Alito - take him or leave him

Not to derail this thread into an abortion discussion, but I was thinking about this the other day. Determining when a life begins is only the first step. Let's just say that life begins at conception. Is it a US citizen? According to recent decisions, the Constitution doesn't apply to non-citizens. To be a citizen one must be born in this country or naturalized. If it's not a US citizen then the state has no compelling interest to regulate a woman's bodily functions.

There's no question that the unborn child has legal standing.

A foriegner visiting America doesn't enjoy constitutional protections that Citizens do, but that doesn't make it legal for me to kill his ass.

The only question was whether constitutional rights apply to the unborn, not whether it was legal or illegal to kill them.

Cycloptichorn

Even then, though, you have competing rights. The fetus's so called right to life versus the woman's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

FreeDuck wrote:

Even then, though, you have competing rights. The fetus's so called right to life versus the woman's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The womans right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is not a valid argument, otherwise drug use, prostitution, and a host of other crimes all done in private for the sake of pursuing happiness or whatever would all be sanctioned under the constitution, which is of course ridiculous.

I wrote that jokingly, but now I'm starting to consider the truth of the matter. It's interesting to me that we don't have a legal definition of when a person is a 'person' and when they are accorded rights under the USC.

Cycloptichorn

IX

* * *

A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, [410 U.S. 113, 157] for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. 51 On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument 52 that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to "person." The first, in defining "citizens," speaks of "persons born or naturalized in the United States." The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for Representatives and Senators, Art. I, 2, cl. 2, and 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, 2, cl. 3; 53 in the Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, 9, cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, 9, cl. 8; in the Electors provisions, Art. II, 1, cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of President, Art. II, 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application. 54 [410 U.S. 113, 158]

All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. 55 This is in accord with the results reached in those few cases where the issue has been squarely presented. McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 751 (WD Pa. 1972); Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N. Y. 2d 194, 286 N. E. 2d 887 (1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-434; Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (Conn. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730. Cf. Cheaney v. State, ___ Ind., at ___, 285 N. E. 2d, at 270; Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68, 72 (CA7 1960), aff'd sub nom. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); State v. Dickinson, 28 [410 U.S. 113, 159] Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N. E. 2d 599 (1971). Indeed, our decision in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would not have indulged in statutory interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.

FreeDuck wrote:

Even then, though, you have competing rights. The fetus's so called right to life versus the woman's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The womans right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is not a valid argument, otherwise drug use, prostitution, and a host of other crimes all done in private for the sake of pursuing happiness or whatever would all be sanctioned under the constitution, which is of course ridiculous.

Many of the best drugs are still completely legal. The legality of substances has little to do with this conversation.

Cycloptichorn