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Mon 5 Jul, 2004 10:43 am
Cheney Cat's Paw, Porter Goss, as CIA Director?
By Ray McGovern
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Saturday 03 July 2004
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Ray McGovern, a CIA analyst for 27 years, is co-founder of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. He is also the author of "A Compromised CIA: What Can Be Done?" - Chapter 4 in "Patriotism, Democracy and Common Sense", to be published in September by the Eisenhower Foundation. His chapter includes a long section titled "The Qualities Needed in a Director of Central Intelligence."
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There is, thankfully, a remnant of CIA professionals who still put objective analysis above political correctness and career advancement. Just when they thought there were no indignities left for them to suffer, they are shuddering again at press reports that Rep. Porter Goss (R-FL) may soon be their new boss.
That possibility conjures up a painful flashback for those of us who served as CIA analysts when Richard Nixon was president. Chalk it up to our naiveté, but we were taken aback when swashbuckling James Schlesinger, who followed Richard Helms as CIA director, announced on arrival, "I am here to see that you guys don't screw Richard Nixon!" To underscore his point, Schlesinger told us he would be reporting directly to White House political adviser Bob Haldeman (Nixon's Karl Rove) and not to National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger.
No doubt Goss would be more discreet in showing his hand, but his appointment as director would be the ultimate in politicization. He has long shown himself to be under the spell of Vice President Dick Cheney, and would likely report primarily to him and to White House political adviser Karl Rove rather than to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.
Goss would almost certainly follow lame-duck director George Tenet's practice of reading to the president in the morning and become an integral part of the "White House team." The team-membership phenomenon is particularly disquieting.
If the failure-prone experience of the past few years has told us anything, it is that being a "team member" in good standing is the kiss of death for the CIA director's primary role of "telling it like it is" to the president and his senior advisers. It was a painful moment of truth when former Speaker Newt Gingrich - like Cheney, a frequent visitor to CIA headquarters - told the press that Tenet was "so grateful to the president that he would do anything for him."
The Whore of Babylon
One need look no farther than what has become known as a latter-day Whore of Babylon - the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of Oct. 1, 2002, the very title of which betrayed a politically correct, but substantively wrong, conclusion: "Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction." And bear in mind that it was only several months after President Bush decided to attack Iraq that Tenet commissioned that estimate. Not unreasonably, Congress was wondering about the views of the intelligence community, and the White House needed congressional acquiescence.
No problem. "Slam-dunk" Tenet, following White House instructions, ensured that the estimate was cooked to the recipe of Cheney's tart speech of August 26, 2002. "We know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons," Cheney said, and the estimate Tenet signed gave belated endorsement - with "high confidence," no less - to that lie.
The intelligence process, of course, was not the only thing undermined. So was the Constitution. Various drafts of that NIE, reinforced with heavy doses of "mushroom-cloud" rhetoric, were used to deceive congressmen and senators into ceding to the executive their prerogative to declare war - the all-important prerogative that the framers of the Constitution took great care to reserve exclusively to our elected representatives in Congress.
What was actually happening was clear to intelligence analysts, active and retired. We Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity were not the only ones to expose it as clearly and often as the domesticated US media would allow.
But what about CIA alumnus Porter Goss, then in his sixth year as chairman of the House intelligence oversight committee? Republican party loyalist first and foremost, Goss chose to give an entirely new meaning to "oversight." Even when it became clear that the "mushroom cloud" reporting was based mostly on a forgery, he just sat back and watched it all happen. Like Br'er Fox, he didn't say nothin'.
From Sycophant Tenet to Professional Politician
This is what CIA would get with Porter Goss at the helm. Appointing Goss would administer the coup de grace to intelligence analysts trying to survive while still speaking truth without fear or favor. The only saving grace for them would be the likelihood that they would be spared "multiple visits" by Cheney to the inner sanctum where it used to be possible to produce unvarnished analysis without vice presidents and other policy makers looking over their shoulders to ensure they "had thought of everything." Goss, who has a long history of subservience to Cheney, could be counted upon to play the Cheney/Gingrich/et al. role himself.
Don't Throw Me in That Briar Patch
Last month when Tenet was let go, administration officials indicated that a permanent replacement would not be named until after the election. They indicated they wanted to avoid washing the dirty linen of intelligence once again in public. Evidently, they had not yet checked with Karl Rove.
