Ethics of war

This article has an interesting ethical perspective. If Hezbollah forces Israel to drop bombs on residential buildings killing innocent children, then one could argue that Israel is not morally responsible for the deaths the bombs they drop cause.

If this is true (and I am willing to accept it for the sake of this argument) then it raises another question?

Why is Israel so stupid that even though it knows the strategy of its enemy, it plays right into its hand?

It seems that any competent military leader would avoid the trap his enemy was laying.

Creativity is an asset in military struggles and coming up with a plan that would one's enemy from reaching his objective (i.e. condemnation of Israel for dropping bombs that result in the death of children) would be a good idea.

Here's an idea-- what about avoiding dropping bombs that result in the deaths of children?

Even if avoiding dropping bombs that kill children isn't a mandate of ethics from a civilized society (and it seems the article is arguing that at least in this situation it isn't)... It seems like sound military strategy would mandate avoiding dropping bombs that kill children. But sound military strategy doesn't seem to be the order of the day.

At it is Israel will most likely end up back where it started (an uncomfortable stalemate with international discomfort with its policies) and Hezbollah (or its successor) and Iran end up with more popular support.

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Yes, neither side is creative. It is somewhat ethical that Israel has notified civilians, by leaflet or phone that their neighborhood is going to be bombed. As far as support for the Hizzys and Iran go, they will never lack it. Their minions ingest carefully crafted propaganda, and have a martyrdom mentality that defies logic.

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paull wrote:

Yes, neither side is creative. It is somewhat ethical that Israel has notified civilians, by leaflet or phone that their neighborhood is going to be bombed. As far as support for the Hizzys and Iran go, they will never lack it. Their minions ingest carefully crafted propaganda, and have a martyrdom mentality that defies logic.

They are neither creative nor considerate to the aspects of their own war. And, if I may, Israel is not ethical when it notifies civilians of an incoming assault- it is merely convenient for their international standing in the offensive.

I agree Paull: support for either Iran or the Hizzys will not be diminished any time soon.

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Israelis are in an impossible position. Since 1948 they have been attacked in small ways or in devastating ways. When they hit back they are criticized for their actions.
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Every time a fragile peace has been agreed to, the other side has broken it by killing Israelis. A weak Israel would not last long; all its enemies want to kill all its citizens.
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The present shock-and-awe decision looks a lot like an American solution. Destroying the infra-structure of a country cannot be a good solution. Too many innocent people get hurt in a brutal attack.
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The more one witnesses the plight of Israel, the more one thinks back to the Madagascar solution. It would have been a great idea and Israel would today be an island paradise without enemies.
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http://history1900s.about.com/library/holocaust/aa071299.htm

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detano inipo wrote:

The more one witnesses the plight of Israel, the more one thinks back to the Madagascar solution. It would have been a great idea and Israel would today be an island paradise without enemies.

A small digression, I believe Madagascar is and was and is populated by human beings (maybe as different from Europeans as the Palestinians are)

According to Wikipedia:

"In 1947, with French prestige at low ebb, a nationalist uprising was suppressed after several months of bitter fighting with 100,000 persons killed".

I can just imagine the nice Israeli/Malgasy wars we'd have today.

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Quote:

Every time a fragile peace has been agreed to, the other side has broken it by killing Israelis. A weak Israel would not last long; all its enemies want to kill all its citizens.
.
The present shock-and-awe decision looks a lot like an American solution. Destroying the infra-structure of a country cannot be a good solution. Too many innocent people get hurt in a brutal attack.

On the first note, the states which Israel is dealing with are a frantic bunch with a high level of emotional potency. I certainly can not blame them for this, as can be seen by the foreign policy of Israel.

For the second note, a "shock and awe" offensive is not an American solution; truth be told, that name was a terrible choice. This type of military strategy was congenial to the assessment of Iraq's military capability, and so our generals- yes, the GS15s and above- derived a solution that agreed with the demand of the heads at Washington: swift, effective, and endurable. But the type of offensive is neither particular to American military strategy nor did the Americans invent it.

