THE EMPTY SUIT

The origin of the "empty suit" phenomenon in contemporary politics is the political career of Ronald Reagan. Once a Democrat and the President of the Screen Actors guild, Reagan radically switched course and began to promote himself as a conservative when the "Hollywood Ten" appeared before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1947. This group--one director and nine screenwriters--were branded as communists and blacklisted for more than 25 years. It was the end of their careers for most of them. Although Hollywood was badly spooked and moved quickly to remove people who might be "dangerous" to the industry's image, they deeply resented those who had testified against others, and a silent, "underground" blacklist emerged. Reagan's political about-face at the time of the HUAC hearings earned him a place on this underground blacklist, too. He was not re-elected to the top post of the Screen Actors Guild, and the prospect of work in motion pictures dried up. In all honesty, he was a B-movie grade of actor, and his days as a handsome young leading man were ending. The television program Death Valley Days kept him employed through the 1950'S--but his career in film was ended. He eventually found well-paying work travelling as a speaker at industrial association meetings and in corporate board rooms in the southwest. He made friends among people in positions of responsibility in the corporate world which would lead to his political career in California.

The corporate boys in Orange County saw Reagan as an opportunity to end the Democrat's political dynasty in Sacramento. Reagan had the necessary skills to project a public persona, and the political experience from the Screen Actors Guild which would allow him to smoothly move into the gubernatorial campaign. By 1966, his recent career as a spokesman for powerful corporate conservative interests made him attractive both to voters outside of Los Angeles as well as wealthy contributors. He won his first term in a landslide--partly because of his conservative credentials, largely because of the fatigue of voters who were sick of the Brown era in California politics.

**************************************************************

In 1980, the Republicans scented defeat in the wind for Carter, but needed to find a candidate who could not only defeat a sitting President, but who could help the campaigns of Republicans who aimed for seats in Congress. The great Republican loyalist, George Bush, who had taken the post of Chairman of the Republican National Committee in the darkest days of the Nixon Presidency looked like the sure winner of the primaries, but elicited little enthusiasm among national party leaders. Reagan was, in the primary season, the Republican dark horse. Little known or regarded outside California, his primary campaign team went into high gear to capitalize on the traits which had made him popular with California voters. A "home boy" from Illinois, Reagan seemed the very personification of a Frank Capra character such as George Bailey in It's a Wonderful Life, and the Republican voters began to see him as their Jefferson Smith (the Jimmy Stewart character in Capra's Mr. Smith Goes to Washington). In a now famous moment from the primary debates, Bush tried to override Reagan's speech, and the moderator told the soundman to turn off Reagan's microphone, at which Reagan showed a genuine anger, saying that he had "paid for this microphone, Mr. Green." Voters loved it, and Reagan buried Bush. Bush, always the party loyalist, expecting his eventual reward, accepted the second position on the ticket.

THe Nixon years, the Watergate scandal, the Democratic "Koreagate" scandal and the apparent failure of Carter to effectively deal with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, with its hostage crisis--had all left voters with a sour attitude toward politics and politicians. Reagan's handlers carefully portrayed him as the outsider (although he had been eight years in the governor's mansion in California, and had long been active in the politics of the Screen Actors Guild) and as the hometown boy--it is alleged that Capra's techniques in It's a Wonderful Life and Mr. Smith Goes to Washington were studied for pointers on how to handle the candidate--gave him a significant advantage in the election. Reagan polled more than eight million votes more than Carter, and a solid 9% advantage in the popular vote--while careful Republican campaigning in all of the states gave him 90% of the electoral votes--an electoral college landslide. Most significantly, Reagan pulled every state in the South, except for Carter's home state of Georgia. From the Civil War onward, Southerners had voted Democratic--when there wasn't a "Dixiecrat" alternative--or they had stayed home. For Southerners, the Republicans were long the party of Lincoln, long the "enemy." But the returning prosperity in the South, which began at the same time as and greatly benefited from the civil rights movement had created a corporate class in the South such as those who supported Reagan elsewhere in the nation. It was a simple matter to appeal to the suspicions of Southern voters about the agenda of the Democrats to create the "Reagan Democrats."

Reagan enjoyed a "honeymoon" with the Congress and the press which all Presidents get in the months after inauguration. His "aw, gosh" hometown boy persona was carefully groomed for all of his public appearances and his handlers worked to emphasize the image of a friend speaking to the listener or viewer directly, and in an "ad-libbed" manner. Then, just over two months into his first term, he was shot by John Hinckley. His already high popularity rating skyrocketed. He became immune to press criticism. Any criticism of the administration policies were carefully portrayed as a personal attack, and the public were encouraged to see such criticisms as mean-spirited attacks on the man, rather than on his policies. He became known as the "Teflon President," to whom no opprobrium could stick. This carried through the rest of his Presidency, including the Iran-contra brouhaha, and remained a powerful factor of image after he had left office. It is only within the last decade that informed people have been willing to speak out about the negative consequences of many of the policies of his administration.

*****************************************

The Republicans have tried to create the same image for the younger George Bush. His verbal stumbling has been an asset rather than a liability, and even conservatives who do not approve of the policies of his administration still like the man, and have twice voted for him. As was the case with Reagan, criticism of his policies are carefully portrayed as personal attacks, mean-spirited attacks on the man, rather than on his policies. Similar to the assassination attempt on Reagan a little over two months into his first term, Bush was able to capitalize on the September 11the disaster, not nine months after his inauguration, to build a solid base for his public approval ratings. But Bush is not Reagan, and there is a sullenness which has become more apparent as his policies have not yielded the promised results, as the war has gone badly--he has not been able to maintain the high public approval ratings which Reagan enjoyed. One member here has described him as a decent man who holds our destinies in his hands. He may at base be a decent man, but the increasing desperation of his political position is eroding the "Reaganesque" image his handlers have tried to cultivate for him, and the rumors of his private anger and surliness with staff have increased. Few Americans would now necessarily agree that their destinies were in his hands, or that they would wish them to be.

The phenomenon cannot, however, be ignored. The American electorate has always, of course, been appealed to on the basis of the character of the candidate. Thomas Flexner has described George Washington as "the indispensable man," and there can be no doubt that Washington was crucial to the foundation of our nation and the ratification of the constitution--everyone in the Philadelphia convention looked to the President's chair, and seeing Washington, saw the man whom they were certain would fill the office when once it were created. Thereafter, political movers and shakers have always sold the man, rather than the policies. This is not to say that policy is meaningless in appealing to voters--but it is to say that the perceived personality of the man means more than the policy. In 1980, John Anderson campaigned on the basis of no reduction in taxes and a reduction of domestic and defense spending--his basic argument was "just to look at the numbers." In the Republican primary campaign, George Bush the elder referred to Reagan's proposed economic policy as "Voodoo economics." History seems to have proven Anderson and Bush to have been correct--but Reagan's campaign managers were able to sell the man and thereby to sell the policy. Despite the claims of his supporters, the economic policies of George Bush the younger have not produced the results which were so confidently predicted. The Iraq war has destroyed his popularity--but the value of selling the image of the man was so effective that he won a second term, in a very close election (both of his wins came in very close elections). Will this result in any "soul-searching" on the part of the electorate about how they make their choice of candidates? I regret to say that i doubt that it will.