Is the US military now going to have a war with US citizens?
They don't see who the "real" threat is?
Our USA security people are capable of tracing and tapping any wire or wireless call that is initiated anywhere in the world. In particular, they are capable of tracing and tapping a call from say Iraq or France to anyone in the USA.
It is essential that our USA security people keep secret within their defense agencies what they learn so that they can be effective in using what they learn to secure our "life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness." That is, after all, our government's primary function.
Personally, for the sake of securing the lives, liberties and pursuits of happiness of those I love, I willingly and eagerly request our USA security people, to feel free to trace and tap any and all of my and anyone else's wire and wireless calls, whenever their appropriate management think that probably necessary to do their job effectively.
All of my rights and the rights of those I love terminate when we are dead. Only one of our rights -- privacy for our phone calls -- is temporarily suspended, and not terminated, when and if USA security people listen to our private telephone conversations.
I think part of your problem, Ican, is that you don't believe there is anything more to lose than your life. Which is untrue.
Everybody dies. Only some are lucky enough to live free and with dignity.
Cycloptichorn
Of course, everybody dies! But in the USA, people are used to feeling secure and expect the government to take care of their security.
I am sure that Cyclopys does not remember the cry of the left wing moth eaten hippies-
BETTER RED THAN DEAD!!!!!
When and if I master the art of extra-sensory perception, I shall devote it to worldwide sensing and stopping imminent murder of civilians by terrorists. Until then, those like me, who have not mastered this art, but not like me, who are nonetheless responsible for our security, are limited by their presently inadequate tools to do their job. They need our help not our obstruction.
The right to privacy
The Constitution does not specifically mention a right to privacy. However, Supreme Court decisions over the years have established that the right to privacy is a basic human right, and as such is protected by virtue of the 9th Amendment. The right to privacy has come to the public's attention via several controversial Supreme Court rulings, including several dealing with contraception (the Griswold and Eisenstadt cases), interracial marriage (the Loving case), and abortion (the well-known Roe v. Wade case). In addition, it is said that a right to privacy is inherent in many of the amendments in the Bill of Rights, such as the 3rd, the 4th's search and seizure limits, and the 5th's self- incrimination limit.
FOURTH AMENDMENT [U.S. Constitution] - 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, detention must be 'reasonable. ' See U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542-44 ('85) (analyzing constitutionality of length of traveler's border detention under Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard); Caban, 728 F.2d at 75 (considering whether duration of border detention without a hearing was reasonable).
In the context of a criminal arrest, a detention of longer than 48 hours without a probable cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law in the absence of a demonstrated emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 670 ('91). However, the Supreme Court arrived at this rule by considering the time it takes to complete administrative steps typically incident to arrest. See id.
Unreasonable Searches And Seizures.
Non-consensual extraction of blood implicates Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 16 ('89) ('this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes [a reasonable] expectation of privacy'); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 67 ('66) (compulsory blood test 'plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment').' '[f]or the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable.' Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; accord Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, No. 95-590, 1995 WL 373274, at *3 (June 26,'95) ('the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is `reasonableness''). A search's reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment generally depends on whether the search was made pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause. U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 ('83).
Even in the law enforcement context, the State may interfere with an individual's Fourth Amendment interests with less than probable cause and without a warrant if the intrusion is only minimal and is justified by law enforcement purposes. E.g., Michigan State Police Dept v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 ('90); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 ('68).
The gathering of fingerprint evidence from 'free persons' constitutes a sufficiently significant interference with individual expectations of privacy that law enforcement officials are required to demonstrate that they have probable cause, or at least an articulable suspicion, to believe that the person committed a criminal offense and that the fingerprinting will establish or negate the person's connection to the offense. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 813-18 ('85); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-28 ('69).
