Cheney says Bush gave him declassification power

National Security Presidential Directives
http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/pd2_essayx.htm

(excerpt) BUSH II

George W. Bush assumed the presidency on January 20, 2001. A little over three weeks later, on February 13, he signed National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1), "Organization of the National Security Council System."

The bulk of the directive focused on the committees and subcommittees to be established or continued?-including the NSC Principals Committee, the "senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security." In addition, there will be a NSC Deputies Committee as well as a number of NSC Policy Coordination Committees to deal with regional and functional (e.g. arms control, international finance, global environment) issues.[126]

In a sharp change with administrations stretching back to the Nixon administration, the directive decreed that the NSPD series would replace both the Clinton administration's Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives "as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States."[127]

Over the next three months, President Bush signed another four directives. NSPD 4 initiated a review of U.S. nuclear offensive and defensive posture. NSPD 5 ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence capabilities, with specific focus on how the Intelligence Community is coping with rapid technological change and difficult new targets. The directive required DCI George Tenet to appoint both external and internal panels to conduct the review.[128]

Several actions taken by President Bush in June and July 2002 were or were likely subjects of NSPDs. In June, he "directed his top national security aides to make a doctrine of pre-emptive action against states and terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction into the foundation of a new national security strategy." In early July, he was expected to approve resumption of a program to force down or shoot down airplanes suspected of ferrying drugs in Latin America. Later that month he initiated a review of U.S. space policy with NSPD-15.[129]

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, led to creation of a second set of directives dealing with homeland security, which have been released to the public in their entirety.

Homeland Presidential Security Directive (HSPD)-1 established a Homeland Security Council, a principals committee, a deputies committee, and 11 policy coordination committees covering subjects such as weapons of mass destruction consequence management; domestic transportation security; detection, surveillance, and intelligence; and medical and public health.[130]

HSPD-2, "Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies," also issued on October 29, 2001, established Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force whose objectives would be to "deny entry into the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity," and "locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the United States." It also called for an enhanced Immigration and Naturalization Service and Customs enforcement capability as well as the use of advanced technologies for data sharing and enforcement.[131]

In HSPD-3, signed on March 11, 2002, President Bush established the Homeland Security Advisory System. The system established, for the executive branch, a color-coded system to be used to indicate the extent of the threat of a terrorist attack: green (low), blue (guarded), yellow (elevated), orange (high), and red (severe). Associated with each threat condition is a set of protective measures. The protective measures involve both those spelled out in the directive as well as measures that are part of individual agency preplanned responses.[132]

Conclusions
Study directives provide a means for generating inter-agency studies or single agency responses on critical national security subjects. Draft decision directives provide a means by which national security decision makers can evaluate and critique the specifics of proposed policy decisions. Thus, a draft NSDD on U.S. policy toward Iran brought harsh criticism from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger as well as Secretary of State George Shultz. The NSDD recommended that anti-Khomeini factions in Iran should be supported and U.S. allies should be encouraged to sell Iran selected military equipment. Secretary Weinberger observed on the transmittal note accompanying the draft that "This is almost too absurd to comment on ... It's like asking Qadaffi to Washington for a cozy chat."[133]

Putting down on paper presidential decisions in the national security area has several virtues. First, it forces a single statement of policy in a particular area. Second, it provides a means to communicate that decision to agencies which will be responsible for implementing it. Third, in the case of disputes as to what the policy is the directives can be used as a point of reference. Thus, while on the Reagan National Security Council staff, Constantine Menges would occasionally refer to NSDDs when he believed policy implementers were acting in ways not consistent with the directives.[134]

While study and draft decision directives facilitated orderly review of policy options and evaluation of proposed policies within the Executive Branch, the secrecy attached to the directives proved, for many years, an impediment to not only public, but even contemporaneous Congressional understanding of U.S. policy. That secrecy was driven by a number of factors?-the status of the directives as key Presidential national security guidance, the sensitivity of some of the topics addressed in the directives, and occasional fear of embarrassment.

