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Thu 1 Apr, 2004 09:58 am
I think the 9/11 widows are the heroines of the effort to defeat George Bush. ---BBB
April 1, 2004 - New York Times
9/11 Widows Skillfully Applied the Power of a Question: Why?
By SHERYL GAY STOLBERG
ASHINGTON, March 31 ?- Kristen Breitweiser was at home in Middletown, N.J., cleaning out closets. Patty Casazza of Colts Neck was dashing to the dry cleaners. Lorie Van Auken of East Brunswick was headed out to do grocery shopping. Her neighbor Mindy Kleinberg had just packed her children off to school.
Then came word, Tuesday morning, that President Bush had agreed to allow his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, to testify publicly about the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. All at once, the cellphones started ringing and the e-mail started flying and "the Jersey girls," as the four women are known in Washington, were getting credit for chalking up another victory in the nation's capital.
Americans just tuning in to the work of the commission investigating the attacks may not have heard of Ms. Breitweiser and the rest. But on Capitol Hill, these suburban women are gaining prominence as savvy World Trade Center widows who came to Washington, as part of a core group of politically active relatives of Sept. 11 victims, and prodded Congress and a recalcitrant White House to create the panel that this week brought official Washington to its knees.
"They call me all the time," said Thomas H. Kean, the commission's chairman and a former Republican governor of New Jersey. "They monitor us, they follow our progress, they've supplied us with some of the best questions we've asked. I doubt very much if we would be in existence without them."
The families have spent months pressing for Ms. Rice's public testimony; when the White House failed to send her to last week's hearings, they walked out in silent protest. On Tuesday, two Democratic senators, Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Charles E. Schumer of New York, suggested that the families think about asking Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to testify publicly as well.
Ms. Van Auken said that had always been their preference. "Of course we would like them to testify publicly," she said Wednesday.
Before Sept. 11, the Jersey girls (the nickname, which distinguishes the women from their New York and Connecticut counterparts, was popularized in song by Bruce Springsteen) knew little about government and less about politics. The closest Ms. Casazza came to foreign affairs was processing visa applications for French trainees while working for the cosmetics company Lancôme. Ms. Van Auken could not keep the two chambers of Congress straight.
"I remember saying to Patty: `Which one is the one with more people, the Senate or the House?' " she recalled.
The story of how they helped move a seemingly immoveable bureaucracy is at once the tale of a political education, and a sisterhood born of grief. They gathered Monday in the sun-drenched living room of Ms. Casazza's spacious home to tell it. The place, with its well-tended lawn and tennis court out back, spoke of another life. Ms. Casazza, who has a 13-year-old son, is planning to sell it. "Downsizing," she said simply.
Three of them were married to men who worked for Cantor Fitzgerald, but the women were strangers until after the attacks. Ms. Breitweiser, 33, and Ms. Casazza, 43, voted for Mr. Bush in 2000. Ms. Van Auken, 49, and Ms. Kleinberg, 42, voted for Al Gore. All insist they had no political agenda, then or now.
But they had a burning question. "We simply wanted to know why our husbands were killed," Ms. Breitweiser said, "why they went to work one day and didn't come back."
On Capitol Hill, lawmakers were pressing for a commission; in December 2001, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut, had proposed a bill. By the spring of 2002, Ms. Kleinberg had befriended the father of a victim of Pan Am Flight 103, the plane that was bombed over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. "He said, `The bill is languishing. If you want it to go anywhere, you have to make it happen.' "
The women went to Home Depot, sawed wood for signs and staged a Washington rally; 300 people came out in the blistering heat. They staked out lawmakers and boarded the elevators marked "Senators Only." They wheedled their way into the White House. Jay Lefkowitz, a former Bush domestic policy adviser, recalls giving them chocolate chip cookies, even as he successfully opposed some demands.
They stayed up nights surfing the Web, taking notes on things like Islamic radicalism and the Federal Aviation Administration's hijacking protocols.
"The Internet," Ms. Breitweiser said, "has been our fifth widow."