The Democrats warn smugly that an attempt by the administration to confirm a new CIA director could become an embarrassing referendum on CIA's recent performance, but they miss the point entirely - and show, once again, that they can't hold a candle to Rove for political cleverness. The name of the administration's game is to blame Iraq on intelligence failures, and Goss already did so last week in what amounted to his first campaign speech for the job of director. Consider court historian Bob Woodward's book, Plan of Attack, which Condoleezza Rice and other officials have promoted. Rice has publicly confirmed Woodward's story about Tenet misleading the president by claiming the evidence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was a "slam dunk."
While there is ample evidence of ineptitude on Tenet's part, this now-famous vignette obscures the fact that President Bush had unleashed the dogs of war well before checking to see if there was any credible intelligence to justify doing so. As the election nears, it serves the administration nicely to keep the focus on intelligence shortcomings and to make it appear that the president was misled - on weapons of mass destruction, for example. And Porter Goss is precisely the right person to cooperate in this effort. I can imagine Rove laughing up his sleeve last week at word that the Democrats are urging Senate minority leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) to prepare for extensive confirmation hearings this fall. (In my mind's eye I can see Rove musing, Bring em on!)
The report due later this month by the Senate Intelligence Committee investigating intelligence performance regarding the long-sought-after Iraqi weapons of mass destruction is said to be scathing in its criticism of CIA. No problem. This too will help keep the focus where the White House wants it - the more so since committee chair and Republican stalwart Pat Roberts (R-KS) can be counted on to do whatever Cheney and Rove tell him to do. It was not until Roberts was instructed to give Tenet the cold shoulder that the latter began to see the handwriting on the wall.
And Republicans are also in control of the 9/11 commission, which will be issuing its own report later this month. There are already signs that Republican commissioners have begun to water down findings critical of the administration, while highlighting those critical of intelligence performance.
Goss was happy to let the Senate intelligence committee take the lead in investigating intelligence performance on key issues like weapons of mass destruction and, before he decided to promote his candidacy for director, he generally chose to keep his committee's head (and his own) down. With good reason. The myriad shortcomings in intelligence work appeared on his somnolent watch; by any reasonable standard, he bears some responsibility for impaired oversight - not only on Iraq, but on 9/11 as well.
Goss on 9/11
With respect to the various investigations into 9/11, Goss was thrust into the limelight by Cheney, who initially opposed any investigation at all. In February 2002, Cheney went so far as to warn that if Congress decided to go ahead with an investigation, administration officials might not show up to testify. When folks started talking about the need for a genuinely independent commission, though, Cheney acquiesced in the establishment of the congressional joint committee as the lesser evil and took reassurance in the fact that Goss could be counted on to keep the lid on - and, when necessary, run rings around co-chair Sen. Bob Graham, (D-FL).
Porter Goss performed that task brilliantly, giving clear priority to providing political protection for the president. Goss acquiesced when the White House and CIA refused to allow the joint committee to report out any information on what President Bush had been told before 9/11 - ostensibly because it was "classified." This gave rise to thinly disguised, but eloquently expressed, chagrin on the part of the committee staff director, who clearly had expected stronger backing in her negotiations with White House officials.
As a result, completely absent from the committee's report was any mention of the President's Daily Brief of Aug. 6, 2001, which bore the title "Bin Laden determined to strike in US," even though the press had already reported the title and the gist of that damning piece of evidence. Small wonder that the families of 9/11 victims were outraged and pressed even harder for an independent investigation.
And a First for a Congressional Committee
The most notable (and bizarre) achievement of the joint committee was inviting the FBI to investigate members of Congress. In June 2002, Cheney called Goss and Graham to chastise them for a media leak of sensitive information from intercepted communications. A CNN report had attributed the leak to "two congressional sources," and Cheney was livid.
Goss admitted to being "chagrined" over Cheney's call. He and Graham promptly bypassed normal congressional procedures and went directly to Attorney General John Ashcroft, asking him to investigate the leak. Little thought apparently was given to the separation of powers between the executive and congressional branches, or the fact that Congress has its own capability for such investigations.
