40
   

Is free-will an illusion?

 
 
Briancrc
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 06:20 pm
@layman,
Quote:
When human participants perform under concurrent schedules of reinforcement, matching has been observed in some experiments


Why?
Briancrc
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 06:25 pm
@layman,
Quote:
Thank you for that. That's basically what Chomsky said


Chomsky predicted the matching law? Interesting historical note. Where was that written again?
0 Replies
 
layman
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 06:26 pm
@Briancrc,
Quote:
Why?


Perhaps for reasons elegantly elucidated by Skinner. Nobody, not Chomsky, not me, and not anybody I've quoted denies that his analysis has some validity in some areas of human behavior.

The point is that these cases cannot be over-generalized and supposed to be capable of explaining ALL aspects of human behavior. Certainly not such behavior as the acquisition and and application of language skills.
Fil Albuquerque
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 06:27 pm
@Briancrc,
American bipolar politics of extreme black n white povs comes to mind...why ?
Because usefulness is a thing !
0 Replies
 
Briancrc
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 06:31 pm
@FBM,
Quote:
He explores conscious will in hypnosis, Ouija board spelling, automatic writing, and facilitated communication, as well as in such phenomena as spirit possession, dissociative identity disorder, and trance channeling


Some good examples in there. Several people were wrongfully sent to jail because of facilitated communication. The facilitator was convinced that the child being facilitated was authoring messages about daddy touching him/her. It was the facilitator. Just another example of our brains filling in the gaps incorrectly.
Briancrc
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 06:34 pm
@layman,
Quote:
these cases cannot be over-generalized


I agree. But why has there been any lawful matching of rates of behavior to rates of reinforcement?
Fil Albuquerque
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 06:38 pm
@Briancrc,
You peepz asking about why there is such a thing as "fashion" in a fancy way ?
...oh lord...
0 Replies
 
layman
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 06:39 pm
@Briancrc,
Quote:
But why has there been any lawful matching of rates of behavior to rates of reinforcement?


This question virtually answers itself. If I happen to feed a homeless, starving dog, chances are good that he will come back around next time he is hungry, to see if he can get another free lunch. Dogs have memory, too.

What he won't know, and what you cannot know, in advance (unless I tell you), is that I will continue feeding him until he gets enough meat on his bones to be worth killing, butchering, and making a stew out of.

Could I possibly alter that "decision" after having cemented it in my consciousness? Yeah, sure, it's possible. I might just haul off and take a liking to the sorry mutt, and keep him around to run errands for me. It could happen.
Briancrc
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 07:10 pm
@layman,
Quote:
What he won't know, and what you cannot know, in advance (unless I tell you), is that I will continue feeding him


No, we are not at the point of being able to predict everything that someone will do. But I do not think that that is a fair measure of the model; nor does that address the level of prediction that has been achieved.
0 Replies
 
FBM
 
  1  
Reply Sun 25 Oct, 2015 09:52 pm
http://www.psych.unimelb.edu.au/sites/live-1-14-1.msps.moatdev.com/files/SoonHeBodeHaynes_PredictingAbstractIntentions_PNAS13.pdf

Quote:
Predicting free choices for abstract intentions
Chun Siong Soona,b,c,d,e,1, Anna Hanxi Heb,f, Stefan Bodeb,e,g, and John-Dylan Haynesa,b,d,e,h,1

a
Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience, Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, 10115 Berlin, Germany; b
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive
and Brain Sciences, 04103 Leipzig, Germany; c
Neuroscience and Behavioral Disorders, Duke-National University of ...

Edited by Marcus E. Raichle, Washington University in St. Louis, MO, and approved February 22, 2013 (received for review July 19, 2012)


Unconscious neural activity has been repeatedly shown to precede
and potentially even influence subsequent free decisions.
However, to date, such findings have been mostly restricted to
simple motor choices, and despite considerable debate, there is
no evidence that the outcome of more complex free decisions can
be predicted from prior brain signals. Here, we show that the
outcome of a free decision to either add or subtract numbers can
already be decoded from neural activity in medial prefrontal and
parietal cortex 4 s before the participant reports they are consciously
making their choice. These choice-predictive signals co-occurred with
the so-called default mode brain activity pattern that was still
dominant at the time when the choice-predictive signals occurred.
Our results suggest that unconscious preparation of free choices is not
restricted to motor preparation. Instead, decisions at multiple scales of
abstraction evolve from the dynamics of preceding brain activity.
free will | Libet | self-paced

The subjective experience that our voluntary actions are initiated
in the conscious mind has been challenged by the
finding that the human brain may already start shaping spontaneous
decisions even before they enter into conscious awareness
(1, 2). Specifically, the human brain can start preparing spontaneous
movements up to several seconds before a person believes
themselves to be consciously making a decision to move (1–3).
To date, such early choice-predictive signals have only been investigated
for simple movement decisions (1–6). However, there
are several reasons to assess whether preparatory processes also
occur for higher-level, more abstract types of decisions. First, the
relevance of motor decisions for understanding the neural formation
and preparation of intentions has been heavily debated (7, 8),
mainly because of their reduced complexity (9, 10) and the limited
levels of awareness in motor control (11, 12). Second, previous
studies on predictive signals for motor choices have revealed early
information in prefrontal and parietal brain regions. These regions
are not generally considered “motor,” but they have been sporadically
observed in motor preparation (13, 14). This invites the
question of whether these regions provide only unconscious
preparation of motor intentions or a common, task-independent
network for preparing multiple types of decisions before awareness.
Given the fundamentally different neural processes involved
in performing motor acts and mental calculations, identifying
overlap between the early choice-predictive signals would be of
high relevance because it would point toward a common cerebral
starting point for different types of choices.

