federally UNCONSTITUTIONAL state constitutional amendments

Polgamy isn't marriage--it's the existence of multiple (more than one) marriages each entered without dissolving the last.

Marriage may only be entered, maintained, or dissolved in accordance with the law. A person who is already married may not lawfully enter another marriage without lawfully dissolving his first marriage.

The states have not violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring that an individual lawfully dissolve his first marriage before entering a second marriage.

Polgamy isn't marriage--it's the existence of multiple (more than one) marriages each entered without dissolving the last.

Marriage may only be entered, maintained, or dissolved in accordance with the law. A person who is already married may not lawfully enter another marriage without lawfully dissolving his first marriage.

The states have not violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring that an individual lawfully dissolve his first marriage before entering a second marriage.

Debra_Law wrote:

Polgamy isn't marriage--it's the existence of multiple (more than one) marriages each entered without dissolving the last.

Marriage may only be entered, maintained, or dissolved in accordance with the law. A person who is already married may not lawfully enter another marriage without lawfully dissolving his first marriage.

The states have not violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring that an individual lawfully dissolve his first marriage before entering a second marriage.

So then you DO agree that the state can regulate who can or cannot get married,and under what circumstances.
Isn't that what the anti-gay marriage amendments are about?
Or,are you saying that the equal protection clause only applies in certain situations?

Debra_Law wrote:

Polgamy isn't marriage--it's the existence of multiple (more than one) marriages each entered without dissolving the last.

Marriage may only be entered, maintained, or dissolved in accordance with the law. A person who is already married may not lawfully enter another marriage without lawfully dissolving his first marriage.

The states have not violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring that an individual lawfully dissolve his first marriage before entering a second marriage.

So you are saying that the govt can indeed set the limits on what the dictates of what marriage constitutes?

So then you DO agree that the state can regulate who can or cannot get married,and under what circumstances.
Isn't that what the anti-gay marriage amendments are about?
Or,are you saying that the equal protection clause only applies in certain situations?

Personally I think it was abhorrent that that US arbitrarily outlaw polygamy because it was statistically deviant (they weren't looking out for women's rights, people), and more than that, they sought to enforce those laws against a geographical area that they really had no jurisdiction over. . . .

So tell us, how would it be "looking out for women's rights" if she was relegated to the lowly position of fourth or fifth wife of a Mormon?

Inasmuch as marriage is a fundamental right, the state may not restrict marriage unless the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Each and every restriction on marriage survives or fails constitutional muster on its own merits.

The state has no interest compelling enough to justify differential treatment between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples.

Since our past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that "critical examination" of the state interests advanced in support of the classification is required. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 , 314 (1976); see e. g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).

The leading decision of this Court on the right to marry is Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In that case, an interracial couple who had been convicted of violating Virginia's miscegenation laws challenged the statutory scheme on both equal protection and due process grounds. The Court's opinion could have rested solely on the ground that the statutes discriminated on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 11-12. But the Court went on to hold that the laws arbitrarily deprived the couple of a fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry. The Court's language on the latter point bears repeating:


"The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

"Marriage is one of the `basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id., at 12, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). [434 U.S. 374, 384]

Although Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals. Long ago, in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), the Court characterized marriage as "the most important relation in life," id., at 205, and as "the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress," id., at 211. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court recognized that the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children" is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, id., at 399, and in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, supra, marriage was described as "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race," 316 U.S., at 541 .

More recent decisions have established that the right to marry is part of the fundamental "right of privacy" implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court observed:


"We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." Id., at 486.

See also id., at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id., at 502-503 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment).

Cases subsequent to Griswold and Loving have routinely categorized the decision to marry as among the personal decisions protected by the right of privacy. See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 -600, and nn. 23-26 (1977). For [434 U.S. 374, 385] example, last Term in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), we declared:


"While the outer limits of [the right of personal privacy] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions `relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 -542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 453 -454; id., at 460, 463-465 (WHITE, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, [262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)].'" Id., at 684-685, quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 -153 (1973).

See also Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 -640 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 -844 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). 10 [434 U.S. 374, 386]

It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. As the facts of this case illustrate, it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society. The woman whom appellee desired to marry had a fundamental right to seek an abortion of their expected child, see Roe v. Wade, supra, or to bring the child into life to suffer the myriad social, if not economic, disabilities that the status of illegitimacy brings, see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 -770, and n. 13 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 -176 (1972). Surely, a decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional family setting must receive equivalent protection. And, if appellee's right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place. 11

By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed. See Califano v. Jobst, ante, p. 47; [434 U.S. 374, 387] n. 12, infra. The statutory classification at issue here, however, clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry.

Under the challenged statute, no Wisconsin resident in the affected class may marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere without a court order, and marriages contracted in violation of the statute are both void and punishable as criminal offenses. Some of those in the affected class, like appellee, will never be able to obtain the necessary court order, because they either lack the financial means to meet their support obligations or cannot prove that their children will not become public charges. [/b]These persons are absolutely prevented from getting married.[/b] Many others, able in theory to satisfy the statute's requirements, will be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that they will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry. And even those who can be persuaded to meet the statute's requirements suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be fundamental. 12 [434 U.S. 374, 388]


III
When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. See, e. g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S., at 686 ; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S., at 262 -263; San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 16 -17; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972). Appellant asserts that two interests are served by the challenged statute: the permission-to-marry proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the necessity of fulfilling his prior support obligations; and the welfare of the out-of-custody children is protected. We may accept for present purposes that these are legitimate and substantial interests, but, since the means selected by the State for achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry, the statute cannot be sustained.

Inasmuch as marriage is a fundamental right, the state may not restrict marriage unless the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Each and every restriction on marriage survives or fails constitutional muster on its own merits.

The state has no interest compelling enough to justify differential treatment between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples.

