Enough with the swift boat crap already

What I would like to know from Kerry, are detailed (as possible) plans for the war on terror. How does he propose to make the country safe?

This diversionary issue is keeping the focus on a bogus issue, causing us to ignore the real issues. I invite a2kers to spell out their own version of what is important in this election - certainly not personal smear attacks, I would hope?

What I would like to know from Kerry, are detailed (as possible) plans for the war on terror. How does he propose to make the country safe? If I can be satisfied that he will be proactive in protecting the US, and has credible, workable plans, then Sozobe will owe me a cheesecake!

"I'd like to say a few words about the 9-11 Commission Report that was just released. The commission has done an extraordinary job. It has issued a clear set of recommendations to protect us from terrorism and make America safer.

"Now that the 9-11 Commission has done its job, we need to do ours. We understand the threat. We have a blueprint for action. We have the strength as a nation to do what must be done. The only thing we don't have is time.

-snip-

"We must act on the commission's recommendations now, and keep working, without pause, until we have done everything possible to prevent another terrorist attack.

"That is why I support the 9-11 Commission's commitment to continue pushing for progress and make sure its recommendations are implemented without further delay.

"The commission should stay on the job for at least another 18 months and, beginning this December, the commission should issue a status report every six months to address the following questions with absolute candor: First, are we doing enough, fast enough, to strengthen our homeland security? Second, are we reorganizing our intelligence agencies to meet the terrorist threat? Third, are we building a true global alliance to fight the terrorists and their extremist ideology? Fourth, are we leading and uniting the world, so that we isolate our enemies, not ourselves? Fifth and finally, are we doing everything we can do to make America as safe as it can be?

RECOMMENDATIONS


(890) Three years after 9/ 11, the national debate continues about how to protect our nation in this new era. We divide our recommendations into two basic parts: What to do, and how to do it.


(895) WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY


(898) The enemy is not just "terrorism." It is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Bin Ladin and others who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion, and distorts both.


(905) The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and vio-lence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that con-tributes to Islamist terrorism.


(914) The first phase of our post-9/ 11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelli-gence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.


(923) What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.


(929) Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction. That image lowers expectations of gov-ernment effectiveness.


(937) It lowers them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile and occasionally left vulnerable by the mar-ginal, unstable people often attracted to such causes. The enemy made mistakes. The U. S. government was not able to capitalize on them.


(944) No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/ 11 will not happen again. But the American people are entitled to expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.


(952) We propose a strategy with three dimensions: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, (2) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.


(957) Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations


(961) Root out sanctuaries. The U. S. government should identify and prior-itize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and have realistic country or regional strategies for each, utilizing every element of national power and reaching out to countries that can help us.

(968) Strengthen long-term U. S. and international commitments to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

(972) Confront problems with Saudi Arabia in the open and build a relation-ship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citi-zens and includes a shared commitment to reform.



(978) Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism In October 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked if enough was being done "to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists." As part of such a plan, the U. S. government should


(986) Define the message and stand as an example of moral leadership in the world. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have the advantage-- our vision can offer a better future.

(993) Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law, or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future.

(998) Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War.

(1005) Offer an agenda of opportunity that includes support for public edu-cation and economic openness.

(1009) Develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, using a flexible contact group of leading coalition governments and fashioning a common coalition approach on issues like the treatment of captured terrorists.

(1015) Devote a maximum effort to the parallel task of countering the pro-liferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(1019) Expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more from fol-lowing the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt terrorists, understand their networks, and disrupt their operations. Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks

(1026) Target terrorist travel, an intelligence and security strategy that the 9/ 11 story showed could be at least as powerful as the effort devoted to terrorist finance.

(1031) Address problems of screening people with biometric identifiers across agencies and governments, including our border and transportation systems, by designing a comprehensive screening system that addresses common problems and sets common standards. As standards spread, this necessary and ambitious effort could dramatically strengthen the world's ability to intercept individuals who could pose catastrophic threats.