Next thing you know, the FBI is crawling all over Capitol Hill, questioning members of the joint committee that is investigating the FBI, CIA, et al., and asking members of Congress to submit to lie-detector tests. Shaking his head, Sen. John McCain (R-NM) noted the ludicrousness of allowing the FBI to build dossiers on lawmakers who are supposed to be investigating the FBI. He and others joined those pushing for the creation of an independent 9/11 commission.
That Goss and Graham could be so easily intimidated by Cheney speaks volumes.
Bottom Line
West Virginia Sen. Jay Rockefeller, the ranking Democrat on the Senate intelligence committee is right in saying, "We need a director who is not only knowledgeable and capable but unquestionably independent." And politicians need not apply. Rockefeller would rule out "any politician from either party." But who pays attention to minority members these days - ranking or non-ranking? Rockefeller might have added that another prerequisite is prior experience managing a large, complex organization. Tenet had none; neither does Goss.
There seems a better than even chance the Bush administration will nominate Goss, and use the nomination hearings as yet another forum at which to blame the Iraq debacle on faulty intelligence. And, as a bonus for Bush, if there is time before the election, it would seem a safe bet that Goss will be able to bring to heel recalcitrant analysts who are still "fighting the problem," still staring in disbelief at the given wisdom (given, apparently, only to the Pentagon and White House) that Iraq and al-Qaeda were in bed with each other.
BBB and truthout seem to have been prescient about this demagogue's nomination to be chief spook.
Those of you who have seen "Fahrenheit 9/11" know that Goss appears briefly in the film giving out a bogus toll-free number to contact him regarding suspected terrorist activity (Moore fixed that by captioning in the number of his Washington office).
Here's a couple of Goss' more revealing utterances:
Quote:"Iraq has expanded its weapons of mass destruction capabilities against its pledge not to. It still has deadly chemical weapons hidden throughout the country, and it has tried to develop nuclear devices as well. It is certain that Iraq has ties to many Islamic terror groups in the region, including Al Qaeda. Evidence supports Iraq's involvement in the first and probably the second World Trade Center bombing."
Village Voice
Quote:"Goss bristles at the charges leveled by some foreign policy analysts and lawmakers that the Sept. 11 attacks should be viewed primarily as an intelligence debacle.
"This was not an intelligence failure. There were a lot of warnings from the intelligence community. There was not specificity in terms of times and dates. But there were plenty of warnings that a shoe was about to drop," he said...."
Washington Diplomat
This is from his letter to George Tenet in September of 2003:
Quote:We have a fundamental disagreement generally on whether the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD programs and the intelligence on Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida were deficient with regard to the analysis and presentation, especially in the certainty of the IC's judgments. The Ranking Member believes it was. The Chairman (Goss) believes it was not.
Washington Post
Interestingly enough, Goss was having breakfast with a Taliban sympathizer
on the morning of September 11:
Quote:Most controversially, Goss was having a breakfast meeting in Washington with the then ISI chief Mahmoud Ahmad at the exact instant the 9/11 hijackers flew their planes into the World Trade Center. Ahmad was a Taliban supporter who was subsequently removed from his job when he continued to bat for the outlaw regime post 9/11.
Some reports have suggested that Ahmad and the ISI had links to -- or foreknowledge about -- 9/11. A money transfer from Karachi to the hijackers in Florida has never been fully explored or explained. Ahmad was never called to account for this or his support to the Taliban post 9/11 even as General Musharraf moved him into the shadows.
India Times
...and finally, Goss remains pretty non-plussed about the leaking of the name of a CIA undercover operative by Robert Novak:
Quote:Rep. Porter Goss said Thursday that the uproar over allegations that White House officials purposely identified a covert CIA agent appears largely political and doesn't yet merit an investigation by the House Select Committee on Intelligence, which he chairs.
Goss, who was a CIA agent himself from the early 1960s to 1971, said he takes such leaks seriously, but he distinguished between a willful violation of federal law and an inadvertent disclosure.
(snip)
"Somebody sends me a blue dress and some DNA, I'll have an investigation," Goss said.
Herald-Tribune
Porter is, naturally, wrong about that one too; it happens of course to be an ongoing investigation by the Justice Dept. which has reached the White House and this week resulted in the jailing of a TIME reporter for contempt of court.
This man is
not the guy any sane person would pick to be CIA chief.
But for a President who openly claims God speaks to him (or whom God speaks through, depending on his mood), we shouldn't expect anything more.
