US AND THEM: US, UN & Iraq, version 8.0

Dept. of Measures
The Pentagon tries to come up with a metric for success in the war on terror.
by Christian Lowe
08/24/2005 12:00:00 AM

CRITICS BEGAN USING the "Q" word to describe the war in Iraq two years ago, well before the Sunni insurgency and al Qaeda franchise-leader Abu Mussab al Zarqawi began inflicting serious casualties on U.S. and coalition forces.

Today President George W. Bush's approval ratings are in the tank and calls for an unequivocal pull-out from the Iraqi "quagmire" are starting to be heard on Capitol Hill. But does this mean that the coalition is actually failing?

The question is not a new one. More than a year ago, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld revealed that he did not know whether the billions of dollars and hundreds of U.S. lives were being spent well in Afghanistan and Iraq. "Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror," Rumsfeld wrote to top DoD officials in October 2003. "Is our current situation such that the harder we work, the behinder we get?" Nearly two years later, Pentagon officials are still largely in the dark.

Nevertheless, the search is on for a barometer that can determine the day-to-day success or failure in combating extremist movements and eroding the influence of terror.

SPEARHEADED BY THE PENTAGON'S office of Advanced Systems and Concepts, a group of DoD and civilian officials has been struggling to forge a consensus on so-called "measures of effectiveness" in the global war on terrorism. Their work on developing these benchmarks is an offshoot of a larger project sponsored by the Pentagon to explore new tactics for fighting the global war on terrorism.

The "measures of effectiveness" have helped form a framework for evaluating how well alternative tactics to the war on terrorism would work.

"Our tasking was to come up with some good alternative ideas, and the fact that the ability to measure how you were doing was a good idea was one of the initial things that came out of the game," said Gary Anderson, a former Marine colonel and frequent DoD consultant who ran a series of Pentagon-sponsored war games which examined alternative strategies to waging America's war on terrorism. "We decided to see what would be the long-term indications that you were succeeding," he said.

Starting in September 2004, his group, dubbed the Defense Adaptive Red Team, developed a series of alternative strategies for fighting terrorism. The Pentagon-sponsored team concluded that the war on terrorism is essentially a global insurgency, where discontiguous groups that share a radical Islamic ideology are waging a campaign against the ideologies of the United States and its allies. Therefore, Anderson's team argued, U.S. strategy should incorporate many of the same methods used to counter classic insurgencies, including covert military and police actions; political and economic reform; and the winning hearts and minds.

"Kinetic measures of casualties and body counts never has worked and probably never will work because if you don't know how big the terrorist organization was to begin with, you really don't know how much progress you've made," Anderson says.

Anderson's team came up with a series of broader trends that would allow U.S. policy-makers to see how well their strategies are working to defeat terrorism:

* Terrorist attacks that take place on U.S. territory show a continuous decline.

* The number of states in the Arab and Islamic worlds with representative or inclusive governments that oppose terrorism is increasing.

* Roughly 90 percent of Islamic clergy are preaching against terrorism.

* The majority of Arab language media are editorializing against the use of terrorism and giving negative reportage to acts of terrorism.

* Polling index of Arab/Muslim opinion polls are increasingly favorable.

* Groups previously identified as terrorists but have chosen to adopt non-violent means are increasing.

"We wanted something that if the president got up in front of the American people and said . . . here's what we're shooting for--if we can do these things in the next, 5 or 10 years, we think we're doing pretty good," Anderson said.

With the elections in Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories, Iraq; municipal elections in Saudi Arabia, parliamentary elections in Lebanon, and upcoming presidential elections in Egypt a trend toward "representative" governments in a region associated with terrorist movements--a key measurement of success--could be taking hold.

The nonpartisan Freedom House, a Washington-based democratic advocacy and research group, wrote in its latest "Freedom in the World" survey that there has been an overall gain in freedom around the globe since the attacks of September 11, 2001. East-Central Europe, East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have posted the most gains, while key countries in the Middle East, including Jordan, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates, have had overall setbacks.

The number and effectiveness of terrorist strikes worldwide as a measure
of success is equally mixed. Though there have been no attacks in the United States since 9/11, the U.S. State Department's latest statistics show worldwide terrorist incidents rose from 198 in 2002 to 208 in 2003.

Terrorism caused 725 deaths in 2003, 100 fewer than in the previous year--but wounded 3,546, up nearly 45 percent.

And, as Michael Barone recently noted, surveys in the Muslim world now indicate that America's war on terror is far more effective than the body counts and bomb blasts in Iraq would suggest. The message conveyed by these attacks on U.S. forces and the steady progress toward democracy there could be indicative of what Anderson's group is getting at: Success in the war on terror is as much about killing the bad guys is as it is about coaxing others away from an Islamist path.

Christian Lowe is a staff writer for Army Times Publishing Company and a contributing writer to The Daily

CI, the last I have heard on the news a lot of people are huddled together in the dome and even that is starting to leak.