(1040) Quickly complete a biometric entry-exit screening system, one that also speeds qualified travelers.

(1044) Set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of iden-tification, such as driver's licenses.

(1048) Develop strategies for neglected parts of our transportation security system. Since 9/ 11, about 90 percent of the nation's $5 billion annual investment in transportation security has gone to aviation, to fight the last war.

(1054) In aviation, prevent arguments about a new computerized profiling system from delaying vital improvements in the "no-fly" and "auto-matic selectee" lists. Also, give priority to the improvement of check-point screening.

(1060) Determine, with leadership from the President, guidelines for gather-ing and sharing information in the new security systems that are need-ed, guidelines that integrate safeguards for privacy and other essential liberties.

(1066) Underscore that as government power necessarily expands in certain ways, the burden of retaining such powers remains on the executive to demonstrate the value of such poweres and ensure adequate supervision of how they are used, including a new board to oversee the imple-mentation of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing infor-mation in these new security systems.

(1074) Base federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D. C., at the top of the current list. Such assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel spending.

(1080) Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, includ-ing a regional approach. Allocate more radio spectrum and improve connectivity for public safety communications, and encourage wide-spread adoption of newly developed standards for private-sector emer-gency preparedness-- since the private sector controls 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure.



(1090) HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING GOVERNMENT


(1093) The strategy we have recommended is elaborate, even as presented here very briefly. To implement it will require a government better organized than the one that exists today, with its national security institutions designed half a century ago to win the Cold War. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists.


(1101) Our detailed recommendations are designed to fit together. Their purpose is clear: to build unity of effort across the U. S. government. As one official now serving on the front lines overseas put it to us: "One fight, one team." We call for unity of effort in five areas, beginning with unity of effort on the challenge of counterterrorism itself:


(1109)


(1112) unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;

(1117) unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;

(1121) unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that tran-scends traditional governmental boundaries;

(1126) unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and

(1130) strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders. Unity of Effort: A National Counterterrorism Center The 9/ 11 story teaches the value of integrating strategic intelligence from all sources into joint operational planning-- with both dimensions spanning the foreign-domestic divide.

(1137) In some ways, since 9/ 11, joint work has gotten better. The effort of fighting terrorism has flooded over many of the usual agency bound-aries because of its sheer quantity and energy. Attitudes have changed. But the problems of coordination have multiplied. The Defense Department alone has three unified commands (SOCOM, CENT-COM, and NORTHCOM) that deal with terrorism as one of their principal concerns.

(1146) Much of the public commentary about the 9/ 11 attacks has focused on "lost opportunities." Though characterized as problems of "watch-listing," "information sharing," or "connecting the dots," each of these labels is too narrow. They describe the symptoms, not the disease.

(1153) Breaking the older mold of organization stovepiped purely in execu-tive agencies, we propose a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that would borrow the joint, unified command concept adopted in the 1980s by the American military in a civilian agency, combining the joint intelligence function alongside the operations work.

(1161) The NCTC would build on the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center and would replace it and other terrorism "fusion centers" with-in the government. The NCTC would become the authoritative knowl-edge bank, bringing information to bear on common plans. It should task collection requirements both inside and outside the United States.

(1169) The NCTC should perform joint operational planning, assigning lead responsibilities to existing agencies and letting them direct the actual execution of the plans.

(1174) Placed in the Executive Office of the President, headed by a Senate-confirmed official (with rank equal to the deputy head of a cabinet department) who reports to the National Intelligence Director, the NCTC would track implementation of plans. It would be able to influence the leadership and the budgets of the counterterrorism operating arms of the CIA, the FBI, and the departments of Defense and Homeland Security.

(1183) The NCTC should not be a policymaking body. Its operations and planning should follow the policy direction of the president and the National Security Council.



(1189) Unity of Effort: A National Intelligence Director Since long before 9/ 11-- and continuing to this day-- the intelligence commu-nity is not organized well for joint intelligence work. It does not employ com-mon standards and practices in reporting intelligence or in training experts overseas and at home. The expensive national capabilities for collecting intelli-gence have divided management. The structures are too complex and too secret.