But hey, Chalabi is busy right now...
PDiddie
PDiddie, thanks for nudging this post up as a reminder that Goss' connection to VP Cheney is what concerns me most about his nomination as CIA chief. If that happens and Bush remains in office, it means that Cheney will control the CIA in addition to the Defense Department. Is the FBI next?
BBB
Bumble, welcome back; we missed you.
I am amazed that the topic wasn't introduced in the last couple of days (it is one among many others that is much more worthy of prolonged discussion than most of what I have been reading here lately).
I for one don't think that the forum's frequent conservative contributors will prove themselves capable of rising out of the sewage of the Not So Swift Veterans' lies, but we'll give it a shot anyway... :wink:
I guess the Dems are nostalgic for the integrity and skills of Clinton appointed George Tenet.
Brand X wrote:I guess the Dems are nostalgic for the integrity and skills of Clinton appointed George Tenet.
You would guess wrong, once more.
Wanna guess again?
Goss
himself said he was unqualified to be in the CIA (much less run the agency) and he said so to
Michael Moore 
:
Quote:"I couldn't get a job with CIA today. I am not qualified," the Florida Republican told documentary-maker Michael Moore's production company during the filming of the anti-Bush movie "Fahrenheit 9/11."
A day after Bush picked Goss for the top U.S. spy job, Moore on Wednesday released an excerpt from a March 3 interview in which the 65-year-old former House of Representatives intelligence chief recounts his lack of qualifications for employment as a modern CIA staffer.
"I don't have the language skills. I, you know, my language skills were romance languages and stuff. We're looking for Arabists today. I don't have the cultural background probably," Goss is quoted in an interview transcript.
"And I certainly don't have the technical skills, uh, as my children remind me every day: 'Dad you got to get better on your computer.' Uh, so, the things that you need to have, I don't have."
Reuters
The content of BumbleBeeBoogie's post is very informative. It also illustrates that like just about every other entity in life CIA too is very political.
Obviously anyone and I mean anyone appointed to lead the CIA is going to be in for a rough time in this day and age. I don't know Porter Goss from Adam. Nevertheless his credentials look pretty good to me. It is one thing to put someone in charge of The Department of The Interior or HUD or the FCC or even The Treasury or Homeland Security that knows little about the details of the business at hand. It is quite another where CIA is concerned. That is not the type of responsibility you can simply grow into by on-the-job training as you go along. You must have a good knowledge of how it operates to begin with. In spite of the age of his credentials the fact is, Porter Goss was a bonafide Case Officer with CIA for several years. No small accomplishment there. He has experience in other lesser intelligence assignments as well. He served as an officer in Army Intelligence.
As openers I would ask his detractors one question? Who who is your reccomendation for the job?
Brand X wrote:I guess the Dems are nostalgic for the integrity and skills of Clinton appointed George Tenet.
ah yes the old tenet ate a bowl of **** and that makes it okay for goss to eat two philosophy........a familiar old chestnut....
Actually I think Tenet was prolly alright, it was Gorelick's wall that caused most problems with communication.
I do hope he brushed is teeth after that though. :wink:
Goss admits he's not qualified to work for CIA
Daily News (and also as filmed during Michael Moore interview by Charlie Rose in July 2004.
An unqualified success at the CIA?
President Bush has said that Rep. Porter Goss is "the right man" to lead the CIA - but as of five months ago, the nominee didn't think he was even qualified to work there.
The Florida Republican told filmmaker Michael Moore in March, "It is true I was a case officer, clandestine services officer, and yes, I do understand the core mission of the business. But I couldn't get a job with the CIA today. I am not qualified."
Goss, who went on to become a multimillionaire and then a congressman after leaving his job as an agent, explained: "I don't have the language skills.
I, you know, my language skills were Romance languages and stuff. We're looking for Arabists today. I don't have the cultural background, probably.
"And I certainly don't have the technical skills, uh, as my children remind me every day, 'Dad you got to get better on your computer.'
"Uh, so, the things that you need to have, I don't have."
Moore interviewed Goss, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, for his documentary "Fahrenheit 9/11." This part was edited out, but Moore still has all the footage.
Goss faces tough criticism in the confirmation process from colleagues like Rep. Nancy Pelosi and Sen. Jay Rockefeller, who agree that he is not qualified.
