carpet-bagging wench.
Quote:carpet-bagging wench.I get the feeling someone sneaks their wife's paperbacks.
Al-Zarqawi: al Qaeda's Second Generation by Jordanian journalist, Fouad Hussein.
Al Qaeda's seven phase plan for world conquest:
Phase 1, the "wakeup call." Spectacular terrorist attacks on the West get the infidels to make war on Islamic nations. This arouses Moslems, and causes them to flock to al Qaedas banner. This phase is complete.
Phase 2, the "eye opening." Al Qaeda does battle with the infidels, and shows over a billion Moslems how it's done. This phase to be completed by next year.
Phase 3, "the rising." Millions of aroused Moslems go to war against Islam's enemies for the rest of the decade. Especially heavy attacks are made against Israel. It is believed that major damage in Israel will force the world to acknowledge al Qaeda as a major power, and negotiate with it.
Phase 4, "the downfall." By 2013, al Qaeda will control the Persian Gulf, and all its oil, as well as most of the Middle East. This will enable al Qaeda to cripple the American economy, and American military power.
Phase 5, "the Caliphate." By 2016, the Caliphate (i.e., one government for all Moslem nations) will be established. At this point, nearly all Western cultural influences will be eliminated from Islamic nations. The Caliphate will organize a mighty army for the next phase.
Phase 6, "world conquest." By 2022, the rest of the world will be conquered by the righteous and unstoppable armies of Islam. This is the phase that Osama bin Laden has been talking about for years.
Phase 7, "final victory." All the world's inhabitants will be forced to either convert to Islam, or submit to Islamic rule. To be completed by 2025.
i seem to recall that before the invasion started it was reported on u.s. television that it was impossible to find saddam, because he was hiding out in a different house every night. he was plainly on the run. i could not understand at that time nor can i understand now, how someone who has to find a new hole to hide in every night, presented much of a threat to the u.s.
Charles Duelfer's Report, 30 September 2004
www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf
Regime Strategic Intent
Key Findings
Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted.
Saddam totally dominated the Regime's strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraq's strategic policy.
Saddam's primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections--to gain support for lifting sanctions--with his intention to preserve Iraq's intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.
The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Bagdad's economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.
By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of the sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo by the end of 1999.
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMD capability--which was essentially destroyed in 1991--after sanctions were removed and Iraq's economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop nuclear capability--in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks--but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.
Iran was the pre-eminate motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerattions, but secondary.
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam's belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam's view, WMD helped save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of feeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi'a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire.
The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.
www.c-span.org/resources/pdf/hjres114.pdf
Public Law 107-243
107th Congress
Joint Resolution
Oct. 16, 2002
(H.J. Res. 114) To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq
[size=7] (1) Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq;
(2) Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism;
(3) Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated;
(4) Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998;
(5) Whereas in Public Law 105-235 (August 14, 1998), Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in `material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations' and urged the President `to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations';
(6) Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations;
(7) Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolution of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait;
(8) Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people;
(9) Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council; [/size]
(10) Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;
(11) Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;
(12) Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;
(13) Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;
(14) Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994);
(15) Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1), Congress has authorized the President `to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677;
(16) Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),' that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and `constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,' and that Congress, `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688';
(17) Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;
(18) Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to `work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge' posed by Iraq and to `work for the necessary resolutions,' while also making clear that `the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable';
(19)Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;
(20) Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
(21) Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
(22) Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and,
(23) Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region:
Now therefore be it,
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
Authorization for use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.
50 USC 1541 note.
i also seem to recall that both the u.s. and the british air-force essentially controlled iraqi airspace; no troop movement could take place by the iraquis, any anti-aircrft batteries were destroyed almost immediately - so were was the threat ?
From Encyclopedia Britannica, IRAQ
www.britannica.com
In April 1991 the United States, the United Kingdom, and France established a “safe haven” in Iraqi Kurdistan, in which Iraqi forces were barred from operating. Within a short time the Kurds had established autonomous rule, and two main Kurdish factions—the KDP in the north and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the south—contended with one another for control. This competition encouraged the Ba'thist regime to attempt to direct affairs in the Kurdish Autonomous Region by various means, including military force. The Iraqi military launched a successful attack against the Kurdish city of Arbil in 1996 and engaged in a consistent policy of ethnic cleansing in areas directly under its control—particularly in and around the oil-rich city of Karkuk—that were inhabited predominantly by Kurds and other minorities.
And in focusing so much on Iraq, we can lose sight of the problems in Afghanistan... here
"Only about half of the 1,000 buildings once envisioned as being completed by the end of 2004 will actually be completed, and it will take at least until August 2005 to complete the reduced number," the report said.
The reduced number in that program was 533. By Nov. 5, only 138 had been turned over to the Afghan government.
