Utilitarianism

joefromchicago wrote:

djbt wrote:
'One ought to maximize utility' would be the one ought Thomas referred to, I believe.

As to why one ought maximise utility, I have no answer, except that it follows from:
(1) Pleasure is good.
(2) Pain is bad.
(3) All things that experience have the same claim to happiness. (In other words, everything that has interests should have their interests equally considered).
... but, of course, one could disagree with any of these premises.

Or I could disagree with your conclusion. I don't see how it necessarily follows that, if pleasure is good, we then ought to maximize it for society as a whole.

(1) Pleasure is good. (Premise)
(2) It is good for people to feel pleasure. (1 rephrased)
(3) The more pleasure a person feels the better. (From 2)
(4) Society is made up of people (Premise)
(5) The more pleasure experienced by people in a society the better. (From 3 and 4)
(6) Maximizing the pleasure of people in a society is good. (5 rephrased)
(7) One ought to maximise the pleasure of people in a society.

Where do we disagree?

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joefromchicago wrote:

Thomas wrote:
In this case, the behavior of the doctors does not maximize utility over the relevant timeframe, so your example does not test the moral implications of utilitarianism.

Of course it does. You just don't see it because you're begging the question: the only reason that utility is relevant at all to the doctor's decision is because it is the basis for morality in a utilitarian system.

Apparently we have a mismatch between what I am trying to argue and what you are trying to find out about utilitarianism, or my view of it. Perhaps we should clarify that before we continue.

I am trying to argue that if the doctor acts to maximize utility, he will produce an outcome that is morally acceptable. The problem is how to make that argument without circular reasoning. Ideally, we would have a standard of morality that is absolutely true by definition, buy unanimous consensus, or whatever would persuade every person in the world that something is absolutely true. But we don't have such a standard -- if we did, our discussion would be mute because we would just use that standard and not bother with anything else. Absent that, I use the next best non-perfect standard that is available as an independent test of utilitarianism. In my world, this test is my own moral sentiments. I admit it's not perfect, but it's the best I can do. If you know a better way to test utilitarianism, I'd be interested in hearing it.

Okay, I hope that tells you what I am trying to explain. Now, could you please explain just what you are trying to find out about utilitarianism, or about my view of it? My understanding was that you were trying to give an example where a behavior optimises utility, but is unjust, thus presenting an argument against utilitarianism. On this understanding I pointed out that contrary to your implied premise, the doctor's behavior does not optimize utility, so the fact that it is immoral doesn't tell me anything about utilitarianism. Apparently you don't accept this argument, and this leads me to suspect that we were talking past each other.

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joefromchicago wrote:

I don't see how it necessarily follows that, if pleasure is good, we then ought to maximize it for society as a whole.

It follows from the definition of "good" -- good is whatever ought to be maximized throughout society.

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In the examples with the organ donor doesn't the doctor's values come into it?

Say that it is in North Korea and the 5 sick men are the great leader and 4 of his close family and the healthy man is doing 40 years for stealing from the great man's charity collection bottle.What could the doctors expect if they didn't do it.Would that influence their ethical values and wouldn't it be utilitarianism if they got on with the job.

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djbt wrote:

Were I faced with this situation, I would say that I should act as I described. I just don't think that such a situation is possible.

Anything is possible. Read Hume.

djbt wrote:

As I thought I had made clear, I do not consider the point of a moral system being to work out how to apportion blame, or 'moral censure'.

A moral system must censure bad acts. If bad acts are not blameworthy under your utilitarianism, djbt, then it's not much of a moral system.

djbt wrote:

Apportioning of blame or censure is the job of law, not morality.

Moral blame is the exclusive province of morality. I never mentioned -- and I won't mention -- anything about the law.

djbt wrote:

Since I would base any legal system on my utilitarian moral system, I would make laws that tend to maximised happiness, and assess 'blameworthiness' accordingly. This is a separate, lengthy, question, but I'll go into it if you wish, but perhaps on another thread, like 'How can utilitarianism be used to decide on laws', although it would probably turn into a historical debate rather than a philosophical one.

