Iraq Gov't Wants US Out By Fall 2006

This report is in line with the UN resolution passed about a year ago. We agreed then to start troop withdraw in the spring of 2006. This really isn't any type news.

You can rest assured we will have some type of troop presence in the area for some years to come.

Isn't "on their way out" different than "some troop withdrawal?"

If I was them I would just take the bull by the horns and deal with the insurgency on my own regardless of any civil wars.

Half the problem is caused by our very presence and if we left we would take half the problems away. The rest will take years and years if ever to sort out.

Are we going to stay for years and years or maybe forever? If we are then we will forever be a thorn for those in ME not happy about the US muscling in on them.

I don't understand why we go in and bomb these places to the stone age and then spend money we could be using to educate and care for and protect our own country and citizens to rebuild them and help them.

We should leave 'em on their own after we destroy them. That's a better message. "We won't interfere with you or your life and we will turn a deaf ear if you want to talk **** about us but first time you screw around with us you're f**ked". Have a nice day.

Re: Iraq Gov't Wants US Out By Fall 2006


I do not care if the Iraqi forces can or can not protect THEIR democracy. What I do know is the US and England should not be doing it.

What is happening is obvious.

We are putting a Shia government in place. The current (democratically elected) government is led by Jaafari, a religious politician who spent time in Iran. The real power broker is Sistani, an Islamic cleric who spent time in Iran.

Those resisting the new government are Sunni, who are the big losers in this whole thing. But the Shia have a majority and by throwing some favors to the Kurds hold all the power.

The reality is the Shia want us out, the Sunni want us out. No one wants us there. The Shia are using us only to make sure they stay in power.

The Shia don't need us much longer. They would far prefer to get their military support against the Sunni opposition from Iran. Iran will be more than willing to offer this, and the connections are already being made (Jaafari is even making trips to Tehran).

The natural course of things is a Shia dominated government with military support from Iran and a mostly independant Kurdish area. With Iran's help a Shia government can squash the Sunni opposition in the way that oppositions are normally squashed.

Obviously the US doesn't want this outcome. It is the US that is trying to prolong things to squirm out of the obvious awkwardness of the obvious outcome.

The US has a little leverage and these stories are just covers for the real deals being made out of the public eye.

I think that the Shia government, with the help of Iran, is using its political leverage as a supposedly sovereign nation, to pressure the US out. They are trying to offer a fairly dignified way out for the US that will leave the Shia fully in power to set up the Islamic republic they want.

Outfoxed by a bunch of third worlders that Bushco looks down their noses on. Oh the embarassment....oh the humiliation....oh what a bunch of dumb asses....

Perhaps what you seeing re: troop strength, is evidence of the huge impact the new Ambassador will have on the situation in Iraq. We can only hope his actions and thinking will translate into real progress.

The ambassador's own scorecard

By Daniel Serwer | July 28, 2005

THE NEW American ambassador in Baghdad has given the public an unusual opportunity to gauge his success. Based on his widely lauded work as US ambassador in Kabul, the new envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, has developed a checklist for the United States when it undertakes nation-building after a conflict.
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Khalilzad will face difficult tradeoffs in trying to meet his own criteria, which were listed in an article published recently in The National Interest.

The aspirations of a newly liberated society have to be understood, and the United States must align itself with these goals.
The initial US plan to decapitate the Iraqi government, removing Saddam Hussein and a relatively few of his loyalists, betrayed a profound misunderstanding of Iraqi aspirations. American understanding of Iraqi politics has improved, but sectarian tensions have increased dramatically. Khalilzad will have to find what he calls the ''the center of gravity" and stay with it. He will find many courageous Iraqis who, eager for security and freedom, reject sectarian divisions and violence.

The United States has to position itself as an ally, not a conqueror or occupier.
When decapitation proved unworkable, the United States hastily established an occupation authority in Iraq, which officially ended more than a year ago. An elected transitional government is now in place. But many Iraqis believe that the occupation continues in another guise. Khalilzad will have to step lightly to avoid arousing suspicions that the occupation continues.

Intensive political and diplomatic engagement with national leaders is needed to craft a national compact.
In the first year after liberation, American officials were deeply engaged with Iraqi leaders in developing transitional administrative law. Today, Iraqis control their own constitution-writing process with assistance from international experts. The United States is pressing hard to keep what increasingly looks like an unrealistic timetable for completing the constitution. Khalilzad will have to decide whether it is more important to meet the Aug. 15 deadline or get the new national compact right.

The United States should size its footprint to avoid unnecessary friction and overreliance on the military.
Many critics of the administration believe the United States has not had sufficient troops in Iraq to meet postwar security requirements. Would raising the Iraq troop level help or just cause greater frictions? Troop strength is not the ambassador's call, but his judgment weighs heavily. Too few troops, or too many, could encourage the insurgency and make it much harder for the Iraqi authorities to control the country.