Portfolio Makes Rep. Goss a Millionaire
Posted on Tue, Aug. 10, 2004
Kansas City Star
Portfolio Makes Rep. Goss a Millionaire
Associated Press
WASHINGTON - Rep. Porter Goss, tapped by President Bush on Tuesday to become the next director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is one of Congress' millionaires, with a wide array of holdings in stocks and real estate.
Goss, R-Fla., reported assets worth between $6 million and $24 million last year, according to a personal financial disclosure form he filed with the House in June. The required annual report calls for the value of holdings to be described in broad ranges, not precise amounts.
Of the 44 holdings he reported owning individually or jointly, his biggest included $1 million to $5 million worth of shares each in IBM Corp., Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and General Electric Co.
Goss also listed joint ownership of Retreat Farm Produce LLC, a farm in Rapidan, Va., worth $1 million to $5 million. He reported undeveloped real estate on Fishers Island, N.Y., valued at $500,000 to $1 million.
Besides those holdings, 134 others worth millions more were listed in the name of his wife, Mariel.
The value of Goss' property far exceeds the $154,700 he is earning this year as a lawmaker. Goss, a 16-year House veteran, planned to retire from Congress in January.
The CIA director's salary is $158,100.
Goss, a former CIA operative, lives in the southwest Florida resort community of Sanibel.
Porter Goss
BumbleBeeBoogie I don't think William Cohen was even considered for that job even in the administration's collective, wildest imagination. Why? Well first of all he is a Democrat. I know the assignment is not supposed to be political but who is kidding who? Of course it is.
I never paid much attention to him when he was Secretary of Defense. I am not aware of him doing anything noteworthy while he was there are you?
No, all eyes are on Goss right now. Undoubtedly there will be a good deal of argument for and against his confirmation but I cannot imagine the administration compromising on this one.
I believe the short term, prevailing anxiety of many voters to fill this billet quickly will have far more impact than foot dragging and excuses by a comparatively few members of Congress.
It will be interesting to watch this thing play out but if Goss has been thoroughly vetted by the administration he is going to be the man.
Jaack Webb
Jack Webb, Cohen is and has always been a Republican, formerly Senator from Maine. Democrat president Clinton appointed him Secretary of Defense. ---BBB
William S. Cohen
January 24, 1997 - January 20, 2001
20th Secretary of Defense
Clinton Administration
On 5 December 1996 President Clinton announced his selection of William S. Cohen as secretary of defense. Cohen, a Republican about to retire from the United States Senate, was the "right person," Clinton said, to build on Secretary Perry's achievements, "to secure the bipartisan support America's armed forces must have and clearly deserve." In responding to his nomination, Cohen said that during his congressional career he had supported a nonpartisan national security policy and commended the president for appointing a Republican to his cabinet.
Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine, on 28 August 1940. He received a B.A. in Latin from Bowdoin College (1962) and a law degree from Boston University Law School (1965). While practicing law, he served on the Bangor City Council beginning in 1969, and was mayor of Bangor, 1971-1972. Elected to Congress in 1972, he served three terms in the House of Representatives and won election to the Senate in 1978, and reelection in 1984 and 1990. A moderate Republican, he served on both the Senate Armed Services and Governmental Affairs Committees from 1979 to 1997 and was a member of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, 1983-91 and 1995-97. He participated in the drafting of several important laws related to defense matters, including the Competition in Contracting Act (1984), the GI Bill (1984), the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (1986), the Intelligence Oversight Reform Act (1991), and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (1996). During his years in Congress, he found time to write or co-author eight booksÐthree non-fiction works, three novels, and two books of poetry.
During his confirmation hearings, Cohen said he thought on occasion he might differ with Clinton on specific national security issues. He implicitly criticized the Clinton administration for lacking a clear strategy for leaving Bosnia and stated that he thought U.S. troops should definitely be out by mid-1998. He also asserted that he would resist further budget cuts, retain the two regional conflicts strategy, and support spending increases for advanced weapons, even if it necessitated further cuts in military personnel. Cohen questioned whether savings from base closings and acquisition reform could provide enough money for procurement of new weapons and equipment that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought necessary in the next few years. He supported the expansion of NATO and looked on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the most serious problem the United States faced.
