"Yes, they outed Wilson's wife as did Wilson himself did first. But his wife hadn't been an under cover agent (i.e., covert agent) for more than five years when she was outed. This according to the special prosecutor."
EVIDENCE, please.
http://www.mediavillage.net/test/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=1686
[scroll past ABSTRACT--boldface added by me]
TEXT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR PATRICK FITZGERALD NEWS CONFERENCE
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Friday, October 28, 2005
A text of the statement by Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald at Friday's news conference on the CIA leak investigation, as transcribed by CQ Transcriptions:
...
Valerie Wilson was a CIA officer. In July 2003, the fact that Valerie Wilson was a CIA officer was classified. Not only was it classified, but it was not widely known outside the intelligence community.
Valerie Wilson's friends, neighbors, college classmates had no idea she had another life.
The fact that she was a CIA officer was not well-known, for her protection or for the benefit of all us. It's important that a CIA officer's identity be protected, that it be protected not just for the officer, but for the nation's security.
Valerie Wilson's cover was blown in July 2003. The first sign of that cover being blown was when Mr. Novak published a column on July 14th, 2003.
...
Those youths know that their rewards in fighting you, the USA, is double than their rewards in fighting some one else not from the people of the book. They have no intention except to enter paradise by killing you. An infidel, and enemy of God like you, cannot be in the same hell with his righteous executioner.
… when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)"; and peace be upon our Prophet, Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah, who said: "I have been sent with the sword between my hands to ensure that no one but Allah is worshipped", Allah who put my livelihood under the shadow of my spear and who inflicts humiliation and scorn on those who disobey my orders.
… to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.
Once again, we repeat our call and send this clear message to our Muslim brothers, warning against fellowship with the Crusaders, the Americans, Westerners and all idols in the Arab Gulf. Muslims should not associate with them anywhere, be it in their homes, complexes or travel with them by any means of transportation.
Prophet Muhammad said "I am free from who lives among idols".
No Muslim should risk his life as he may inadvertently be killed if he associates with the Crusaders, whom we have no choice but to kill.
Everything related to them such as complexes, bases, means of transportation, especially Western and American Airlines, will be our main and direct targets in our forthcoming operations on our path of Jihad that we, with Allah's Power, will not turn away from.
A summary of Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi July 9, 2005.
The war in Iraq is central to al Qa'ida's global jihad.
The war will not end with an American departure.
Thir strategic vision is one of inevitable conflict with a call by al-Zawahiri for political action equal to military action.
Popular support must be maintained at least until jihadist rule has been established.
More than half the struggle is taking place "in the battlefield of the media."
Letter in English at:
www.dni.gov/letter_in_english.pdf
Al Qaeda's seven phase plan for world conquest:
Phase 1, the "wakeup call." Spectacular terrorist attacks on the West get the infidels to make war on Islamic nations. This arouses Moslems, and causes them to flock to al Qaedas banner. This phase is complete.
Phase 2, the "eye opening." Al Qaeda does battle with the infidels, and shows over a billion Moslems how it's done. This phase to be completed by next year.
Phase 3, "the rising." Millions of aroused Moslems go to war against Islam's enemies for the rest of the decade. Especially heavy attacks are made against Israel. It is believed that major damage in Israel will force the world to acknowledge al Qaeda as a major power, and negotiate with it.
Phase 4, "the downfall." By 2013, al Qaeda will control the Persian Gulf, and all its oil, as well as most of the Middle East. This will enable al Qaeda to cripple the American economy, and American military power.
Phase 5, "the Caliphate." By 2016, the Caliphate (i.e., one government for all Moslem nations) will be established. At this point, nearly all Western cultural influences will be eliminated from Islamic nations. The Caliphate will organize a mighty army for the next phase.
Phase 6, "world conquest." By 2022, the rest of the world will be conquered by the righteous and unstoppable armies of Islam. This is the phase that Osama bin Laden has been talking about for years.
Phase 7, "final victory." All the world's inhabitants will be forced to either convert to Islam, or submit to Islamic rule. To be completed by 2025.
… the U.S., Israel and India as existential enemies of Islam and lists eight reasons for global jihad. These include the restoration of Islamic sovereignty to all lands where Muslims were once ascendant, including Spain, "Bulgaria, Hungary, Cyprus, Sicily, Ethiopia, Russian Turkistan and Chinese Turkistan. . . Even parts of France reaching 90 kilometers outside Paris." Blaming the U.S. for the delusions of these admittedly small groups confers a degree of legitimacy on Islamist extremists and undermines moderate Muslim struggling for the soul of their faith.
