@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil Albuquerque wrote:The largely accepted base concept of will depends on acceptance of causation that is, that you are in control of your actions, that there is a relation between what you intend and what you can do. Granting that, equally there is no good reason to assume whatever is the cause of your will is constrained to your own internal conditions or that your own internal conditions are not dependent on external factors beyond your control
causation is a strong correlation between 2 or more events that we can observe and upon which we can establish a dynamic comprehensible linkage.
You're not making yourself any clearer.
You appear to have two attempts to define "causation":
1) causation that is, that you are in control of your actions, that there is a relation between what you intend and what you can do
2) causation is a strong correlation between 2 or more events that we can observe and upon which we can establish a dynamic comprehensible linkage.
The two state different things and neither is a clear statement of anything useful.
An agent has free will on any occasion on which that agent makes and enacts a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives.
This requires that there be at least the following:
1) a conscious agent
2) a finite set of at least two realisable options
3) a means by which the agent can evaluate and compare the options.
A "choice" is the construction of a set with exactly one member and which is a proper subset of an option set.
A choice is conscious if the agent has imagined future expectations for each option, compared those options and holds one as preferred before enactment.
Tell me, where in this is "causation" supposedly a problem? how is it a problem? and how is that problem entailed by the definitions?