The situations in Japan and England were radically different. Japan could not feed itself, even before the war. Japan needed to import food, even before the war. A video about the submarine campaign against Japan is a complete non-sequitur. England was
able to feed itself--which is why i used the word starve--look it up if you need to.
But more than that, England could provide its own electrical generating capacity through coal-burning power plants, which is what they were doing already. Japan could not provide coal or fuel oil for electrical generation without importing those commodities. I already noted that an aggressive submarine campaign would have, for a time, reduced the amount of war materials which reached the United Kingdom--but not by very much and not for very long. Canada produced the ships it needed to escort convoys, and produced them using their own iron ore and their own ores for other metals, made usable in their own smelting and foundry operations. They then used those materials in their own shipyards to build the escort vessels they needed for convoy duty. While it is true that their capacity to build destroyers and larger craft was limited by their ship building capacity on the St. Laurant river, they relied on mine sweepers and corvettes, and later frigates, built in their Great Lakes shipyards, and delivered under their own power to the St. Laurant through the Rideau Canal system. Both Canada and the United States had the shipyard capacity to build (and did build) merchant ships faster than the Germans could sink them.
England was not the aggressor, they didn't need to continually produce offensive weapons in order to survive. Japan, on the other hand, had no "dominions" like Canada, and no allies like the United States to make up any shortfalls in their production. Furthermore, they were
the aggressor and needed to continually produce war materials, weapons, ships and planes to continue to prosecute their war. England could have (and did) wait out the defeat of the submarine attack on shipping--Japan enjoyed no such luxury.
As usual, you don't know what the hell you're talking about.
By the way, your video is wrong--American submarine warfare did not become a significant contributing factor in the war until well after the Japanese navy was reduced to a small, ineffective collection of ships, and their highly expensive air forces--land- and sea-based--were nearly wiped out. This was because American torpedoes sucked, and BuOrd (the Naval Ordnance Bureau), being pig-headed, refused to recognize that and act on it--not until well into 1943.
When the war started, the submarine force was immediately sent into action, with the order to wage "unrestricted submarine warfare" against Japan. As it turned out, it would be 18 months before this really happened, and most of the problem during that time was torpedo related.
Up to a point, the American experience paralleled that of the Kriegsmarine (German Navy), which experienced its own torpedo problems during the Norway campaign.
Initially, there was a depth keeping problem. A torpedo set to run at fifteen feet would actually run as much as ten feet deeper. This problem was compounded by the blunt statement from the Bureau of Ordnance that there was nothing wrong with the depth keeping mechanism, and the commanders were obviously just missing their targets.
Eventually, it was no longer possible to ignore the commanders' complaints. Tests were run, using the relatively simple expedient of firing torpedoes at a fish net, and it was confirmed that the Mark-14 torpedo was running ten feet deeper than set. After this, BuOrd finally did their own tests, at last conceding that there was a depth problem. The commanders were ordered to adjust the depth settings to compensate for the error, and new torpedoes were modified to fix the problem.
This having been accomplished, it was presumed that the success rate would now soar.
Commanders were complaining that, even with the corrected depth settings, and perfect shots, the magnetic exploders were either detonating prematurely, which only served to warn the target and alert the escorts, or they were passing under the target and not exploding at all.
This was the second time where American torpedo problems ran along the same lines as German torpedo problems (though the German depth keeping problem came from a leaky seal on a balance tank, and not from an engineer rather stupidly basing the settings on practice torpedoes with warheads that weighed 200 pounds less than the production version). In Norway, the u-boats had experienced the same problems with prematures and failures, using their own magnetic exploders.
The two experiences diverged at this point. The Germans recognized the problem, ordered the magnetic exploders deactivated, and went back to blowing up targets. The Americans, on the other hand, insisted that the exploder worked, and that the problem had to be in the people using it.
. That's just an excerpt, there's more information on the torpedo problems at the site linked.
Give it up, Gunga Dim, you're too ignorant to survive in a debate such as this. A rah-rah U.S.A. video from youtube isn't making your case.