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"Creativity is an asset in military struggles and coming up with a plan that would one's enemy from reaching his objective (i.e. condemnation of Israel for dropping bombs that result in the death of children) would be a good idea.

Here's an idea-- what about avoiding dropping bombs that result in the deaths of children?"

And what would a realistic solution be? If a substate actor is responsible for storing powerful armaments under civilian infrastructure, what is it that the Israeli's should do to nullify the military threat that that target poses? How are anyone but the actors responsible for the cynical placement of such weaponry morally culpable in the event of a tragedy?

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Brookings wrote:

"Creativity is an asset in military struggles and coming up with a plan that would one's enemy from reaching his objective (i.e. condemnation of Israel for dropping bombs that result in the death of children) would be a good idea.

Here's an idea-- what about avoiding dropping bombs that result in the deaths of children?"

And what would a realistic solution be? If a substate actor is responsible for storing powerful armaments under civilian infrastructure, what is it that the Israeli's should do to nullify the military threat that that target poses? How are anyone but the actors responsible for the cynical placement of such weaponry morally culpable in the event of a tragedy?

Creativity in war- and here I assume we speak of military intelligence and tactics- is essential in obtaining the advantage point of the opponent; after all, our plans are based on the plans of our opponents. So then creativity in this sense amounts to ensuring "the upper hand" in combat- gaining ground, obtaining fruitful intelligence, etc. The methods that one takes up to derive this creativity, this ace up the sleeve as it were, may, of course, be questionable and below standard.

If a certain group places powerful armaments below or within the infrastructure of a community, and another group desires the elimination of these caches of weaponry, then I would suggest forceful intelligence collection by the latter group's core collectors in that community- as an initial step that is. By 'forceful' I do not mean 'torture', and they are not synonyms in any instance to my mind; rather I suggest rigorous intel collection around the clock, continuous surveillance of hard targets, and excessive contacts between collectors, field officers, and embedded agents. Non-stop cables, bribes, bonuses, meetings, negotiations, corruption, trades, and, to be sure, precise interrogation. Without question, the first step is securing vital intelligence of paramount importance. The second step could very well be the insertion of military special services to proceed in a surgical manner.

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While I recognize and completely sympathize whole heartedly with your concern over the safety of civilians in war zones, I dont find your solution realistically applicable (politically, or strategically) in situations such as can be found in Lebanon. It is well nice to pay lip service to the obvious rhetoric regarding the necessities of rigorous intelligence gathering, and the importance of creativity in recognizing and undermining your enemies strategy's, be they military or in legitimizing their propaganda. It is quite different to actually construct a policy which will be militarily effective, yet stop the deaths of civilians when that is the specific goal of those you are fighting.

The reality is that Israel's only real chance of avoiding falling into it's enemies propaganda trap was to avoid escalating the conflict to this level. They made the decision to attack, a mistake in my opinion, but as they are there (not without any justification) your solution simply wouldn't work.

It's simply unreasonable to expect Israel to wait until a couple of rockets (out of an entire cache) are removed from the basement to strike the "hard target" (I'm assuming you mean the actual launcher). Even if Israeli intelligence and capability is omnipotent (its not) the fact remains that hundreds of weapons, rockets, explosives, will remain to be utilized against the Israeli military in the future. What then should they do? The Israeli military is extremely cost averse, hezbollah knows this, Israel will not insert special forces into south Beirut via helicopter to secure and hold a building full of explosives (what else could they do? Blow it up?), nor should they, that's an asinine military strategy that would likely get them all killed.

The deaths of citizens is ALWAYS tragic, however, when a group explicitly places military targets among a civilian population THEY are to blame for the deaths of innocents if and when that target is taken out. I know this wont change the powerful saddness and outrage that images of wounded and dead civilians invoke, however, it is simply misplaced to put the brunt of the moral burden on the Israeli's in this situation.

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Doctor Scrat wrote:

detano inipo wrote:

The more one witnesses the plight of Israel, the more one thinks back to the Madagascar solution. It would have been a great idea and Israel would today be an island paradise without enemies.