In the Capitol, they cried, they pleaded, they cajoled. Ms. Breitweiser showed her husband's wedding ring, found at ground zero still attached to his finger. Ms. Casazza brought photos of a Cantor Fitzgerald pool party, telling lawmakers, "All the men are dead."
They befriended reporters: Gail Sheehy, in The New York Observer, dubbed them "the four moms." With her articulate manner and Ivory girl complexion, Ms. Breitweiser became a fixture on the television networks.
"No one wanted to say no to these women," said a Republican who participated in negotiations over the commission. He said the women "were used" by Democrats, an accusation Republicans repeated recently when Ms. Breitweiser criticized the Sept. 11 images in a Bush campaign advertisement. It is an acccusation she hotly denies.
Since the commission began its work, the Sept. 11 relatives, who call themselves the Family Steering Committee, have dogged its every move. When the panel complained of a lack of money, they lobbied for a bigger budget ?- and won. When the House speaker, J. Dennis Hastert of Illinois, refused to grant the panel an extension, they headed to Washington again, and the speaker retreated. "Public pressure by the 9/11 families," Mr. Hastert's spokesman, John Feehery, said about the reversal. "There is no doubt about that."
For every battle they have won, though, the families have lost others. The commission rejected their calls to subpoena classified intelligence briefings and to fire its executive director, Philip D. Zelikow, who co-wrote a book with Ms. Rice. The families also complained that last week's hearings deteriorated into a partisan spat over a book by Richard A. Clarke, the former counterterrorism official. "They were right on that one," Mr. Kean conceded.
So the Jersey girls are not congratulating themselves now on Ms. Rice. "There are no victories here," Ms. Casazza said. Ms. Breitweiser added: "A victory implies that this is a game. And this is not a game."
Family Steering Comt. Stmt. re Rice Testimony
The Family Steering Committee (FSC) is an independent, nonpartisan group of individuals who lost loved ones on September 11, 2001. The FSC does not receive financial or other support from any outside organizations.
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The Family Steering Committee Statement Regarding Condoleezza Rice's Testimony
March 30, 2004
The Family Steering Committee is pleased to learn that Condoleezza Rice will testify under oath in a public hearing.
This is good news and will undoubtedly make the 9/11 Commission's Final Report more complete, comprehensive, and transparent in nature.
More than anything, the families want to know why our nation was so vulnerable to 19 hijackers on the morning of 9/11. We look forward to Ms. Rice answering questions about her priorities as National Security Advisor to the President, the processes used before, and after, 9/11 to share critical intelligence and other related data regarding this country's counter terrorism activities within the government, her knowledge of Al-Qaeda, and her role, and the role of the NSC--leading up to, on, and after the morning of 9/11.
We are hopeful that the information gleaned from Ms. Rice's public testimony can be used by the Commission as part of their investigation and be included in their Final Report and Recommendations to help minimize the chances of a future attack and thus, save lives.
Upon the signing of the 9/11 Commission into law, President Bush stated that the Commission's work was their most solemn duty. He also stated that the Commission must go wherever the facts may lead. We hope that the following qualifying language presented in the letter to the Commission regarding Ms. Rice's testimony does not now contradict these words:
"The Commission must agree in writing that it will not request additional public testimony from any White House official, including Dr. Rice. The National Security Advisor is uniquely situated to provide the Commission with information necessary to fulfill its statutory mandate. Indeed, it is for this reason that Dr. Rice privately met with the Commission for more than four hours on February 7, fully answered every question posed to her, and offered additional private meetings if necessary. Despite the fact that the Commission will therefore have access to all information of which Dr. Rice is aware, the Commission has nevertheless urged that public confidence in the work of the Commission would be enhanced by Dr. Rice appearing publicly before the Commission. Other White House officials with information relevant to the Commission's inquiry do not come within the scope of the Commission's rationale for seeking public testimony from Dr. Rice. These officials will continue to provide the Commission with information through private meetings, briefings, and documents, consistent with our previous practice."
Consistent with Bush's statement upon the formation of the Commission, the FSC sincerely hopes that the commission will be given full and unfettered access to any officials in the White House whom they feel it is necessary to interview under oath.
