First, i need to point out that Admiral Howe was not acting in a military capacity, but had been appointed by Bush as the ambassador. Second, i should point out that when Howe pushed an effort to take out Aidid, Clinton, Aspin (DoD), Berger (NSA), Christopher (State) and eventually even Powell (JCS) all backed the plan. What i wrote before gives the impression that Howe acted on his own authority. Rather, he gave bad advice, and Clinton's administration accepted it as being the best way to deal with the situation as seen by the man on the spot. I just checked my source material and some online accounts in order to correct what i had written.
Here is a link to
Blackhawk Down, a series of articles in
The Philadelphia Inquirer by Mark Bowden, which was then made into a book, and finally a movie.
An operational plan is a military statement of the goals to be achieved and how they are to be achieved. As an example, you are a regimental commander ordered to take out an enemy brigade command post known to be protected by an infantry battalion, indirect fire support from artillery, and on-call amored forces. Therefore, your goal is the destruction of the command post. Your method will be to line up the resources necessary to neutralize the artillery (either counter-battery artillery fire or air strikes), prevent the arrival of or achieve the destruction of the armored forces (air strikes most likely, as a direct armor to armor confrontation can get out of hand and lead to a general engagement, which is not necessarily what is wanted), and then in consideration of the relative balance of forces (the number of your men versus the number in the infantry battalion defending, the number and quality of your weapons versus theirs, the tactical doctrine in which your troops are trained as opposed to the tactical doctrine the enemy is known to use), and the terrain to be crossed in the approach march (moving the troops up to the firing line), and the terrain in which the defenders are located, you decide how much of your force to use and how to deploy them. Then the operational plan must be written so that all of the components act in concert to achieve the maximum effect in the minimum time with the least possible casualties.
Rules of engagement, simply stated, tell you who you can shoot and under what circumstances. Before we launched an all-out attack on Serb forces in Kosovo, American troops went into Bosnia to try to patch up the failed United Nations effort. A Dutch battalion in Srebrenica had been overwhelmed trying to defend a Muslim enclave there, largely because the rules of engagement did not allow them to take effective action against Serb paramilitary forces. Clinton would not go into Bosnia until he was sure the rules of engagement would effectively protect American troops and the civilian population, and that NATO and the UN agreed to those rules of engagment.
Broad-based international support ought to be readily understood--Clinton did not proceed until he got assurances that NATO, acting under UN Security Council Authority (a tough sell, as Russia has, literally for centuries, seen the Serbs as their "Slavic Little Brothers"), would provide air support and troops and material support.