After confirmation by a unanimous Senate vote, Cohen was sworn in as the twentieth secretary of defense on 24 January 1997. He then settled into a schedule much fuller than he had followed in the Senate. Routinely he arrived at the Pentagon before 7:00 a.m., received an intelligence briefing, and then met with the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The rest of the day he devoted to policy and budget briefings, visits with foreign and other dignitaries, and to what he termed "ABC" meetings at the White House with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and national security adviser Samuel Berger. He also traveled abroad several times during his first months in office.
One of Cohen's first major duties was to present to Congress the FY 1998 Defense budget, which actually had been prepared under Secretary Perry's leadership. Cohen requested a budget of $250.7 billion, which represented 3 percent of the nation's estimated gross domestic product for FY 1998. He stressed three top budget prioritiesÐpeople, readiness, and modernization. To preserve U.S. military superiority DoD needed to recruit and retain high quality people. This required regular military pay raises, new construction or modernization of barracks, and programs for child care, family support, morale, welfare, and recreation. To enable the U.S. military to respond to crises, the budget would have to provide strong support for force readiness, training, exercises, maintenance, supplies, and other essential needs. As for modernization, Cohen stressed the need to develop and upgrade weapon and supporting systems to guarantee the combat superiority of U.S. forces. This meant increasing the funds available for procurement of new systems, with the target set at $60 billion by FY 2001.
When he presented the FY 1998 budget, Cohen noted that he would involve himself with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which would focus on the challenges to U.S. security and the nation's military needs over the next decade or more. When the QDR became public in May 1997, it did not fundamentally alter the budget, structure, and doctrine of the military. Some defense experts thought it gave insufficient attention to new forms of warfare, such as terrorist attacks, electronic sabotage, and the use of chemical and biological agents. In commenting on the QDR, Cohen stated that the Pentagon would retain the two regional wars scenario adopted after the end of the Cold War. He decided to scale back purchases of jet fighters, including the Air Force's F-22 and the Navy's F/A-18E/F, as well as Navy surface ships. The review included cutting another 61,700 active duty service membersÐ15,000 in the Army, 26,900 in the Air Force, 18,000 in the Navy, and 1,800 in the Marine Corps, as well as 54,000 reserve forces, mainly in the Army National Guard, and some 80,000 civilians department-wide. Cohen also decided to recommend two more rounds of base closingsÐin 1999 and 2001. The Pentagon hoped to save $15 billion annually over the next few years to make possible the purchase of new equipment and weapon systems without a substantial budget increase above the current level of $250 billion.
As he settled into office, Cohen knew that unforeseen problems would undoubtedly arise and that he would have to face several that had occupied his immediate predecessors in the Pentagon, among them the question of the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which he supported, and its relationship to Russia. At a summit meeting between President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin in Helsinki, Finland, in March 1997, Yeltsin acknowledged the inevitability of broader NATO membership. Two months later he agreed, after negotiations with NATO officials, to sign an accord providing for a new permanent council, to include Russia, the NATO secretary general, and a representative of the other NATO nations, to function as a forum in which Russia could air a wide range of security issues that concerned that country. Formal signing of this agreement would pave the way for a July 1997 invitation from NATO to several nations, probably including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, to join the organization.
The proposed U.S. missile defense system received attention at the Helsinki summit, where Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to an interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty allowing the United States to proceed with a limited missile defense system currently under development. Specifically, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to distinguish between a national missile defense system, aimed against strategic weapons, not allowed by the ABM Treaty, and a theater missile defense system to guard against shorter range missile attacks. Some critics thought that any agreement of this kind would place undesirable limits on the development of both theater and strategic missile defenses. The Helsinki meeting also saw progress in arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia, a matter high on Cohen's agenda. Yeltsin and Clinton agreed on the need for early Russian ratification of the START II Treaty and negotiation of a START III Treaty to make further significant cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenals of both nations.
The continuation, at least until mid-1998, of the existing peacekeeping mission involving U.S. forces in Bosnia and the possibility that other such missions would arise worried Cohen, who earlier had expressed reservations about such operations. Humanitarian efforts that did not involve peacekeeping, such as in Rwanda in the recent past, also seemed likely. Other persistent national security problems, including tension with Iraq in the Persian Gulf area, Libya in North Africa, and North Korea in East Asia, could flare up again, as could conflict in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians.
