Sandra Day O'Connor warns of beginnings of dictatorship

Amazing history. A warning to take to heart.

Eeeenteresting!

Isn't is funny that SHE was the one that cast the deciding vote to annoint King George in the first place!! Now she's warning us. Thanks for nothing!!

Anon

Words to take heed of but whos listening, and who understands, and who cares. American Idol is on.

Unless, of course, you're ready to retire.

Anon, she sure did cast the deciding vote. And the threat was there from the beginning.

Do you mean the vote that stated Flordia has to follow its voting rules? It's good to see that she didn't just let Florida change its voting laws because some people didn't like the out come. God Bless her!

Let us all remember that one of the first things that Hitler did was to "capture" the judiciary. This administration has tried to follow the same path.

I'm afraid it goes much deeper than that.

Anon

Baldimo, sorry but the FSC followed the letter of Florida law as it existed on election day. The USSC ordered the FSC to count the ballots in a way inconsistent with Florida law.

I am very much afraid that Blueflame's contention that the USSC ordered the FSC to count the ballots in a way that was contrary to Florida law is quite in error.


source-"Breaking the Deadlock"- Judge Richard Posner--P. 254

"...the Florida court had violated the clause of Article II of the Federal Constitution than commits the "Manner" of appointing Presidential electors to the "legislature" of each state. Florida's legislature had spoken in the state election code. The Florida Supreme Court so far deformed the code-primarily though not only by abrogating the discretionary authority that the code unmistakably grants to state and local election officials--as to have arrogated the legislative function to itself. There was no basis in the Florida election code for any of the hand recounts after the initial sample recounts failed to disclose a defect in the design, maintenance, or operation of the tabulating machinery...A MAJORITY OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED THAT THE CRITERIA(or rather lack of criteria) PRESCRIBED BY THAT COURT IN ITS DECISION OF DECEMBER 8 WERE SO ARBITRARY THAT THE RECOUNT WOULD DENY THE VOTERS OF FLORIDA THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS."



The decisions of the Supreme Court, until revised or nullified by themselves, such as Roe vs. Wade or Brown vs.Board of Education, are THE LAWS OF THE LAND!!!!

Justice Ginsberg was the smartest justice
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 00?-949
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GEORGE W. BUSH, et al., PETITIONERS v.
ALBERT GORE, Jr., et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
[December 12, 2000]
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens joins, and with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join as to Part I, dissenting.

I

The Chief Justice acknowledges that provisions of Florida's Election Code "may well admit of more than one interpretation." Ante, at 3. But instead of respecting the state high court's province to say what the State's Election Code means, The Chief Justice maintains that Florida's Supreme Court has veered so far from the ordinary practice of judicial review that what it did cannot properly be called judging. My colleagues have offered a reasonable construction of Florida's law. Their construction coincides with the view of one of Florida's seven Supreme Court justices. Gore v. Harris, __ So. 2d __, __ (Fla. 2000) (slip op., at 45?-55) (Wells, C. J., dissenting); Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, __ So. 2d __, __ (Fla. 2000) (slip op., at 34) (on remand) (confirming, 6?-1, the construction of Florida law advanced in Gore). I might join The Chief Justice were it my commission to interpret Florida law. But disagreement with the Florida court's interpretation of its own State's law does not warrant the conclusion that the justices of that court have legislated. There is no cause here to believe that the members of Florida's high court have done less than "their mortal best to discharge their oath of office," Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981), and no cause to upset their reasoned interpretation of Florida law.

This Court more than occasionally affirms statutory, and even constitutional, interpretations with which it disagrees. For example, when reviewing challenges to administrative agencies' interpretations of laws they implement, we defer to the agencies unless their interpretation violates "the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). We do so in the face of the declaration in Article I of the United States Constitution that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." Surely the Constitution does not call upon us to pay more respect to a federal administrative agency's construction of federal law than to a state high court's interpretation of its own state's law. And not uncommonly, we let stand state-court interpretations of federal law with which we might disagree. Notably, in the habeas context, the Court adheres to the view that "there is ?'no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to [federal law] than his neighbor in the state courthouse.' " Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, n. 35 (1976) (quoting Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 509 (1963)); see O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) ("[T]he Teague doctrine validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.") (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990)); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801, 813 (1981) ("There is no reason to assume that state court judges cannot and will not provide a ?'hospitable forum' in litigating federal constitutional
questions.").

