That scared me a little.
I know that it seems like I have at least some control over my actions, but that is not enough to convince, esp. considering the contradictions it would imply (determinism, and all).
I am more interested in finding a way to explain (apparent) free will within a deterministic framework. If we could better understand what free will really is, maybe we could see how determinism and free will coexist.
From a religious standpoint, reformed theology (aka Calvinism) provides one
explanation of how determinism and free will can coexist (there may be other explanations out there as well), but it depends (no surprise) on a very specific definition for "free will".
The concept of "compatibilism" describes the notion that determinism may co-exist (be compatible with) a free will, if "free will" is defined to be the power to choose what we want to do. IOW, if we always choose what our greatest desire is (at the time, and considering he circumstances), then our will is free (i.e. we were not forced to choose something other than we wanted.) A will is free, then, just as long as it chooses what it desires.
The main argument against this comes from those who claim that a free will is only free if it always has the power to chose contrary to what someone else has determined, regardless of circumstances or desires. This type of free will would lead to the concept of "incompatibilism", as it could not exist simultaneously with a deterministic view.
One common complaint against compatibilism is that a person isn't really making a choice, if it has been determined for them. Said differently, their will isn't really
free. However, this argument simply assumes that a will is only free if one has the power to chose contrary to any other determining force. IOW, the complaint begs the question of what it means to have a free will.
I suspect there are other solutions out there, which would most likely tweak the definition of "free will" or "determinism" or both.