Of the 23 whereases (i.e., reasons) Congress gave in its resolution, “Authorization for use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” these following six subsequently verified reasons were sufficient reasons for invading Iraq:
Quote:(10) Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;
(11) Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;
(20) Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
(21) Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
(22) Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and,
(23) Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region:[/color]
Saddam's regime, while lacking government civil control of northeastern Iraq in the autonomous region, was not lacking military ground control.
Quote:From Encyclopedia Britannica, IRAQ
www.britannica.com
In April 1991 the United States, the United Kingdom, and France established a “safe haven” in Iraqi Kurdistan, in which Iraqi forces were barred from operating. Within a short time the Kurds had established autonomous rule, and two main Kurdish factions—the KDP in the north and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the south—contended with one another for control. This competition encouraged the Ba'thist regime to attempt to direct affairs in the Kurdish Autonomous Region by various means, including military force. The Iraqi military launched a successful attack against the Kurdish city of Arbil in 1996 and engaged in a consistent policy of ethnic cleansing in areas directly under its control—particularly in and around the oil-rich city of Karkuk—that were inhabited predominantly by Kurds and other minorities.
Soon after the USA invaded Iraq, Kurdish military forces with the aid of USA military forces attacked the camps of the Ansar al-Islam terrorists in northeastern Iraq.
Quote:"American Soldier in Chapter 12 A CAMPAIGN UNLIKE ANY OTHER, CENTCOM FORWARD HEADQUARTERS 21 MARCH 2003, A-DAY, page 483, General Tommy Franks.
The Air Picture changed once more. Now the icons were streaming toward two ridges and a steep valley in far northeastern Iraq, right on the border with Iran. These were the camps of the Ansar al-Islam terrorists, where al Qaeda leader Abu Musab Zarqawi had trained disciples in the use of chemical and biological weapons. But this strike was more than just another TLAM [Tomahawk Land Attack Missle] bashing. Soon Special Forces and SMU [Special Mission Unit] operators leading Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, would be storming the camps, collecting evidence, taking prisoners, and killing all those who resisted.
When the USA military forces attacked the camps of the Ansar al-Islam terrorists in northeastern Iraq, their leaders escaped.
Quote:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansar_al-Islam
When the US invaded, it attacked AI [i.e., Ansar al-Islam] training camps in the north, and the organization's leaders retreated to neighboring countries. When the war in the north settled down, the militants returned to Iraq to fight against the occupying American forces.
By the time of the invasion of Iraq, Ansar al-Islam had grown significantly.
Quote:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansar_al-Islam
Ansar al-Islam (i.e., Supporters or Partisans of Islam) is a Kurdish Sunni Islamist group, promoting a radical interpretation of Islam and holy war. At the beginning of the 2003 invasion of Iraq it [i.e., Ansar al-Islam] controlled about a dozen villages and a range of peaks in northern Iraq on the Iranian border.
AI [I.E., Ansar al-Islam] is believed to be responsible for several suicide bomb attacks in Iraq, mostly in the north. The first such was at a checkpoint on February 26, 2003, before the war [March 20, 2003].
Ansar al-Islam was formed in December 2001, 1 year 3 months prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
Quote:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansar_al-Islam
It [i.e., Ansar al-Islam] was formed in December 2001 as a merger of Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam), led by Abu Abdallah al-Shafi'i, and a splinter group from the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan led by Mullah Krekar. Krekar is alleged to be the leader of Ansar al-Islam. He has lived in Norway, where he has refugee status, since 1991. On March 21, 2003 his arrest was ordered by Økokrim, a Norwegian law enforcement agency, to ensure he did not leave the country while accusations that he had threatened terrorist attacks were investigated.
Obviously, Mullah Krekar was at best an absentee leader of Ansar al-Islam in 2001, since he "has lived in Norway, where he has refugee status, since 1991."
In the 5 years 5 months from May 1996 to October 2001 (when the USA invaded Afghanistan), al Qaeda in Afghanistan trained 10,000 or more terrorist fighters: an average of about 1,846 per year. In the 1 year 3 months from December 2001 to March 2003 (the time of the USA invasion of Iraq), I estimate a thousand or more terrorist fighters were trained by al Qaeda in Iraq. As of now, far fewer than 11,000 such fighters have been killed or captured in Iraq. Until at least these 11,000 have been killed or captured, one cannot rationally claim that our invasion of Iraq increased the total number of al Qaeda trained terrorists.