No doubt there are cases in which the proper application of federal law may hinge on interpretations of state law. Unavoidably, this Court must sometimes examine state law in order to protect federal rights. But we have dealt with such cases ever mindful of the full measure of respect we owe to interpretations of state law by a State's highest court. In the Contract Clause case, General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 (1992), for example, we said that although "ultimately we are bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made," the Court "accord[s] respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the State's highest court." Id., at 187 (citation omitted). And in Central Union Telephone Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190 (1925), we upheld the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of a state waiver rule, even though that interpretation resulted in the forfeiture of federal constitutional rights. Refusing to supplant Illinois law with a federal definition of waiver, we explained that the state court's declaration "should bind us unless so unfair or unreasonable in its application to those asserting a federal right as to obstruct it." Id., at 195.1

In deferring to state courts on matters of state law, we appropriately recognize that this Court acts as an " ?'outside[r]' lacking the common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction." Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). That recognition has sometimes prompted us to resolve doubts about the meaning of state law by certifying issues to a State's highest court, even when federal rights are at stake. Cf. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997) ("Warnings against premature adjudication of constitutional questions bear heightened attention when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State's law, for the federal tribunal risks friction-generating error when it endeavors to construe a novel state Act not yet reviewed by the State's highest court."). Notwithstanding our authority to decide issues of state law underlying federal claims, we have used the certification devise to afford state high courts an opportunity to inform us on matters of their own State's law because such restraint "helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Lehman Brothers, 416 U.S., at 391.

Just last Term, in Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23 (1999), we took advantage of Pennsylvania's certification procedure. In that case, a state prisoner brought a federal habeas action claiming that the State had failed to prove an essential element of his charged offense in violation of the Due Process Clause. Id., at 25?-26. Instead of resolving the state-law question on which the federal claim depended, we certified the question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for that court to "help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised." Id., at 29; id., at 28 (asking the Pennsylvania Supreme Court whether its recent interpretation of the statute under which Fiore was convicted "was always the statute's meaning, even at the time of Fiore's trial"). The Chief Justice's willingness to reverse the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of Florida law in this case is at least in tension with our reluctance in Fiore even to interpret Pennsylvania law before seeking instruction from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. I would have thought the "cautious approach" we counsel when federal courts address matters of state law, Arizonans, 520 U.S., at 77, and our commitment to "build[ing] cooperative judicial federalism," Lehman Brothers, 416 U.S., at 391, demanded greater restraint.

Rarely has this Court rejected outright an interpretation of state law by a state high court. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (1813), NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), cited by The Chief Justice, are three such rare instances. See ante, at 4, 5, and n. 2. But those cases are embedded in historical contexts hardly comparable to the situation here. Fairfax's Devisee, which held that the Virginia Court of Appeals had misconstrued its own forfeiture laws to deprive a British subject of lands secured to him by federal treaties, occurred amidst vociferous States' rights attacks on the Marshall Court. G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 61?-62 (13th ed. 1997). The Virginia court refused to obey this Court's Fairfax's Devisee mandate to enter judgment for the British subject's successor in interest. That refusal led to the Court's pathmarking decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Patterson, a case decided three months after Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), in the face of Southern resistance to the civil rights movement, held that the Alabama Supreme Court had irregularly applied its own procedural rules to deny review of a contempt order against the NAACP arising from its refusal to disclose membership lists. We said that "our jurisdiction is not defeated if the nonfederal ground relied on by the state court is without any fair or substantial support." 357 U.S., at 455. Bouie, stemming from a lunch counter "sit-in" at the height of the civil rights movement, held that the South Carolina Supreme Court's construction of its trespass laws-criminalizing conduct not covered by the text of an otherwise clear statute-was "unforeseeable" and thus violated due process when applied retroactively to the petitioners. 378 U.S., at 350, 354.

The Chief Justice's casual citation of these cases might lead one to believe they are part of a larger collection of cases in which we said that the Constitution impelled us to train a skeptical eye on a state court's portrayal of state law. But one would be hard pressed, I think, to find additional cases that fit the mold. As Justice Breyer convincingly explains, see post, at 5?-9 (dissenting opinion), this case involves nothing close to the kind of recalcitrance by a state high court that warrants extraordinary action by this Court. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that counting every legal vote was the overriding concern of the Florida Legislature when it enacted the State's Election Code. The court surely should not be bracketed with state high courts of the Jim Crow South.