In preparing future budgets, the challenge would be to find the right mix between money for operation and maintenance accounts on the one hand and modernization procurement funds on the other, while facing the prospect of a flat DoD budget of about $250 billion annually for the next decade or so. A relatively new problem that could affect the DoD budget was "vertical integration" in the defense industry. It occurred on a large scale in the 1990s as mergers of major defense contractors created a few huge dominant companies, particularly in the aerospace industry. They were called vertical because they incorporated most of the elements of the production process, including parts and subcomponents. Cohen and other Pentagon leaders began to worry that vertical integration could reduce competition and in the long run increase the costs of what the Department of Defense had to buy.
Finally, Cohen would have to address social issues that engaged the widest public interest. The status and treatment of homosexuals in the military, the role of women in combat as well as in other jobs in the services, racism, and sexual harassment were serious problems, inevitably requiring strong leadership from Cohen and other top civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense.
Conclusion
Between 1947 and 1997, 20 men served as secretary of defense. Ten had prior national security experienceÐseven in the Department of Defense or its predecessor agencies (the War and Navy Departments); one in Defense, State, and as national security adviser to the president; and two in related agencies (AEC, CIA, and State). Their professional backgrounds varied, including four lawyers, three investment bankers, three industrialists, five politicians who had been elected to national office, one economist, one mathematician, one scientist, one career executive branch official, and one career military officer. The average term of the first 19 secretaries was slightly over 31 months, although one served less than 4 months and another more than 7 years.
The secretary of defense presides over a vast confederation of agencies that today employ about 2.2 million military and civilian personnel and consume 15 percent of the annual federal budget. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the immediate staff of the secretary, has evolved from a mere handful of employees and limited functions when it was established in 1947 to an authorized strength of more than 2,000 civilian and military positions in 1997 and duties which require a deputy secretary, 4 under secretaries, 10 assistant secretaries, and 6 other statutory officials concerned with a huge range of functions. Over the years, OSD has borne the main burden of implementing a central mandate of the National Security ActÐto provide for "authoritative coordination and unified direction [of the military services] under civilian control" and for "effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." While some secretaries have been more successful than others in accomplishing these goals, all have encountered difficulty overseeing the services, whose historic competition for resources and missions has invariably complicated the secretary's job.
Legislative and institutional changes greatly facilitated the trend toward centralization of authority in OSD after 1947, but the outlook, temperament, and energy of the individual secretaries, as well as the disposition of their chiefs in the White House, significantly affected the exercise of power. Louis Johnson, dedicated to a tight budget and not afraid to take summary executive action, did not hesitate to cancel construction of an aircraft carrier coveted by the Navy. Robert McNamara took bold initiatives and exerted personal influence in a wide range of Pentagon concernsÐthe sweep of his office was perhaps wider than any other secretary's. McNamara had support in his management of the Pentagon from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and this was a critical factor. Had he served under President Eisenhower, it is unlikely that he would have had the opportunity to conduct the department's affairs in the same manner. Les Aspin, an influential defense expert while in the House of Representatives, found that running the Defense Department was quite different from being a member of Congress. Under pressure from the White House, he decided to resign before the end of his first year in office.
Quite clearly, whatever the respective philosophies and approaches of the individual secretaries, each enhanced or influenced the office in some way, although in some instances brief tenure prevented major accomplishments. James Forrestal, a hesitant innovator who was compelled early in his trailblazing tenure to arbitrate the quarrels of the military services, set standards and instituted practices that still influence his successors. George Marshall, a career military officer, contributed much to strengthening the principle of civilian control of the defense establishment. Robert Lovett's suggestions about reform contributed significantly to the major reorganization plan implemented in 1953. Thomas Gates, in an effort to improve relationships between OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, initiated important and lasting procedures for consultation. Robert McNamara instituted organizational and management changes that consolidated power in OSD, and he devoted more time to developing strategic policy than any of his predecessors. Among his successors, Melvin Laird is recognized for his efforts to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War and to bring an end to the draft. James Schlesinger and Harold Brown in particular gave much attention to strategic policy. Caspar Weinberger demonstrated tenacity in efforts to secure increased budgets from Congress. Richard Cheney played a prominent role in developing strategy and directing the forces during the Gulf War of 1991, in close collaboration with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell. William Perry presided over much of the post-Cold War drawdown of the military services and traveled abroad more than any of his predecessors, to meet with foreign officials and visit U.S. service men and women stationed all over the world.
