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What we do and don't know about Able Danger

 
 
rayban1
 
Reply Fri 12 Aug, 2005 08:24 pm
TKS [ jim geraghty reporting ]
[ home | archives | email ]
WHAT WE KNOW, AND WHAT WE DON'T KNOW

I don't know about you readers, but I feel like the revelations about Able Danger have stirred a certain energy, anger, and analytical adrenalin in the blogosphere that we haven't seen since the Rather memos. Of course, this is bigger and more serious, without that fun "we got the documents from Lucy Ramirez and a mysterious man at a rodeo" absurdity.

(An aside: Can we please avoid giving this story some excessively cute suffix-gate nickname? Every time some over-eager blogger or talking head does that, the rest of the country rolls their eyes. This thing is too serious for our usual bad habits. Let's just call it "the Able Danger revelations" and leave it at that.)

Many blogs are doing what they do best - collecting data, analyzing, thinking, and speculating about how the pieces fit together. If you haven't checked out sites like The Strata-Sphere, Captain Ed, Michelle Malkin, Anchoress, Dr. Sanity, and Just One Minute, do so soon. Andy McCarthy weighs in over in the Corner, as does John Podhoretz.

John Pod and Captain Ed raise the question of why the Commission was so adamant that its information about Mohammed Atta's was correct, and rejected any new information that contradicted it.

At this point, it might be worth it to take a moment and review what we know, what we think we know, and what's still unproven at this point.

What we know:

* In 1999, the Pentagon established an intelligence unit called Able Danger, assigned to seek out and identify al-Qaeda cells and members for U.S. Special Operations Command. This group reportedly used data mining from open sources.

* Approximately August or September 2000, Able Danger identified an al-Qaeda cell in Brooklyn. An intelligence official and Rep. Curt Weldon claim that the AD unit identified Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, and included a photo of Atta. (Weldon claims that he has spoken to four persons involved with the program.) At least two of those men were pilots on the hijacked flights.

* Able Danger analysts recommended the information be passed on to the FBI so that the cell could be rounded up. Accounts in Government Security News, the New York Times, and the Associated Press indicate that Pentagon lawyers decided that anyone holding a green card (as it was believed the cell members did) had to be granted essentially the same legal protections as any U.S. citizen. Thus, the information Able Danger had gathered could not be shared with the FBI, the lawyers concluded. This is in keeping with "the wall" philosophy and policy established in 1995 by Assistant Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, in which intelligence and law enforcement were directed to go beyond what the law requires to keep intelligence-gathering and criminal law enforcement separated.

* The prohibition against sharing intelligence on Atta and the others should not have applied since they were in the country on visas. They did not have permanent resident status.

* At least two 9/11 Commission staffers were told of Able Danger's findings on at least two occasions by members of the military intelligence community.

* Information about Able Danger was not passed on to the commissioners Tom Kean, Lee Hamilton, Tim Roemer, or John Lehman. If the other members of the commission have indicated whether or not they were informed of this information, I have not seen those reports.

* The 9/11 Commission Report, which everyone and their brother praised as a comprehensive and definitive analysis of the flaws in U.S. counterterrorism operations before 9/11, now has at least one giant glaring hole in it. One cannot help but wonder what else got left out, because some staffer or staffers seemed to think it wasn't important enough. I relish the wording in this comment: "The 9-11 Commission's job was to find and connect all the intelligence dots that obviously didn't get connected prior to 9-11, and then recommend how we can connect the dots better and faster next time. It wasn't part of their job to erase the dots they didn't like, before connecting. Doing that, implies that their conclusions were arrived at well before the investigation was complete."

What we don't know:

* Just how many names Able Danger wanted to forward to the FBI. However, the wording in the Government Security article indicates that these four names were the only four that popped up on AD's data-mining operation.

Thus, the information Able Danger had amassed about the only terrorist cell they had located inside the United States could not be shared with the FBI, the lawyers concluded.

Unless the former intelligence officer quoted in the story is lying, these four guys were all that Able Danger found.

* Whether the military lawyer who denied Able Danger's request to pass on the information checked with any superiors.

* It seems very hard to imagine this information would not be passed on to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, and the White House's point man on counterterrorism, Richard Clarke. Yet, as of this moment, we have no direct confirmation that this information went any higher than the Pentagon lawyer.

