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Thu 21 Oct, 2004 06:13 am
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF1B7.pdf
Interesting read, hear's an exerpt:
Quote:Eight-five percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is controlled by the private
sector. "Homeland security and national preparedness therefore often begins with the
private sector," the 9/11 Commission's report says.6 Security expert Stephen Flynn,
director of the Hart-Rudman commission that concluded prior to 9/11 that America's
greatest security challenge was the threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack, states flatly
that "without standards, or even the threat of standards, the private sector will not secure
itself."7
Yet the administration has failed to use its executive powers or support legislation
to mandate regulatory steps that can and should be taken without large taxpayer
expenditures. In some cases, it has played a leading role in blocking critical measures.
This reflects the administration's hostility toward the reasonable regulation of
industry, even where the safety and security of Americans is at grave risk. Within days
of taking office, the Bush administration began setting up hurdles in the regulatory
process and installing industry executives and their allies in the government. A
particularly telling appointment was that of John Graham, a well-known industry-backed
academic hostile to regulation, who was given the job of regulatory czar within the White
House Office of Management and Budget. The administration has hired more than 100
industry lobbyists, lawyers or company executives to fill high-level government jobs
during Bush's tenure in office.8
While business lobbyists work within the administration to block regulatory
initiatives and dismantle existing ones, industries that would be affected by new security
measures have lobbied hard against such proposals - and found much success. And, as
this report shows, these same industries have provided strong financial support for the
Bush presidential campaigns and the Republican Party.
The chemical, nuclear, hazardous materials transport, ports and shipping, and
water utility industries have contributed $19.9 million to Bush and the Republican
National Committee since the 2000 election cycle. Thirty of Bush's top fundraisers - 10
so-called "Rangers" and 20 "Pioneers," who each raise at least $200,000 and $100,000,
respectively - hail from those industries. In addition, these industries have spent more
than $201 million to lobby the administration and Congress since 2002.
Ack.
The perks for lobbyists thing seems to be a thread that runs throught lots of different entities and seems to be linked to their ineffectiveness -- I realize it didn't start with the Bush administration, but they seem to have brought it to a whole 'nother level. (Lobbyists from polluting companies becoming environmental regulators, etc.)
Completely agree. Someone said a while back that what was happening with this admin was akin to looting. I think I now agree with that.
Is Public Citizen suggesting the government should take over all privately owned infrastructure and factories, etc?
Ummmm.... no.
"Take over" and "regulate" are not synonymous...
McGentrix wrote:Is Public Citizen suggesting the government should take over all privately owned infrastructure and factories, etc?
Ummmm.... no.
Did someone say that it was?
This administration, and people like me, are opposed to governmental regulation.
This administration is supposedly also for security.
Something has to give, and I'd rather it wasn't security.
McGentrix wrote:This administration, and people like me, are opposed to governmental regulation.
He said he'd do 'whatever it takes to keep the American people safe'. Apparently that doesn't include insisting on higher standards from his big donors.
Expecting higher standards and imposing the governments will over private business are 2 seperate issues.
The government is already a proven failure at regulating business. To further impair American businesses with unneccessary regulations would only hurt the economy and drive up the cost of goods.
You can believe what you will about this issue, but governmental regulations never work. Private companies have and are securing their own facilities.
Notice that no examples are given in that document. Merely vague generalizations. It's too busy discussing who is giving how much to whom.
McG, I'm guessing you didn't click on the link and read the whole 107-page document...?
I admit to skimming portions of it, but did read most of it.
Ah, so you're going to take back "Notice that no examples are given in that document. Merely vague generalizations. It's too busy discussing who is giving how much to whom"? "NO examples" is kinda strong, mebbe finish reading the parts you skimmed before you commit to it... ;-)
Yes, let me change that. No GOOD examples are given. Merely vague generalizations with no GOOD ways of correcting the problems pointed out.
McGentrix wrote:You can believe what you will about this issue, but governmental regulations never work. Private companies have and are securing their own facilities.
Notice that no examples are given in that document. Merely vague generalizations. It's too busy discussing who is giving how much to whom.
From the article ( I couldn't paste all of it, that's why the link )
Quote: After reviewing EPA documents in the months following 9/11, The Washington
Post reported7 on some of the potential dangers of chemical plants:
A suburban California chemical plant routinely loads chlorine into 90-
ton railroad cars that, if ruptured, could poison more than 4 million people
in Orange and Los Angeles counties, depending on wind speed and
direction and the ambient temperature.
A Philadelphia refinery keeps 400,000 pounds of hydrogen fluoride that
could asphyxiate nearly 4 million nearby residents.
A South Kearny, N.J., chemical company's 180,000 pounds of chlorine
or sulfur dioxide could form a cloud that could threaten 12 million people.
20
The West Virginia sister plant of the infamous Union Carbide factory in
Bhopal, India, keeps up to 200,000 pounds of methyl isocyanate that could
emit a toxic fog over 60,000 people near Charleston.
The Atofina Chemicals Inc. plant outside Detroit projects that a rupture
of one of its 90-ton rail cars of chlorine could endanger 3 million people.
Chemical plants and storage facilities are a ubiquitous feature of our
industrialized landscape and pose a major threat if left unsecured.
Those are just exerpts from the Chemical section. I will post what's in the nuclear and water sections.
Aw, I wanted to get him to commit and then whammo. :-D
Sorry, I guess I was copying and pasting while you two were talking. Slow, slow, slow.
Same result.
(I have something copied already if he comes back with "yes but that's just complaining about what's wrong, no recommendations for correcting the problems or anything...") (Oops, I just showed my hand... ;-) )
nuclear...
Quote:The GAO issued a report in September 2003, urging a variety of security
improvements at the nation's nuclear power plants.33 It identified three major
deficiencies in the NRC's oversight of nuclear plant security.
First, inspectors often classified security lapses as "non-cited violations" if the
problem had not been identified frequently in the past and was not deemed by the agency
to be something that would have direct or immediate consequences. This type of
violation does not require a response from the licensee and does not require any followup
by the NRC to see if the problem had been corrected.
Some of these non-cited violations appeared serious to the GAO. These included:
a security guard found sleeping on duty for more than half an hour, a security guard who
falsified logs to show he had checked vital doors and barriers when he was actually in
another part of the plant, and guards who failed to search individuals and allowed them
unescorted access to the plant's protected area even after metal detectors indicated they
had metal objects in their clothing.
Second, the NRC did not systematically and routinely collect, analyze and
disseminate security assessments to identify problems that may be common to plants or
to provide lessons learned in resolving security problems.
47
Third, there were serious weaknesses in the way the NRC conducted mock
terrorist attacks to evaluate security precautions. The exercises were conducted
infrequently against security forces that were beefed up with additional guards or
barriers. The simulated terrorists had unrealistic weapons and were not trained to operate
like terrorists.
I think, McG, that they don't offer solutions because those solutions have already been suggested in other reports. This one is basically a summary of the problems and a report on why this group thinks those solutions have not been implemented.
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