Quote:The non-partisan 9/11 Commission Report in Chapter 2.5, page 67, note 78.
www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm
The Taliban seemed to open the doors to all who wanted to come to Afghanistan to train in the camps. The alliance with the Taliban provided al Qaeda a sanctuary in which to train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other jihad groups and leaders, and plot and staff terrorist schemes. While Bin Ladin maintained his own al Qaeda guesthouses and camps for vetting and training recruits, he also provided support to and benefited from the broad infrastructure of such facilities in Afghanistan made available to the global network of Islamist movements. U.S. intelligence estimates put the total number of fighters who underwent instruction in Bin Ladin-supported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000.78
Osama bin Laden's deputy Turabi had ties to Iraq and through him provided Osama a connection to Iraq. Osama helped form Ansar al-Islam, and Saddam may have helped Osama against the Kurds.
Quote:The non-partisan 9/11 Commission Report in Chapter 2.4, page 61, note 54".
www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm
To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi [Bin Laden's Sudanese deputy] reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad's control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.54
Osama bin Laden’s deputy Zawahiri had ties to Iraq and through him also provided Osama a connection to Iraq.
Quote:The non-partisan 9/11 Commission Report in Chapter 2.5, page 66, note 75.
www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm
In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis.
More than once, the USA requested Saddam to extradite the leadership of Ansar al-Islam, but Saddam ignored these requests
Quote:Secretary of State, Colin Powell's speech to UN, 2/5/2003
http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm
But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network... Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.
... We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi still remains at large, to come and go.
While Saddam's regime denied Powell's claims before the UN that the regime was an accomplice to 9/11 or possessed ready-to-use WMD, Saddam's regime never confirmed or denied the USA requested the Saddam regime to extradite the terrorist leadership in Iraq. Instead the Saddam regime ignored these requests.
Because Saddam ignored those two requests as well as Powell's statement before the UN, Saddam's regime as well as Ansar al-Islam had to be removed in order to ultimately prevent Ansar al-Islam and al Qaeda from again operating terrorist training camps in Iraq.
By the way, Saddam was planning to re-commence development of WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted.
Quote:Charles Duelfer's Report, 30 September 2004
www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf
Regime Strategic Intent
Key Findings
Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted.
Saddam totally dominated the Regime's strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq's strategic policy.
Saddam's primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections--to gain support for lifting sanctions--with his intention to preserve Iraq's intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.
The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Bagdad's economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.
By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of the sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo by the end of 1999.
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMD capability--which was essentially destroyed in 1991--after sanctions were removed and Iraq's economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop nuclear capability--in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks--but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.
Iran was the pre-eminate motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerattions, but secondary.
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam's belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam's view, WMD helped save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of feeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi'a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire.
The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.
War in Iraq:
Consequences
With Joseph C. Wilson
Former Acting Ambassador to Iraq
Thursday, April 3, 2003; 11 a.m. ET The battle for Baghdad got underway Wednesday as U.S. troops advanced on the southern suburbs of the city both on the ground and in the air, breaking up Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard, his best-trained and best-equipped troops. Combined with significant maneuvers by the 3rd Infantry Division in Karbala against the Iraqi Medina Division, the moves are a prelude to a takeover of the capital and the government of Saddam Hussein.
Joseph C. Wilson was Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad from 1988 to 1991. During "Desert Shield" he was acting ambassador and was responsbile for the freeing of several hundred American hostages. He was the last official American to meet with Saddam Hussein before "Desert Storm."
Wilson was online Thursday, April 3 at 11 a.m. ET, to discuss the consequences of a conquest of Iraq and what it would mean to the broader regional and global interests of the U.S.
A transcript follows.
Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
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Joseph C. Wilson: I am delighted to be with you this morning. There is no issue that is more important to a society than sending the flower of its youth off to war. The best way we can support our troops is to ensure that when we send them off it is a decision we make as a society and not the whim of an individual or an administration unquestioned. I was pleased to be part of that debate. Now the issues we face are even more complex. Making war will seem relatively easy compared to making the peace. We will all need to put our shoulders to the wheel in that endeavor.
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Boston, Mass.: Mr. Wilson
Thank you for taking our questions. What happens if we do not find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?
Joseph C. Wilson: Whether we find them or not is now immaterial. The liberation is now the rationale. If we don't find them, discussion about them will cease and we will focus on the other reasons the administration has articulated. If we do find them, world public opinion will only change on the margins.
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Honolulu, Hawaii: This whole thing looks like a coup d'etat. The post war plans by Wolfewitz as seen on 60 Minutes II (4/2) and a NY Times article (4/3) are very disturbing. Is this legal? Saddam can win this war if he makes it impossible to find any WMD. If none are found, what then?