Nevertheless, everyday 'booking' procedures routinely require even the merely accused to provide fingerprint identification, regardless of whether investigation of the crime involves fingerprint evidence. See Smith v. U.S., 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir.'63) (Burger, J.) ('it is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to . . . fingerprinting . . . as part of the routine identification processes'); Napolitano v. U.S., 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.'65) ('Taking fingerprints [prior to bail] is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights.'). Thus, in the fingerprinting context, there exists a constitutionally significant distinction between the gathering of fingerprints from free persons to determine their guilt of an unsolved criminal offense and the gathering of fingerprints for identification purposes from persons within the lawful custody of the state.
Although the drawing of blood from free persons generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a person has committed a criminal offense and that his blood will reveal evidence relevant to that offense, see Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-71; U.S. v. Chapel, ___ F.3d ___, slip op. at 5753-54 (9th Cir.'95) (en banc), the absence of such a warrant does not a fortiori establish a violation of the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that the drawing of blood constitutes only a minimally intrusive search. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (blood tests do not 'infringe significant privacy interests'); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 62 ('85) (not 'an unduly extensive imposition'); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 ('commonplace'); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 36 ('57) ('routine' and 'would not be considered offensive by even the most delicate').
'An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.' Skinner, 489 U.S. at 421-2 (holding that a warrant was not required in part because 'in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate'). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed and expanded the principle first enunciated in Skinner, stating that, in some contexts, 'testing based on `suspicion' of [wrongful activity] would not be better, but worse' than suspicionless testing. Acton, 1995 WL 373274, at *8. In Acton, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a school district's practice of conducting random, suspicionless urine testing of school athletes for drug use. The Court rejected the proposition that the school district could conduct such testing only if school officials had suspicion that a specific athlete was using drugs, holding that this alternative 'entails substantial difficulties -- if it is indeed practicable at all.' Id. Accusatory drug testing would 'transform[] the process into a badge of shame' and would increase the risk that school officials would impose testing arbitrarily upon disfavored, but not drug-using, students. Id.
Except in certain narrowly limited cases, the Court repeatedly has stated its 'insist[ence] upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution.' Chambers v. Moreny, 399 U.S. 42, 51 ('70). Because '[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value in our society,' searches that invade bodily integrity cannot be executed as mere fishing expeditions to acquire useful evidence: 'The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.' Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, 769-70.
Only when law enforcement faces an exigent circumstance, such as a need to preserve evanescent blood alcohol evidence, and has probable cause to link the sought-after information to a crime under investigation is it constitutional to conduct nonconsensual blood testing without a warrant. Id. at 770-71. Therefore, forced extraction of blood not only 'implicates the Fourth Amendment,' as the majority notes, but also falls squarely within the area of privacy interests for which the traditional probable cause requirement determines reasonableness in the law enforcement context. Forced blood extraction intrudes on the private personal sphere and infringes upon an individual's 'most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.' Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 60 ('85).
Searches Involving Intrusions Beyond The Body's Surface.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 69 ('66). The Schmerber Court posed two questions: (1) whether the police were justified in imposing a nonconsensual blood test and (2) whether the procedures themselves were reasonable. Id. at 768. In answering the first question, the Court recognized that it was 'writ[ing] on a clean slate' regarding the treatment of searches that involve intrusions into the human body. Id. at 767-8. It concluded that such searches require probable cause. Id. at 770-1.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 ('85), recognized that Schmerber's threshold standard was a requirement of probable cause 'where intrusions into the human body are concerned,' which implicate 'deep-rooted expectations of privacy.' Id. at 761, 760. The Winston Court then acknowledged `other factors'' eyond these standards' that must be considered in determining whether a particular intrusion is reasonable: whether 'the procedure threatens the safety or health of the individual' and 'the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests.' Id. at 761 (emphasis added). In regard to the additional 'dignitary' factor (beyond the threshold inquiry of invasion of bodily integrity), the Winston Court noted Schmerber's recognition that blood extraction is not 'an unduly extensive imposition.' Id. at 762. The Court contrasted this lesser bodily invasion, which the Schmerber Court had upheld upon demonstration of probable cause, with the more drastic measure of dangerous surgery to recoup criminal evidence, which the Winston Court concluded would violate the individual's Fourth Amendment rights even when supported by probable cause. Thus again, the context of the quotation demonstrates that the Court places blood extraction squarely within the probable cause requirement because it is an invasion of bodily integrity, while at the same time acknowledging that it is a less extensive imposition on dignitary interests than surgical removal of a bullet.
