Free Will

The retributary aspect of punitive justice is intended to gratify the victim, or those with an interest in the victim--it has nothing to do with the perpetrator.

That's not what you said before.

At all events, my contention is that the function of retribution in systems of "justice" which societies enact is to gratify the victim, and society as a whole, that the crime has been "paid for."

Joe.

I am trying to avoid "defining" anything ! In order to avoid the regress of words defining words, I am taking a Wittgenstein approach that "the meaning of its word is its usage"...I use "context" for "usage" and "analyse" for the investigation of "meaning".

For example we would not usually apply "free will" to the act of choosing between tea or coffee.

It seems "top heavy" in such a context. The concept seems to be evoked relative to acts of interpersonal behaviour. Its nuances might involve such legalese as "mitigating circumstances" and "prior intent". The contextual balance of such nuances results in a social or legal decision. It is the pragmatics of such a decision process within the functioning of society as a system which reifies the term "free will" rather than some extrinsic definition. As you rightly point out, different societies have different norms and judicial systems and I am implying that "free will" could have very different connotations accordingly. (The Azande for example might argue that a certain act was committed because the perpetrator was "bewitched" by another).

joe, I can undersstand what fresco is saying. The "context" is the culture in which one lives. We see evidence of this in history and today where "free will" is being guided by the culture in which one lives. About 100 years ago, it was okay for people to pracdtice cannibalism in Fiji. For them, that was "free will." Quite an extreme when compared to our senses in contemporary America, even though the Donner Party did the same. One was done as a cultural practice, the other for survival. They still made the free will choice...considering the social conventions in which they lived.

Your responses are disingenuous, Joe, and only convenient to an argument you've conceived since i objected to your statement about the retributive nature of "justice" systems. I offered the concept of wergild as an offhand refutation to your contention that the victim would (you seemed to offer this as an axiomatic assumption) be entitled to determine the extent of punishment, of retribution--i considered that an unwarranted statement, and offered the first objection to it which came to mind.

Now, i originally wrote:

Setanta wrote:

The retributary aspect of punitive justice is intended to gratify the victim, or those with an interest in the victim--it has nothing to do with the perpetrator.

And with reference to which you now claim:

joefromchicago wrote:

That's not what you said before.

In response to my statement to this effect:

Setanta wrote:

At all events, my contention is that the function of retribution in systems of "justice" which societies enact is to gratify the victim, and society as a whole, that the crime has been "paid for."

Whereas it is certainly true that those two statements of mine materially differ, the latter does not contradict the former, it merely expands upon the original remark. Do you suggest that one is never entitled, in such a discussion, to expand upon what they've written to make clear their meaning?

Do you get points of you can make it appear that i'm inconstant in my expressions of opinion?

Admittedly, I did not qualify my response by saying that it only applied to current penal codes and modern conceptions of justice. I didn't really take into consideration the possibility that someone would seriously consider an example from the Dark Ages as "refutation" of the proposition that the role of retributory justice was not primarily to gratify the victim. I suppose my answer also ignored the possibility that a penal system would treat criminals like the sick and the sick like criminals, in the fashion of Erewhon, or that a penal code might resemble that of the gas monsters of the Crab Nebula, who view the role of retributory justice as a means of entertaining clients at business lunches. In the future, I'll take all such eventualities into account, in order to avoid such petty quibbles.

If by "expand" you mean "significantly alter in a vain effort to backtrack from an indefensible position," then I suppose you're entitled to do that. You're entitled to do pretty much anything you want. I won't stop you.

Setanta wrote:

Do you get points of you can make it appear that i'm inconstant in my expressions of opinion?

I can get points for that?

The only petty quibble which i see here is you continued attempt to suggest that i intend a discussion of theory and principles inherent in retributive justice must necessarily refer to "the Dark Ages."

Once again, you are taking a false position merely for the sake of argument. As i pointed out, my second statement does not contradict my first statement. You well know what expand means, and my second statement simply clarifies my first statement, as it became clear to me that you weren't able to "get it."

Sure, if you're keeping score, knock yourself out.

joe wrote:
Whether a certain act is good or bad is a moral question, not a question of free will.

However, morals is established within the culture in which one lives, and within that environment, one determines whether it is moral or not.

Joe,

Your apparent disability to avoid confrontational replies is clear evidence to anybody who is assessing whether we have "free will".

You don't know how many times I've refrained from posting "confrontational replies."

Sure, Joe you win, you're always right.