Joseph C. Wilson: Not a coup d'etat but there is reason for others to suspect that our motives are not as pure as some would have us believe. This is not a war of liberation, though we will need to make sure the peace truly does liberate Iraq from the tyranny.
The President received all the authority he needed from Congress in October after a Congressional debate best described as desultory.
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Washington, D.C.: I am baffled by the vitriolic comments by U.S. politicians and others against France. France hasn't sided with Iraq; they disagreed with the U.S. on the use of force in this case (as we often disagree with France). I am especially puzzled by comments of France not appreciating our help to them in the world wars. World War I started in 1914. German troops almost took Paris. The U.S. didn't get involved until 1917, when we felt sufficiently threatened. Ditto in World War II, which started in 1939 (with France occupied by the Nazis in mid-1940, and the U.S. entering the war in late 1941, only after attacked). We didn't jump into either war to save France and certainly stayed on the sidelines for quite a while. Plus, France guaranteed our independence in the 18th century. Do our politicians and commentators just not know history?
Joseph C. Wilson: I agree with your concerns. Patriotism too quickly gives way to jingoism. As for me, I still favor my Hermes ties and camembert! Seriously, we will want to avoid self isolation after this.
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Mt. Lebanon, Pa.: Is it going to be a U.S. Viceroy, a U.S. vetted Iraqi citizen, the U.N. High Commission of the Hapless, Big-time Leader to be Named Later -- who rules Iraq during the immediate postwar period? Where's the money going to come from to maintain this mandate? Will Iraq experience partition like India/Pakistan leading to nationhood for the unalloyed -- Kurds, Sunni, Shia]? Who's going to conduct the Nuremburg Showtime Trial once the bandits have been rounded up? Since our government is silent on these issues, who really is drawing up the big plan for: The New and Improved Iraq -- Grand Opening Soon! Thanks much. Signed ... Vietnam-Era Veteran and Cynic.
Joseph C. Wilson: We are going to want to internationalize the effort in my judgement if we ever hope to succeed and we will need a broad and deep Iraqi investment in the process. I think that we will want to return as many of the Iraqi ministries back to Iraqis as quickly as possible but how quickly that will be is anybody's guess. I too am somewhat cynical. There is a tendency to wear rose tinted glasses, to think and act too simplistically and to overstay our welcome, all bad signs going in to an occupation.
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washingtonpost.com: Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being online with us today. You were the last official American to meet with Saddam Hussein back in before Desert Storm. From what you observed then does that give you any indication of what he might be up to now if, in fact, he's still alive?
Joseph C. Wilson: I think he is preparing to go underground to fight a guerrilla campaign, assuming he is still alive. The regime has avoided doing anything that would make its return to power out of the question. For example, no destruction of oil fields or infrastructure or use of WMD. If our presences is seen as an occupation rather than a liberation it is entirely possible that Saddam thinks he can rebound after the disillusion of the population with the U S presence. He would not be the first politician to stage a comeback.
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Jonesboro, GA: Listening to the war briefings and the 'expert' opinions of all the folks on TV and the news, it seems that victory is a foregone conclusion to the coalition forces. That is, it is just a matter of time(days, weeks) before we over-run and take over Baghdad. That said, I am beginnig to think that the major test for us lies ahead - the re-building of Iraq. Now, from all reports it seems as if the US has an ad-hoc administration waiting in the wings to assume the control and running of the country in the interim. However, there is a growing cry from the international community, including Britain to cede this control to the UN. If, as we did in this war, decide to go it alone, do you forsee a disastrous chain of events for us, the so-called Arab world and the world at large. If so, why? If not, what would ameliorate such a disaster?
Joseph C. Wilson: I agree. The war will not truly be over until we have changed the minds of the region in a way that is in our interest. We need quick victories to point to. Things like an overabundance of humanitarian aid. When there is demand for four trucks of aid as there was the other day in Safwan, we need to send six trucks and not just one as we did, leading to a riot. We also need to get broad acceptance in Iraq for what we want to do and that means we cannot impose solutions of people on the process. Finally, we should make a dramatic gesture to the other issue that preoccupies Arabs, the Middle East peace process. That is the thorn in the side of the region that needs to be pulled before true progress on other issues can occur.
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Arlington, Va.: What's going to happen after the war? How will Iraq be run? How long will the allied presence be in the country?
Joseph C. Wilson: We will run the country for awhile and return it to Iraq piece by piece. Think of the occupation in terms of ten years. And then only in the most positive conditions. If there is resistance it will test our political will.
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Vienna, Va.: What was Saddam Hussein like?