Your points have been duly noted. Now address the hypothetical.

djbt wrote:

(1) Pleasure is good. (Premise)
(2) It is good for people to feel pleasure. (1 rephrased)
(3) The more pleasure a person feels the better. (From 2)
(4) Society is made up of people (Premise)
(5) The more pleasure experienced by people in a society the better. (From 3 and 4)
(6) Maximizing the pleasure of people in a society is good. (5 rephrased)
(7) One ought to maximise the pleasure of people in a society.

Where do we disagree?

The enormous, unexplained gap between 4 and 5.

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Thomas wrote:

I am trying to argue that if the doctor acts to maximize utility, he will produce an outcome that is morally acceptable.

Then you're begging the question.

Thomas wrote:

The problem is how to make that argument without circular reasoning. Ideally, we would have a standard of morality that is absolutely true by definition, buy unanimous consensus, or whatever would persuade every person in the world that something is absolutely true. But we don't have such a standard -- if we did, our discussion would be mute because we would just use that standard and not bother with anything else. Absent that, I use the next best non-perfect standard that is available as an independent test of utilitarianism. In my world, this test is my own moral sentiments. I admit it's not perfect, but it's the best I can do. If you know a better way to test utilitarianism, I'd be interested in hearing it.

If our task here is to find out what a utilitarian would do in any given situation, then I can understand your point. That's important to do, but it's only the beginning. Remember, one of the initial questions raised by djbt was if there are "any damning criticisms of utilitarianism?" I can imagine what a utilitarian would do in any given situation just as easily as you can: what I want to know is if utilitarianism is ultimately a coherent system of morality.

Thomas wrote:

Okay, I hope that tells you what I am trying to explain. Now, could you please explain just what you are trying to find out about utilitarianism, or about my view of it? My understanding was that you were trying to give an example where a behavior optimises utility, but is unjust, thus presenting an argument against utilitarianism. On this understanding I pointed out that contrary to your implied premise, the doctor's behavior does not optimize utility, so the fact that it is immoral doesn't tell me anything about utilitarianism. Apparently you don't accept this argument, and this leads me to suspect that we were talking past each other.

It wouldn't be the first time.

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Thomas wrote:

joefromchicago wrote:
I don't see how it necessarily follows that, if pleasure is good, we then ought to maximize it for society as a whole.

It follows from the definition of "good" -- good is whatever ought to be maximized throughout society.

Imagine this conversation between a utilitarian and a hedonist:

Utilitarian: Pleasure is the highest good.
Hedonist: I agree.
Utilitarian: And, all things being equal, more pleasure is better than less.
Hedonist: That is correct.
Utilitarian: And so the moral person ought to maximize pleasure.
Hedonist: Without question.
Utilitarian: Thus, morality is a system of rules designed to maximize pleasure throughout society.
Hedonist: Throughout society? Do you mean I have to act to bring pleasure to others?
Utilitarian: Yes, of course.
Hedonist: Hold on a second, when you were talking about "pleasure" I thought you were talking about my pleasure. I see no reason to act in such a way that would maximize pleasure for other people, especially if that means sacrificing some of my own pleasure for their benefit.
Utilitarian: But you agreed that more pleasure is better than less pleasure.
Hedonist: Yes, for me it is. As for the rest of society, I don't really understand why I should care.
Utilitarian: Because you have a moral obligation to maximize pleasure.
Hedonist: Only as to myself.

Utilitarianism, as I see it, must explain why maximizing pleasure/utility throughout society follows from the initial premise that pleasure is good. Just saying that pleasure is good and therefore one has an obligation to contribute to someone else's pleasure doesn't make any sense.

(And, as an interesting thought Gedankenexperiment, Thomas, replace "pleasure" in the above dialogue with "wealth," replace "morality" with "government," and change the utilitarian and the hedonist to "Statist" and "Libertarian")

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spendius wrote:

In the examples with the organ donor doesn't the doctor's values come into it?

If I wanted to ask the doctor I would have. The hypothetical is designed to explore the reader's moral values, not the hypothetical doctor's.

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I know that.Does it not explore the readers values if he thinks what the doctor might do and whether or not different doctors in different circumstances might do different things.And then see if utilitarianism was anything other that one's own values.If we provide a bourgeois setting only we get a bourgeois answer.