Thus, in response to a March 1987 request from Representative Jack Brooks (D-Texas) for a list of all NSDDs issued since 1981, national security adviser Frank Carlucci refused, calling the request unprecedented, "overbroad and objectionable on legal and constitutional grounds."[135] Speaker of the House Jim Wright (D-Texas), who also sought such a list, protested that "Congress cannot react responsibly to new dictates for national policy set in operation by the executive branch behind closed doors."[136]

In an attempt to remedy the situation, Brooks unsuccessfully introduced a bill in 1988, the "Presidential Directives and Accountability Act," which would have required the White House to notify the Speaker and the president pro tempore of the Senate of the existence of new NSDDs. Unclassified NSDDs would be published in the Federal Register. Rep. Louis Stokes (D-Ohio) noted, in testimony on the bill, that NSDDs are "sometimes the only record of secret policy." Stokes asked, "Is the secret policy of the United States the same as the public policy of the United States ... with respect to very sensitive matters such as terrorism [and] paramilitary covert actions?" Congress he said, needed to know. And to know it needed the NSDDs.[137]

Similarly, Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana), who served as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Iran-Contra investigating committee, testified: "I think all of us have had the experience of listening to testimony by executive branch officials who are articulating policy of the Federal Government, and have had those officials refer to a NSDD as the basis of that policy. We don't know what that NSDD is and we cannot evaluate the official's comments without reference to it, but it is not available to us."[138]

One person who did not testify concerning the Brooks bill was the national security adviser, Colin L. Powell. On August 3, 1988, the day the hearings were about to begin, Powell wrote to Brooks that "In accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, members of the president's personal staff who participate in the deliberative process through which Executive Policy is developed have traditionally not testified before Congress... Therefore, I regret that I must decline your request."[139]

That position did not change with a new administration. A September 9, 1991, NSC letter to Rep. John Conyers (D-Michigan), chairman of the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, reaffirmed the NSC position that if pressed on the matter of providing the title, number and summary of each NSD issued by President Bush, the president would be advised to invoke executive privilege and not provide the information.[140]

Doyle Reedy, an investigator for the General Accounting Office, who was requested by Congress in 1991 to obtain a list of the directives ran into a similar stone wall. Reedy observed that "You can't even say how many there are. You can't confirm or deny whether they exist."[141]

During the Clinton administration the gap between public and White House knowledge of the number and subject of Presidential Decision Directives narrowed. While there is still no procedure for the regular reporting of such directives to Congress, much less the public, there were numerous press reports that discussed the subject of the PDDs, and an increased willingness to release current directives themselves (often in response to FOIA requests), including PDDs on NSC organization, public encryption, alien smuggling, security policy coordination, counterterrorism, or international organized crime?-or provide fact sheets specifying the number, title, subject, and part of the content of the directives (for example, PDD 23 on commercial space imagery, and PDDs 62 and 63, discussed above).[142]

At the same time, the Clinton administration fought and won a case before the United States Court of Appeals that resulted in the NSC being exempted from the requirements of the FOIA?-n the grounds that it provided advice to the president but was not an "operational" agency. The administration was motivated by a desire to avoid having to comply with the FOIA with regard to its internal e-mail communications. It did continue to process other document requests, including those for PDDs, on a discretionary basis?-a practice continued by the Bush administration with respect to NSPDs.[143]

In addition, as a result of the Presidential Records Act, first passed in 1978 and amended in 1995, the Bush NSC has ceased processing document requests for all records, including decision directives, created prior to the current Bush administration. The records have been transferred to the appropriate presidential libraries that will be responsible for processing FOIA requests for them?-except that unclassified Clinton administration records will not be subject to the FOIA for 5 years, while classified records will be exempt for 12 years.[144]

I've been away.

Are there still people posting here who think this incredibly incompetent, duplicitous administration is worth the toilet tissue that would be needed to flush it down a toilet?

Frank


Hi there, Frank. About time you got your lazy butt back on A2K.

I was sure Hot Gun Cheney would bring you back to us.

BBB :wink:

Re: Frank


Darth Cheney may have stubbed his toe mightily here. We'll see how it plays out.