Investigatory Stops Of Motorists At Sobriety Checkpoints.
The unique situation in which the Supreme Court has approved suspicionless searches in the traditional law enforcement context. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 ('90). The Sitz Court relied on well-settled law that motorists have a lessened expectation of privacy regarding stops and visual searches of automobiles on the nation's roadways. Id. at 450 (explaining the importance of the context of 'police stops of motorists on public highways'). At these sobriety checkpoints, which motorists may choose to avoid, only the initial brief stop and preliminary questioning may take place without individualized suspicion: 'more extensive field sobriety testing' requires justification. Id. at 450-2.
Like the highway sobriety checkpoints, the 'special needs beyond normal law enforcement' rationale supports searches on lesser grounds than probable cause only in a very few, carefully tailored regulatory contexts that do not involve apprehension of criminal perpetrators. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 65-66 ('89) (applying the special needs exception to suspicionless quasi-consensual drug testing of Customs Service employees seeking transfer to positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction).
The special needs exception covers testing which 'is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement [because] . . . results may not be used in criminal prosecution.' Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (emphases added). Even so, a search in the special needs context almost always requires individualized suspicion. See, e.g., Portillo v. U.S. Dist. Court, 15 F.3d 819, 823 (9th Cir.'94) (requiring individualized suspicion for urinalysis testing under the probationer special needs exception). The rare special needs cases which do not require individualized suspicion involve persons who voluntarily participate in a highly regulated context. See, e.g., Von Raab, at 671, 677 (noting that 'certain forms of employment may diminish privacy expectations' for the 'employees who seek to be promoted' to certain positions); Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 1995 WL 373274, *6-*7 (U.S. June 26, '95) (noting that schools are highly regulated and 'like adults who choose to participate in a `closely regulated industry,' students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy').
Nonetheless, routine searches that intrude into prisoners' bodies without probable cause may be upheld only when the search is undertaken pursuant to a valid prison regulation that is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87-91 ('87); see, e.g., Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 387 (9th Cir.'90) (remanding for evidence of a specific penological objective because 'general protestations of concern for the welfare of the citizens of Nevada and the prison community are simply insufficient to render the involuntary seizure of blood specimens, even from prison inmates, constitutionally reasonable').
Individuals have a categorically different and lesser expectation of privacy in their fingerprints, visual images, or voice prints -- even when their production is compelled -- because they are personal attributes that are routinely exposed to the public at large in daily life. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 51 ('67) (finding a lesser expectation of privacy in personal effects that 'a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office').
The Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what 'a person knowingly exposes to the public'. Like a man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.
The required disclosure of a person's voice is thus immeasurably further removed from the Fourth Amendment protection than was the intrusion into the body effected by the blood extraction in Schmerber . . . . Rather, this is like the fingerprinting in Davis, . . . [which] 'involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.' U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 ('73) (quoting Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 51 ('67), and Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 27 ('69)) (emphases added).
'Fingerprinting' - like the compelled production of other aspects of an individual's identification that are routinely exposed to and superficially observable by the public at large, such as voice prints, handwriting exemplars, and photographs - simply belongs to a different category of search that 'represents a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of searches and detentions.' Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 14 ('85).*fn10 The majority's analysis obliterates this critical constitutional distinction between coerced fingerprinting and blood extraction for DNA genetic pattern analysis.
Blanket Searches.
Blanket searches are unreasonable, however 'evenhanded' they may be, in the traditional criminal law enforcement context. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-2, 92 n.4 ('79) (invalidating a blanket patdown search of all patrons in a tavern, even though there was probable cause to search the bartender and the premises). The ill that the Fourth Amendment prevents is not merely the arbitrariness of police discretion to single out individuals for attention, but also the unwarranted domination and control of the citizenry through fear of baseless but 'evenhanded' general police searches.