A small digression, I believe Madagascar is and was and is populated by human beings (maybe as different from Europeans as the Palestinians are)

According to Wikipedia:

"In 1947, with French prestige at low ebb, a nationalist uprising was suppressed after several months of bitter fighting with 100,000 persons killed".

I can just imagine the nice Israeli/Malgasy wars we'd have today.

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"It would be almost impossible to have a war between 22 million on an island larger than France."

At the time of the creation of Israel there were less than one million Palestinians living on what is now Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, It was commonly said at the time that there was no space for more people. Today there are over 6,000,000 people in Israel proper alone. Needless to say, despite the plethora of land at the inception of the Israeli state, conflict between the two groups was never too difficult to incite.If Israel wanted to maintain the Jewish character of its state, it would have had to displace residents on Madagascar as well. I wouldn't be so sure hostilities wouldn't have arisen there. But this is silly speculation, Israel exists now where it does, its pointless discussing decades old points.

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Brookings wrote:

While I recognize and completely sympathize whole heartedly with your concern over the safety of civilians in war zones, I dont find your solution realistically applicable (politically, or strategically) in situations such as can be found in Lebanon. It is well nice to pay lip service to the obvious rhetoric regarding the necessities of rigorous intelligence gathering, and the importance of creativity in recognizing and undermining your enemies strategy's, be they military or in legitimizing their propaganda. It is quite different to actually construct a policy which will be militarily effective, yet stop the deaths of civilians when that is the specific goal of those you are fighting.

The reality is that Israel's only real chance of avoiding falling into it's enemies propaganda trap was to avoid escalating the conflict to this level. They made the decision to attack, a mistake in my opinion, but as they are there (not without any justification) your solution simply wouldn't work.

It's simply unreasonable to expect Israel to wait until a couple of rockets (out of an entire cache) are removed from the basement to strike the "hard target" (I'm assuming you mean the actual launcher). Even if Israeli intelligence and capability is omnipotent (its not) the fact remains that hundreds of weapons, rockets, explosives, will remain to be utilized against the Israeli military in the future. What then should they do? The Israeli military is extremely cost averse, hezbollah knows this, Israel will not insert special forces into south Beirut via helicopter to secure and hold a building full of explosives (what else could they do? Blow it up?), nor should they, that's an asinine military strategy that would likely get them all killed.

The deaths of citizens is ALWAYS tragic, however, when a group explicitly places military targets among a civilian population THEY are to blame for the deaths of innocents if and when that target is taken out. I know this wont change the powerful saddness and outrage that images of wounded and dead civilians invoke, however, it is simply misplaced to put the brunt of the moral burden on the Israeli's in this situation.

Brookings,

I concur: it is neither reasonable nor pragmatic to propose forcible intelligence collection at this point in the Israeli offensive. What is more, one can not drive backwards the advance of their own intelligence process for apparent reasons, as drafted and approved by the heads of their war department. Perhaps I gave the impression that my proposal, as the "initial step" in a probable offensive, should be applied at this point without delay; if this is the case I apologize, since it was not my intent to suggest a reversal of the elements in their plans- I would not.

Also I agree that a degree of differentiation exists between military creativity, intelligence gathering, and constructing a sound policy in the hopes of being militarily effective, while concurrently avoiding collateral damage. I did not suggest anything otherwise; more, I did not state that there is not a difference within them. But the difference is slight, and the coherence in this triad requires the planners to draw them up not in isolation but as functions within the same framework. To say that it is nice to pay lip service to the necessities of hard intelligence and to assume that I could possibly avoid the relation of this requirement in reference to a sound policy is a tad presumptuous of you. In the construction of a sound policy during war-time, planners, if not deterred by their superiors, draw up plans via their intelligence channels (and the assessment of their worth) and the existing strategic creativity within the framework of the designated battlefield. As we know, the process, through its advancement in practice, calls for improvisation since the very process of intelligence gathering fluctuates; equivalently, the entire offensive advances piecemeal given the nature of military intelligence on the field during war-time.