Cheney is in trouble if he really thinks this is going to clear him; for two reasons.

First, the executive order that was signed back in Clinton's day, and even with the changes Bush made in 2003, doesn't allow one 'agency' to unilaterally declassify another 'agency's' information.

Second, Bush signed the addendum to the exec order in March 2003; right around the time that they decided to Out Plame. Coincidence? Nah, and Fitzgerald isn't going to think so either.

Cycloptichorn

Cy


Cy, you are right. Cheney has the authority to CLASSIFY information. However, he does NOT have the authority to DECLASSIFY information.

Another big fib by Fibber Cheney.

BBB

Cheney Says He Can Declassify Secrets
Cheney Says He Can Declassify Secrets
By Pete Yost
The Associated Press
Thursday 16 February 2006

Vice President Dick Cheney says he has the power to declassify government secrets, raising the possibility that he authorized his former chief of staff to pass along sensitive prewar data on Iraq to reporters.

Cheney coupled his statement in a TV interview Wednesday with an endorsement of I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, his ex-aide. Libby is under indictment on charges of perjury, obstruction and lying to the FBI about disclosing the identity of undercover CIA officer Valerie Plame.

"Scooter is entitled to the presumption of innocence," Cheney told Fox News Channel. "He is a great guy. I worked with him for a long time. I have tremendous regard for him. I may well be called as a witness at some point in the case, and it is therefore inappropriate for me to comment on any facet of the case."

In a recent court filing, Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald revealed Libby's assertions to a grand jury that superiors had authorized him to spread sensitive information from a National Intelligence Estimate. The administration used the NIE assessment on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction as part of its justification for going to war.

At the time of Libby's contacts with reporters in June and July 2003, the administration, including Cheney, who was among the war's most ardent proponents, faced growing criticism.

No weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq, and Bush supporters were anxious to show that the White House had relied on prewar intelligence projecting a strong threat from such weapons.

Fitzgerald did not specify which superiors Libby may have been referring to when he testified that higher-ups had authorized him to spread sensitive information.

But in the interview, Cheney said an executive order gives him, and President Bush, power to declassify information.

"I have certainly advocated declassification. I have participated in declassification decisions," Cheney said. Asked for details, he said, "I don't want to get into that. There's an executive order that specifies who has classification authority, and obviously it focuses first and foremost on the president, but also includes the vice president."

Libby is not charged with leaking classified information, and his lawyers said last week that there was no truth to a published report that they had advised the court or prosecutors that Libby will raise a defense based on authorization by superiors.

A legal expert said Cheney's comments could nonetheless foreshadow a Libby defense.

Former Whitewater independent counsel Robert Ray said, "If the focus is off the defendant and on to somebody else, generally for the defense that's a good day. If it turns out that Cheney was actively involved in decisions related to the disclosure of a CIA officer's identity and if the truth of it is that he was orchestrating the disclosure of information to the media, it seems to me that's a fundamentally different case than one centered around the activities of Libby."

The indictment against Libby says Cheney advised his chief of staff on June 12, 2003, that the wife of Bush administration critic and former U.S. Ambassador Joseph Wilson worked at the CIA in the counterproliferation division.

Libby understood that the vice president had learned this information from the CIA, according to the indictment, which says Libby also learned of Wilson's wife's identity from the CIA and the State Department.

On July 14, 2003, the CIA identity of Valerie Plame - the maiden name of Wilson's wife - was published by columnist Robert Novak. Eight days earlier, Wilson had accused the administration of twisting prewar intelligence to exaggerate the Iraqi threat. Wilson concluded it was highly doubtful that a purported sale of uranium yellowcake by Niger to Iraq in the late 1990s had ever taken place.

Libby was indicted last October on five counts of perjury, obstruction and lying to the FBI about how he learned of Plame's identity and what he told reporters about it.

A defense that Libby was authorized to leak sensitive data about Iraq would not appear to provide any defense against the charge of making false statements regarding Plame.

But some lawyers pointed out that setting up defenses before a jury involve more than simply constructing legal arguments.