This administration is a complete and utter failure and I just can't understand how in the world he got re-elected after failing in Afghanistan to rebuild the country and find Bin long forgotten ladden and the failure to secure Iraq enough for any rebuilding to make a difference.
From al Qaeda’s 1996 fatwah
http://www.mideastweb.org/osambinladen1.htm
[scroll down to find it].
Few days ago the news agencies had reported that the Defence Secretary of the Crusading Americans had said that "the explosion at Riyadh and Al-Khobar had taught him one lesson: that is not to withdraw when attacked by coward terrorists".
We say to the Defence Secretary that his talk can induce a grieving mother to laughter! and shows the fears that had enshrined you all. Where was this false courage of yours when the explosion in Beirut took place on 1983 AD (1403 A.H). You were turned into scattered pits and pieces at that time; 241 mainly marines solders were killed. And where was this courage of yours when two explosions made you to leave Aden in less than twenty four hours!
But your most disgraceful case was in Somalia; where- after vigorous propaganda about the power of the USA and its post cold war leadership of the new world order- you moved tens of thousands of international force, including twenty eight thousands American solders into Somalia. However, when tens of your solders were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge , but these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear. It was a pleasure for the "heart" of every Muslim and a remedy to the "chests" of believing nations to see you defeated in the three Islamic cities of Beirut , Aden and Mogadishu.
Distributed by American Committees on Foreign Relations, ACFR NewsGroup No. 633, Monday, November 20, 2005.
Irresponsible on Iraq
Sunday, November 20, 2005; Page B06
A SERIOUS congressional debate about Iraq is essential at a time when public support for the mission is falling and the danger of failure seems great. Aggressive challenges to the Bush administration's military and political strategy -- even calls for an immediate withdrawal of troops, such as that made by
Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) on Thursday -- must be part of that democratic discussion. Yet what we've mainly seen during the past two weeks is a shameful exercise in demagoguery and name-calling.
Democrats accuse President Bush of deliberately lying about the grounds for war three years ago. Vice President Cheney responds by calling accusations by the Democrats "dishonest and reprehensible, " while Mr. Bush claims his critics "send mixed signals to our troops and the enemy." Mr. Murtha, a 73-year-old former Marine, was said by the White House to advocate "surrender to the terrorists" and called a coward by Republican members of Congress. He replied by smearing Mr. Cheney and Mr. Bush as "guys who got five deferments and never been there, and send people to war."
It sounds like the final days of a bitter, mud-slinging political campaign. But what is at stake is not an election but a war in which American soldiers are being killed and wounded almost every day and in which one possible outcome is a major victory for the Islamic extremist movement that carried out the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Those losses won't be stemmed, nor the dangers averted, by attack rhetoric or sound bites that deliberately distort the facts. Leaders of both parties know that, of course. Which raises the question: Is their priority to win in Iraq -- or in next year's midterm elections?
The hard truth is that those two objectives may be in conflict. The war is unpopular for many reasons, including the painful human losses, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction, incompetent management of postwar reconstruction and the involvement of some U.S. personnel in appalling practices of torture. Mr. Murtha, deeply moved by the wounded soldiers he has visited, cited several other serious problems, including the wear and tear on the U.S. military and the steady increase in attacks by insurgents.
Yet Mr. Murtha, like other Democrats who advocate an early pullout, grossly misstates the nature of the conflict in Iraq. In a news conference, he contended that U.S. troops "have become the primary target" and have united Iraqis against them. In fact, far more Iraqis than Americans are being killed by the insurgents; Iraq is divided between a Shiite and Kurdish majority -- whose leaders strongly support a continued U.S. presence -- and a Sunni and Islamic extremist minority that seeks to drive international forces out so that it can try to impose a dictatorship on the rest of the country. As Democrats such as Sens. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.) and Joseph I. Lieberman (Conn.) have recognized, a premature American departure from Iraq would not end but greatly escalate what is now a low-grade civil war. It could allow al Qaeda to claim a triumph and establish a base for attacking the United States and its allies in the Middle East.
Mr. Bush indulges in his own surreal rhetoric, insistently describing Iraq as a Manichaean battle between foreign terrorists and Iraqi democrats, rather than the multi-sided power struggle that it is. In so doing, he hamstrings his own diplomats and generals, who are trying to forge a political accord among the various Iraqi communities and isolate the foreign and Sunni extremists through a conventional counterinsurgency campaign. Many Democrats have no better alternative strategy, which may be why their leaders spend most of their time making charges about what was said, or not, about weapons of mass destruction in 2002.