The Chief Justice says that Article II, by providing that state legislatures shall direct the manner of appointing electors, authorizes federal superintendence over the relationship between state courts and state legislatures, and licenses a departure from the usual deference we give to state court interpretations of state law. Ante, at 5 ("To attach definitive weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the court has actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the explicit requirements of Article II."). The Framers of our Constitution, however, understood that in a republican government, the judiciary would construe the legislature's enactments. See U.S. Const., Art. III; The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton). In light of the constitutional guarantee to States of a "Republican Form of Government," U.S. Const., Art. IV, §4, Article II can hardly be read to invite this Court to disrupt a State's republican regime. Yet The Chief Justice today would reach out to do just that. By holding that Article II requires our revision of a state court's construction of state laws in order to protect one organ of the State from another, The Chief Justice contradicts the basic principle that a State may organize itself as it sees fit. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) ("Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign."); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) ("How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself.").2 Article II does not call for the scrutiny undertaken by this Court.

The extraordinary setting of this case has obscured the ordinary principle that dictates its proper resolution: Federal courts defer to state high courts' interpretations of their state's own law. This principle reflects the core of federalism, on which all agree. "The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504, n. 17 (1999) (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The Chief Justice's solicitude for the Florida Legislature comes at the expense of the more fundamental solicitude we owe to the legislature's sovereign. U.S. Const., Art. II, §1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the electors for President and Vice President) (emphasis added); ante, at 1?-2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).3 Were the other members of this Court as mindful as they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty, they would affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

II

I agree with Justice Stevens that petitioners have not presented a substantial equal protection claim. Ideally, perfection would be the appropriate standard for judging the recount. But we live in an imperfect world, one in which thousands of votes have not been counted. I cannot agree that the recount adopted by the Florida court, flawed as it may be, would yield a result any less fair or precise than the certification that preceded that recount. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (even in the context of the right to vote, the state is permitted to reform " ?'one step at a time' ") (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).

Even if there were an equal protection violation, I would agree with Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer that the Court's concern about "the December 12 deadline," ante, at 12, is misplaced. Time is short in part because of the Court's entry of a stay on December 9, several hours after an able circuit judge in Leon County had begun to superintend the recount process. More fundamentally, the Court's reluctance to let the recount go forward-despite its suggestion that "[t]he search for intent can be confined by specific rules designed to ensure uniform treatment," ante, at 8-ultimately turns on its own judgment about the practical realities of implementing a recount, not the judgment of those much closer to the process.

Equally important, as Justice Breyer explains, post, at 12 (dissenting opinion), the December 12 "deadline" for bringing Florida's electoral votes into 3 U.S.C. § 5's safe harbor lacks the significance the Court assigns it. Were that date to pass, Florida would still be entitled to deliver electoral votes Congress must count unless both Houses find that the votes "ha[d] not been … regularly given." 3 U.S.C. § 15. The statute identifies other significant dates. See, e.g., §7 (specifying December 18 as the date electors "shall meet and give their votes"); §12 (specifying "the fourth Wednesday in December"-this year, December 27-as the date on which Congress, if it has not received a State's electoral votes, shall request the state secretary of state to send a certified return immediately). But none of these dates has ultimate significance in light of Congress' detailed provisions for determining, on "the sixth day of January," the validity of electoral votes. §15. [/u]

The Court assumes that time will not permit "orderly judicial review of any disputed matters that might arise." Ante, at 12. But no one has doubted the good faith and diligence with which Florida election officials, attorneys for all sides of this controversy, and the courts of law have performed their duties. Notably, the Florida Supreme Court has produced two substantial opinions within 29 hours of oral argument. In sum, the Court's conclusion that a constitutionally adequate recount is impractical is a prophecy the Court's own judgment will not allow to be tested. Such an untested prophecy should not decide the Presidency of the United States.[/u]

I dissent.


