@contrex,
His standard bullshit is that it is an example of what happens when you take on superior firepower. However, that's bullshit because they were both equipped with 15" naval rifles in the main batteries. However, the Royal Navy rather whitewashed the inquiries.
Hood was laid down in 1916, but the savaging of the RN's fast cruisers in the battle of Jutland lead to radical design changes in
Hood and the cancellation of the other three ships which were projected for her class. The Royal Navy rather whitewashed the Jutland inquiry, too, lamely saying that it had been a victory because their ships were ready for sea sooner than the German capital ships. In fact, the one thing which made it a strategic victory and not just a tactical disaster was the Kaiser's pathological addiction to Mahan's theories, which lead him to keep the High Seas Fleet in port, so that he would have a "fleet in being." Mahan was not that shallow, however, and would never have approved of the German failure to capitalize on the strong tactical victory of Jutland. Not only did the High Seas Fleet do far, far more damage to the Royal Navy than was done to them, but most of their losses were in older, even obsolete classes of ship, and the RN's newest fast cruisers were savaged, precisely because of the limitations of their armor, particularly their deck armor.
Hood had had a major refit in the 1920s, a common enough practice--you don't pay for behemoths like that and then just replace them wholesale. (Most of the battleships in the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii in 1941, for example, were built during or even before the First World War.) But her continuing defect, and the one which allowed the Germans at Jutland to so heavily damage the RN's fast cruisers, was insufficient armor, especially deck armor. Even so,
Hood's refit had included heavy armored caps for the magazines, and she might have survived had it not been for the other major problem--Admiral Holland's fatal tactical choice.
Holland decided to run down and enage
Bismarck and
Prinz Eugen as quickly as possible, fearing they would try to escape. (This was not an unwarranted assumption, Lütjens hesistated to give Lindemann permission to return fire, because his orders were to get into the Atlantic and avoid an engagement.) However, that meant that he was approaching on a perpendicular course, rather than angling in to get on a parallel course. That meant that
Hood and
Prince of Wales could only use their forward batteries, cutting their fire-power in half. But the fatal consequence was that a shell from
Bismarck glanced off the armored cap of the mid-ships magazine, and penestrated the wall of the after magazine. Had they been steaming on parallel courses, this would not have happened. For that matter, adequate deck armor would also have prevented the catastrophe. Holland, of course, paid for his unwise decision with his life.
Neither after Jutland, nor the sinking of
Hood would the Royal Navy publicly admit that their fast cruisers and the battlecruiser were inadequately armored.