An authorization defense in the CIA leak case would mean that "much of what Libby was trying to do was aid and protect his boss Cheney," Ray suggested. The downside to employing such an approach is that it "almost comes with a defense that I did it."

The Little-Noticed Order That Gave Dick Cheney New Power
http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york200602160841.asp

February 16, 2006, 8:41 a.m.
The Little-Noticed Order That Gave Dick Cheney New Power
by Byron York
National Review

Have you ever heard of Executive Order 13292?

In addition to discussing his hunting accident, Vice President Dick Cheney, in his interview on the Fox News Channel Wednesday, also pointed to a little-known but enormously consequential expansion of vice-presidential power that has come about as a result of the Bush administration's war on terror.

Near the end of the interview, Fox anchor Brit Hume brought up a controversy arising from the CIA-leak case, in which prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald said in court papers that former top Cheney aide Lewis Libby testified he had been authorized "by his superiors" to disclose information about the classified National Intelligence Estimate to members of the press. "Is it your view that a Vice President has the authority to declassify information?" Hume asked.

"There is an executive order to that effect," Cheney said.

"There is?"

"Yes."

"Have you done it?"

"Well, I've certainly advocated declassification and participated in declassification decisions. The executive order ?- "

"You ever done it unilaterally?"

"I don't want to get into that. There is an executive order that specifies who has classification authority, and obviously focuses first and foremost on the President, but also includes the Vice President."

Cheney was referring to Executive Order 13292, issued by President Bush on March 25, 2003, which dealt with the handling of classified material. That order was not an entirely new document but was, instead, an amendment to an earlier Executive Order, number 12958, issued by President Bill Clinton on April 17, 1995.

At the time, Bush's order received very little coverage in the press. What mention there was focused on the order's provisions making it easier for the government to keep classified documents under wraps. But as Cheney pointed out Wednesday, the Bush order also contained a number of provisions which significantly increased the vice president's power.

Throughout Executive Order 13292, there are changes to the original Clinton order which, in effect, give the vice president the power of the president in dealing with classified material. In the original Clinton executive order, for example, there appeared the following passage:

Classification Authority.

(a) The authority to classify information originally may be exercised only by:

(1) the President;

(2) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the Federal Register...

In the Bush order, that section was changed to this (emphasis added):

Classification Authority.

(a) The authority to classify information originally may be exercised only by:

(1) the President and, in the performance of executive duties, the Vice President;

(2) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the Federal Register...

In another part of the original Clinton order, there was a segment dealing with who was authorized to delegate the authority to classify material. In the Clinton order, the passage read:

(2) "Top Secret" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President or by an agency head or official designated...

(3) "Secret" or "Confidential" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President; an agency head or official designated...

In the Bush order, that segment was changed to read (emphasis added):

(2) "Top Secret" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President; in the performance of executive duties, the Vice President; or an agency head or official designated...

(3) "Secret" or "Confidential" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President; in the performance of executive duties, the Vice President; or an agency head or official designated...

Both executive orders contained extension sections defining the terms used in the order. One of those terms was "original classification authority," that is, who in the government has the power to classify documents. In the Clinton order, the definition read:

"Original classification authority" means an individual authorized in writing, either by the President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President...

In the Bush executive order, the definition was changed to read (emphasis added):

"Original classification authority" means an individual authorized in writing, either by the President, the Vice President in the performance of executive duties, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President...

In the last several years, there has been much talk about the powerful role Dick Cheney plays in the Bush White House. Some of that talk has been based on anecdotal evidence, and some on entirely fanciful speculation. But Executive Order 13292 is real evidence of real power in the vice president's office. Since the beginning of the administration, Dick Cheney has favored measures allowing the executive branch to keep more things secret. And in March of 2003, the president gave him the authority to do it.
----------------------------------------------

?- Byron York, NR's White House correspondent, is the author of The Vast Left Wing Conspiracy: The Untold Story of How Democratic Operatives, Eccentric Billionaires, Liberal Activists, and Assorted Celebrities Tried to Bring Down a President ?- and Why They'll Try Even Harder Next Time.

There are those in this world who cherish incompetence.