Doesn't utilitarianism have to be universal.Can it be localised?

And isn't the doctor the only player who matters in the example.The healthy man is unlikely to be consulted and the others needn't be told at all.

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joefromchicago wrote:

Thomas wrote:
I am trying to argue that if the doctor acts to maximize utility, he will produce an outcome that is morally acceptable.

Then you're begging the question.

How so?

joefromchicago wrote:

I can imagine what a utilitarian would do in any given situation just as easily as you can: what I want to know is if utilitarianism is ultimately a coherent system of morality.

Do you believe that the doctor in your hypothetical maximizes utility throughout society? Do you believe that the doctor acted immorally? How do you think the two hang together, if you think they do?

joefromchicago wrote:

Thomas wrote:
[...][T]his leads me to suspect that we were talking past each other.

It wouldn't be the first time.

I think I am detecting vibes of chagrin here. Is something wrong?

I enjoyed your dialogue, but here is where I think you misrepresent the utilitarian:

joefromchicago wrote:

Hedonist: Throughout society? Do you mean I have to act to bring pleasure to others?
Utilitarian: Yes, of course.

The correct answer for the utilitarian would be: "Only up to the point when you begin to bring more displeasure to yourself than pleasure to others." To which the hedonist would answer: "Fair enough -- I actually like it when my girlfriends say I'm good in bed." It is also possible that the hedonist would answer: "Well yeah, so I ought to make other people happy. I don't care -- I'll continue doing what makes me happy anyway." This makes the hedonist an unlikeable person, but he has granted the point.

joefromchicago wrote:

Utilitarianism, as I see it, must explain why maximizing pleasure/utility throughout society follows from the initial premise that pleasure is good. Just saying that pleasure is good and therefore one has an obligation to contribute to someone else's pleasure doesn't make any sense.

Again, this is not what I would conclude as a utilitarian. In my view, one only has an obligation to contribute to other people's pleasure to the point where it causes less displeasure to oneself. With this qualification, the argument is almost a syllogism: People ought to maximize what's good throughout society (definition of "ought" or of "good", whichever term you're less sure of), pleasure is good by assumption, therefore people ought to maximize pleasure throughout society. What do you see here that is left to be proven?

joefromchicago wrote:

(And, as an interesting thought Gedankenexperiment, Thomas, replace "pleasure" in the above dialogue with "wealth," replace "morality" with "government," and change the utilitarian and the hedonist to "Statist" and "Libertarian")

Doesn't work for me. The hedonist has the same moral claim to pleasure as anybody else, simply by virtue of being a human. But the government does not have the same moral claim to wealth as the citizens do. Transfers of wealth from the citizens to the government is justified if the government uses it to produce at least as much wealth for the citizens -- or it isn't justified at all. The government has no independent claim to wealth but the hedonist has an independent claim to pleasure.

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The Euro end wrote-

Quote:

"Fair enough -- I actually like it when my girlfriends say I'm good in bed."

Now this is more like it.

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I see this thread had proliferated once again.

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May I also just say that there is a difference in "killing" and "not saving someone's life." The two actions are not the same.

As to "not saving someone's life", I think that it is morally wrong to not save someone's life when you can, but as to sacrificing an innocent person's life to save people's life, I'd say it is immoral.

What I was asking in how pain and pleasure is to be measured, is how on earth would you measure the net pleasure or pain, and which factor has a greater digit quantity? Let's take an example that has been used over and over again. Let's say a group of people can only live with "pleasure" at the cost of a person's lifelong suffering. Is this moral? My moral belief say it is not, but what does utilitarianism say?

Also, take the example of a person experiencing psychological pleasure when under physiological pain. Is it moral for the person to continue causing physiological pain to him or herself?

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Thomas said-

Quote:

I actually like it when my girlfriends say I'm good in bed."

I think we might discover more about ourselves by pursuing utilitarianism through this example rather than the idea of killing a healthy man to save five sick ones.The latter is hardly something anybody can relate to whereas Thomas's statement is something one can really get one's teeth into.

