@dalehileman,
dalehileman wrote:Okay Fil and again thank you. I am still wondering however how randomness can possibly enter into the discussion of the freewill/determinism impasse
This is a really well known argument, it's been stated on this thread and appeals to its implications have been made several times. There really is no point in yet again explaining something to you, if you're not going to take it in. You have cried "wolf" a string of times, so this is your last chance. You don't have to read hundreds of posts, you just have to take things in and remember them, if you can't do that, then you can forget about me answering any more questions.
The so-called classical dilemma goes like this:
1) an agent has free will on any occasion on which that agent makes and enacts a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives
2) if the world is determined there are no realisable alternatives and thus no free will
3) if the world is not determined then
everything is random thus agents have no control and there is no free will
4) the world either is or is not determined, in either case there is no free will, so, there is no free will.
One problem with this argument is premise
3, and there are at least two fatal problems with that premise.
1) the world is determined if and only if:
a) at all times the world has a definite global state, which can in principle be fully and exactly described
b) there are laws of nature which transform the states of the world and are the same in all times and places
c) given the state of the world at any time, the state of the world at all other times is exactly and globally fixed by the given state in conjunction with the laws of nature.
Notice that this is
not the statement that the world is determined if
anything is nonrandom, so if the world is not determined, there is no implication that
everything is random.
2) given the definition of determinism above, in principle the evolution of the world can be fully described, which is to say, in principle the is a mathematical equation by which the state of the world, at any time, can be exactly and globally
computed. So, the world is not determined if there is any
mathematical randomness. For premise
3 to succeed, it would need to be the case that willed actions are impossible if there is any mathematical randomness. That is where my argument comes in.
By demonstration we can perform willed actions and by mapping those willed actions to binary digits, we can form the prefix of a real number. Notice that our actions don't entail that particular number and cannot be retrieved from the information in that number. It is a theorem of classical mathematics that the probability of the continued expansion of a real number being computable is zero. Whether it is computable or not is irrelevant, to hold either position to be the case would be to beg the question, what matters is the mathematical fact that we have the prefix of an uncomputable string, yet we can continue to expand it by mapping our further actions to it. As there is no logical reason that we cannot continue producing willed actions and mapping them to the expansion of this prefix, there is no logical impediment to willed actions in a nondetermined world. If objectors call for it, we can even "complete" the expansion as a supertask in our final moment of life.
In short, our willed actions are compatible with the randomness implied by a nondetermined world.