In Zurcher, the Supreme Court held that a search of the offices of a university newspaper, which was not involved in any criminal activity, for photographs of demonstrators who had assaulted police officers did not offend the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court concluded: '[T]he Amendment has not been a barrier to warrants to search property on which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located, whether or not the owner or possessor of the premises to be searched is himself reasonably suspected of complicity in the crime being investigated.' Zurcher v. Stanford Daily ('78) 436 U.S. 547, 549-50.
Fourth Amendment protects the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The essence of that protection is a prohibition against some modes of law enforcement because the cost of police intrusion into personal liberty is too high, even though the intrusion undoubtedly would result in an enormous boon to the public if the efficient apprehension of criminals were the sole criterion to be considered. 'The easiest course for [law enforcement] officials is not always one that our Constitution allows them to take.' Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, dissenting).
A permanent resident alien is entitled to constitutional protection. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-4 ('82) ('[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.'). In particular, to Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful seizures. See Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 760 F.2d 907, 09-10 (9th Cir.'85) (finding that INS seizure of alien violated Fourth Amendment); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 213 n.1, 215-21 ('84) (considering whether questioning of resident aliens by INS agents amounted to seizure for purposes of Fourth Amendment); Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 824, 826-28 (9th Cir.'87) (analyzing whether seizures of three resident aliens complied with Fourth Amendment).
This is a re-post from 02
Quote:CounterPunch
October 11, 2002
Addiction, Brain Damage and the President
"Dry Drunk" Syndrome and
George W. Bush
by KATHERINE van WORMER
Ordinarily I would not use this term. But when I came across the article "Dry Drunk" - - Is Bush Making a Cry for Help? in American Politics Journal by Alan Bisbort, I was ready to concede, in the case of George W. Bush, the phrase may be quite apt.
Dry drunk is a slang term used by members and supporters of Alcoholics Anonymous and substance abuse counselors to describe the recovering alcoholic who is no longer drinking, one who is dry, but whose thinking is clouded. Such an individual is said to be dry but not truly sober. Such an individual tends to go to extremes.
It was when I started noticing the extreme language that colored President Bush's speeches that I began to wonder. First there were the terms-- "crusade" and "infinite justice" that were later withdrawn. Next came "evil doers," "axis of evil," and "regime change", terms that have almost become clichés in the mass media. Something about the polarized thinking and the obsessive repetition reminded me of many of the recovering alcoholics/addicts I had treated. (A point worth noting is that because of the connection between addiction and "stinking thinking," relapse prevention usually consists of work in the cognitive area). Having worked with recovering alcoholics for years, I flinched at the single-mindedness and ego- and ethnocentricity in the President's speeches. (My husband likened his phraseology to the gardener character played by Peter Sellers in the movie, Being There). Since words are the tools, the representations, of thought, I wondered what Bush's choice of words said about where he was coming from. Or where we would be going.
First, in this essay, we will look at the characteristics of the so-called "dry drunk;" then we will see if they apply to this individual, our president; and then we will review his drinking history for the record. What is the dry drunk syndrome? "Dry drunk" traits consist of:
* Exaggerated self-importance and pomposity
* Grandiose behavior
* A rigid, judgmental outlook
* Impatience
* Childish behavior
* Irresponsible behavior
* Irrational rationalization
* Projection
* Overreaction
Clearly, George W. Bush has all these traits except exaggerated self importance. He may be pompous, especially with regard to international dealings, but his actual importance hardly can be exaggerated. His power, in fact, is such that if he collapses into paranoia, a large part of the world will collapse with him. Unfortunately, there are some indications of paranoia in statements such as the following: "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends." The trait of projection is evidenced here as well, projection of the fact that we are ready to attack onto another nation which may not be so inclined.
Bush's rigid, judgmental outlook comes across in virtually all his speeches. To fight evil, Bush is ready to take on the world, in almost a Biblical sense. Consider his statement with reference to Israel: "Look my job isn't to try to nuance. I think moral clarity is important... this is evil versus good."
