You guys are boring . . . somebody go find me a Presbyterian . . . some kinda Calvinist, fer chrissake . . .
Regarding the phrase "not mattering a whit....."
The locking up (etc) of a rapist is not simply a function of his likelihood to re-offend. Such a penalty involves (1) retribution to the aggrieved and (2) deterrent value to others. Both of these are aspects of "the safety of society" if "safety" is interpreted in terms cohesion and stability.
Doktor S wrote:Regardless if a person 'chooses' to be a rapist, or 'ends up' as one, the problem still exists. The rapist still needs to be removed from society, for the good of society.
But if that certain idea is taken back as far as the 'freewill' course usually goes--which isn't really my usual habit due to wanting to avoid the frustration of such a moot point that I do, however, find completely valid--then I must raise the question of: would a 'good' society grow rapists and fiends of other sorts in the first place?
That's not necessarily needing an answer--it more or less begs another question...
fresco wrote:The locking up (etc) of a rapist is not simply a function of his likelihood to re-offend. Such a penalty involves (1) retribution to the aggrieved and (2) deterrent value to others. Both of these are aspects of "the safety of society" if "safety" is interpreted in terms cohesion and stability.
Perhaps society may find comfort in the idealized aspect of retribution, but I am not aware of any demonstrable deterrent value.
Doktor S wrote:Can you think of a causeless effect? Me either.
Freewill implies effect without cause, and thus I find the whole idea quite specious
I don't understand. Why does free will imply a "causeless effect?"
Doktor S wrote:I don't think predestination precludes justice or responsibility. Justice and responsibility are human constructs invented by humans and exist within the human mind. That has little to do with the actual logistics of reality.
Cause and effect are also human constructs.
Doktor S wrote:If there was a way to predict the future with 100% accuracy, which there isn't. You can't knowwhether a rapist will rape again. Thats why you lock them up (or preferably kill them) to make absolutely sure.
Well, then why don't we lock up everyone that we suspect will commit rape at some point in the future. Or preferably kill them to make absolutely sure?
fresco wrote:The locking up (etc) of a rapist is not simply a function of his likelihood to re-offend. Such a penalty involves (1) retribution to the aggrieved and (2) deterrent value to others. Both of these are aspects of "the safety of society" if "safety" is interpreted in terms cohesion and stability.
Only if there is free will. Deterrence is an empty concept in a world without free will, since people are determined in their actions regardless of what punishments others might receive. Likewise, retribution only makes sense if someone is responsible for his/her actions. If there is no free will, how can there be any responsibility?
The retributary aspect of punitive justice is intended to gratify the victim, or those with an interest in the victim--it has nothing to do with the perpetrator.
Setanta wrote:The retributary aspect of punitive justice is intended to gratify the victim, or those with an interest in the victim--it has nothing to do with the perpetrator.
If that were true, then the extent of the punishment would be based on the magnitude of the victim's desire for vengeance, not on the magnitude of the crime.
Not necessarily, it is not axiomatic that the victim is entitled to determine the amount of punishment. The concept of wergild for example, set schedules of the worth of an individual which would have to be repaid to expiate a crime.
Setanta wrote:Not necessarily, it is not axiomatic that the victim is entitled to determine the amount of punishment. The concept of wergild for example, set schedules of the worth of an individual which would have to be repaid to expiate a crime.
Were we currently under a system of
Weregeld I might be inclined to agree with you.
On what basis do you assert that this discussion limits itself to the system under which we currently operate? This appears to me to have been a discussion of theory, first and foremost, and of principles rather than comtemporary legal realities. At all events, my contention is that the function of retribution in systems of "justice" which societies enact is to gratify the victim, and society as a whole, that the crime has been "paid for."
There are too many inconsistencies of how our laws punish crime. Attempting to discuss "free will" with criminal penalties makes little sense.
Dok, you say: "Freewill implies effect without cause, and thus I find the whole idea quite specious." It seems to me that the assumption of free-will (and by implication, agency, actor, ego, etc.) is an assumption about causation, an assumption that mind can influence material action.
By the way, it also seems to me that a rapist does not really choose to rape. His rapacious actions are expressions of an on-going set of often irrepressible drives that are continuous, not divisible into discrete things called causes and effects. He should be locked away until society can eliminate his drives, not change his mind. To believe otherwise is to believe that a tidal wave consists of bits of water pushing other bits of water toward a shore, or that the beginning of a story causes the end of the story, or that one end of a stick is the cause of the other end. Nevertheless, it is usually useful to think in terms of causality--we think causes; we do not see them.