The above condition, which prohibits them from seeking further public testimony, is of particular concern because decisions made by those officials on the day of 9/11 are critically important to provide a full accounting to the American public.
Nevertheless, the families are cautiously optimistic that Dr. Rice's public appearance before the Commission will enhance its ability to produce the kind of Final Report that the nation deserves.
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The Family Steering Committee Statement
Regarding Condoleezza Rice and Release of 28 Pages
March 27, 2004
The Family Steering Committee demands the appearance of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice under oath in a public hearing immediately. We believe that testifying before the Commission in a public forum is Ms. Rice's moral obligation given her responsibility as National Security Advisor to protect our nation. The death of nearly 3000 innocent people warrants such a moral precedent.
We further request Richard Clarke, Samuel Berger, Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley also be present, under oath, and made part of the same panel as Dr. Rice.
We have attached a list of questions that must be addressed during this hearing. In addition to these questions, we would also appreciate the reconciliation of various issues that were raised on behalf of Mr. Clarke during this past week's hearings. Furthermore, we would request the examination and discussion of the following issues:
1. The draft report of the 2001 NSPD-5 Presidential Commission on Intelligence Reform chaired by General Brent Scowcroft.
2. Budget requests made by various agencies since 1998 so as to compare those requests within the agencies from which they originated, within the Administration, and by Congress.
3. The NSC policy options paper, prepared by Richard Clarke's office during Spring 2001 which proposed a change in US policy regarding [------------]. (Joint Inquiry Report, Appendix, NSC Document Request, July 1, 2002, enclosure to Condoleezza Rice letter dated July 8, 2002)
4. The after-action report on the Millennium prepared by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism's office.
We would encourage White House counsel to view this commission for what it is?- a quasi-legislative entity. After all, Chairman Kean is an Executive Branch appointee to the Commission. Furthermore, the mere fact that the Commission has gained access?-albeit limited access, to the Presidential Daily Briefings (something that the Joint Inquiry of Congress was refused for reasons of Separation of Powers principles) further supports the notion that this Commission is not a purely legislative body.
Assuming arguendo that White House counsel continues to persist that a legal precedent might be presented, Dr. Rice should testify to set a moral precedent that is aptly warranted by the murder of 3000 people. Voluntarily coming forward to testify under oath during a public hearing without the use of a subpoena would simply set a rare, refreshing, and appropriate moral precedent for all of history to judge.
Finally, in light of recent actions on behalf of Senate Majority Leader Frist, we also request the de-classification of the infamous 28 blank pages of the Joint Inquiry Final Report. The Saudi government stated to the media in August, 2003 that they would like the 28 pages released. Members of the Joint Inquiry have stated on the record that the 28 pages did not include national security secrets. Nevertheless, the White House continues to refuse to release said information on grounds of national security.
One of the underlying themes of this past week's hearings was the failure to garner the "will of the nation." One way to arouse the will of the nation is to engage the American people in healthy debate and dialogue. In order to have the will, the nation must be properly informed. As such, we encourage the release of the 28 pages of the Joint Inquiry Final Report that pertains to the foreign sponsorship of terrorism.
We hope that Senator Frist will show the same zeal to release the 28 pages as he has shown in de-classifying Mr. Clarke's testimony. We request that all witness testimony to the Joint Inquiry of Congress be impartially reviewed and declassified if possible. We abhor the tendency to over-classify information and we support the release of any material as long such public release does not legitimately harm national security.
Questions For Condoleezza Rice from the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry Appendix
1. As stated in the Appendix of the Joint Inquiry of Congress' Final Report:
"Despite the White House decision [to deny access to the PDBs], the Joint Inquiry was advised by Intelligence Community representatives of the content of an August 2001 PDB item that is discussed in the report. This glimpse into that PDB indicated the importance of such access [--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------]*
*National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated in a May 16, 2002 press briefing that, on August 6, 2001, the President's Daily Brief (PDB) included information about Bin Ladin's methods of operation from a historical perspective dating back to 1997. One of the methods was that Bin Ladin might choose to hijack an airliner in order to hold passengers hostage to gain release of one of their operatives. She stated, however, that the report did not contain specific warning information, but only a generalized warning, and did not contain information that al-Qa'ida was discussing a particular planned attack against a specific target at any specific time, place, or by any specific method." (Joint Inquiry Final Report, Appendix, "Access Limitations Encountered by the Joint Inquiry," pages 1-2).