What is speculation, but is interesting speculation:

* The 9/11 Commission staffers who felt the information about Able Danger wasn't worth mentioning to their bosses could, conceivably, be imbeciles. Perhaps, more plausible, is that they had a particular view they wished the report to express, and the Able Danger revelations contradicted that view. Another possibility: These staffers in question didn't tell Kean, Hamilton, Roemer, or Lehman, but they did tell another member or other members of the Commission, who instructed them to leave it out of the briefings, summaries, and reports given to Kean, Hamilton, Roemer, Lehman, and/or other members. (COUGHgorelickCOUGH)

* No one has concretely tied this new information to the strange, felonious behavior of Sandy Berger, smuggling documents out of the National Archives. But boy, if the document in question related to Able Danger's warning and the decision to not act upon it, his actions would make a lot more sense, wouldn't they?

[Posted 08/12 03:46 AM]
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Type: Discussion • Score: 1 • Views: 1,535 • Replies: 24
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rayban1
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 06:47 am
Laughing No one on the left cares to know the truth about why information was not shared before 9/11............why is that?

Guess this proves the left just cannot raise the level of discussion above childish name calling of Bush.
0 Replies
 
gustavratzenhofer
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 06:50 am
Bush is a shithead
0 Replies
 
Bi-Polar Bear
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 06:54 am
a ca ca face.... a doo doo brain....
0 Replies
 
Setanta
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 06:55 am
That's extremely considerate of you, Gus, to make an old man happy by confirming his irrational prejudices for him. I'm proud of you, and all of your goats and capybaras, as well.
0 Replies
 
rayban1
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 06:55 am
gustavratzenhofer wrote:
Bush is a shithead


Geez.......I doubt the left would want to claim anyone with an intellect the size of a peanut.
0 Replies
 
dlowan
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 07:04 am
Dunno - this is a Blade article - reproduced on the net by Information Clearing House:

"Able Danger disabled

THE report of the 9/11 commission, once a best seller and hailed by the news media as the definitive word on the subject, must now be moved to the fiction shelves.

By Jack Kelly

08/13/05 "The Blade" -- -- The commission concluded, you'll recall, that the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon couldn't have been prevented, and that if there was negligence, it was as much the fault of the Bush Administration (for moving slowly on the recommendations of Clinton counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke) as of the Clinton administration.

Able Danger has changed all of that.

Able Danger was a military intelligence unit set up by Special Operations Command in 1999. A year before the 9/11 attacks, Able Danger identified hijack leader Mohammed Atta and the other members of his cell. But Clinton administration officials stopped them - three times - from sharing this information with the FBI.

The problem was the order Clinton Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick made forbidding intelligence operatives from sharing information with criminal investigators.

"They were stopped because the lawyers at that time in 2000 told them Mohammed Atta had a green card" - he didn't - "and they could not go after someone with a green card," said Rep. Curt Weldon, the Pennsylvania Republican who brought the existence of Able Danger to light.

The military spooks knew only that Atta and his confederates had links to al-Qaeda. They hadn't unearthed their mission. But if the FBI had kept tabs on them (a big if, given the nature of the FBI at the time), 9/11 almost certainly could have been prevented.

What may be a bigger scandal is that the staff of the 9/11 Commission knew of Able Danger and what it had found, but made no mention of it in its report. This is as if the commission that investigated the attack on Pearl Harbor had written its final report without mentioning the Japanese.

Mr. Weldon unveiled Able Danger in a speech on the House floor June 27, but his remarks didn't attract attention until the New York Times reported on them Tuesday.

When the story broke, former Rep. Lee Hamilton, a Democrat from Indiana, co-chairman of the 9/11 Commission, at first denied the commission had ever been informed of what Able Danger had found, and took a swipe at Mr. Weldon's credibility:

"The Sept. 11th Commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of the surveillance of Mohammed Atta or his cell," Mr. Hamilton said. "Had we learned of it obviously it would have been a major focus of our investigation."

Mr. Hamilton changed his tune after the New York Times reported Thursday, and the Associated Press confirmed, that commission staff had been briefed on Able Danger in October, 2003, and again in July, 2004.

It was in October, 2003, that Clinton National Security Adviser Sandy Berger stole classified documents from the National Archives and destroyed some. Berger allegedly was studying documents in the archives to help prepare Clinton officials to testify before the 9/11 Commission. Was he removing references to Able Danger? Someone should ask him before he is sentenced next month.