Joseph C. Wilson: Cold, ruthless, sociopathic but a rational political actor. His invasion of Kuwait was not a miscalculation but a high risk gamble. As a high risk gambler, he does miscalculate but he is a canny survivor ... and utterly ruthless.
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Adelphi, Md.: What will U.S. and British relations be with France and Germany after the war, assuming Saddam Hussein is overtaken?
Joseph C. Wilson: We will want to rebuild the institutional relationships but so long as the current presidents/prime ministers are in place the personal relations will be zilch.
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Virginia: Is Saudi Arabia next?
Joseph C. Wilson: The neocons talk about Iran and Syria as the next targets. That said pressure will continue to build on the Saudis to undertake fundamental reform.
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New York, N.Y.: Do you think the Bush administration has already made some decisions about which other countries in the region it might confront militarily after Iraq? Isn't it difficult to access the impact of the conquest of Iraq without knowing if Iraq is an isolated instance, or part of a larger policy to take on regimes in the region viewed as hostile to U.S. interests?
Joseph C. Wilson: I think that there will be a pause in the military use of power and an effort to use this demonstration of force as an example of what can happen if you cross us. While the policy is to eradicate support for terrorism, there will be an effort to do that in the neighborhood without having to militarily overthrow the other regimes. Terrorist support is the key to what we do and where we go.
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Arlington, Va.: How has the war in Iraq affected our Arab allies' willingness to work with us in the war on terrorism? It seems to me earlier efforts of Iran and Saudi Arabia have gone unrecognized by the current administration, even to the point where Iran has been hinted at being "next" on the administration's list of countries to take over. Are we making more enemies than we need to be, or should be?
Joseph C. Wilson: Badly. We can expect less cooperation on terrorism, less interest in doing business with us, investing in the US economy and in buying our products. We have greatly offended the entire Muslim world with this war and with every day that images of Baghdad on fire and Iraqi civilian casualties is another day of humiliation for the region. Humiliated populations are not friendly populations.
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Bethesda, Md.: I don't understand. In the first answer you say the rational is liberation so WMD do not matter. While I couldn't disagree more, in the second answer you say this isn't a war of liberation. Does this make sense?
Joseph C. Wilson: The administration has offered a menu of reasons for the war. WMD was one of them. The answer was to the question of whether finding WMD would make a difference in how the war is perceived. And the answer is no. Here in the US we have bought off on the other reasons so for us it does not matter. Overseas, they think there are any number of other reasons behind what we are doing so again if we find WMD it wown't change their position as to why we are doing what we are.
The issue is really transfer of WMD to terrorist groups which had never occurred before in Saddam's regime but now that he is toast don't be surprised if as his last act of defiance he does precisely that.
As to liberation, we will see a year from now if the Iraqis feel they are liberated. That will help determine victory in this conflict
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Washington, D.C.: Mr. Ambassador,
It seems to me that the Iraqis and most of the world preceived the 'coaliton forces' as an occupation army. For it truly to qualify as liberation, there should be Iraqis actively fighting or assisting the US/UK forces -- which has not happened. It is obvious to any informed observer (getting information from multiple sources) that this is going to be a quagmire not unlike Vietnam, and with the rising temperatures in Iraq much more difficult war to win. Any comments?
Joseph C. Wilson: IN fact they shut down the training program for Iraqi forces when fewer than 100 signed up.
It will be different from Vietnam in that there will not be an active war once we mop up but rather an active resistance that will emerge. Assymetric warfare on their turf.
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Arlington, Va.: If liberation is the administration's current rationale for invading Iraq, how do we address the matter of a double standard? Iraq is (was) surely not the world's only non-democratic regime.
Joseph C. Wilson: Good question. Better is how do we square liberation with our own military doctrine developed over years about the appropriate use of our military. It is generally accepted that we use our armed forces to defend ourselves and not liberate others
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New York, N.Y.: If Saddam is actually no more, who would actually be surrendering to us? How will we know, in other words, that the war is essentially over and the peace has begun?
Joseph C. Wilson: We will not know until we disengage completely. As to surrender, if Saddam dies the Iraqis will come up with somebody to hand over the sword. Even if he doesn't, if he can disappear possibly some general will surrender while Saddam tries to mount a guerilla campaign. He is getting a bit long in the tooth to play Che Guevara but he is a survivor
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Arlington, Va.: You say that Saddam will go underground to stage a comeback, which is a very interesting and likely theory, but the one I had previously held was that he might align himself with more radical forces to exact revenge against the United States with unconventional means where he could not succeed with conventional ones. Osama has denounced Saddam has an infidel, but do you think they might band together to fight a common enemy?