We also aimed to address another question regarding the
prediction of free choices. Previous studies (2, 4) have found
early choice-predictive information in areas that overlap with the
so-called “default mode” network (DMN) (15–17). For this reason,
we also directly investigated the link between our choice-predictive
signals and these “off-task” brain signals. Interestingly, we identified
a partial spatial and temporal overlap of choice-predictive signals
with activity in the DMN.

Results
We investigated the neural precursors of abstract intentions by
asking participants to perform an abstract decision task in which
they spontaneously and freely chose to perform either of two mental
arithmetic tasks: adding or subtracting...

Discussion
Our results show that regions of medial frontopolar cortex
and posterior cingulate/precuneus encode freely chosen abstract
intentions before the decisions have been consciously made. Previously,
a similar network of regions was reported to be involved in
the unconscious preparation of motor intentions (2). In contrast, in
the current experiment, the intended “action” was a nonmotor,
abstract mental operation. Importantly, the randomized response
mapping ensured that the motor output used to indicate the
arithmetic answer was independent of, and did not contain any
information about, the abstract decision made. In addition, these
regions did not encode the motor response at any time before or
after the conscious decision, even when the behavioral response
was made. Thus, by fully dissociating high-level intentions from
motor preparation and execution, our current findings provided
direct evidence that the medial frontopolar and precuneus/posterior
cingulate regions were involved in the formation of high-level
intentions for voluntary actions in general. This also confirmed that
the frontoparietal network previously reported was indeed involved
in the formation of free intentions per se (2), rather than
motor preparation. In future studies, it should be possible to enhance
the sensitivity for smaller differences between informative
brain regions by directly comparing motor and calculation tasks in
the same participants...
Olivier5
 
  1  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 01:03 am
@Fil Albuquerque,
Metaphysics are more than unfashionable; they are useless speculations based on no fact whatsoever, unprovable and unfalsifiable. You believe in determinism like you believe in God: because you like the idea. Or rather in your case, because you are terrified by the alternative...
Fil Albuquerque
 
  2  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 03:57 am
@Olivier5,
I don't belive in God period. My so called God is no different from a complete system to explain the world as multiverse for instance.
By the way you are the one absolutely terrified of losing your autonomy your free will. Don't project that fear over my own pov.
layman
 
  1  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 08:49 am
@FBM,
Quote:
Unconscious neural activity has been repeatedly shown to precede and potentially even influence subsequent free decisions


These guys deserve some credit for not over-stating the case, as has often been done.

They don't say the "decision" precedes conscious awareness, they only say that preparatory "neural activity" does.

Likewise, they don't say that this "neural activity" is the decision. They don't even say the "neural activity" influences the decision. They only say the "potential" for such "influence" exists.
Fil Albuquerque
 
  2  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 09:00 am
@layman,
You have yet to honestly come to terms with the implied contradiction in the common sense description of free willing.

To the point:

How come the agent requires determinism in order to have authorship of will instead of willing being just spontaneous behaviour, and simultaneously free willing as is understood by the common sense is trying to get rid of determinism when it comes to the factors that precede the agent like genetics, history, circumstance ?

You cannot have it both ways and yet you have continually kept ignoring it because it is evidently inconvenient to you to address it. Either that or you simply fail to grasp the basics of the argument like D. Dennet explained.

So I would like to know with proper formal language what is your stance on this.

Are you a soft determinist or a libertarian ?
Olivier5
 
  1  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 09:38 am
@Fil Albuquerque,
Strict determinism is not required for agency. Only 1) the possibility / existence of cause to effect relations, 2) the possibility / existence of consciousness and reason, and 3) the possibility of such reason to cause an effect 'beyond itself' ie outside the brain, in the 'physical world' so to speak.
Fil Albuquerque
 
  1  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 09:53 am
@Olivier5,
FYI there is no such thing as non strict determinism anywhere in this debate. You really sound dumb (sorry) failing to grasp what mechanical causal connection means...
By the way what's your formal stance ? Libertarian or soft determinist ?
Clearly you are not a Fatalist Hard determinist so I ask for the more well known general alternatives.

If you need help to chose a variation of the general positions, here:
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/books/scandal/Taxonomy.pdf
layman
 
  1  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 09:59 am
@Fil Albuquerque,
Quote:
free willing as is understood by the common sense is trying to get rid of determinism when it comes to the factors that precede the agent like genetics, history, circumstance ?


This is not an accurate analysis of the problem. Genetics, history, circumstance, etc. can be and are "factors" when making a decision. The notion of free will does NOT "try to get rid" of these as "factors."

Quote:
Are you a soft determinist or a libertarian ?


Sorry, I don't generally put self-imposed labels on what I "am." You could call me "agnostic" about these things, if you wish.
Fil Albuquerque
 
  1  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 10:02 am
@layman,
Answer the question properly and honestly or you will be ignored from now on. I am done with dishonest talking.

What is your formal stance on the matter ? What is your position ?
Are you a LIBERTARIAN or a SOFT DETERMINIST ?
Fil Albuquerque
 
  1  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 10:06 am
@layman,
The analysis is perfectly and formally accurate although you seam to be utterly ignorant of it...all you have done so far with the other nerd around was engaging in noisy techno babble which is completely irrelevant to the matter as it is formally presented in free will debates.
0 Replies
 
layman
 
  1  
Reply Mon 26 Oct, 2015 10:10 am
@Fil Albuquerque,
Quote:
is trying to get rid of determinism when it comes to the factors that precede the agent


Whether or not these factors were "pre-determined" in some way prior to their occurrence, they have definitely been determined at the time one makes a new decision. They have happened, they are in the past, and can't be changed now.
 

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