Presidents have had varying objectives in choosing their secretaries of defense. Truman's selection of Johnson in 1949 may have had more than the usual political motivation for such appointments, but the next year, when he replaced him with Marshall, he moved to enhance the prestige of the office and gain effective military direction of the Korean War. Eisenhower picked Charles Wilson because he wanted an efficient manager rather than a strategist; Nixon chose Melvin Laird in part because of his excellent congressional ties; and Carter nominated Brown because of his scientific and technical expertise and experience in defense matters that made him well suited to manage the Pentagon at a time of critical decisions on weapons and strategy. Three recent secretaries of defenseÐRichard Cheney, Les Aspin, and William CohenÐcame directly from seats in Congress to head the Department of Defense, reflecting the increasing role of Congress in military affairs and the need for both presidents and secretaries of defense to pay more attention to congressional relations. Thus, each president applies criteria that derive from his personal predilections and contemporary political circumstances. Perhaps most important are the president's views on defense policy and how he conceives of the role of the secretary of defense.
In sum, the factors that affect a secretary's performance are myriad: variables of circumstance and personality, the capacity to work with the president, the secretary of state, and other high national security officials; prior experience in the national security field; understanding of the federal bureaucracy, especially the military services; understanding of the budget process and experience in congressional relations; skill in crisis management; understanding of nuclear strategy; technical-scientific knowledge; expertise in managing a large organization; diplomatic skills (especially as the relationship between foreign policy and defense matters has become increasingly close in recent years); and perhaps past military service. The history of the secretaries of defense suggests the usefulness of these qualifications, but no secretary has possessed them all, and there is no guarantee that an incumbent who did would be successful.
From the beginning, the Office of the Secretary of Defense faced formidable tasks that grew in number and complexity, reflecting persistent tensions around the world, especially with the Soviet Union up to 1991, and the increasingly complicated technology of modern weapon systems. The secretaries of defense have differed considerably, sometimes markedly, in their response to these demands and have achieved varying degrees of success in meeting them. Whatever their special strengths and objectives, as leaders of a department that has become one of the great centers of power and decision in the U.S. government, they have been prominent and influential principals on the world stage.
BumbleBeeBoogie. Boy is my face red on this one!
Although he comes across to me like a Democrat Senator Cohen is a Republican. A moderate one. I really have not paid much attention to him, not intrested. I checked party affiliation prior to making my last post. The very first reference to Cohen that came up on the search engne states that he is a Democrat Senator from Maine. This reference is concerned with his voting record on immigration.
Checking his e-mail address I found a reference to him as being Republican. This of course disqualifies part of my previous post with regard to party affiliation. Nevertheless I still don't believe he was even thought of, considered for the post that Porter Goss has been assigned to.
Thanks for pointing out my mistake.
Jack Webb
Jack Webb, no problem. A lot of people make that mistake because they can't believe Clinton would appoint a Republican to a Cabinet position as important as Secretary of Defense.
BBB
Porter Goss's nomination is questionable
Statement of P.J. Crowley
On the Nomination of Porter Goss for Director of Central Intelligence
August 10, 2004
P.J. Crowley is a senior fellow and national security expert at the Center for American Progress.
President Bush's nomination of Congressman Porter Goss is questionable both because of implications for intelligence reform and its timing. It calls into question President Bush's commitment to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.
Up until today, President Bush and Congressman Goss have been going in opposite directions on intelligence reform. President Bush has favored a National Intelligence Director, but without broad authorities over the intelligence community. Congressman Goss introduced legislation in June that - while silent on the question of a National Intelligence Director - would strengthen the authority of the DCI over budgets and key personnel. Now Goss has flip-flopped and is willing to accept a position that will likely have less authority than his predecessors had and less authority than he believes necessary to do the job.
This nomination also puts the cart before the horse. It makes more sense to determine what the CIA should be and do in the future, then chose a committed reformer who can lead the agency and the intelligence community in a new direction. Instead, we are presented with a divisive partisan who could end up minimizing rather than maximizing real intelligence reform.
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