I find it difficult to believe that your reading comprehension skills are as limited as claim them to be. If you cannot read the posts and understand them in the context of this overall discussion, there isn't much I can do to assist you unless you want me to treat you like a kindergarten student who is just learning the alphabet.
Off topic and an adolescent remark which does nothing to support you claims
Inasmuch as marriage is a fundamental right, the state may not restrict marriage unless the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Each and every restriction on marriage survives or fails constitutional muster on its own merits.
One such restriction being the definition of marriage as adopted by a state!
The state has no interest compelling enough to justify differential treatment between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples.
Is the above your opinion or that of the SCOTUS, and with reference to what? Your statement is not narrowly defined, at least not with reference to the issuing of a state marriage license and the definition of marriage as adopted by a state.
We aren't talking about shacking up. We aren't talking about ordinary contracts. We're talking about civil marriage wherein entry into the social institution is regulated by the state.
Exactly so, Debra! And among those regulations and policies of a state, as concluded and upheld in IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MARSHALL G. GARDINER, Deceased
"The Legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to recognize only the traditional marriage between 'two parties who are of the opposite sex,' and all other marriages are against public policy and void," Justice Donald Allegrucci wrote. "We cannot ignore what the Legislature has declared to be the policy of this state."
In addition to what the Court stated above, a number of very important points concerning constitutional law are stated by the Court which every freedom loving American ought to study and remember:
“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs. When construing a statute, words in common usage are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning.”
“In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to consideration of the language used in the statute but may look to the historical background of the statute, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested.”
“We apply the rules of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. We do not read into a statute something that does not come within the wording of the statute. We must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be.
5. The legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to recognize only the traditional marriage between two parties who are of the opposite sex.
6. The words "sex," "marriage," "male," and "female" in everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals. The common, ordinary meaning of "persons of the opposite sex" contemplates what is commonly understood to be a biological man and a biological woman. A post-operative male-to-female transsexual does not fit the common definition of a female.
7. A traditional marriage is the legal relationship between a biological man and a biological woman for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose relationship is founded on the distinction of sex.”
Like I said Debra, although there is a fundamental right for two people to shack up and consider themselves ‘married”, there is no fundamental right requiring a state to recognize a contract which is not in harmony with its laws, which includes the definition of marriage.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly established through case precedent that marriage is a fundamental right--a liberty interest--protected from state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1957); ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
We all know the above Debra, why do you state the obvious?
Given that you are such a fan of Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, you might want to read Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in TURNER v. SAFLEY, 482 U.S. 78 (1987):
Justice O'Connor wrote:
. . . In support of the marriage regulation, petitioners first suggest that the rule does not deprive prisoners of a constitutionally [482 U.S. 78, 95] protected right. They concede that the decision to marry is a fundamental right under Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), but they imply that a different rule should obtain "in . . . a prison forum." See Brief for Petitioners 38, n. 6. Petitioners then argue that even if the regulation burdens inmates' constitutional rights, the restriction should be tested under a reasonableness standard. They urge that the restriction is reasonably related to legitimate security and rehabilitation concerns.
We disagree with petitioners that Zablocki does not apply to prison inmates. It is settled that a prison inmate "retains those [constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822. The right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration. Many important attributes of marriage remain, however, after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life. First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment. These elements [482 U.S. 78, 96] are an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship. In addition, many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some inmates and their spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication. Third, most inmates eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated. Finally, marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e. g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e. g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e. g., legitimation of children born out of wedlock). These incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal aspects of the marriage commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.
Taken together, we conclude that these remaining elements are sufficient to form a constitutionally protected marital relationship in the prison context.
How many times and in how many ways does the Supreme Court have to say that the right to marry is a fundamental right protected by the constitution before you comprehend the concept?
False conclusion that I am a fan of Justice O'Connor, but then most of your conclusions are false.
We are not talking about marriage not being a fundamental right. We are talking about the definition of marriage as adopted by a state. How many times and in how many ways do you have to be reminded what the subject matter is?
The state has no interest compelling enough to justify differential treatment between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples. If you can think of a compelling state interest that would survive constitutional muster, by all means . . . let us know. But simply stating the state legislature intended only to recognize opposite sex marriage merely begs the question.
The kindergarten class is now dismissed for recess.
But Debra dear, you did not answer the question. Why did you cite the case you did to support your claim that “The state has no interest compelling enough to justify differential treatment between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples” ?
Did the S.C. in the case you cited say that the federal constitution forbids a state to require that couples who apply for a marriage license must be of the opposite sex?
If a state does require couples who apply for a marriage license to be of the opposite sex, how would that be treating heterosexual couples different than homosexual couples? Seems to me the requirement of "opposite sex" to obtain a "marriage" license applies equally regardless of “sexual preference“, the only restriction is that the couple is made up of one male and one female whether the couple is homosexual, hetero sexual, bi-sexual, transsexual or any combination one can imagine___ the only requirement for a “marriage” license is, the couple must be one male and one female. Surely, a homosexual male and a homosexual female are eligible for a marriage license in a state which requires an opposite sex couple for the license to be issued.
Now my dear, what is your argument and what is its constitutional basis, if any?