(1199) The community's head-- the Director of Central Intelligence-- has at least three jobs: running the CIA, coordinating a 15-agency confeder-ation, and being the intelligence analyst-in-chief to the president. No one person can do all these things.

(1205) A new National Intelligence Director should be established with two main jobs: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers that combine experts from all the collection disciplines against common targets-- like counterterrorism or nuclear proliferation; and (2) to oversee the agencies that contribute to the national intelligence program, a task that includes setting common standards for personnel and information technology.

(1214) The national intelligence centers would be the unified commands of the intelligence world-- a long-overdue reform for intelligence com-parable to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law that reformed the organ-ization of national defense. The home services-- such as the CIA, DIA, NSA, and FBI-- would organize, train, and equip the best intelligence professionals in the world, and would handle the execution of intelli-gence operations in the field.

(1223) This National Intelligence Director (NID) should be located in the Executive Office of the President and report directly to the president, yet be confirmed by the Senate. In addition to overseeing the National Counterterrorism Center described above (which will include both the national intelligence center for terrorism and the joint operations planning effort), the NID should have three deputies:

(1232) For foreign intelligence (a deputy who also would be the head of the CIA)

(1236) For defense intelligence (also the under secretary of defense for intelligence)

(1240) For homeland intelligence (also the executive assistant director for intelligence at the FBI or the under secretary of homeland securi-ty for information analysis and infrastructure protection)

(1245) The NID should receive a public appropriation for national intelli-gence, should have authority to hire and fire his or her intelligence deputies, and should be able to set common personnel and informa-tion technology policies across the intelligence community.

(1252) The CIA should concentrate on strengthening the collection capabil-ities of its clandestine service and the talents of its analysts, building pride in its core expertise.

(1257) Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all the current organizational incentives encourage overclassification. This balance should change; and as a start, open information should be provided about the overall size of agency intel-ligence budgets.



(1265) Unity of Effort: Sharing Information The U. S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for processing and using what it has. The system of "need to know" should be replaced by a system of "need to share."


(1273) The President should lead a government-wide effort to bring the major national security institutions into the information revolution, turning a mainframe system into a decentralized network. The obsta-cles are not technological. Official after official has urged us to call attention to problems with the unglamorous "back office" side of gov-ernment operations.

(1281) But no agency can solve the problems on its own-- to build the net-work requires an effort that transcends old divides, solving common legal and policy issues in ways that can help officials know what they can and cannot do. Again, in tackling information issues, America needs unity of effort.



(1289) Unity of Effort: Congress Congress took too little action to adjust itself or to restructure the executive branch to address the emerging terrorist threat. Congressional oversight for intelligence-- and counterterrorism-- is dysfunctional. Both Congress and the executive need to do more to minimize national security risks during transi-tions between administrations.


(1298) For intelligence oversight, we propose two options: either a joint com-mittee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or a single committee in each house combining authorizing and appropriating committees. Our central message is the same: the intel-ligence committees cannot carry out their oversight function unless they are made stronger, and thereby have both clear responsibility and accountability for that oversight.

(1307) Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. There should be one permanent stand-ing committee for homeland security in each chamber.

(1312) We propose reforms to speed up the nomination, financial reporting, security clearance, and confirmation process for national security offi-cials at the start of an administration, and suggest steps to make sure that incoming administrations have the information they need.



(1320) Unity of Effort: Organizing America's Defenses in the United States We have considered several proposals relating to the future of the domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. Adding a new domestic intelligence agency will not solve America's problems in collecting and analyzing intelli-gence within the United States. We do not recommend creating one.


(1329) We propose the establishment of a specialized and integrated national security workforce at the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security. At several points we asked: Who has the responsibility for defending us at home? Responsibility for America's national defense is shared by the Department of Defense, with its new Northern Command, and by the Department of Homeland Security. They must have a clear delineation of roles, missions, and authority.