Thirdly, it is beyond the obvious that my proposal can not possibly serve as a solution in this point of the Israeli offensive. As written, I stated that, as an "initial step," first point in process should call for these methods etc. And, I did not suggest that Israel should (or could) "wait until a couple of rockets are removed from the basement to strike." Both points are absurd, both in theory and practice, and I would never suggest them.

As for your remark in placing any special services via helicopter in Southern Beirut to have a footing on a target of great importance, the matter is sensitive since it is a function entirely of the details of this proposed operation. Let us say that a commander receives a cable that an Israeli team is authorized to be inserted, via chopper as you say, into a dense inner-city area. The commander acknowledges receipt, briefs the team and transport crew, and prepares for the op in the time allotted by head command. He, in all probability, curses the day he was promoted since it is obvious that these men, given this sort of operation, will have a grave weight on their backs in securing a cache of weaponry within a circle of enemies; insertion into S. Beirut would be akin to blowing the start whistle in the Super Bowl, the storage facility may be rigged via radio, and worse- the enemy may expect the insertion. Stealth insertion seems impossible unless by foot, the cache can not be wired for explosion, and the team may run into a world of pain in any attempt to maintain a stronghold in the area. In a word, it parallels a suicide mission. And despite the fact that special services are trained in such operations, the matter would be terribly demanding. In the worst case, the op would be abandoned during operation; at best, the team enters the facility, disarms the entire cache, and comes out with guns blazing to save their hides, if at all.

This is to say that it is not a foolish thing to follow your orders and attempt the impossible; special services are trained for this sort of the impossible. And, as you may know, special teams rarely concern themselves with "getting killed." They do the job because they live for the job, and they admire the fact that when things get out of hand, they are the ones that are called on for the foolish, the impossible, and the unimaginable. I too admire this very fact.

Lastly, I have not and will not place the "brunt of the moral burden" on Israel.

Thank you for the reply.

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whoops...mis-post Embarrassed

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Upon reading your recent post it seems we have little disagreement in the end. I still maintain, however, my skepticism over the feasibility of any possible special operations maneuver on the part of the Israeli's to manually disarm a cache of weapons. Not least because the prevalence of such sites seem too vast for such an operation be strategically, and also politically, possible.

While special operations forces may be willing to embark on a suicide mission, Israeli society has shown that it is very unwilling to suffer large numbers of causalities in their military policies when there are significantly less risky alternatives.

I also question whether or not widespread utilization of such operations would result in fewer civilian causalities. When soldiers are thrown into high risk situations they become significantly less discriminate at who they fire at. Storming a building which is filled not only with civilians, but armed miltia members, seems just as likely to result in civilian causalities as targeted bombing, with a significantly smaller chance of operational success to boot. The political, military, and moral calculus which is done at the highest echelons of decision making circles does not seem to work out in the favor of such a risky and, I would venture to say, foolhardy policy.

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Brookings wrote:

Upon reading your recent post it seems we have little disagreement in the end. I still maintain, however, my skepticism over the feasibility of any possible special operations maneuver on the part of the Israeli's to manually disarm a cache of weapons. Not least because the prevalence of such sites seem too vast for such an operation be strategically, and also politically, possible.

Foremost in this exchange of strategic study is the applicability of any special services amidst an existing offensive, as with the current Israeli offensive into Lebanon. In a word, it is nonsensical if it is to be taken in isolation. Any current plan in the works- infantry maneuvers, intelligence ops, air campaigns, etc- must relate directly to any special services and their objective, since all plans lead to the final objective. If one is to carry out a military special operation beyond the hard-earned lines on the ground, it must both stand in relation to those existing infantry operations underway and the proposed special ops at hand. This, I assume, is acceptable.

The feasibility of any such operation to manually disarm a weapons cache given the number and locations of such reserves in a city district under heavy guard is a function of the worth (and worthlessness) of the intelligence on the matter. If the intel can be verified prior to the launch of a massive offensive, so the better for special services and worse for the owners of the caches. If there are indeed scores of such sites, then it would be prudent to verify (via on-site agents) the intel prior to initiating an extensive special military op with multiple teams.

