maporsche wrote:I'm sorry, I should have known from reading some of your previous posts that you don't like to do your own research. I should have realized that you already have fully formed opinions on certain matters and refuse to research anything that may refute those previously held opinions. Well, I'm doing you a favor and providing the government sources you asked for.
Here is the study that was completed by the Department of Energy (notice the .gov in the URL, specifying a government entity), specifically the by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. It was released on or near December 11th 2006. It's a 39 page document so I doubt you'll take any time to read it. Let me extract some points for you.
http://www.pnl.gov/energy/eed/etd/pdfs/phev_feasibility_analysis_combined.pdf
I did read the report and I have long been generally familiar with its contents. The report basically calculates the unused potential of the total U.S. productive capacity in terms of equivalent numbers of electrically powered light vehicles, based on certain assumptions about their distribution by type (truck, SUV etc.) and others regarding the power requirements and efficiencies of the imaginary vehicles that would be so supplied. It turns out that under these assumptions the total number of vehicles so powered is large. The study goes on to estimate the oil import and atmospheric emission potential of this transfer based on additional assumptions about the efficacy of new emission controls at fossil fueled power generationg plants.
What is missing from the report is any consideration of the practical value of the power demand "valleys" and the relationship of the reliability of the generation/distribution system to the average load imposed on it. To illustrate - if their proposal were applied to its fullest potential (i.e. the very numbers they calculated) then the first hiccup at a power station, major transmission line, or a regional network station, or even at some obscure local transformer station would result in a major regional or nationwide system cascading failure. We have already seen examples of such cascading failures, even under less than peak demand situations.
A significant reserve of excess capacity is needed to cover issues ranging from plant maintenance requirements to unscheduled outages of plants or transmission facilities. Additional online, operating reserve is required for redundancy & short-term reliability including reserve capacity for matters such as rerouting power flows, and the huge power surges that can result from local system failures or changes in configuration of the network.
The truth is we don't have suffucient redundancy in the existing generating and transmission capacity in certain regions of the country. The report you so value already noted that our current system operates at 100% of capacity about 5% of the time -- i.e. about 70 minutes every day. From a systems perspective this is already a dangerous source of unreliability.
It is true that in an ideal world the "valleys" in the seasonal and diurnal demand curves could power a large number of vehicles (if they existed; and if the needed transmission and charging facilities were built). In this same ideal world the mice found a way to put a bell around the cat's neck and lived without fear. Unfortunately this isn't the world we live in.
The report you cited was a very good example of the insubstantial fluff you get posing as science on a "hot" topic like AGW. I know the Pacific NW Lab well, and know that they produce a lot of this stuff (it is run bt Battele Inc under contract to the government). It is interesting to note that most U.S. utilities are today running various programs to bribe their customers into using less power, not more. Have you ever wondered why they do this? Do businesses usually ask their customers to buy less of their product? The truth is they are capacity limited and, given the environmental issues they face and the various NIMBYs they must deal with they know they can raise their profits by limiting demand and avoiding the regulatory and intervener hassle - as well as the capital requirements - of new plant construction.