Success in reconstituting a country's political elite depends on the emergence of people with the vision and capability to build a new and better order.
Many of the leaders who have emerged in Iraq show determination, courage, and promise, but the insurgency makes the conditions under which they operate exceedingly difficult. Most important, no one has emerged from the Sunni community with a message and a following that competes effectively with the insurgency, which actively seeks to prevent new leadership from emerging. Khalilzad's job is to find Sunnis who can lead their community in a peaceful, democratic direction and persuade them to take risks.

Effective communication is vital.
The United States has had enormous difficulty communicating its vision to Iraqis over the past two years. This is Khalilzad's toughest assignment: to convince Iraqis that the United States intends to do well by Iraq and will get out once a democratic regime is in place if that's what the Iraqi government wants. He will have to climb a mountain of public skepticism.

The United States should use a flexible, multilateral model for intervention backed by energetic and robust policies and programs.
The US-led military coalition in Iraq was never broad enough, but it has narrowed recently. The Poles, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Italians, and Dutch are either going or gone. The UN, which managed to pull off elections in January because of Iraqi determination to vote, is helping with the constitutional process, as mandated by a Security Council resolution. Still, the United States is perilously close to going it alone in Iraq these days, and Khalilzad will have to reinvigorate a US approach that has lost steam.

If neighboring countries can help or harm the effort, the United States should engage them and shape their conduct to the extent possible.
Iraq's key neighbors continue to cause serious problems. The Syrians are pumping money and people into the Sunni insurgency. The Iranians are pushing an Islamist agenda that fortunately has little traction in Iraq.The Saudis have done little to prevent Sunni extremists from entering Iraq, apparently glad to see them leave the kingdom and blow themselves up elsewhere. Kuwait, Jordan, and even Turkey are playing more benign roles, but they are not the hard cases for the United States to influence. More military and police effort is needed to seal Iraq's borders and more diplomatic effort to gain cooperation from its neighbors.

A loosely integrated civil-military structure, policies, and programs are the best way to succeed.
Civilian/military cooperation in Iraq has been erratic: excellent in some parts of the country and disastrously bad in others. The still shaky peace that prevails in the multiethnic, oil-producing town of Kirkuk is due in part to concerted civilian-military cooperation there, especially right after liberation. Khalilzad will have his work cut out for him ensuring that integration is sufficient to block and eventually defeat the insurgency.

Success requires resources and more efficient operations.
US funding has never been lacking in Iraq, but effectiveness has been problematic. This is due largely to the insurgency, which has made it mortally dangerous for any American to do business in Iraq. Khalilzad was careful in Afghanistan to focus his own attention mainly on politics and not overpromise on physical reconstruction. In Iraq, the focus was initially on grand promises of physical and economic reconstruction, with political transition an afterthought. The new ambassador needs to reverse the priorities.

The ambassador's 10 well-framed lessons learned from Afghanistan are a road map for success in Iraq.

If he performs as well in Baghdad as he did in Kabul, Khalilzad will be a hero.

If he fails, the United States will be unable to establish a stable, democratic Iraq, with profoundly negative consequences for the Iraqis, for regional stability, and for US credibility throughout the Muslim world and beyond.

Daniel Serwer is vice president for peace and stability operations at the United States Institute of Peace, where he oversees its Iraq programs. These views are his own.

An ambassador is going to clear up this whole mess? Such optimism...

Well you saw the disastrous results of the first US ambassador....Paul Bremer....why couldn't it work the other. Don't you ever get tired of being pessimistic or is it that you don't want anything to work?

While Bremer was no great shakes in his role in Iraq, I hardly think he can be blamed for the current fiasco. But sure, I'll try to see the brighter side, if you think that will help...

That is a great thing to remember considering the situation in Iraq



I bet you'll have a hard time getting that whistling out of your head now.

Thank you....Bremer was tasked with an impossible mission because there was no plan but he didn't know the mission was impossible. He went in with the typical American, "Get the job done" attitude. He and Bush were willing to accept some bad consequences but they had no idea of the magnitude of the consequence caused by disbanding the Iraqi Army.

Everyone has realized the enormous cost of making huge mistakes caused by a total lack of understanding the people and the politics of the region. I don't know that we could have avoided any of these mistakes because we were "feeling" our way like a blind man groping in the darkness. As Rumsfeld has said ....... there were some things that were and are unknowable. I am not making excuses for the administration......just stating a fact. No one had a crystal ball, but of course there were thousands of opinions....about what to do. Which opinion would you have picked......they happened to back the wrong guy....Chalabi.....I can't say that I would not have picked him.......after all we had NO actionable intelligence from within Iraq.....put that into perspective if you will.