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Notes
1. See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032, n. 18 (1992) (South Carolina could defend a regulatory taking "if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents [by its courts] would exclude … beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found"); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344?-345 (1976) (deciding whether North Carolina had created a property interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause by reference to state law as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court). Similarly, in Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200 (1975), a gasoline retailer claimed that due process entitled him to deduct a state gasoline excise tax in computing the amount of his sales subject to a state sales tax, on the grounds that the legal incidence of the excise tax fell on his customers and that he acted merely as a collector of the tax. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the legal incidence of the excise tax fell on petitioner. Observing that "a State's highest court is the final judicial arbiter of the meaning of state statutes," we said that "[w]hen a state court has made its own definitive determination as to the operating incidence, … [w]e give this finding great weight in determining the natural effect of a statute, and if it is consistent with the statute's reasonable interpretation it will be deemed conclusive." Id., at 208.

2. Even in the rare case in which a State's "manner" of making and construing laws might implicate a structural constraint, Congress, not this Court, is likely the proper governmental entity to enforce that constraint. See U.S. Const., amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 1?-15; cf. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (treating as a nonjusticiable political question whether use of a referendum to override a congressional districting plan enacted by the state legislature violates Art. I, §4); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42 (1849).

3. "ecause the Framers recognized that state power and identity were essential parts of the federal balance, see The Federalist No. 39, the Constitution is solicitous of the prerogatives of the States, even in an otherwise sovereign federal province. The Constitution … grants States certain powers over the times, places, and manner of federal elections (subject to congressional revision), Art. I, §4, cl. 1 … , and allows States to appoint electors for the President, Art. II, §1, cl. 2." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841?-842 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

I was debating with myself whether mele42846 was or was not a reincarnation of Italgato. This post removed all doubt.

"Any effort by the Florida Supreme Court to have set a specific standard would have invited the argument that they were making "new law" beyond the Legislature's established "intent of the voter" standard and thereby violating Article II of the Constitution." http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:z4iKx67EndcJ:jurist.law.pitt.edu/election/electionques.htm+fsc+followed+letter+of+law+2000+election&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1&ie=UTF-8

Sandra Day O'Connor's statements are fairly surprising. I think the threat is there, but the source of the greatest threat is perhaps the one greatest source of debate. Much of the recent dissatisfaction of citizens and Congress concerning the Judicial branch is I think more of a reactionary response to what they viewed as a power grab by the judiciary in terms of laws being declared unconstitutional, based on questionable and murky, unsound opinions. So what we are dealing with here is, is the Judiciary or is it the Legislative branch becoming too arrogant and overstepping their bounds? If one is perceived as doing that, then the other tends to have a reactionary response.

It is my personal opinion that the Supreme Court has in fact overstepped their bounds in the last 30 or 40 years, and what we see now is simply a debate over where the pendulum should be.

Yes. The "I am very much afraid" and the caps gave it away.....

I have been referring to it as MeleeGate for some time.

Former NSA lawyer Johnathan Turley at Conyers' NSA Hearing: Bush Committed a Crime
Former NSA Lawyer Jonathan Turley at the NSA Hearing
(C-span) rtsp://video.c-span.org/project/ter/ter012006_spying.rm

Audio #1 (more to follow): Bush Committed a Crime http://www.archive.org/download/ill... Please download this mp3 audio to share with others. Do you work at a business with a sound system... more download options at archive.org

Professor Turley (rough transcript):

President Bush has for many years asserted authority that is both absolute and in my view, quite dangerous.

In August 2002, there was the infamous torture memo, put out by the justice department, that stated that the President could indeed order gov't officials to violate federal law. In fact, that memo said that imposing a limitation on his ability to conduct exercises that constitute torture would be a constitutional infringement on his authority.

The President also claimed authority to unilaterally declare a citizen an enemy combatant, to strip him entirely of his constitutional rights, including the right of access to counsel.

On Dec 30th 2005, the President signed the torture bill and he used a "signing statement"- reserving the right to violate that law. Now we know that there is an NSA operation based on the same extreme theory of Presidential power.

The problem with these claims is that they are devoid of any limiting principles. They place this country on a slippery slope that inevitably leads to a maximum leader.

I read the document put out by the Dept of Justice and I've changed my testimony to address that document. Frankly what is most remarkable is not the sweeping claims of authority, but the conspicuous lack of authority to support those claims.

The Supreme Court has rejected the very claims being made by the President with regard to the NSA operation, it is in direct contradiction of FISA.