Bush's tendency to dichotomize reality is not on the Internet list above, but it should be, as this tendency to polarize is symptomatic of the classic addictive thinking pattern. I describe this thinking distortion in Addiction Treatment: A Strengths Perspective as either/or reasoning-- "either you are with us or against us." Oddly, Bush used those very words in his dealings with other nations. All-or-nothing thinking is a related mode of thinking commonly found in newly recovering alcoholics/addicts. Such a worldview traps people in a pattern of destructive behavior.
Obsessive thought patterns are also pronounced in persons prone to addiction. There are organic reasons for this due to brain chemistry irregularities; messages in one part of the brain become stuck there. This leads to maddening repetition of thoughts. President Bush seems unduly focused on getting revenge on Saddam Hussein ("he tried to kill my Dad") leading the country and the world into war, accordingly.
Grandiosity enters the picture as well. What Bush is proposing to Congress is not the right to attack on one country but a total shift in military policy: America would now have the right to take military action before the adversary even has the capacity to attack. This is in violation, of course, of international law as well as national precedent. How to explain this grandiose request? Jane Bryant Quinn provides the most commonly offered explanation in a recent Newsweek editorial, "Iraq: It's the Oil, Stupid." Many other opponents of the Bush doctrine similarly seek a rational motive behind the obsession over first, the war on terror and now, Iraq. I believe the explanation goes deeper than oil, that Bush's logic is being given too much credit; I believe his obsession is far more visceral.
On this very day, a peace protestor in Portland held up the sign, "Drunk on Power." This, I believe, is closer to the truth. The drive for power can be an unquenchable thirst, addictive in itself. Senator William Fulbright, in his popular bestseller of the 1960s, The Arrogance of Power, masterfully described the essence of power-hungry politics as the pursuit of power; this he conceived as an end in itself. "The causes and consequences of war may have more to do with pathology than with politics," he wrote, "more to do with irrational pressures of pride and pain than with rational calculation of advantage and profit."
Another "dry drunk" trait is impatience. Bush is far from a patient man: "If we wait for threats to fully materialize," he said in a speech he gave at West Point, "we will have waited too long." Significantly, Bush only waited for the United Nations and for Congress to take up the matter of Iraq's disarmament with extreme reluctance.
Alan Bisbort argues that Bush possesses the characteristics of the "dry drunk" in terms of: his incoherence while speaking away from the script; his irritability with anyone (for example, Germany's Schröder) who dares disagree with him; and his dangerous obsessing about only one thing (Iraq) to the exclusion of all other things.
In short, George W. Bush seems to possess the traits characteristic of addictive persons who still have the thought patterns that accompany substance abuse. If we consult the latest scientific findings, we will discover that scientists can now observe changes that occur in the brain as a result of heavy alcohol and other drug abuse. Some of these changes may be permanent. Except in extreme cases, however, these cognitive impairments would not be obvious to most observers.
To reach any conclusions we need of course to know Bush's personal history relevant to drinking/drug use. To this end I consulted several biographies. Yes, there was much drunkenness, years of binge drinking starting in college, at least one conviction for DUI in 1976 in Maine, and one arrest before that for a drunken episode involving theft of a Christmas wreath. According to J.D. Hatfield's book, Fortunate Son, Bush later explained:
"[A]lcohol began to compete with my energies....I'd lose focus." Although he once said he couldn't remember a day he hadn't had a drink, he added that he didn't believe he was "clinically alcoholic." Even his father, who had known for years that his son had a serious drinking problem, publicly proclaimed: "He was never an alcoholic. It's just he knows he can't hold his liquor."
Bush drank heavily for over 20 years until he made the decision to abstain at age 40. About this time he became a "born again Christian," going as usual from one extreme to the other. During an Oprah interview, Bush acknowledged that his wife had told him he needed to think about what he was doing. When asked in another interview about his reported drug use, he answered honestly, "I'm not going to talk about what I did 20 to 30 years ago."