After having first denied that staff had been briefed on Able Danger, commission spokesman Al Felzenberg said no reference was made to it in the final report because "it was not consistent with what the commission knew about Atta's whereabouts before the attacks," the AP reported.

The only dispute over Atta's whereabouts is whether he was in Prague on April 9, 2001, to meet with Samir al Ani, an Iraqi intelligence officer. Czech intelligence insists he was. Able Danger, apparently, had information supporting the Czechs.

The CIA, and the 9/11 Commission, say Atta wasn't in Prague April 9, 2001, because his cell phone was used in Florida that day. But there is no evidence of who used the phone. Atta could have lent it to a confederate. (It wouldn't have worked in Europe anyway.)

But acknowledging that possibility would leave open the likelihood that Saddam's regime was involved in, or at least had foreknowledge of, the 9/11 attacks. And that would have been as uncomfortable for Democrats as the revelation that 9/11 could have been prevented if it hadn't been for the Clinton administration's wall of separation.

The 9/11 commission wrote history as it wanted it to be, not as it was. The real history of what happened that terrible September day has yet to be written."

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9755.htm
0 Replies
 
rayban1
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 07:20 am
Quote:
The 9/11 commission wrote history as it wanted it to be, not as it was. The real history of what happened that terrible September day has yet to be written."


Interesting last paragraph from your article Dlowan.......says a lot about the political agenda of the commission.......also says a lot about the lack of integrity of the commission members
0 Replies
 
dlowan
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 07:28 am
Hmmmm - who knows what it all means, as yet.
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 07:34 am
dlowan wrote:
Hmmmm - who knows what it all means, as yet.


Maybe a 9/11 Commission Commission to investigate the 9/11 Commission will find out.
0 Replies
 
revel
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 07:35 am
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/13/politics/13intel.html

August 13, 2005
9/11 Panel Explains Move on Intelligence Unit
By DOUGLAS JEHL
WASHINGTON, Aug. 12 - The Sept. 11 commission concluded that an intelligence program known as Able Danger "did not turn out to be historically significant," despite hearing a claim that the program had identified the future plot leader Mohammed Atta as a potential terrorist threat more than a year before the 2001 attacks, the commission's former leaders said in a statement on Friday evening.

The statement said a review of testimony and documents had found that the single claim in July 2004 by a Navy officer was the only time the name of Mr. Atta or any other future hijacker was mentioned to the commission as having been known before the hijackings. That account is consistent with statements this week by a commission spokesman, but it contradicts claims by a former defense intelligence official who said he had told the commission staff about Able Danger's work on Mr. Atta during a briefing in Afghanistan in October 2003.

The statement was issued by Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton after a week in which the Able Danger program, a highly classified operation under the military's Special Operations Command, rose to public prominence. The Sept. 11 commission report made no mention of the unit, disbanded in 2002, and the statement by Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton defended that omission, saying the operation had not been significant "set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts" that involved Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton also noted that the name and character of Able Danger had not been publicly disclosed when the commission issued its public report in 2004. They said the commission had concluded that the July 2004 testimony by the Navy officer, who said he had seen an Able Danger document in 2000 that described Mr. Atta as connected to a cell in Brooklyn "was not sufficiently reliable" to warrant further investigation, in part because the officer could not supply documentary evidence to prove it.

The leaders said the staff learned about the program in the October 2003 briefing and later sought Defense Department documents about it. But those department documents, they said, "had mentioned nothing about Atta, nor had anyone come forward between September 2001 and July 2004 with any similar information."

Representative Curt Weldon, a Pennsylvania Republican who has called attention to the program, said the commission had done too little to follow up on the information. Mr. Weldon said he would continue to "push for a full accounting of the historical record so that we may preclude these types of failures from happening again."

Among the questions left by the commission statement is whether the Special Operations Command received information about Mr. Atta and others from the Able Danger team in the summer of 2000 and chose not to forward it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as Mr. Weldon and the former defense intelligence official have said.

If verified, that would be the first indication that Mr. Atta was identified as a threat by any American agency before the Sept. 11 attacks. The Special Operations Command and the Pentagon have declined to comment, and the statement issued by the commission on Friday evening addressed only its own role in reviewing information about the program.