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Ray wrote:

What I was asking in how pain and pleasure is to be measured, is how on earth would you measure the net pleasure or pain, and which factor has a greater digit quantity? Let's take an example that has been used over and over again. Let's say a group of people can only live with "pleasure" at the cost of a person's lifelong suffering. Is this moral? My moral belief say it is not, but what does utilitarianism say?

My answer to your question about measuring was that it's best done by observing people's willingness to seek it or avoid it. It has the benefit of resolving paradoxes as the one posed by masochists. A masochist gets pleasure from physical pain, so he seeks it. But by seeking pain, he reveals to the utilitarian who observes him that physical pain adds to the masochist's pleasure, the maximand of the utilitarian calculus.

When comparing the pain of one person to the pleasure of another, my utilitarian calculus would observe each party's willingness to seek them, avoid them, and voluntarily exchange them. This gets us to a similar point as the one about the ethics of slavery that we discussed early in this thread.

As you remember, I argued that antebellum slavery in the south was not utility-maximizing, as judged by the fact that its conditions could not be recreated once the former slaves had freedom of contract. Former slaves were not willing to work in an agricultural system based on gang labor for any wage that former slave owners were willing to offer. The utilitarian calculus concludes that this kind of slavery was unethical. My moral instincts, as the Supremes like to say, "concur in judgment", but feel uncomfortable with the reasoning.

By contrast, indentured servitude was commonly seeked by poor Europeans as a method of paying their passage to colonial America. Based on this evidence, the utilitarian calculus concludes that this form of "slavery light" was ethical -- and again, my own moral intuitions agree with the conclusions, but feel a bit uneasy about the reasoning.

I think these examples still illustrate quite well how I would resolve the more general problems you described in your last post. I also think you still disagree with them.

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spendius wrote:

I know that.Does it not explore the readers values if he thinks what the doctor might do and whether or not different doctors in different circumstances might do different things.And then see if utilitarianism was anything other that one's own values.If we provide a bourgeois setting only we get a bourgeois answer.

The hypothetical presents only one set of circumstances. Different circumstances would require different hypotheticals.

spendius wrote:

Doesn't utilitarianism have to be universal.Can it be localised?

If it aspires to be a system of morality, it must apply to all moral beings.

spendius wrote:

And isn't the doctor the only player who matters in the example.The healthy man is unlikely to be consulted and the others needn't be told at all.

The reader is invited to opine on what the doctor should do. The doctor, then, is merely the object of the reader's moral speculation.

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Thomas wrote:

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
I am trying to argue that if the doctor acts to maximize utility, he will produce an outcome that is morally acceptable.

Then you're begging the question.

How so?

Because you are assuming that utility is the measure of morality, and that is, as far as I can tell, an open question.

Now, of course, if you're simply attempting to determine what a rational utilitarian would do in a given situation, you are free to assume that utilitarianism is a given. That's a worthwhile question, but the more interesting question (to my mind) is whether utilitarianism is defensible at all, not whether it can provide moral guidance in a particular situation.

Thomas wrote:

Do you believe that the doctor in your hypothetical maximizes utility throughout society? Do you believe that the doctor acted immorally? How do you think the two hang together, if you think they do?

The doctor in my hypothetical didn't act at all -- he was waiting for instructions from you and djbt. His actions, therefore, cannot be described as either moral or immoral, since he took no actions.

Thomas wrote:

joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
[...][T]his leads me to suspect that we were talking past each other.

It wouldn't be the first time.

I think I am detecting vibes of chagrin here. Is something wrong?

No, not chagrined. That we disagree or misunderstand one another is not regrettable, it is inevitable. Nevertheless, I continue to enjoy your posts and look forward to our exchanges.

Thomas wrote:

I enjoyed your dialogue, but here is where I think you misrepresent the utilitarian:

joefromchicago wrote:
Hedonist: Throughout society? Do you mean I have to act to bring pleasure to others?
Utilitarian: Yes, of course.

The correct answer for the utilitarian would be: "Only up to the point when you begin to bring more displeasure to yourself than pleasure to others."

That is certainly not correct, at least for traditional utilitarianism (it may, however, be an aspect of your utilitarianism -- perhaps you'd care to explain this point further). In my train hypothetical, it is clear that murdering B gives more pleasure to A than watching B get hit by the train. Yet you said that it would be more blameworthy for A to murder B than to let him get hit by the train. So, in your view, A clearly should act to increase utility to others, even though he is sacrificing his own pleasure in doing so.