That there might be a tendency toward addiction in Bush's family is indicated in the recent arrests or criticism of his daughters for underage drinking and his niece for cocaine possession. Bush, of course, deserves credit for his realization that he can't drink moderately, and his decision today to abstain. The fact that he doesn't drink moderately, may be suggestive of an inability to handle alcohol. In any case, Bush has clearly gotten his life in order and is in good physical condition, careful to exercise and rest when he needs to do so. The fact that some residual effects from his earlier substance abuse, however slight, might cloud the U.S. President's thinking and judgment is frightening, however, in the context of the current global crisis.
One final consideration that might come into play in the foreign policy realm relates to Bush's history relevant to his father. The Bush biography reveals the story of a boy named for his father, sent to the exclusive private school in the East where his father's reputation as star athlete and later war hero were still remembered. The younger George's achievements were dwarfed in the school's memory of his father. Athletically he could not achieve his father's laurels, being smaller and perhaps less strong. His drinking bouts and lack of intellectual gifts held him back as well. He was popular and well liked, however. His military record was mediocre as compared to his father's as well. Bush entered the Texas National Guard. What he did there remains largely a mystery. There are reports of a lot of barhopping during this period. It would be only natural that Bush would want to prove himself today, that he would feel somewhat uncomfortable following, as before, in his father's footsteps. I mention these things because when you follow his speeches, Bush seems bent on a personal crusade. One motive is to avenge his father. Another seems to be to prove himself to his father. In fact, Bush seems to be trying somehow to achieve what his father failed to do - - to finish the job of the Gulf War, to get the "evildoer" Saddam.
To summarize, George W. Bush manifests all the classic patterns of what alcoholics in recovery call "the dry drunk." His behavior is consistent with barely noticeable but meaningful brain damage brought on by years of heavy drinking and possible cocaine use. All the classic patterns of addictive thinking that are spelled out in my book are here:
the tendency to go to extremes (leading America into a massive 100 billion dollar strike-first war);
* a "kill or be killed mentality;" the tunnel vision;
* "I" as opposed to "we" thinking;
* the black and white polarized thought processes (good versus evil, all or nothing thinking).
* His drive to finish his father's battles is of no small significance, psychologically.
If the public (and politicians) could only see what Fulbright noted as the pathology in the politics. One day, sadly, they will.
Katherine van Wormer is a Professor of Social Work at the University of Northern Iowa Co-author of Addiction Treatment: A Strengths Perspective (2002). She can be reached at:
[email protected]
Source of article.
If his mouth is moving, he's lying.
Thats the rule of thumb with Bush
Cycloptichorn wrote:I think part of your problem, Ican, is that you don't believe there is anything more to lose than your life. Which is untrue.
Everybody dies. Only some are lucky enough to live free and with dignity.
Cycloptichorn
I think part of your problem is that you twist reality to conform to your prejudices, and you twist what is written to conform to that for which you can synthesize valid counter allegations or arguments. In other words, if what you twist what I write were truly what I have written, then your counter arguments would be valid. But since what you twist what I write is not truly what I have written, your counter arguments are not valid.
Again,
I Can and Do Declare:
That all people are created
equally endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That
to secure these rights, governments are instituted among people, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Among government's just powers are those powers that enable government to
stop those people, who have denied persons their unalienable rights or who declare they will deny persons their unalienable rights,
from actually denying persons their unalienable rights.
Without life, I have no liberty; without liberty I cannot pursue happiness. But to give up some liberties for a short time less dear to me in order to secure other liberties for a greater time that are more dear to me, makes a lot of sense to me.
You and others here appear to equate one's temporary loss of privacy in phone calls with permanent loss of
all ones rights: that is, to you giving up temporarily one liberty is tantamount to permanently giving up all liberty. That is not merely fallacious, that is not merely moronic, that is crazy.