Joseph C. Wilson: I would not be surprised that the dreaded transfer of WMD might have occurred if S. thinks he is toast or that they might make common cause. It might be real tough though given that both are on the run. More likely would be a nationlistic campaign led by the rump of the Baath party-
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Maryland: Your read, please, on all the braggadoccio coming out of the Iraqi leadership, i.e., the Americans are going to get a taste of their own blood, etc. Is this something cultural, i.e., they are not people given to understatement, or will the battle for Baghdad be truly bloody?
Joseph C. Wilson: Part of it is bravado (we hear the same in some of our briefings); some is wishful thinking and part is to set the stage for resistance to the occupation.
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New York, N.Y.: I'm concerned about the symbolism of placing someone like Gen. Garner, an avid supporter of Ariel Sharon's style of "peacekeeping," in command over the peace in Iraq. Is the U.S. about to get entangled in an intifadah of its own?
Joseph C. Wilson: The fact that GArner signed a letter and went on a trip sponsored by Jinsa is troubling to Arabs and does not help his credibility. A good friend of mine who is a security expert said last night at a meeting exactly that. Watch out for intifadah type activities
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Arlington, Va.: Once the war is over and (hopefully) we begin our efforts to rebuild Iraq, there will be a lot of $$ in oil-funded reconstruction contracts in each town and city.
Why would the emergent powerbrokers in, say, Najaf, want to participate in this democracy stuff? By subverting it, isn't it easier to steer contracts toward your cousins' companies, etc.?
A rational Iraqi city mayor could conclude, "Why on earth agree to be voted out of office? Too much money at stake. It's better to drive out the occupying Americans through a steady parade of bombs and sniping against U.S. troops. Once they leave, my family can enjoy our oil revenues without all this inconvenient democracy stuff."
Joseph C. Wilson: In twenty years of doing democratization, one thing is clear power is actively sought and those who seek it will do what they need to to get and keep it. No surprise there. That is why it will be important to get broad buy in so that we don't become captive to our favorites at the expense of the broader population and leadership
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Mayaguez, P.R.: In the light of the recent international impression that the United States is an aggressor to the Arab nations, how can we now capitalize to change this belief, and move to be a respected and accepted ally in the region?
Joseph C. Wilson: Rebuild the bridge to the Arab world by reinvigorationg the Middle East peace process.
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Washington, D.C.: Thanks so much for your educational comments during this chat. I have a slightly different question than those that have been posed thus far: Do you have any advice for young people starting out in the field of international policy, and specifically the Middle East? How did you get started in your career and what is the best way to get involved in educating our country and affecting its policies. Thanks!
Joseph C. Wilson: Take the Foreign Service exam (my son just passed). Go to work on a Congressional staff. Look at NGOs and international organizations. Peace Corps is a great opportunity. Look at think tanks or international business
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Arlington, Va.: You say terrorist support is the key to what we do and where we go, but is that support of terrorism against the U.S. or terrorism against Israel? One theme I have seen occur in Iraq from the administration is the blurring of lines between the two, presumably in an attempt to justify using force to confront the latter.
Joseph C. Wilson: You are right on that. And it is not lost on Arabs who suspect we are fighting Israel's battle against supporters of Palestinian resistance, which they do not see as terrorism.
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Fairfax, Va.: If Iraq did not support Palestinian suicide bombers, do you think we would be in a war to overthrow Saddam?
Joseph C. Wilson: Saddam's support of Palestinian suicide bombers was not a reason to go to war, just an excuse. The reason for the President, I think was concern that Saddam might transfer WMD to terrorists gunning for us. I think he got bad advice.
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Fairfax, Va.: (At the risk of sounding anti-Semitic, which I don't intend), if Saddam didn't support Palestinian suicide bombers, do you think we'd be in a war to liberate Iraq?
Joseph C. Wilson: The literature is clear. His closest advisers have argued for years that the way to peace in the middle east is to crush the palestinian resistance and it supporters. I profoundly disagree with that analysis, but it is not anti semitic or semitic. It is secular and tied to the Likud party
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Logan Circle, Washington, D.C.: Shouldn't I be offended that 1/3 of France answered in a poll that they hoped Saddam would win? Shouldn't I be upset that France continued to sell Iraq weapons and parts only one week before hostilities were to commence? And shouldn't I be ticked off that France, by saying that they'd never authorize force, pretty much screwed the U.S. over and hung us out to dry?
I really don't see what's wrong with being slightly upset with France's choices during this ordeal.
