What the theory demonstrates however is not that words don't point to anything in reality. It demonstrates that words only point to things in reality. A proposition may be taken as being true (for instance by how well it matches with experience), but it is not proper to discuss "truth" as disembodied from a proposition. Truth must be grounded in something.
"Truth statements" do not only refer to themselves, they specifically refer to the wider contexts in which they have been made. "Truth" must be "verified" by a socially anchored method and in a socially recognized environment.
No "truth value" contains within itself the statement claiming to be the fact, except insofar as it it also attaches itself to the method and context of verification. "Truths" never contain a "why" or a "what", but by a "how".
I think we are NOT in disagreement.
Truth as a redundant concept
was used as a shorthand for a much more lengthy treatment such as described here:
And i think you're right. My response was probably due to an over-hasty reading, but i was mistaken. i appreciate the gentle rebuke.
Regarding the start of language:
I think that you have a much higher bar for what qualifies as language than I do. For example I don't think that a language necessarily must be able to handle non-concrete thinking.
Words do not only co-exist on the basis of their own existential strata, but on the basis of alternate or unavailable versions of their own (ontological) combinations, and yet, they only become affective as a isolated, gestural parody of their potential. They exist only insofar as they undermine themselves.
Do you have a reason for assuming a language must have a plurality of ways of expressing something?
Nope, not really (and i'm not trying to be flippant, just honest.) The distinction between what i consider to be communication v. language is probably arbitrary. Thus, i will utilize a personal anecdote: One of my best friends has a two year old son. He's perfectly capable of telling me "color" when he wants me to use his crayons, and he can tell me to "sit" when he wants me to stay next to him. And if i say, "sit, what?" He says, "please!" But though we share a few words "in common", as well as a common "humanity", i don't think that we yet share a common language. His acclimation to that system is as yet incomplete. He just knows the noises to make to let me know what he wants. Although, he is much more adorable, a rabid dog would be just as capable of doing the same.
When i tell this adorable two year old that i can't "sit", that i have other things i have to do, he doesn't understand my words or intent-- he only understands that i am denying him his desired effect. This child and i communicate, but we do not share a language, yet.
By the same token, i have four dogs; i have lived with them long enough to "get" their personalities, their habits, and the way that they choose to communicate their desires, but aside from some rather primitive ways of expressing my own motives, i cannot talk to them -- except in so far as i anthropomorphize them (which i do occasionally, i confess.) While i think that i communicate with them, i do not imagine that we share a language.
Although i do not think that some language theorists would be comfortable with the comparison, the simplistic acts of communication i supply here are similar to what Wittgenstein would call "language-games". "Language-games" may be possible between diverse "peer groups" and even species, but the advent of "language" demands an excess of both those categories. It requires a social function exceeding mere personal interest and investment.
Overall, as far as language-usage goes, i regard myself as possessing only the slightest of degrees advantage over a ten year old child. i may have a few vocabulary advantages on her, but, by and large, we are equals. And, yet, though i think that they communicate, i think she is a not anywhere near languaging with her pet hamster.