Ms. Rice can you reconcile this intimated discrepancy?
Terrorism as a Policy Priority
1. During your time as National Security Advisor, what priorities did you establish for U.S. Intelligence priorities and where did terrorism fit in? How did this change from the priorities of the Clinton administration?
2. How were these priorities conveyed to the intelligence Community? Did the intelligence Community propose any changes in priority with regard to counterterrorism or al-Qa'ida? What were they?
3. Prior to September 11, who at the National Security Council and the U.S. government played a leading role in setting counterterrorism policy? Who else was involved in this process? Please describe the process, the participants and the fora.
4. Prior to September 11, did Congress support the NSC's counterterrorism efforts? Did Congress oppose NSC priorities related to terrorism in any way? Please provide details of both, as appropriate.
5. Was Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for counterterrorism, included all in Principals' meetings related to terrorism after January 2002? If not, why not? How was it determined who would be involved in such meetings? What was his role in counterterrorism policy and intelligence prioritization after January 2002?
6. During the transition from the Clinton administration, did former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger or other senior Clinton NSC officials provide any advice, information, warning, or guidance requiring policy, priorities, or threats from al-Qa'ida and Bin Ladin? If so, what was the advice, information, warning, or guidance?
7. Prior to September 11, was the Administration engaged in a review of counterterrorism policy? What issues were identified for change? What stage were plans in? What changes in the role of the intelligence Community, if any, were planned? What happened to the review after the September 11 attacks?
8. When the new Administration came into office, was it aware that Usama bin Ladin had declared war on the United States in 1998? Who provided this information, and how was it provided? What was the impact of that fact on the Administration's national security priorities? How did it affect the intelligence Community's posture?
9. Prior to September 11, did the President or other senior officials in the administration make any public statements or give any speeches on the subject of the threat of terrorism, or Usama bin Ladin's terrorist network in particular? If so, please make copies available to the (Joint Inquiry Staff)?
Resources
1. Prior to September 11, did the Intelligence Community come to the new Administration with any requests for additional counterterrorism resources, e.g. additional funding? Who made the request, and what was the nature of the proposal?
2. Did the Intelligence Community ask the Administration for more resources to fight Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida? Who made this request?
3. Did the Intelligence Community ever cite a lack of resources as the basis for not acting? If so, provide details and the NSC response.
4. When the DCI, Director of NSA, and FBI Director requested more counterterrorism resources, what was the stated justification for their requests?
5. What was the NSC's response to each specific Intelligence Community request for any increases in resources for counterterrorism? For al-Qa'ida?
Agency responsiveness and support for policy makers
1. What specific strengths did you observe in intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting on Bin Ladin, al-Qa'ida or terrorism in general prior to September 11? What specific weaknesses? Please provide specific examples of each.
2. What was the quality of intelligence received by the NSC? Did the NSC make any efforts to improve this quality?
3. With respect to Intelligence Community counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11, how responsive were the CIA, the FBI, NSA, and DIA?
--Did they provide the President and the National Security Council with the information needed to make informed decisions?
--Did the agencies use their authority aggressively? Did they cite limits or a lack of authority as a basis for no action?
--Did they shift resources appropriately in response to NSC direction?
--Did the NSC provide any specific tasking to Intelligence Community agencies to which they did not respond? Please provide specific examples.
Threat to the homeland
1. Prior to September 11, including especially spring/summer 2001, what information did the Intelligence Community provide to the National Security Council, orally or in writing, indicating the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the United States?
2. Prior to September 11, what information did the Intelligence Community provide to the National Security Council on al-Qa'ida activities and infrastructure inside the United States?
3. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council ever consider alerting the American people to the internal threat from al-Qa'ida? What happened?
4. Did the National Security Council ever consider enhancing U.S. border controls, e.g., by strengthening watchlist programs, alerting the FAA or the airlines, or inspecting cargo containers on a larger scale? If so, what happened?
5. Prior to September 11, what was the National Security council's view regarding how well postured the FBI was with respect to combating terrorist groups inside the United States? What steps were taken to improve the FBI, if any?
6. Prior to September 11, did the Intelligence Community provide the NSC with any information regarding the possibility that al-Qa'ida members would use airplanes as weapons or hijack airplanes in the United States? What did the NSC do in response to this information?
Foreign governments
1. Prior to September 11, which foreign governments were most and least helpful regarding counterterrorism? How were they helpful or not helpful in each case?
2. Prior to September 11, were the governments of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supportive of U.S. counterterrorism efforts? How responsive were European allies? What priority was counterterrorism cooperation in Saudi Arabia relative to military operations against Iraq, the Middle East peace negotiations, and other concerns?
3. Did Intelligence Community agencies ask for NSC assistance in getting foreign governments to take action against terrorist cells? Did the NSC take any specific actions to support the Intelligence Community? What did the NSC do? Did the NSC ask or instruct the State Department or the Department of Defense to assist the intelligence Community in this regard?
4. Prior to September 11, was there any discussion of increasing information sharing and/or counterterrorism cooperation with the Sudan?
Use of Force/Overt and Covert
1. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council consider the use of military force against al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan? How? In what form? Why was it not pursued? Was there sufficient intelligence to support military options? Was their tasking to gain further intelligence to support military operations?
2. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council issue any tasking to the CIA or the U.S. military to develop plans involving the covert or overt use of force?
3. Prior to September 11, did the National Security Council ever review the CIA's authorities to conduct covert action against Bin Ladin or al-Qa'ida? What problems were identified regarding existing authorities, [-----------]? Were there any proposals to change those authorities before September 11th? What steps were taken?
4. Prior to September 11, was the unarmed Predator flown in Afghanistan after the Bush Administration came into office? Were proposals made to the NSC to fly it? Which participants favored flying it? If it was not flown, why not?
5. Did the National Security Council support the development of the armed Predator? Did any administration official try to expedite the process? Were any discussions held on this issue at the NSC? Who participated?
6. Did you consider [------------]? Why or why not? What impact did you expect?
7. Why was there no military response to the attack on the USS Cole? Was this considered?
Recommendations
1. What recommendations would you make to improve the intelligence community's performance?
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Statement of the Family Steering Committee
for The 9/11 Independent Commission
March 20, 2004
The Family Steering Committee is deeply disturbed to learn about Executive Staff Director Philip Zelikow's participation in urgent post election briefings, December 2000, and January 2001, with Sandy Berger and Condoleezza Rice. In this particular meeting the Senior Clinton Administration official clearly warned that Al Qaeda posed the worst Security threat facing the nation.
It is apparent that Dr. Zelikow should never have been permitted to be Executive Staff Director of the Commission. As Executive Staff Director his job has been to steer the direction of the Commission's investigation, an investigation whose mandate includes understanding why the Bush Administrations failed to prioritize the Al Qaeda threat. It is abundantly clear that Dr. Zelikow's conflicts go beyond just the transition period.
It is extremely distressing to learn this information at this late date. This new information clearly calls into question the integrity of this Commission's investigation. The Family Steering Committee repeatedly expressed concerns over all members' conflicts requesting that the commission be forthcoming so as not to taint the validity of the report. The Family Steering Committee did not know about Dr. Zelikow's participation in this intelligence briefing until today.
As such, the Family Steering Committee is calling for:
1. Dr. Zelikow's immediate resignation.
2. Dr. Zelikow's testimony in public and under oath.
3. Subpoena of Dr. Zelikow's notes from the intelligence briefings he attended with Richard Clarke
4. The Commission to apologize to the 9/11 families and America for this massive appearance of impropriety.
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