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While special operations forces may be willing to embark on a suicide mission, Israeli society has shown that it is very unwilling to suffer large numbers of causalities in their military policies when there are significantly less risky alternatives.

The less risky alternative would be a set of surgical insertions of special teams on the basis of rigorous intelligence, for which the Israelis are well-known. One suffers from a large number of casualties via heavy infantry assaults and not through covert ops. Of course I noted before that such maneuvers would seem futile at this point in the offensive, and I maintain this; perhaps the teams can be used to augment an existing infantry line or trace targets for the air force etc, but little more than this.

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I also question whether or not widespread utilization of such operations would result in fewer civilian causalities. When soldiers are thrown into high risk situations they become significantly less discriminate at who they fire at. Storming a building which is filled not only with civilians, but armed miltia members, seems just as likely to result in civilian causalities as targeted bombing, with a significantly smaller chance of operational success to boot. The political, military, and moral calculus which is done at the highest echelons of decision making circles does not seem to work out in the favor of such a risky and, I would venture to say, foolhardy policy.

To conclude that "widespread utilization" of such ops may not result in fewer civilian casualties on the basis of the trigger habits of professional soldiers in a tight squeeze is not equitable- that is, for both the argument and the soldiers. These men are instructed on and prepare for the most high-risk and volatile scenarios imaginable, and the more pressure at hand, the more discriminate their selection of targets becomes. Oddly enough, this is an effect of the function between degree of volatility and time allotted; or else, the more pressure on the op, the more precision in its execution, especially for the special services. And, for the sake of argument, target bombing by definition comprises a larger area of damage than a surgical strike on a compound; the number of civilian casualties would be determined by the damage area, and a special op would draw out any fighters to the scene; the bombing would encompass anyone in the designated range.

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I'm glad you have so much faith in special operations forces. However, given such conditions I doubt any amount of training would ensure the operational success that strategic bombing affords. Also, if Delta Forces's experience at Desert One tells us anything, is that the more complicated plans are, the more likely things will go wrong.

I also must say that i've been offering you too much hypothetical leeway. What on earth would it mean to "disarm" a weapons cache? Its not as if it would be possible to remove critical (but replaceable I imagine) parts from enough weapons, fast enough to escape, to be worth the risk. Also, given the nature of the enemy would it be unreasonable, if defense seemed lost, to toss a grenade into a case of RPGs setting off one hell of a fireworks show? I dont feel the need to justify my skepticism any more, in fact, i've forgotten what exactly it is we were discussing. Question

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Brookings wrote:

I'm glad you have so much faith in special operations forces. However, given such conditions I doubt any amount of training would ensure the operational success that strategic bombing affords. Also, if Delta Forces's experience at Desert One tells us anything, is that the more complicated plans are, the more likely things will go wrong.

No, my faith in such operations is not as much as you afford me; truthfully, I only "trust" the drives of the operatives.

As for operational success, we were speaking of collateral damage, and you persist in the opinion that "strategic bombing," if you have ever seen the aftermath, is preferable over special services. And I agree with your last statement since you express only an axiom in strategic study: volatility in combat is a function of the complexity in its design.

Quote:

I also must say that i've been offering you too much hypothetical leeway. What on earth would it mean to "disarm" a weapons cache? Its not as if it would be possible to remove critical (but replaceable I imagine) parts from enough weapons, fast enough to escape, to be worth the risk. Also, given the nature of the enemy would it be unreasonable, if defense seemed lost, to toss a grenade into a case of RPGs setting off one hell of a fireworks show? I dont feel the need to justify my skepticism any more, in fact, i've forgotten what exactly it is we were discussing.

Surely you know what it means to swiftly disarm a reservoir of weapons , i.e., rockets, mines, explosives etc. All propelled rocketry, from mortars to ICBMs, contains fuse units or strorage containers that hold the "propellant." Removing a fuse clip and pin can be done as quickly as removing the cream from an Oreo cookie while your friend is sleeping. Most often than not a leak can be caused in the storage bins of these weapons. And there are many methods to disarm a cache under time contraints.

Sure, as Hollywood dictates, toss a nade if the operation is lost. Shocked

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