Thomas wrote:

To which the hedonist would answer: "Fair enough -- I actually like it when my girlfriends say I'm good in bed." It is also possible that the hedonist would answer: "Well yeah, so I ought to make other people happy. I don't care -- I'll continue doing what makes me happy anyway." This makes the hedonist an unlikeable person, but he has granted the point.

No, the hedonist would reply: "You posit that I ought to maximize pleasure for others only up to the point that I bring more displeasure to myself than pleasure to others, but, from my perspective, my displeasure always outweighs someone else's pleasure. I would rather someone else suffer death than for me to suffer a toothache. You have to convince me that I owe a duty to someone else that outweighs my own self-interest, and I don't see that you can."

Thomas wrote:

Again, this is not what I would conclude as a utilitarian. In my view, one only has an obligation to contribute to other people's pleasure to the point where it causes less displeasure to oneself. With this qualification, the argument is almost a syllogism: People ought to maximize what's good throughout society (definition of "ought" or of "good", whichever term you're less sure of), pleasure is good by assumption, therefore people ought to maximize pleasure throughout society. What do you see here that is left to be proven?

The connection between a person's pleasure and society's pleasure.

As the hedonist would argue, the fact that one ought to increase one's own pleasure is totally separate from the conclusion that one ought to increase someone else's pleasure. The latter does not follow automatically from the former. Indeed, they are contradictory, for if one's obligation to maximize pleasure comes at the expense of one's own pleasure, then one must reluctantly conclude that pleasure is both good and bad (good for society, bad for the individual). That's the gap in the reasoning.

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joefromchicago wrote:

djbt wrote:
As I thought I had made clear, I do not consider the point of a moral system being to work out how to apportion blame, or 'moral censure'.

A moral system must censure bad acts. If bad acts are not blameworthy under your utilitarianism, djbt, then it's not much of a moral system.

The system is intended to help one decide how to act. If you insist on apportioning blame, the criteria could be:
A blameworthy act = one which was committed knowing that the consequences would be less than optimal in the situation (optimal by utilitarian standards, of course). I suppose the further from optimal, the more blameworthy.
Another blameworthy act = one that was committed in ignorance of the consequences, when it is known that the consequences could have be known, or predicted with some degree of certainty. The greater the ease with which the consequences could have been predicted, the more blameworthy.

So, my answer to your hypothetical would depend on these factors:
(a) Would being shot be a more or less painful way to die?
(b) Would the fact that B had been shot upset B's family more than if he'd just been killed?
(c) Is the waste of a bullet or two a bad thing?

In short, the more blameworthy act would be the one with the worst consequences, presuming A would be able to anticipate these consequences.

joefromchicago wrote:

djbt wrote:
(1) Pleasure is good. (Premise)
(2) It is good for people to feel pleasure. (1 rephrased)
(3) The more pleasure a person feels the better. (From 2)
(4) Society is made up of people (Premise)
(5) The more pleasure experienced by people in a society the better. (From 3 and 4)
(6) Maximizing the pleasure of people in a society is good. (5 rephrased)
(7) One ought to maximise the pleasure of people in a society.

Where do we disagree?

The enormous, unexplained gap between 4 and 5.

Note that (2) says: 'It is good for people to feel pleasure', not 'It is good for a person that they feel pleasure'. That someone's else pleasure is as important as one's own is part of the premise. Of course, a hedonist would disagree with this. A sadist probably would, too. It seems to me impossible to conceive of a moral system that doesn't have premisses that someone would disagree with, if 'oughts' cannot be derived from 'is's.

Do you disagree with the premises? If so, why? Because you don't think that it is bad for people to suffer pain, or because you don't think pain is the only evil?

joefromchicago wrote:

...the more interesting question (to my mind) is whether utilitarianism is defensible at all, not whether it can provide moral guidance in a particular situation.

I fully agree. Fire at will.

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joefromchicago wrote:

Thomas wrote:
joefromchicago wrote:
Thomas wrote:
I am trying to argue that if the doctor acts to maximize utility, he will produce an outcome that is morally acceptable.