In an interview this week, a former senior military officer disputed that the unit members had ever presented to their superiors information that identified Mr. Atta or other suspected members of Al Qaeda. A second former officer said any information presented by the team to the leaders of the Special Operations Command would have been unlikely to be shared outside the command in the environment that prevailed before Sept. 11.

The former defense intelligence official, who was interviewed twice this week, has repeatedly said that Mr. Atta and four others were identified on a chart presented to the Special Operations Command. The former official said the chart identified about 60 probable members of Al Qaeda.

In interviews, former military officers have said the Able Danger unit was established in September 1999 by Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, then the head of the Special Operations Command, under a charter issued by Gen. Hugh Shelton, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Shelton, now retired, has said he does not recall the program; General Schoomaker, now the Army chief of staff, has declined to comment, as has Gen. Charles R. Holland, who took over the Special Operations Command in October 2000.
0 Replies
 
rayban1
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 07:48 am
dlowan wrote:
Hmmmm - who knows what it all means, as yet.


There were many of us enraged when Gorelick's role came to light but then it was quickly glossed over by the leaders of the commission. She should have been dismissed from the commission and called as a witness.

Had she been called as a witness, the damage caused by the wall that her memo erected, would have come to light and changed the entire impact of the commission findings.

It will be a bombshell when the real reason for her memo, preventing information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement, is revealed.
0 Replies
 
squinney
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 08:55 am
Why would it be a bombshell? There were laws in place preventing secret Pentagon groups from gathering intelligence on US citizens and those here legally with green cards. Gorlick followed the law. Would you have had her do otherwise?

Also, the memo was actually from 1995, and the Atta info, if true, was not discovered until September 2000.

The Patriat Act, passed after 9/11, is what took down the wall. The Patriat Act was in process of being written at the time Clinton left office.

If Clinton knew about Atta, which is not clear, it would have only been for a couple of months before he left office. Maybe that's why he was so adament about making sure Bush and the new administration new about the dangers Osama represented.
0 Replies
 
rayban1
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 10:12 am
Squinney wrote:
The Patriat Act was in process of being written at the time Clinton left office.


Prove it

Squinney wrote:
If Clinton knew about Atta, which is not clear, it would have only been for a couple of months before he left office. Maybe that's why he was so adament about making sure Bush and the new administration new about the dangers Osama represented.


Laughing This is completely illogical. If it comes to light that Clarke and/or Clinton knew about Atta without actually mentioning his name, Clinton and Clarke will both be criminals...........
0 Replies
 
revel
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 10:43 am
The wall would not have effected Atta anyway because it deals with US citizens and not persons who are here on visa's.

http://mediamatters.org/items/200508110001

Quote:
The recommendation was rejected and the information was not shared, they said, apparently at least in part because Mr. Atta, and the others were in the United States on valid entry visas. Under American law, United States citizens and green-card holders may not be singled out in intelligence-collection operations by the military or intelligence agencies. That protection does not extend to visa holders, but Mr. Weldon and the former intelligence official said it might have reinforced a sense of discomfort common before Sept. 11 about sharing intelligence information with a law enforcement agency
0 Replies
 
DontTreadOnMe
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 01:22 pm
yeah, yeah... it's all clinton's fault.

oh brother.
0 Replies
 
rayban1
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 01:28 pm
DontTreadOnMe wrote:
yeah, yeah... it's all clinton's fault.

oh brother.



Well.......yeah......it is! :wink:
0 Replies
 
DontTreadOnMe
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 01:35 pm
rayban1 wrote:
DontTreadOnMe wrote:
yeah, yeah... it's all clinton's fault.

oh brother.



Well.......yeah......it is! :wink:


nice try, but i'm not buying any bridges today. Cool
0 Replies
 
rayban1
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 01:59 pm
DontTreadOnMe wrote:
rayban1 wrote:
DontTreadOnMe wrote:
yeah, yeah... it's all clinton's fault.

oh brother.



Well.......yeah......it is! :wink:


nice try, but i'm not buying any bridges today. Cool


Damn........I've got a "steal" on the San Francisco Bay bridge. Just one million $.......my Swiss account number is ................ Only catch is.....you must move it quickly and at night after 2 AM. Crying or Very sad
0 Replies
 
Walter Hinteler
 
  1  
Reply Sun 14 Aug, 2005 02:08 pm
rayban1 wrote:
......my Swiss account number is ................


Would you mind adding your mother's maiden name and your father's birthplace please?
0 Replies
 
 

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