Although there is a fundamental right for two people to shack up and consider themselves ‘married”, there is no fundamental right requiring a state to recognizes a contract which is not in harmony with its laws.

The Court stated, "The Legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to recognize only the traditional marriage between 'two parties who are of the opposite sex,' and all other marriages are against public policy and void," Justice Donald Allegrucci wrote. "We cannot ignore what the Legislature has declared to be the policy of this state."
In addition to what the Court stated above, a number of very important points concerning constitutional law are stated by the Court which every freedom loving American ought to study and remember:

“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs. When construing a statute, words in common usage are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning.”

The understanding of marriage as being a union between one male and one female is the common usage definition of marriage as known from the very founding of our nation. That definition is a legally binding definition today within statutory law and is required to be observed by our public servants!

“In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to consideration of the language used in the statute but may look to the historical background of the statute, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested.”

In other words, in determining the intent for which a state has involved itself in, say issuing marriage licenses, a review of the historical purposes for which the State has involved itself in issuing marriage licenses and the purposes sought to be accomplished, is very important in determining the intent, which is required to be followed.

The Court went on to say:

“We apply the rules of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. We do not read into a statute something that does not come within the wording of the statute. We must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be.

5. The legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to recognize only the traditional marriage between two parties who are of the opposite sex.

6. The words "sex," "marriage," "male," and "female" in everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals. The common, ordinary meaning of "persons of the opposite sex" contemplates what is commonly understood to be a biological man and a biological woman. A post-operative male-to-female transsexual does not fit the common definition of a female.

7. A traditional marriage is the legal relationship between a biological man and a biological woman for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose relationship is founded on the distinction of sex.”

JWK:

You fail to recognize the heirarchy of laws in our government of dual sovereignty:

1. U.S. Constitution (Supreme Law of the Land);

2. United States Code ..................snip..........

The issue is whether state marriage statutes that are intentionally designed to limit marriage to one man and one woman discriminate against homosexuals in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land.

Now my dear, how does your court citation [ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/434/374.html] support your notion that
“The state has no interest compelling enough to justify differential treatment between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples”

Your SC citation has nothing to do with your assertion concerning homosexuals and a state's authority to adopt pulbic policy regarding marriage, its regulation, and its recognition by the state.

I see nothing in the intentions of the Kansas state legislature to limit marriage to one man and one woman that would pass the critical examination required by ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL. The fact that the state legislators intended to limit marriage simply begs the question of whether that limitation is constitutional.

Identify the compelling state interests that you believe make it necessary for the state to impinge on the right to marry.

Identify the compelling state interests that you believe make it necessary for the state to impinge on the right to marry.

Debra_Law wrote:

Inasmuch as marriage is a fundamental right, the state may not restrict marriage unless the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Each and every restriction on marriage survives or fails constitutional muster on its own merits.

The state has no interest compelling enough to justify differential treatment between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples.

Although there is a fundamental right for two people to shack up and consider themselves ‘married”, there is no fundamental right requiring a state to recognizes a contract which is not in harmony with its laws.

. . . In support of the marriage regulation, petitioners first suggest that the rule does not deprive prisoners of a constitutionally [482 U.S. 78, 95] protected right. They concede that the decision to marry is a fundamental right under Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), but they imply that a different rule should obtain "in . . . a prison forum." See Brief for Petitioners 38, n. 6. Petitioners then argue that even if the regulation burdens inmates' constitutional rights, the restriction should be tested under a reasonableness standard. They urge that the restriction is reasonably related to legitimate security and rehabilitation concerns.

We disagree with petitioners that Zablocki does not apply to prison inmates. It is settled that a prison inmate "retains those [constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822. The right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration. Many important attributes of marriage remain, however, after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life. First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment. These elements [482 U.S. 78, 96] are an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship. In addition, many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some inmates and their spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication. Third, most inmates eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated. Finally, marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e. g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e. g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e. g., legitimation of children born out of wedlock). These incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal aspects of the marriage commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals.

Taken together, we conclude that these remaining elements are sufficient to form a constitutionally protected marital relationship in the prison context.

But the following case
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MARSHALL G. GARDINER, Deceased, issued by THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, ought to clear the matter up as to “public policy” and “compelling state interest“..

The Court stated, "The Legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to recognize only the traditional marriage between 'two parties who are of the opposite sex,' and all other marriages are against public policy and void," Justice Donald Allegrucci wrote. "We cannot ignore what the Legislature has declared to be the policy of this state."

In addition to what the Court stated above, a number of very important points concerning constitutional law are stated by the Court which every freedom loving American ought to study and remember:

“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs. When construing a statute, words in common usage are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning.”[/i]

The understanding of marriage as being a union between one male and one female is the common usage definition of marriage as known from the very founding of our nation. That definition is a legally binding definition today within statutory law and is required to be observed by our public servants!

“In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to consideration of the language used in the statute but may look to the historical background of the statute, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested.” [/i]

In other words, in determining the intent for which a state has involved itself in, say issuing marriage licenses, a review of the historical purposes for which the State has involved itself in issuing marriage licenses and the purposes sought to be accomplished, is very important in determining the intent, which is required to be followed.

The Court went on to say:

“We apply the rules of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. We do not read into a statute something that does not come within the wording of the statute. We must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. [/i]

5. The legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to recognize only the traditional marriage between two parties who are of the opposite sex.[/i]

6. The words "sex," "marriage," "male," and "female" in everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals. The common, ordinary meaning of "persons of the opposite sex" contemplates what is commonly understood to be a biological man and a biological woman. A post-operative male-to-female transsexual does not fit the common definition of a female.[/i]

7. A traditional marriage is the legal relationship between a biological man and a biological woman for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose relationship is founded on the distinction of sex.”[/i]

JWK