But she did that on Bush's watch and he did nothing about that except declare an emergency. Rumor has it that Haliburton built that part of the dome that blew off.

Key Changes in Iraq Constitution
Aug 28, 8:22 PM (ET)

By The Associated Press

Key changes to the text of the draft Iraqi constitution, which was submitted without the approval of the Sunni Arabs:

- The preamble places additional emphasis on atrocities under Saddam Hussein. The earlier version said Saddam oppressed "the majority" - a term Kurds and Sunnis said identified too closely with Shiites. Those "of the western region" are Sunnis, emphasizing that they too suffered under the old regime:

... inspired by the suffering of Iraq's martyrs - Sunni and Shiite, Arab, Kurd and Turkomen, and the remaining brethren in all communities - inspired by the injustice against the holy cities (and the south) in the popular uprising and (burnt with the sorrows of the mass graves, the marches and Dujail and others); recalling the agonies of the national oppression in the massacres of Halabja, Barzan, Anfal and against the Faili Kurds; inspired by the tragedies of the Turkomen in Bashir, and as in other parts of Iraq, (the people of the western region have suffered from the liquidation of its leaders, symbols, tribal leaders and displacing its intellectuals, so we worked hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder) to create a new Iraq, Iraq of the future, without sectarianism, racial strife, regionalism, discrimination and (elimination).

- The constitution bans organizations that "advocate, instigate, justify or propagate" racism, terrorism, the declaring of someone as an infidel, sectarian cleansing and "especially the Saddamist Baath in Iraq and its symbols, under any name." The version finished Sunday struck the word "party" from the phrase "Saddam's Baath Party," which could enable a future Baath Party to emerge.

- In a concession to Sunnis in the version finished Sunday, a future parliament will be permitted to establish the rules for implementing federalism:

Article (113): The federal system in the republic of Iraq is made up of the capital, regions, decentralized provinces, and local administrations.

(Article (114):

1st - This constitution, when implemented, shall endorse the region of Kurdistan and its existing power as a federal region.

2nd _This constitution shall endorse the new regions that will be established according to the provisions of the constitution.

Article (115): The Council of Representatives shall pass a law that fixes the executive procedures relating to establishing regions by simple majority in a period that does not exceed six months from the date of the first session.)

Iraqi Draft Constitution in Full, translated from the Arabic by The Associated Press, via the BBC.

The Multilateral Myth

By VANCE SERCHUK
August 26, 2005; Page A12 Wall Street Journal

With considerable numbers of American troops likely to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future, and with Washington shouldering the mounting costs in blood and treasure largely on its own, Afghanistan has emerged as a tempting alternative model of how to manage a postwar occupation -- with an emphasis on multilateralism. From European peacekeepers to U.N. disarmament programs, Afghanistan's reconstruction has been parceled among an alphabet soup of international organizations and multinational entities. Even the Pentagon has embraced the multilateralist credo, gradually turning command of Afghanistan over to NATO.

There's only one problem: Multilateralism in Afghanistan, especially when it comes to security, is often more cosmetic than real. And as much as the Bush administration might wish to free up troops from patrolling the Hindu Kush the peace and stability of Afghanistan still depend on America's military commitment to remain for the long haul.

The multilateral myth is neatly encapsulated in the failure of the so-called "lead nation" concept in Afghanistan. Under this arrangement, responsibility for the different components of the country's security sector -- army, police, judiciary, counternarcotics and disarmament -- was split among the U.S., Germany, Italy, Britain and Japan, respectively. The idea was that assigning ownership of a specific problem to a specific government would ensure accountability. What this approach failed to recognize, however, were the divergent interests and capabilities these "lead nations" brought to Afghanistan.

This is not a new problem. To this day in the Balkans, multinational peacekeeping operations are compromised by divided lines of responsibility and the diverging rules of engagement among participating militaries. By applying a "lead nation" concept to security sector reform, however, these failings are both institutionalized and amplified. How should Britain fight drugs in Afghanistan when reforms of police, courts and jails fall outside its purview?

Arguably the biggest disappointment in Afghanistan has been Germany, responsible for the Afghan police. In three years, Berlin's efforts have focused almost exclusively on rebuilding a single police academy in Kabul, which will train a few thousand officers by 2010. It's a worthy effort, to be sure, but completely divorced from larger Afghan realities -- in particular, the tens of thousands of ill-paid, unreformed and often corrupt Afghan police that roam the countryside.

In the absence of German leadership, the U.S. has been forced to pick up the slack. When I visited an American firebase in Ghazni earlier this year, U.S. soldiers were busy training local cops and equipping them with everything from radios to squad cars. "I'm spending half my time on the police," the commander of the local Provincial Reconstruction Team confessed. This wasn't his job, but the poorly disciplined constabularies were too big an obstacle to ignore.

The U.S. has since been authorized to reform the Afghan police and is working to dispatch 1,500 trainers for that purpose. This is an ambitious commitment that reflects a simple if unpalatable truth: Washington has a greater interest in a functioning Afghan police force than Berlin.