Now I want to be absolutely clear, what the President ordered in this case was a crime. Now we can debate whether he had a good or bad motivation, but it was a crime.

The federal law makes it clear- you cannot engage in this type of domestic surveillance without comitting a crime.

We can debate the wisdom of that, we can debate why the President may have done it, but in my view, the President committed a crime, and we have to deal with that as citizens. And unfortunately, you have to deal with that as members of Congress.

It strikes an alarming circumstance when the President can go into a press conference and announce that he has violated a federal statute 30 times, and promises to continue to do so until someone stops him. That is the most remarkable admission that I have ever heard from a President of the United States...

I was shocked at what I saw [at FISA], I was convinced the judge would sign anything that we put in front of him, and I wasn't entirely sure that he actually read what we put in front of him. But I remember going back to my supervisor at NSA and saying that place scared the daylights out of me. And my supervisor said, "you know what, it is scary, but we're here. We won't let a president exceed his authority."

Well, this president has exceeded his authority.

Under FISA there are three exceptions that allow in one case, to engage in surveillance and proceed later to get approval.

The suggestion that, "time is of the essence", is a ludicrous one.

I'll just remind this instutition of it's duty. Despite any affiliation to the President, it's Congress duty to protect it's authority.

What's at stake is not a president that has committed a crime- it's much more serious than that. What's at stake is a president who is committing a crime under the pretense of legality, he says he has the authority to do that.

Very few members have faced this type of test of faith, but you're facing it now. And as citizens and as members, it's now up to us, we're called to account. For the many benefits that we have gotten from this system, we're called to account to do something. http://benfrank.net/blog/2006/01/24/nsa_hearing_audio/#more-208

Supreme Court Justice Reveals Death Threats
By GINA HOLLAND, AP

WASHINGTON (March 15) - Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said she and former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor have been the targets of death threats from the "irrational fringe" of society, people apparently spurred by Republican criticism of the high court.

Ginsburg revealed in a speech in South Africa last month that she and O'Connor were threatened a year ago by someone who called on the Internet for the immediate "patriotic" killing of the justices.

Security concerns among judges have been growing.

Conservative commentator Ann Coulter joked earlier this year that Justice John Paul Stevens should be poisoned. Over the past few months O'Connor has complained that criticism, mainly by Republicans, has threatened judicial independence to deal with difficult issues like gay marriage.

Worry is not limited to the Supreme Court. Three quarters of the nation's 2,200 federal judges have asked for government-paid home security systems, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said this week.

Ginsburg said the Web threat was apparently prompted by legislation in Congress, filed by Republicans, that would bar judges from relying on foreign laws or court decisions.

"It is disquieting that they have attracted sizable support. And one not-so-small concern - they fuel the irrational fringe," she said in a speech posted online by the court earlier this month and first reported Wednesday by LegalTimes.com.

According to Ginsburg, someone in a Web site chat room wrote: "Okay commandoes, here is your first patriotic assignment ... an easy one. Supreme Court Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor have publicly stated that they use (foreign) laws and rulings to decide how to rule on American cases. This is a huge threat to our Republic and Constitutional freedom. ... If you are what you say you are, and NOT armchair patriots, then those two justices will not live another week."

Rep. Tom Feeney, R-Fla., a sponsor of one of the congressional proposals, wrote about the legislation on his Web site and in bold letters featured a quote from O'Connor predicting the Supreme Court would probably increasingly rely on foreign courts.

Ginsburg pointed out that the legislation was first proposed in 2004, an election year.

Justices, in some of their most hotly contested rulings, have looked overseas. Last year, for example, justices barred the executions of juvenile killers on a 5-4 vote. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said then that "it is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty."

In an angry dissent to that decision, Justice Antonin Scalia said capital punishment policy should be set by states, not "the subjective views of five members of this court and like-minded foreigners."

Ginsburg said, "Critics in Congress and in the media misperceive how and why U.S. courts refer to foreign and international court decisions." She said those decisions are used for guidance only.

O'Connor said last week during a speech at Georgetown Law School that the justices have received threats. But the Ginsburg remarks at the Constitutional Court of South Africa provide unusual detail.

Ginsburg, who turned 73 Wednesday, told the audience O'Connor "remains alive and well - as for me, you can judge for yourself."