Then you're begging the question.

How so?

Because you are assuming that utility is the measure of morality, and that is, as far as I can tell, an open question.

Joe, I'll answer to the rest of your post later, but wanted to get this first point out of the way immediately. Did you notice that "I am trying to argue that... " was explicitly not an assumption? If I simply assumed that some point is true, I wouldn't bother arguing that it is; and I would neither worry about the argument getting circular, nor look for an independent measure of morality to test utilitarianism against. Throughout the whole paragraph which you said was begging the question, I was trying to argue that a utility-maximizing doctor happens to act in an ethical way, without assuming that he does (which would have made the reasoning circular). Please re-read that paragraph a little bit slower than you read it the first time, which I think should make my intentions fairly clear.

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joefromchicago wrote:

Thomas wrote:
Do you believe that the doctor in your hypothetical maximizes utility throughout society? Do you believe that the doctor acted immorally? How do you think the two hang together, if you think they do?

The doctor in my hypothetical didn't act at all -- he was waiting for instructions from you and djbt. His actions, therefore, cannot be described as either moral or immoral, since he took no actions.

Then let me rephrase my question as follows. Suppose the doctor does not wait for instructions from us and slaughters the healthy man to save the sick. In your opinion, a) would the doctor maximize utility throughout society, b) would he be acting immoral, and c) which connections exist between a and b, if any?

joefromchicago wrote:

Thomas wrote:
The correct answer for the utilitarian would be: "Only up to the point when you begin to bring more displeasure to yourself than pleasure to others."

That is certainly not correct, at least for traditional utilitarianism (it may, however, be an aspect of your utilitarianism -- perhaps you'd care to explain this point further).

Society as a whole consists of two parts: This individual hedonist and everybody else. To the utilitarian, the maximand is the pleasure throughout society as a whole, so the hedonist's displeasure from helping others counts as a negative in the utilitarian calculus. Less technically put, his displeasure is a reason for not obliging him to help others. The reason becomes decicive when the total pleasure he can bring the rest of society comes at a higher cost in displeasure to him. (Because at this point it would begin to decrease the pleasure aggregated over society as a whole.) Which part of that argument do you think conflicts with traditional utilitarianism?

joefromchicago wrote:

No, the hedonist would reply: "You posit that I ought to maximize pleasure for others only up to the point that I bring more displeasure to myself than pleasure to others, but, from my perspective, my displeasure always outweighs someone else's pleasure. I would rather someone else suffer death than for me to suffer a toothache. You have to convince me that I owe a duty to someone else that outweighs my own self-interest, and I don't see that you can."

If the hedonist says this in order to state his philosophical position, he is only making clear that he is not a utilitarian (and that I am not a hedonist). If he is saying this to state his preferences, and the specific context for your discussion is that someone is drowning out there and he won't throw a rope, I advise you to do this: Pull out a hair of his and tell him you'll pull out the next in 15 seconds unless he throws that rope to this drowning person now. We'll see what he prefers -- and as a utilitarian I believe you would be acting ethically, as long as the pain you cause the hedonist from having a hair pulled outweighs the pain to the other person from drowning. (That's assuming, for this particular point, that neither of your and his actions has consequences for the rest of the world beyond the drowning guy.)

joefromchicago wrote:

The connection between a person's pleasure and society's pleasure.

I fill this gap by assuming that society is only a ficticious person, a semantic shorthand for "every human in the world". It has no pleasure for us to consider in its own right, except as a semantic shorthand for "the pleasure of each of the six billion humans in the world, as judged by his own preferences, added up." There are people who disagree with this assumption, but this is a disagreement about what the word "society" means. It is a disagreement about hermeneutics, not ethics.

joefromchicago wrote:

As the hedonist would argue, the fact that one ought to increase one's own pleasure is totally separate from the conclusion that one ought to increase someone else's pleasure.

But utilitarians don't make this premise, except in the limit where maximizing ones own pleasure has no (harmful) effects on others, where it's simply a special case of the utlitarian calculus. Why should it trouble me that the conclusion does not follow from a premise I did not make?

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