The case for Afghan multilateralism falters in dollar diplomacy as well. Germany has pooled about $100 million for police through 2007. By contrast, the recent supplemental budget passed by Congress appropriated nearly four times that amount for Afghan police this fiscal year alone. And this is being repeated across the board.

Pinning hopes on NATO's presence in Afghanistan is likewise quixotic. Even as the Atlantic alliance trumpeted its expansion into western Afghanistan this summer, the U.S. military quietly maintained a base of its own in the region. Why? As senior leaders in Kabul admit, NATO structures have proven ill-equipped to rapidly and flexibly disburse aid money, the lifeline of any stability operation. Rather than waiting for reform from Brussels, U.S. military leaders realized it was easier to act on their own.

NATO's swing into southern Afghanistan next year is also likely to prove problematic. Besides the perennial problems with national caveats and intelligence sharing, NATO member states bring conflicting understandings of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency to their operations. Simply put, NATO has yet to build an internal consensus -- much less strategy -- around what its mission in Afghanistan should be.

None of this is to suggest, of course, that Americans or Afghans would be better off without the manpower or fiscal contributions of their allies. And whether real or imagined, a veneer of multilateralism has helped lend legitimacy to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, which appears to be rejoining the international community rather than an American empire.

Perhaps this is merely the clever way for the U.S. to manage its hegemony: American allies pretend to do something; Washington pretends that it matters. Germany, for instance, remains the lead on police, despite being marginalized.

But while the Pentagon is understandably eager to trim its commitments, the progress of postwar Afghanistan still rests foremost on the reality of American power. It's no accident, after all, that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been pushing for a strategic partnership with Washington, not NATO. The Afghans clearly recognize the limits of multilateralism in their country. The question is: Do the rest of us?

Mr. Serchuk is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Mr. Serchuk is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Quote:

Mr. Serchuk is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

What kind of accreditation does this institute have? (just curious)

About AEI

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research is dedicated to preserving and strengthening the foundations of freedom--limited government, private enterprise, vital cultural and political institutions, and a strong foreign policy and national defense--through scholarly research, open debate, and publications. Founded in 1943 and located in Washington, D.C., AEI is one of America's largest and most respected "think tanks." [Read the full history of the Institute.]

AEI research covers economics and trade; social welfare; government tax, spending, regulatory, and legal policies; U.S. politics; international affairs; and U.S. defense and foreign policies. The Institute publishes dozens of books and hundreds of articles and reports each year, and an influential policy magazine, The American Enterprise. AEI publications are distributed widely to government officials and legislators, business executives, journalists, and academics; its conferences, seminars, and lectures are regularly covered by national television.

The Institute's fifty resident scholars and fellows include some of America's foremost economists, legal scholars, political scientists, and foreign policy experts. The resident faculty is augmented by a network of more than one hundred adjunct scholars at universities and policy institutes throughout the United States and abroad. AEI scholars testify frequently before congressional committees, provide expert consultation to all branches of government, and are cited and reprinted in the national media more often than those of any other think tank.

The Institute is an independent, nonprofit organization supported primarily by grants and contributions from foundations, corporations, and individuals. AEI is strictly nonpartisan and takes no institutional positions on pending legislation or other policy questions.

AEI is strictly nonpartisan and takes no institutional positions on pending legislation or other policy questions.

Assuming that Tico used the 'about us' link, the American Enterprise Institute wrote:

AEI is strictly nonpartisan and takes no institutional positions on pending legislation or other policy questions.

How very disingenuous of one of the oldest and influential of conservative and frequently Reaganite of "think tanks." To state that they are technically non-partisan is to ignore that their institutional character and members are conservative, when not actually reactionary.

The Brookings Institution, one of Washington's oldest think tanks, is an independent, nonpartisan organization devoted to research, analysis, and public education with an emphasis on economics, foreign policy, governance, and metropolitan policy.

...
It's a non-profit, so it claims that for that purpose. Kinda like The Brookings Institution.



Tico:
I wonder how any times does a collectivist (e.g., liberal) have to be wrong before he begins to stop advertising his propensity for error? Now, don't say never, 'cause that's a really long time.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/comment/story/0,16141,1558932,00.html

We created "al-Qaida".

I told you this before. Interesting explanation and critique here.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/comment/story/0,16141,1558932,00.html

We created "al-Qaida".

I told you this before. Interesting explanation and critique here.

The evidence we have of what lies behind the London bombings confirms that this was the real nature of the threat. It is fascinating to see how suddenly all the terror "experts" have changed their tune. For three years they told us breathlessly about a terrifying global network. Now, suddenly, it has gone away and been replaced by "an evil ideology" that inspires young, angry Muslim males in our own society.

It is good that we now all agree on the nature of the threat, but there remains a danger that the "idea" will be simplified, exaggerated and distorted just as the "network" was, and that in this mood of fear the government will bring in policies that will alienate young Muslims further and drive them towards dangerous extremism.