@georgeob1,
georgeob1 wrote:I think you are being deliberately evasive and distorting the question to suit your (hard to understand) agenda.
I don't have an agenda, unless you call it an agenda that I'm interested in testing hypotheses against data, and adapting my politics to the hypotheses that pass. As far as I am concerned, the two questions are: what caused the Euro crisis, and how can Europe get out of it? To figure out the answers, I look at the economic models that are out there, run them against the data we have, and ask what the models that fit the data recommend. So that's what I did with the hypotheses you suggested. No more, no less.
georgeob1 wrote:The contaigon among the Eurozone countries is very clearly influenced by the existence of their common currency - a factor that, to some extent, makes them a single financial entity.
So far, I agree.
georgeob1 wrote:Their collective failure to adhere to the financial stability pact they established when the common currency was created, or even to ensure that the required financial reporting of member states was accurate; coupled with generally low economic growth and inflexible labor markets were the main sources of their collective risk.
On this point, I disagree, for three reasons. First, pre-crisis Europe
collectively did stay within the bounds of the stability pact. Second, pre-2007 adherence of individual member states to the pact was uncorrelated with their post-2007 damage from the crisis. Third, and most importantly, the Maastricht pact's so-called stability criteria have nothing to do with what standard macroeconomic models would suggest stabilizes a currency union. The greatest risk for such unions is asymmetric shocks, where depression hits some parts but not others, and a one-size-fits-all monetary must necessarily wreak havoc
somewhere. The Maastricht criteria do nothing to address this risk. Maastricht, in other words, is
called a stability pact, but it's not a stability pact.
georgeob1 wrote: Ireland had and has a very productive economy and low total debt levels, but it had an unusually intense and serious construction bubble;
I agree. The same construction bubble happened in Spain,
and in Italy,
and in Greece, and
not in the countries that didn't fall off the cliff. On
this variable you truly
do have a good correlation. But when you take this variable seriously, it tells a story about out-of-control inflows of hot, private money through an under-regulated banking system. It has nothing to do with either the overregulation story, nor the welfare-state story, nor the government-deficit story you were telling earlier. This is a story of
private financial market failure that taxpayers got stuck with the bill for. For the future, the obvious correction of this market failure is more, not less, public oversight of the banking system.
georgeob1 wrote: Your efforts to find a selective lack of correlation among individual elements are positively deceptive, and I think you know that.
What's selective about it? You tell me, because
you selected them! All I did was take the causes
you suggested and check if there was a correlation between them and the problems that you alleged they caused. And there wasn't.
georgeob1 wrote: I think you understand all this perfectly well: you just chose to ignore it to make some rhetorical point (though what it might be still evades my understanding).
It's called "hypothesis testing", and it's
not a rhetorical point. It's what we trained physicists do to figure out how the world works. Engineers do it, too. I hope you've done lots of it yourself when you had your engineer hat on.