Setanta wrote:On what basis do you assert that this discussion limits itself to the system under which we currently operate? This appears to me to have been a discussion of theory, first and foremost, and of principles rather than comtemporary legal realities.
If you want to discuss the niceties of Gothic penal codes, I won't stop you. Most people today, however, would regard any system of punishments that permits the rich to commit crimes with relative impunity and which is preferable only to the alternative -- blood feuds -- to be barbaric. And with good cause, since such systems were developed and employed by barbarians.
Setanta wrote:At all events, my contention is that the function of retribution in systems of "justice" which societies enact is to gratify the victim, and society as a whole, that the crime has been "paid for."
That's not what you said before.
Decisions, decisions, decisions. :wink:
joefromchicago wrote:fresco wrote:The locking up (etc) of a rapist is not simply a function of his likelihood to re-offend. Such a penalty involves (1) retribution to the aggrieved and (2) deterrent value to others. Both of these are aspects of "the safety of society" if "safety" is interpreted in terms cohesion and stability.
Only if there is free will. Deterrence is an empty concept in a world without free will, since people are determined in their actions regardless of what punishments others might receive. Likewise, retribution only makes sense if someone is responsible for his/her actions. If there is no free will, how can there be any responsibility?
Joe, I believe you are correct but not in the sense that "free will" is an axiom...only in the sense that it is component. For reference I repeat the post I made much earlier.
Quote: There seem to be two levels to refute absolute "free will".
1. The reductionist argument of naive realism - where mental activity can be reduced to deterministic physics and chemistry.
2. The transcendent argument - where "self" dissolves as part of a timeless holism in which "actors actions and objects" are transient ripples in the flux.
Since the second can encompass the first by arguing for the illusion separate "things" , and that "causality" lies only the mind of an so-call "independent observer", the conclusion is that "free will" is a social convention which is associated with the concept of "responsibility of individuals for their actions". It is required to support other social conventions such as "sin" and "guilt" within the interactional network which constitutes current social reality.
Whether the transcendent argument is accepted or not, we cannot analyse "free will" outside the specific contexts in which it is used.
Those contexts involve social actions with social consequences
including "self" debating with "self".
fresco, Clear and concise as usual; thanks for sharing your ideas on this thread.
fresco wrote:There seem to be two levels to refute absolute "free will".
1. The reductionist argument of naive realism - where mental activity can be reduced to deterministic physics and chemistry.
2. The transcendent argument - where "self" dissolves as part of a timeless holism in which "actors actions and objects" are transient ripples in the flux.
Since the second can encompass the first by arguing for the illusion separate "things" , and that "causality" lies only the mind of an so-call "independent observer", the conclusion is that "free will" is a social convention which is associated with the concept of "responsibility of individuals for their actions". It is required to support other social conventions such as "sin" and "guilt" within the interactional network which constitutes current social reality.
If "free will" is deemed a "social convention," that hardly ends the debate. It is no answer to someone who wants to know if he is free to choose his actions to say that society requires that he is. That doesn't resolve the issue of the existence of free will, that merely redefines it as nothing more than a prudential consideration. It is akin to Plato's Noble Lie, a fraud perpetrated on a credulous citizenry for its own good. That's not philosophy, that's public policy.
fresco wrote:Whether the transcendent argument is accepted or not, we cannot analyse "free will" outside the specific contexts in which it is used.
But you are doing exactly that by redefining it as something other than "free will."
Joe.
I am trying to avoid "defining" anything ! In order to avoid the regress of words defining words, I am taking a Wittgenstein approach that "the meaning of its word is its usage"...I use "context" for "usage" and "analyse" for the investigation of "meaning".
For example we would not usually apply "free will" to the act of choosing between tea or coffee. It seems "top heavy" in such a context. The concept seems to be evoked relative to acts of interpersonal behaviour. Its nuances might involve such legalese as "mitigating circumstances" and "prior intent". The contextual balance of such nuances results in a social or legal decision. It is the pragmatics of such a decision process within the functioning of society as a system which reifies the term "free will" rather than some extrinsic definition. As you rightly point out, different societies have different norms and judicial systems and I am implying that "free will" could have very different connotations accordingly. (The Azande for example might argue that a certain act was committed because the perpetrator was "bewitched" by another).