What's needed is more talk about Iraq in 2005. Though there have been successes -- including the staging of an election and a constitutional referendum -- the country is in danger of splitting into pieces, and the Bush administration has not done enough to head that threat off. New elections in December could propel the country toward a political accord that would undermine the insurgency. But reconstruction has foundered and needs to be relaunched, with emphasis on supplying electricity and jobs. Iraqi troops are improving but still are far from ready to fight the counterinsurgency war on their own. If there is to be any chance of that war being won, the United States will have to commit its own forces to the fight for years, though perhaps not at current levels. The alternative is to risk a defeat that would be devastating to U.S. security. That's a hard truth to face: It can't be done amid a partisan free-for-all.
ITEM 8: Jim Hoagland: Trusting in the Transition (Iraq)
Trusting in the Transition
By Jim Hoagland
Washington Post
Sunday, November 20, 2005; Page B07
The curtain will soon go up on Act 3 of the American experience in Iraq, even as its original authors scribble away behind the scenes, trying to determine whether the war eventually ends as Shakespearean tragedy, Hollywood action
film or cautionary moral fable of hubris and its consequences.
It has had elements of all three, from the lightning march to Baghdad to an Act 2 full of unsettling gore, sinister intrigue and smashed expectations. As tragic scenes drag on interminably on the small-screen stage of nightly television, polls show the national audience glancing nervously for an exit it does not yet see.
The Senate voiced its own criticism of the Bush administration's current muddled text last week by calling on the White House to make 2006 a year of "significant transition" toward "the successful completion of the mission" in Iraq.
The 79-19 vote obviously signals Republican nervousness over Iraq policy a year in advance of congressional elections. But that is only one sign of a quickening sense here and abroad that the next few months open a decisive and new period in President Bush's beleaguered attempt to use Iraq to change the Middle East and the world.
U.S. military commanders are composing their own scenarios that point to a drawdown of 30,000 to 40,000 American troops -- from a current force of about 140,000 -- that will begin before the midterm elections. In private White House meetings Bush has hinted at numbers of that magnitude and roughly corresponding cuts in foreign coalition troops, authoritative sources tell me. Italy's coalition government, facing elections in April, will begin discussions with Washington this week on withdrawing 10 percent or so of Italy's 3,000 troops in Iraq this winter.
The signs of impending change also trigger nervousness among allies. European diplomats have begun probing U.S. officials to determine whether NATO and other allies will face new pressure to shoulder financial and other burdens that the Americans want to lighten for themselves in Iraq's year of transition.
The Europeans are aware that the administration has already put oil-rich Arab states on notice that their relations with Washington will be affected by whether they provide more aid to the permanent Iraqi government that is to emerge from Dec. 15 elections.
Last weekend's sudden, very brief visit by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to Baghdad may also reflect concern in the world organization over being asked to play a larger role in transitional Iraq. Under U.S. and British prodding, Arab League officials also have reluctantly visited the Iraqi capital to meet many of the civilians who will form a new government after the elections.
But U.S. reconstruction and pacification efforts have not moved quickly or smoothly enough to rally the support Washington now seeks from others. The United States is unlikely to get significant help on Iraq from other nations or from multilateral organizations that feel they were ignored or defied by the Bush administration in Act 1.
Americans will have to extricate themselves from a script that is largely of their own making. Their only significant help will come from Iraqis, and it will come unevenly even in the best of times.
The administration and an increasingly restive American public need to accept and focus on that reality as control shifts from American hands to the Iraqis. The transition that the U.S. Senate is saying must come is about to begin -- for better or for worse. It will not be reversed.
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That means Americans should stay out of the December elections rather than channel covert help through Jordan's King Abdullah or other Arab proxies, as happened in January. It means ending the covert control that the Central Intelligence Agency exercises over Iraq's intelligence service, which does not report to or get funds from the Iraqi government. And it means finding a way to turn Iraq into a subject of dialogue rather than conflict with neighboring Iran.
A sign that the last condition may be possible despite the increasing tensions over Iran's nuclear ambitions lies in the recent political and physical travels of Ahmed Chalabi, Iraq's most well-known, and therefore most reviled, politician in the West.
Chalabi was given a high-profile welcome in Tehran by Iran's Islamic revolutionaries -- even though he recently split with the Islamic parties that Iran normally supports in Iraq and will be competing against them for votes in December -- on his way to similarly laudatory high-level meetings in Washington.
For differing reasons, President Bush and the ayatollahs would, if they could, choose to have their own Iraqis in charge rather than hedge their bets with the hard-to-control Chalabi. But neither Tehran nor Washington is prepared to insult the future -- which both are slowly realizing they cannot dictate alone.
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This administration is a complete and utter failure and I just can't understand how in the world he got re-elected after failing in Afghanistan to rebuild the country and find Bin long forgotten ladden and the failure to secure Iraq enough for any rebuilding to make a difference.