This whole thing was rushed into being because we had two hundred thousand troops already in place and the hot weather was rushing in. We couldn't afford the time to plan adequately for the aftermath of the war and we couldn't afford to pull the troops back. You remember that it was the presence of the troops that caused Saddam to allow the inspectors back in. Now how in the hell can you keep two hundred thousand troops on the border in the heat until NEXT year. Americans are naturally optimistic therefore due to the reports from the exiled Iraqis and their families back in Iraq, the US would be welcomed as liberators and treated as guests.

We can't say that Saddam planned all this because he knew how the Iraqis would react.......if he had planned all this I think he would chosen something besides a spider hole to hide in for months on end. Did his appearance cause anyone to think he had planned all this? I think he had a bunker all prepared but he was paranoid to use it thinking that someone would stab him in the back and reveal where he was. He knew that we had bunker busting bombs that could penetrate any hiding place if we kept hammering at it. He chose to stay on the run with a handful of trusted family.

My point is that it is not useful to try to place blame on anyone for past mistakes because probably no one could have done better given the circumstances and the time constraints.

My further point is that this new Ambassador brings freshly learned experience from Afghanistan and deep knowledge of the culture. I think we should be optimistic about the future in Iraq and the possibility that many of our troops can be withdrawn within the next year withoud any detrimental effect.


E Brown-----no I won't whistle your tune or play your game **** off

You're something, Rayban.

You spend all this time composing a sober, thoughtful post, putting your ideas forward in an honest manner. You try to appeal to the reader's sense of reason as you review the history of the war and attempt to lead the reader, piece by piece, to the same conclusion you have reached.

Then, after all that, you turn petty and nasty at the end.

In one sentence at the end, you just spoiled the whole effect you worked so hard to build over several paragraphs!

I interpreted EBrowns little ditty as his way of giving me the red ass for being optimistic and as that seems to be a no no to most people on this forum I immediately formed a conclusion ......If someone has an intent that is meant to be friendly he should state so up front.......I am not a mind reader......If I were, I wouldn't be wasting my time here with people who try to be clever beyond their capabilities.

Ebrown is all over the spectrum with his political beliefs and I have given up trying to interpret his meaning or intent. If it was not his intent to offend then let him state so......then I will apologize.

You half way tried to give me a compliment but you kept saying I tried......but I guess in the end I failed ....... not because of the nasty ending but just because I failed to persuade. Do I read you correctly?

Rayban:

No, you didn't lose me because because of the nasty ending, although I thought it was overkill for eBrown's tongue-in-cheek post.

I do believe your post was meant to level with the reader though, and that these are your honest thoughts.

I disagree with you on several points.

First, I am not going to con you, I am a Democrat who was opposed to this war almost from the first. Actually, when Bush first announced his intention to go after Iraq early in 2002, for a brief few weeks I was teeter-tottering, since Saddam had defied the UN under Clinton. A couple of times, I even took Bush's side in arguments on this at the early stages. But after a few weeks I could not help but pushed away by the hyped up rush to go in there, plus the fact that there was little evidence that Saddam Hussein, awful as he was, was involved in 911.

Hussein seemed to be handing us an opportunity to get rid of him by not following UN resolutions to the letter. On the other hand, it seemed to me that Arabs, who have good reasons and bad reasons for not liking the US, might be radicalized by us invading Iraq. While they might not like us in Afghanistan and might protest, deep down inside I think most Arabs know that you cannot seriously harbor the man who sends planes into the WTC and not expect the wrath of the Number One military power to come down on you.

Iraq is a different deal, though. With no proven connections to 911, it seemed to me we ran the risk of having the Arabs think we were out to take over the Middle East, country by country. The Arabs might grudgingly agree that the Taliban had it coming, if only for being stupid. Iraq must strike them as our getting ready to rip through the whole region.

That is why I decided against the invasion back in 2002.

I am afraid that the radicalization of the Arabs is what has occurred.

Then there is the major issue of the fact that Iran and Iraq are right next to each other, and are the only two nations on Earth where Shiites are in the majority. In a region which has never known separation of church and state, this is important. Years ago, I remember reading an account of a Shiite holy day commemorating the Battle of Karbala where the Shiite hero, Hussein, lost and the Sunni hero, Yazid, won. Evrey year on this day, the Shiites go on a sad procession where people cry as they hit themselves with chains. The article said that ooutsiders viewing this spectacle cannot be struck at how real the pain is on the faces of the marchers, and if they were reacting to a massacre which occurred yesterday instead of over a thousand years ago, (the Battle of Karbala was not close).

We live in a country where Protestants, Catholics and Jews have learned to get along just ducky. This leads us to underestimate the bonds of Shia, and how much Iran is in Iraq's likely future. Before the invasion, I believed, as I still do, that we were going to end up doing Iran a big, big favor by deposing Saddam Hussein.