Joseph C. Wilson: It is easy to be ticked off at France, but not terribly useful. The weapons charges will have to be verified, as the same charges against the Chinese and the Russians. I am ticked off about that because the integrity of sanctions regimes depend on the cohesion of the UNSC. Not to have that leads to other solutions like war, which is a blunt instrument to say the least.
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London, UK: The liberation of the Iraqi people was not the cause or the reason of this war? Who said the Iraqi people want to have the U.S. liberate them?
Joseph C. Wilson: Agree. But we are where we are so we need to make the best of it.
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New York, N.Y.: Ambassador Wilson,
Suppose Saddam is gone, and all the splits in the Baathist leadership that had been unexpressed while he was in power suddenly become expressed. Essentially, you would have the beginnings of a civil war, wouldn't you? Add to this the long-simmering tension between the Sunni and Shia populations, not to mention the rival Kurdish factions ... Aren't these the ingredients for anarchy? How is the U.S. going to impose order on a country that could very well be about to explode in intergroup rivalries, possibly fed by regional powers with an interest in seeing one group succeed over another?
Joseph C. Wilson: All those are great points. They are what we should be worrying about in the occupation phase. In the worst of my nightmares, all those factions will unite against us, drive us out and then do the civil war in their internicine fight for power.
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Outside the Beltway: While he's been on the run in his own country for years, do you see Saddam dealing well with life underground -- away from the palaces and bunkers and minus the entourage? Tough to picture him hanging out in caves like OBL?
Joseph C. Wilson: I agree, but not impossible. As you point out he has already been on the run within his country. It will depend on how willing he is to give up his entourage and his fresh fish and live on the land. I think it is unlikey he will pull it off but I don't doubt that he will try.
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Washington D.C.: Recent news reports have stated that Iraqis are fearful of revolting against Saddam Hussein after they did so during the Gulf War at the U.S. request and the U.S. did not help them. Why did the U.S. fail to protect Iraqi during these rebellions?
Joseph C. Wilson: The UN mandate was to remove Saddam from Kuwait. there was no authority or will to become embroiled in an Iraqi civil war, for good reason.
Perhaps the President should not have encouraged the Iraqis to revolt.
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Alexandria, Va.: In response to the reader who said s/he wasn't trying to be anti-semitic, you said that "his advisors" have argued for years that the way to peace in the Middle East is to crush the Palestinian resistance, etc. ... Whose advisors and can you elaborate on the history of this argument? It's not something I've heard of before, but then I imagine we don't hear to much about the arguments that go on in our government behind the scenes.
Also, could you tell us a little bit about your company JC Wilson International? Thank you.
Joseph C. Wilson: WE do political risk assessment for companies wanting to do business in Africa Europe and the Middle East.
As to advisers: Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Bill Kristol et al.
Perle's study group produced a report for Bibi netnayahu in the mid 90s called A Clean Break, A new strategy for the realm
Read also the Project for a new American Century
Michael Ledeen from the American Enterprise INstitue is another leading figure. He is Mr. Total War, go to Iran after this.
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Manassas, Va.: Ambassador Wilson, you need to formally renounce your citizenship now. Your comments aid and abet the enemy, and are what we would expect from someone in the FRENCH government. If you like Saddam so much, then go move to France where you belong.
Joseph C. Wilson: No thanks.
blah blah blah apocalypse blah blah blah prophecy blah blah blah gotterdammerung blah blah blah ragnarak blah blah blah ....
just dropped by to see what was new .... nada .... sos
Withdrawal Pains
Let's Acknowledge the Reality of Iraq And Stop Talking About Fewer Troops
By Robert Kagan
Washington Post
Sunday, December 4, 2005; Page B07
The current discussion about drawing down American troops in Iraq -- whether "immediately," "rapidly" or "as soon as possible" -- would be amusing were it not so dangerously divorced from reality. There could be no greater mistake than drawing down the U.S. force now, at a moment when there is real hope for success if the United States perseveres.
But Democrats calling for these reductions are not the only ones to blame for giving the impression, however mistaken, that the United States is growing short of breath in Iraq just as the situation appears to be improving. The Bush administration has been talking about reducing forces in Iraq ever since the invasion ended in 2003. Indeed, the history of the administration's endless promises to reduce the size of the force in Iraq puts the current discussion in perspective.
On May 3, 2003, the New York Times reported administration plans to "withdraw most United States combat forces from Iraq over the next several months," reducing the number of troops from 130,000 to 30,000 by the fall of 2003. According to officials, the administration did "not want substantial numbers of American forces to be tied down in Iraq" and was "eager to avoid the specter of American occupation."
