Can morality be objective in a world without God?

Not sure what your problem is. I was just saying that he disagreed with what he had said, which sounds similar to what you're saying, even though it was "logical."

John Jones, when you speak to me you speak to Brahmin. But, then, you are also Brahmin speaking to Brahmin.
Can philosophy not be subjective?

Hegel said that language is inherently universal, meaning that if I say "It is raining", I am attempting to convey the meaning of this particular sitation but I suceed only in conveying a universal; what I mean is lost. This is essentially a shift away from the strictly logical analysis of the structure of the sentence towards the a theory about the usage of language.

If I say 'it is raining' both I, and the person I say it to, understand that 'it is raining'. The only way to introduce doubt or the demands of evidence is to change the statement. For example, the statement will become 'it might be raining', or the statement might become: 'the person who says "it is raining" may be lying'.

John Jones

Quote:

If I say 'it is raining' both I, and the person I say it to, understand that 'it is raining'. The only way to introduce doubt or the demands of evidence is to change the statement. For example, the statement will become 'it might be raining', or the statement might become: 'the person who says "it is raining" may be lying'.

Yes, but there are two problems to consider.
When I say to you "it's raining" I use a codified system of communication and, since you are familiar to that particular system, you understand what I mean.
The same when I say "there is a fire in the building".
And the same when I say "the queen of France is a woman".
But language is not only an exchange of statements within a codified system.
When I say to you "it's raining", or "there is a fire" I am describing a factual situation. The statements are valid within the language system previously chosen, but they are not necessarily true.
Because those statements refer to something that is external to the logic of language. And that is the reason why when I say "it is raining" or "there is a fire" I am causing in you, not only an understanding but also a physical reaction.
There is no difference with the signs that some animals give, when they feel a predator. They understand the signs, but there is something else: a reaction, that has nothing to do with language.
I think you agree that logical system can never reach anything that is not already included and codified within that system.
What I mean by this is: the validity of a proposition has nothing to do with it's truth.
See the third example: "the queen of France is a woman". This is a valid proposition. The predicate/attribute is already in the subject. This could be an analytical proposition. But it isn't. When I say "the queen of France is a woman", I am saying more than that. I am saying" There is a queen in France, and that queen is a woman". And that proposition is valid but false.
But if I say "assuming that there is a queen in France, that supposed queen must be a woman", I am enouncing an analytical proposition.

And then there's the problem of WHAT IT IS THAT IS RAINING when we say "it" is raining. There always seems to be an agent of action, even if it has to be invented as a grammatical rule (objective/subject or subject/predicate).