Emotionally, I am ready to jump on the "Bring 'em home" bandwagon. What is bothering me is the sneaking suspicion that future generations might curse us for doing so. How can a great power invade a country in a tinerbox region of great ecnonomic importance, depose the ruler, then say "Toodle-oo" and let various factions which have been building up a grudge for centuries have at each other?

So far, Bush seems to offering a plan which sounds good to Americans who are raised in a democracy from birth. First we have the election to chooose the people who will write the Constitution, then we have more elections to choose this, more elections to choose that, etc. Sounds good to Americans. but we must remember that when America wrote her Constitution, the thirteen colonies were not at war with each other. Rather, they were united against the common enemy-England. We wanted top build a grat nation and live together.

Not like Iraq. The Kurds want their own country, the Sunnis and Shiites barely have anything to do with each other.

So before I jump on the "Bring 'em home NOW" bandwagon, I would just like to know if there are any good options before we take that fateful step. Because right now, I don't see any, but I am willing to listen. I can't think that anything which enhances the power the of the mullahs in Tehran can be good for the world. But Bush's "first we elect this, then we elect that" approach which seems to ignore the divisions in the country appears slated to be waste of time, money, and American blood. And I don't trust Bush's motives-if you look at his Administration, an unbelievably high percentage of his appointments are in the oil buisness or have oil interests. Iraq is the second leading oil producer in the world.

But once we leave, we aren't going back, so whatever good we can do in the region must be done while we are in there-even though I believe we shouldn't have gone there.

If anyone can draw me a realistic plan that we can implement that would do some good in Iraq for us or the cause of world stability, I would like to hear it. Seriously, I'm listening. I have a hunch withdrawal is not the way to go, but I'm trying to find good options to it and I am not seeing any.

One thing that seems to be forgotten in this debate of whether we should bring them home is that the Iraqi government wants us to go home just as soon as they feel they got a handle in the situation. If that fateful day ever comes and they do tell us to leave, are we going to keep our word and leave even if we supposedly don't feel that it is time and we haven't yet "fixed it"?

Nice long post KW.......I have some comments in response but it will some hours before I can get back with you. I'm glad I didn't lose you with my overreaction to EBrown.
rayban

Ebrown said: "What is happening is obvious.

We are putting a Shia government in place. The current (democratically elected) government is led by Jaafari, a religious politician who spent time in Iran. The real power broker is Sistani, an Islamic cleric who spent time in Iran.

Those resisting the new government are Sunni, who are the big losers in this whole thing. But the Shia have a majority and by throwing some favors to the Kurds hold all the power.

The reality is the Shia want us out, the Sunni want us out. No one wants us there. The Shia are using us only to make sure they stay in power.

The Shia don't need us much longer. They would far prefer to get their military support against the Sunni opposition from Iran. Iran will be more than willing to offer this, and the connections are already being made (Jaafari is even making trips to Tehran).

The natural course of things is a Shia dominated government with military support from Iran and a mostly independant Kurdish area. With Iran's help a Shia government can squash the Sunni opposition in the way that oppositions are normally squashed.

Obviously the US doesn't want this outcome. It is the US that is trying to prolong things to squirm out of the obvious awkwardness of the obvious outcome.

The US has a little leverage and these stories are just covers for the real deals being made out of the public eye.

I think that the Shia government, with the help of Iran, is using its political leverage as a supposedly sovereign nation, to pressure the US out. They are trying to offer a fairly dignified way out for the US that will leave the Shia fully in power to set up the Islamic republic they want. "

I agree and have felt that way for some time. The Iran leaders were probably delighted when the U.S. invaded Iraq and may have had some influence over Chalabi who played a role in convincing the Bush administration to attack. The U.S. got rid of Iran's hated enemy, Hussein and the Sunnis, and Iran got the U.S. off its back at the same time.

The Iraq Sunnis are, in fact, cosying up to the Iranis diplomatically, and may well get millitary aid from them in the future. There may be a point where the Shia are fed up with attacks from the Sunnis and take drastic action against them perhaps with help from Iran, and ask the U.S. to leave.

Iraq's new constitution has a provision stating that laws will not be made that are contrary to the Koran. It sounds like an Islamic state to me.
_________________
"Makin' their way, the only way they know how.
That's just a little bit more than the law will allow."

Hey Coluber

Who the hell are you and where have you been?......Sounds to me like you have this thing all mapped out. The situation is certainly headed in that direction at the moment. I was very disappointed when Alawi got the boot....it seemed to me he was doing a good job but he may have been stealing too much. We still hold some strong cards though and this new Ambassador may be just clever enough to deal with Jaafari but about all we can do now is hope. One question though.....what would happen if we pull Jaafari's protection if he starts getting too close to Iran?

I think there is a good possibility that Sistani is the real power and this new Ambassabor may be able to find out just what he really wants and I have heard that he does not want to get too close to Iran. What do you know about that?