US AND THEM: US, UN & Iraq, version 8.0

In emotionless English, Dearlove tells Blair and the others that President Bush has decided to remove Saddam Hussein by launching a war that is to be "justified by the conjunction of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." Period. What about the intelligence? Dearlove adds matter-of-factly, "The intelligence and facts are being fixed around the policy."

May 01, 2005

The secret Downing Street memo


SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY


DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.


The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.


(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)


MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

has been clear from the start that the primary motivation for the intervention in Iraq was to decisively alter the historical trajectory of the states in the Gulf region and the Middle east.

It is neither our right, nor our responsibility, to do this. The short-sighted policies your leaders have adopted will come back to bite us all, George.

You would have us go back to the days of might-makes-right amongst nations; because you cannot fault another nation for acting in the same self-interest with which we have acted; and therefore you invite war upon us. Which I'm not big on.

Cycloptichorn

My view is that the lessons of history are pretty clear on this point, and we cannot depend on "international law" or the cooperative action of international bodies to contain or prevent tyranny or protect ourselves.

The long, long view of history would seem to suggest, what with changes in demographics and sheer volume of population amongst such demographics, now and in the future; is that we appear to be entering a period in which neither law, intelligence, learning from the past, enlightment, working for the common good and needs of the long-term, modern values/ethics, etc., necessarily have anything to do with what will be happening in the world.

I believe there is nothing here that is shocking, and very little that is new. It has been clear from the start that the primary motivation for the intervention in Iraq was to decisively alter the historical trajectory of the states in the Gulf region and the Middle east.

paragraph 4 - of course, but that skips neatly over the morally reprehensible act of being disengenous (deceitful) to the populace about why Iraq ought to be attacked. 9-11 being a handy motivator, let's toss that out as the reason. If you'll recall, that is what happened.

Both Iraq and North Korea present serious dangers of aggressive war to their neighbors and to other powers, the USA included.

We know that Saddam Hussein has invested heavily in the development of the isotope separation and shaped charge triggering methods required to produce a nuclear weapon. We know that he has the ability to produce ballistic missiles with which to deliver them. We know he exercises absolute control over his country and is therefore not particularly subject to the inducements and persuasion that even a modicum of popular democracy might bring. We know that if the sanctions are lifted the oil wealth he will rapidly accumulate will quickly enable him to fill whatever gaps may remain and do more dangerous things as well.

But my protest here was simply regarding the disengenuousness at trying to suggest to the public that Iraq was in some way responsible for 9-11. Because people were so moved by that event, it was an act of opportunism and deceit, and I think it very dangerous for leaders to do this. These guys shouldn't be lying about important stuff, because then the citizens really do lose their connection to truth and to reasoned decision making.

I have little doubt our intelligence has already detected some connections between them (Iraq and al Qaeda)

The so-called Christian Coalition has lost most of its capable political leaders and most of its clout as well. Its high water point in our politics occurred about six years ago. I'm not sure what evidence leads you to suggest "... the religious right has gained increasing power...".

Asherman wrote:
Both Iraq and the DPRK are a clear and present danger to world security. It really probably matters little which is dealt with first. If anything the North Korean situation only makes the move to neutralize Saddam more quickly. Cicero has argued tirelessly for eternal containment of Saddam, North Korea is one of the several reasons that strategy should not be followed.

Excellent point, and one I have not seen cited here or anywhere else (wish I said it myself). Let me repeat it for emphasis.

Both Iraq and North Korea represent serious dangers to the U.S. I doubt that a theoretical debate concerning which is worse would produce much that is useful.

The obvious U.S. motivation for the Iraqi confrontation, and the stated motivation of our government, is to enforce the agreement which ended the hostilities in 1992, following Iraq's unprovoked invasion of Kuwait.

This agreement commits Iraq to divest itself of all WMD and long-range missiles. It is this agreement that makes the possession of nuclear weapons by Iraq different from their posession by all the other countries noted in earlier posts on this thread.

Like Phoenix, I believe the WMD issue is just a red herring.

I believe we didn't forcibly topple Saddam in 1992 (1) because the coalition then would have flown apart had we entered Iraq in a big way after driving Saddam's forces out of Kuwait; and (2) because we still saw a need for some counter force to a still very radical Iran. Very likely we hoped or expected that he would be overthrown soon after his defeat, but that didn't happen.

By early 2001 the international pressures to remove the economic sanctions on Iraq were increasing - it was just a matter of time before they would be lifted. The U.S. had to consider life with Iraq (and Saddam) after the oil and the money valves were reopened. Armed with $10-$20 billion of oil revenues per year, Saddam could do a great deal of harm. Soon after 9/11 the Bush administration announced its intent to bring about a "regime change" there. None of this was exclusively centered on the WMD issue, though it was indeed a factor.

We made WMD the issue in our effort to get Security Council resolution 1441. It was the very legalistic process required in the Security Council by nations that, for their own reasons opposed our aims in Iraq, that made the whole thing rise and fall on WMD - even though that was never the sole reason for our intervention.

Why did we intervene? Many likely reasons; (1) An example for other outlaw nations, (2) to change the balance of terror in the Mideast; (3) to foster a modern secular government in the one nation in the Arab world likely to thrive under such a system and provide a model for the others; (4) to lessen our dependence on a failing Saudi regime; (5) to remove a major player in the international WMD market and a potential host for terrorists. (6)to remove a cruel tyrant from the backs of the Iraqi people.

I don't think we have really added many new recruits for al Queda. With those so disposed we already had nothing to lose. If we could create a more positive model in the Arab world and, in the process achieve a breakthrough in the Palestine/Israel matter, we will have much to gain.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Report, i.e., The 9-11 Commission Report alleged, 8/21/2004 in CHAPTERS 1, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1: Before we invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, al Qaeda et al perpetrated the following mass murders of Americans:
1. 2/1993 WTC in NYC--6 dead Americans;
2. 11/1995 Saudi National Guard Facility in Riyadh--5 dead Americans;
3. 6/1996 Khobar Towers in Dhahran--19 dead Americans;
4. 8/1998 American Embassy in Nairobi--12 dead Americans;
5. 12/2000 Destroyer Cole in Aden--17 dead Americans;
6. 9/2001 WTC in NYC, Pentagon, Pennsylvania Field--approximately 1500 dead Americans plus approximately 1500 dead non-Americans.