That didn't quite pan out. After the invasion, the U.S. force in Iraq turned out to be too small to bring order to the country. The calculation of Pentagon officials such as Paul Wolfowitz, who claimed that the force necessary to bring peace and stability to Iraq need not be larger than the force necessary to invade it, proved mistaken. And so, a year after the invasion, 135,000 troops still were in Iraq, too many to avoid "the specter of American occupation" but too few to make that occupation effective in bringing order and preventing the rise of an armed opposition.
Nevertheless, the Bush administration continued looking for reductions. Pentagon officials told Congress that the numbers would begin to decline significantly by the summer of 2004. But as summer approached, they began asking for more money to maintain troop levels, and some 20,000 troops scheduled for return home had to be kept in the field. In early 2004 administration officials again talked about drawing down forces significantly, perhaps in time for the November elections. That turned out to be wrong, too. By December 2004 troop strength was at 150,000.
Last April, when 142,000 American troops were in Iraq, senior military officials were talking about possibly reducing the force to a little over 100,000 by early 2006. But by August, according to The Post, Pentagon plans called for an increase of 10,000 troops in the fall, with a possible decrease to around 120,000 by the spring of 2006 and further reductions by the end of 2006 to around 100,000. Last month about 150,000 troops were deployed, and, according to the Pentagon, the "current thinking" was that the number could fall to 138,000 after the coming Iraqi elections and then to below 100,000 by late 2006.
President Bush himself repeatedly insisted that he had no intention of withdrawing from Iraq or even reducing the force short of victory. But apparently the president has little control over what his own officials say and do. So there has been a steady drumbeat of anticipated reductions ever since the spring of 2003, with each promise and plan inevitably broken or undone by persistent military realities in Iraq.
Is it any wonder that Democrats uncomfortable defending the war they once supported now feel comfortable talking about withdrawal? Their arguments come directly from administration talking points. Some top military and Pentagon officials have, from the beginning, asserted that the presence of large numbers of U.S. troops is a big reason for the rise of the insurgency and that a "small footprint" was the key ingredient to success. This has proved erroneous. But how much should we blame Nancy Pelosi, John Murtha and John Kerry for making the very same argument and suggesting that Iraq can be made stable and secure only by a steady reduction of forces? Has any senior military officer or top Pentagon official really explained why this is not the case?
They had better begin doing so, even though it might mean owning up to their miscalculation at the end of the war in 2003. The U.S. force was too small at the beginning and remained too small for most of the past two years. As a result, it did not play the role that an occupying force must play in bringing stability to the country, the prerequisites to producing a secure Iraq capable of standing on its own feet. Instead of worrying about an overly large American "footprint," administration and military officials should have been worrying about stopping armed opposition from spreading and about the moral and practical responsibility of providing security to the people whose country we had invaded.
Now that indigenous Iraqi forces are starting to fight more effectively and in greater numbers, we may be getting to the point where the current U.S. force of more than 150,000 troops is adequate to start providing Iraqis the necessary security and stability. We may be today where we should have been two years ago. If American force levels hold steady while Iraqi force levels increase, that gradually shifts the balance in the conflict in our favor. But we will almost certainly have to maintain something like these levels for another two years, and possibly longer.
Talk of reductions and withdrawal is as unhelpful as it almost certainly is ephemeral. For 2 1/2 years, despite the endless promise of reductions, despite election battles, scandals and shifting political fortunes, the United States has maintained a steady force of 130,000 to 150,000 troops in Iraq. You can bet that the numbers will not be dramatically smaller a year from now or even two years from now. Wouldn't we be better off, wouldn't our prospects for success be greater, if we just admitted it? Better still, the administration could explain why it is so important to keep these troops in place so that the public understands the long road ahead. It could start taking steps to increase the overall size of the U.S. military so that the sustained deployment doesn't "break" the Army. And it could stop making false promises of reductions that cannot and should not occur until Iraq is indeed secure and stable.
Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, writes a monthly column for The Post.
Talk of reductions and withdrawal is as unhelpful as it almost certainly is ephemeral. For 2 1/2 years, despite the endless promise of reductions, despite election battles, scandals and shifting political fortunes, the United States has maintained a steady force of 130,000 to 150,000 troops in Iraq. You can bet that the numbers will not be dramatically smaller a year from now or even two years from now. Wouldn't we be better off, wouldn't our prospects for success be greater, if we just admitted it? Better still, the administration could explain why it is so important to keep these troops in place so that the public understands the long road ahead. It could start taking steps to increase the overall size of the U.S. military so that the sustained deployment doesn't "break" the Army. And it could stop making false promises of reductions that cannot and should not occur until Iraq is indeed secure and stable.
