Good Question
CoastalRat wrote:Will they also recognize the "wrongfulness" of not allowing someone to marry their sibling? Or how about marrying a parent? Because if you are going to argue the correctness of gay marriage in the way it seems that you are (from a discrimination angle), then why not go all the way and argue for the legitimacy of all marriages? Seems the right thing to do, is it not?
Hi CoastalRat:
You presented a good question.
The answer to your question can be found within the text of the Supreme Court case, Romer v. Evans (discussed in previous post).
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/517/620.html
Many, many years ago when I endeavored as a young woman to study and read court cases for my law school classes--I often felt like I was reading a foreign language. When I read, I had to keep my huge Black's Law Dictionary on the study table and refer to it often.
Today, I can quickly browse a case and immediately know exactly what it says and why it says what it does without the assistance of my law professors or a legal dictionary. That comes with years and years of experience. Even though we live in a society ruled by law, most people don't understand how it works within the framework of our constitutional republic.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits States from making any laws that deprive its citizens of due process of law or equal protection of the laws. The equal protection clause, however, does not prohibit the States (through their general police powers) from making classifications.
At a minimum, the equal protection clause requires that the classification must be rational and must serve a legitimate state interest. (The Fourteenth Amendment abhors arbitrary classifications that serve no legitimate governmental interest.)
When the State enacts a law that prohibits a person from marrying his sibling or from marrying some other person closely related by blood, the question is this: What legitimate interest is the government trying to protect by making this classification of persons whom another person cannot marry.
The government can reasonably argue that the state has a legitimate (and perhaps substantial) interest in protecting persons, especially young persons who are not in a position to protect themselves, from incest and the effects of incest. The prohibition against allowing persons closely related by blood to marry each other may be viewed as a rational means of discouraging incest.
When the State enacts a law that prohibits same-sex marriages, the question is this: What legitimate interest is the government trying to protect by making this classification of persons whom another person cannot marry? What legitimate government interest is served by prohibiting a homosexual from marrying the person of his choice simply because the person is the same sex?
If we can identify the government interest--then and only then may we determine whether that government interest is legitimate and and whether the means chosen to serve that interest are rationally related to that interest.
In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court said:
"The Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must co-exist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons . . . We have attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality by stating that,
if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end . . . even in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained . . . Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."
In Romer v. Evans, the United States Supreme Court asked the question: Does the state constitutional amendment serve a legitimate state interest and is the amendment rationally related to that interest?
The State of Colorado claimed the constitutional amendment simply denied protected status to homosexuals, lesbians, and bi-sexuals. The State argued that the amendment simply denied gays and lesbians "special privileges."
The Court found that the constitutional amendment went far beyond the stated purpose of treating all persons alike. The Court found that the amendment treated gays and lesbians differently by denying them the same protection from discrimination that all other citizens enjoyed.
Based upon the negative impact of the amendment solely on homosexuals and no other persons, the Court said the inevitable inference is that the disadvantage imposed upon homosexuals was born of animosity towards them. The Court said, if the constitutional concept of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very least mean that a desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest as a matter of law.
The State of Colorado claimed the constitutional amendment simply respects other citizens' freedom of association. The State argued that the amendment respects the freedom of persons, such as landlords or employers, who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.
The Supreme Court rejected the State's arguments. The state failed to identify a legitimate state interest that the constitutional amendment served. The Court said:
"[The constitutional amendment] is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit. Class legislation is obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment."
In summary, a state classification must serve a legitimate government interest. Animosity toward a certain class of persons (e.g., homosexuals) can NEVER serve a legitimate government interest.
As a further note, if the classification infringes (burdens) a fundamental right or targets a suspect class (e.g., race), then the Court applies a heightened standard of review called strict scrutiny. The Court then asks the question: Does the classification serve a COMPELLING government interest and is the classification NECESSARY and narrowly-tailored to serve that compelling (not merely legitimate) interest?
I hope this post adequately answers your question. It was a good question! I'm glad you asked.