federally UNCONSTITUTIONAL state constitutional amendments

Debra,
You said..."Identify the compelling state interests that you believe make it necessary for the state to impinge on the right to marry."

I can ask you the same thing.
What right does the state have to decide that 3 people that love each other cannot get married?
What right does the state have to decide how many spouses a person can have.

What is "compelling state interest" in outlawing polygamy?

You never did answer that question.

I find it difficult to believe that your reading comprehension skills are as limited as claim them to be. If you cannot read the posts and understand them in the context of this overall discussion, there isn't much I can do to assist you unless you want me to treat you like a kindergarten student who is just learning the alphabet.

Inasmuch as marriage is a fundamental right, the state may not restrict marriage unless the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Each and every restriction on marriage survives or fails constitutional muster on its own merits.

The state has no interest compelling enough to justify differential treatment between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples.

We aren't talking about shacking up. We aren't talking about ordinary contracts. We're talking about civil marriage wherein entry into the social institution is regulated by the state.

"The Legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to recognize only the traditional marriage between 'two parties who are of the opposite sex,' and all other marriages are against public policy and void," Justice Donald Allegrucci wrote. "We cannot ignore what the Legislature has declared to be the policy of this state."

“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs. When construing a statute, words in common usage are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning.”

“In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to consideration of the language used in the statute but may look to the historical background of the statute, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested.”

“We apply the rules of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. We do not read into a statute something that does not come within the wording of the statute. We must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be.

5. The legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to recognize only the traditional marriage between two parties who are of the opposite sex.

6. The words "sex," "marriage," "male," and "female" in everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals. The common, ordinary meaning of "persons of the opposite sex" contemplates what is commonly understood to be a biological man and a biological woman. A post-operative male-to-female transsexual does not fit the common definition of a female.

7. A traditional marriage is the legal relationship between a biological man and a biological woman for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose relationship is founded on the distinction of sex.”

The United States Supreme Court has clearly established through case precedent that marriage is a fundamental right--a liberty interest--protected from state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1957); ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).

Given that you are such a fan of Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, you might want to read Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in TURNER v. SAFLEY, 482 U.S. 78 (1987):

Justice O'Connor wrote:

. . . In support of the marriage regulation, petitioners first suggest that the rule does not deprive prisoners of a constitutionally [482 U.S. 78, 95] protected right. They concede that the decision to marry is a fundamental right under Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), but they imply that a different rule should obtain "in . . . a prison forum." See Brief for Petitioners 38, n. 6. Petitioners then argue that even if the regulation burdens inmates' constitutional rights, the restriction should be tested under a reasonableness standard. They urge that the restriction is reasonably related to legitimate security and rehabilitation concerns.

We disagree with petitioners that Zablocki does not apply to prison inmates. It is settled that a prison inmate "retains those [constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822. The right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration. Many important attributes of marriage remain, however, after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life. First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment. These elements [482 U.S. 78, 96] are an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship. In addition, many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some inmates and their spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication. Third, most inmates eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated. Finally, marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e. g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e. g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e. g., legitimation of children born out of wedlock). These incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal aspects of the marriage commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.

Taken together, we conclude that these remaining elements are sufficient to form a constitutionally protected marital relationship in the prison context.

How many times and in how many ways does the Supreme Court have to say that the right to marry is a fundamental right protected by the constitution before you comprehend the concept?

The state has no interest compelling enough to justify differential treatment between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples. If you can think of a compelling state interest that would survive constitutional muster, by all means . . . let us know. But simply stating the state legislature intended only to recognize opposite sex marriage merely begs the question.

The kindergarten class is now dismissed for recess.

Debra,
You said..."Identify the compelling state interests that you believe make it necessary for the state to impinge on the right to marry."

Re: federally UNCONSTITUTIONAL state constitutional amendmen

Brandon9000 wrote:

No, I'm looking at that [the Fourteenth Amendment] really hard and I don't see anything about laws not being based on ethics. I guess you mean you won't waste your time on an argument over a position you can't support.

Brandon9000:

You can't see, because you're wearing blinders. You base your entire argument on the fact that you're wearing blinders.

Help, help . . . I can't see . . . you proclaim as you poke around the Fourteenth Amendment with your white cane.

You cannot be enlightened nor can you be helped to understand the Fourteenth Amendment until you stop playing the deaf, dumb, and blind game. Why don't you raise you blindfold a little bit and take a peek at this:

http://www.able2know.com/forums/viewtopic.php?p=1334631#1334631

Learn or not learn about what it means to be a citizen of this great country. It's up to you whether you remain willfully blind or whether you will wrap your mind around fundamental concepts of liberty secured from state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.

You can lead a horse to water . . . .

All those moral majorities that raced to the polls to amend their state constitutions to ban same sex marriage ought to be ashamed of themselves. It doesn't matter if they make discriminatory, oppressive laws or amend their state constitutions to be discriminatory and oppressive. They may not impose their morals on others through the power of the state. Since they are not smart enough to figure that out, I guess the federal judiciary must do its duty.

Oh yeah. I'm sure the moral majority will scream "judicial activism." But the fact remains that the U.S. Constitution does NOT ALLOW them to impose their views on others unless they have a compelling reason for doing so -- a compelling reason unrelated to their moral disapproval. They cannot stop a federal court from performing its constitutional duty to strike down unconstitutional laws.

Judge Nixes Neb. Same-Sex Wed Ban

Quote:

A federal judge Thursday struck down Nebraska's ban on gay marriage, saying the measure interferes not only with the rights of gay couples but also with those of foster parents, adopted children and people in a host of other living arrangements.

The constitutional amendment, which defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman, was passed overwhelmingly by the voters in November 2000.

U.S. District Judge Joseph Bataillon said the ban "imposes significant burdens on both the expressive and intimate associational rights" of gays "and creates a significant barrier to the plaintiffs' right to petition or to participate in the political process."

(Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman)

Monticello, June 24, 1826


Respected Sir-

The kind invitation I receive from you, on the part of the citizens of the city of Washington, to be present with them at their celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of American Independence, as one of the surviving signers of an instrument pregnant with our own, and the fate of the world, is most flattering to myself, and heightened by the honorable accompaniment proposed for the comfort of such a journey. It adds sensibly to the sufferings of sickness, to be deprived by it of a personal participation in the rejoicings of that day. But acquiescence is a duty, under circumstances not placed among those we are permitted to control. I should, indeed, with peculiar delight, have met and exchanged there congratulations personally with the small band, the remnant of that host of worthies, who joined with us on that day, in the bold and doubtful election we were to make for our country, between submission or the sword; and to have enjoyed with them the consolatory fact, that our fellow citizens, after half a century of experience and prosperity, continue to approve the choice we made. May it be to the world, what I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all,) the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-government. That form which we have substituted, restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion. All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of hope for others. For ourselves, let the annual return of this day forever refresh our recollections of these rights, and an undiminished devotion to them.

I will ask permission here to express the pleasure with which I should have met my ancient neighbors of the city of Washington and its vicinities, with whom I passed so many years of a pleasing social intercourse; an intercourse which so much relieved the anxieties of the public cares, and left impressions so deeply engraved in my affections, as never to be forgotten. With my regret that ill health forbids me the gratification of an acceptance, be pleased to receive for yourself, and those for whom you write, the assurance of my highest respect and friendly attachments.

Th. Jefferson