(1342) The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should reg-ularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command's strategies and planning to defend against military threats to the homeland.

(1347) The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces, in order to determine the adequacy of the government's plans and the readi-ness of the government to respond to those threats.



(1354) * * *


(1357) We call on the American people to remember how we all felt on 9/ 11, to remember not only the unspeakable horror but how we came together as a nation-- one nation. Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy and make America safer for our children and grandchildren. We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recom-mended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate.

But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

923) What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.


(929) Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction. That image lowers expectations of government effectiveness.


(937) It lowers them too far...

(972) Confront problems with Saudi Arabia in the open and build a relation-ship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citizens and includes a shared commitment to reform.

(993) Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law, or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future.

(998) Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War.

(1009) Develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, using a flexible contact group of leading coalition governments and fashioning a common coalition approach on issues like the treatment of captured terrorists.

(1031) Address problems of screening people with biometric identifiers across agencies and governments, including our border and transportation systems, by designing a comprehensive screening system that addresses common problems and sets common standards. As standards spread, this necessary and ambitious effort could dramatically strengthen the world's ability to intercept individuals who could pose catastrophic threats.

(1040) Quickly complete a biometric entry-exit screening system, one that also speeds qualified travelers.

(1066) Underscore that as government power necessarily expands in certain ways, the burden of retaining such powers remains on the executive to demonstrate the value of such poweres and ensure adequate supervision of how they are used, including a new board to oversee the imple-mentation of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing infor-mation in these new security systems.

(1074) Base federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D. C., at the top of the current list. Such assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel spending.

(1357) We call on the American people to remember how we all felt on 9/ 11, to remember not only the unspeakable horror but how we came together as a nation-- one nation. Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy and make America safer for our children and grandchildren. We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate.

Retired Gen. Tony McPeak, the Air Force chief of staff during the first Gulf War, delivered the Democratic radio address supporting implementation of the 9/11 commission's recommendations for national security.

"As president, John Kerry will not waste a minute in bringing action on the reforms urged by the 9/11 commission," McPeak said of the Massachusetts senator nominated by the Democrats this week. "And he will not rest until America's defenses are strong."

The president, on the other hand, "fought against the very formation of the commission and continues to the present moment to give it only grudging cooperation, no matter what he says," the general said. "Why should we believe he will do anything to institute the needed change?"

-snip-

Bush has "alienated our friends, damaged our credibility around the world, reduced our influence to an all-time low in my lifetime, given hope to our enemies."

McPeak said he backed Bush in 2000 because he "had hoped this president could provide" the leadership needed to face modern threats. But disillusionment, he said, has led him to change his voter registration from Republican to independent and shift his support to Kerry.

"The real deal for me is not whether a strategy or a plan or an idea is Republican or Democrat, but whether it makes us safer," he said. "And it means an awful lot to me that John Kerry fought for his country as a young man."

"We who have some experience -- who have seen war close up and sent troops to battle -- know that victory is not won by single combat," he continued. "War is not like that. War is a team sport.

"We built the team that won World War II. We put together the great team that won the Cold War. That's why what has happened over the last three years is such a tragedy, such a national disaster. Rebuilding the team won't be easy."

Obstructing the Investigation


While President Bush hailed the work of the Commission as "important for future administrations," his administration did everything it could to block and impede and the Commission from conducting its vital work. Not only did the White House oppose formation of the Commission, but resisted providing the Commission with the time and resources it needed to carry out its work.


White House Opposed Formation of Commission: President Bush and Vice President Cheney both contacted then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle in the months after 9/11 to insist on strict limits in the scope of any investigation into the attacks. Newsweek reported on February 4, 2002, that Vice President Cheney called Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SD) to "warn" him not to open hearings into the attacks. If Daschle pressed the issue, Cheney "implied he would risk being accused of interfering with the mission" against terrorism. And despite entreaties from the families of victims of 9/11 attacks and a bipartisan group of senators and congressmen, the president vocally resisted forming an investigatory commission. President Bush only relented on November 27, 2002, a year after the attacks.