If merely by temporarily granting government the power to eavesdrop on us we significantly reduce the probability of terrorists murdering, maming, disabling, or injuring some of us, I think it worth it. If you were to advocate that we can protect ourselves sufficiently by merely putting up high enough, thick enough, and deep enough walls of guards or concrete or whatever, I would think you a fool or a fraud.
What value to one is a right which one is permanently too incapacitated to enjoy?
cicerone imposter wrote:The right to privacy
The Constitution does not specifically mention a right to privacy. However, Supreme Court decisions over the years have established that the right to privacy is a basic human right, and as such is protected by virtue of the 9th Amendment.
...
Yes, we have a right to privacy! Yes, it is a basic human right. However, the right to privacy is multi-dimensional.
Temporarily giving up our right to telephone privacy is not tantamount to giving up all our other rights to privacy. We would continue to retain our right to privacy within our own mail, homes, vehicles, enterprises, and other organizations.
We give up much more of our privacy when we are temporarily hospitalized. We do that to regain our health so we can subsequently regain the opportunity to enjoy more of our rights longer. Frequently we trade a temporary loss of rights to regain the opportunity to enjoy more of our rights longer.
I am very much afraid that Cicerone Imposter is not aware of the way in which the alleged "right to privacy" was established. That process may, indeed, be under fire by future Supreme Courts.
Perhaps Cicerone Imposter would like to defend the establishment of the so called right to privacy>
Judge Hugo Black, in a dissent, said:
"I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government HAS THE RIGHT TO INVADE IT UNLESS PROHIBITED BY SOME S P E C I F I C CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION"
What provision was used to create the "right of privacy"?
It came from one of the most parodied phrases in Supreme Court History when William O. Douglas wrote--"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance"
Pemumbras?
emanations?
Can anyone explain SPECIFICALLY how these penunbras and emanations were discerned?
Cyclo wrote:
'Everybody dies. Only some are lucky enough to live free and with dignity"
Certainly but the scumbag left wing in the 60's and 70's told us over and over--
BETTER RED THAN DEAD.
Were they wrong? I did not know that the left wing ever has been shown to be wrong.
Walter Hinteler wrote:Quote:Posted on Mon, Dec. 19, 2005
Bush leaves out the bad news in Iraqi poll
Associated Press
WASHINGTON - President Bush is making selective use of an opinion poll when he tells people that Iraqis are increasingly upbeat.
The same poll that indicated a majority of Iraqis believe their lives are going well also found a majority expressing opposition to the presence of U.S. forces, and less than half saying Iraq is better off now than before the war.
Bush frequently talks in general terms about millions of Iraqis "looking forward to a future with hope and optimism," as he put it in a news conference Monday. The previous evening, he was more specific in his televised address when he declared, "Seven in 10 Iraqis say their lives are going well - and nearly two-thirds expect things to improve even more in the year ahead."
He was referring to an ABC News poll conducted with Time magazine and other media partners before the Iraqi general elections last week. Bush is dismissive of polls that reflect on his own performance, claiming not to pay attention to them.
Among the findings:
_More than two-thirds of Iraqis surveyed face-to-face opposed the U.S. presence, but only one-quarter of respondents wanted American troops to leave right away.
_44 percent said their country is better off than before the war.
_More than six in 10 said they feel safe in their neighborhoods, up from four in 10 in June 2004.
_Half said the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was wrong, up from 39 percent in February 2004.
_More than two-thirds said they expect things to get better in the coming months.
Source
I wonder if the writer of this piece takes issue with ABC too? Or did he ever take issue with Bill Clinton who put the best face on something in a speech? The hypocrisy of some of these media types is simply stunning these days.
Foxfyre wrote:
I wonder if the writer of this piece takes issue with ABC too? Or did he ever take issue with Bill Clinton who put the best face on something in a speech? The hypocrisy of some of these media types is simply stunning these days.
No idea. I suggest, you email to
alertnet at reuters.com
or write to
Reuters
30 South Colonnade
London E14 4EP
United Kingdom
phone Deputy Editor -- +44 20 7542 9484
and ask them :wink:
