.
Utilitarianism is philosophically interesting. The application of utilitarianism to regulations on minimum wages and maximum hours is not. That's just an Econ 101 finger excercise in number crunching.
joefromchicago wrote: Now, of course, one can argue whether the state has made the right decision with regard to plural marriages, but most people (including you, I suspect) are willing, so long as the state sanctions marriages, to allow the state some role in deciding who can marry whom and under what terms.
This is technically true, but without consequence. I don't approve of the state sanctioning marriages, and would reduce it to just another contract, to be guided by plain vanilla contract law. That deprives marriage of government perks, but frees it of any limitations beyond those required to make a contract: Two or more consenting grown-ups, meeting of minds, and so forth.
joefromchicago wrote:And so the situation of Bertha and her two suitors and the situation of Worker and Boss are not really different in kind. It's just that, in the former case, the state has decided that its interests are not so great as to outweigh the liberty interests of the individuals involved, whereas in the latter the state's interests are greater than the interests of either Boss or Worker to agree on the conditions of Worker's employment.
I agree all three scenario (including the solution with the polyandrous marriage) are the same. And all three scenarios, my position is that the actors have a fundamental right to freedom of contract, which the government may not legitimately infringe.
joefromchicago wrote:Now, are the state's interests economically optimal? Quite possibly they are not. But then we can't necessarily conclude that Worker's and Boss's interests are economically optimal either. On the other hand, there's no reason to think that the state's decision is necessarily worse than the one that would have been made by Worker and Boss.
I agree -- and given this ambiguity, the question becomes how we deal with it. Unlike you, I believe in the freedom of contract as a similarly fundamental right as free speech, free excercise of religion, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the rest of the list. So my approach to the uncertainty you describe goes like this: Pretend the Supreme Court had to reverted to the moral positions it took during the
Lochner era. Alternatively, pretend that America just amended its constitution to say "The right of the people to freedom of contract shall not be infringed." As a consequence, I imagine, the Supreme Court would subject all interventions into the economy to strict scrutiny. Federal, state, and local governments could still regulate the economy, but only if they could prove that the particular regulation is narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling government interest.
How would you deal with the ambiguity?