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Sun 6 Nov, 2011 11:33 am
Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike that Changed America
by Joseph A. McCartin
Publication Date: October 6, 2011
Book Description
In August 1981, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) called an illegal strike. The new president, Ronald Reagan, fired the strikers, establishing a reputation for both decisiveness and hostility to organized labor. As Joseph A. McCartin writes, the strike was the culmination of two decades of escalating conflict between controllers and the government that stemmed from the high-pressure nature of the job and the controllers' inability to negotiate with their employer over vital issues. PATCO's fall not only ushered in a long period of labor decline; it also served as a harbinger of the campaign against public sector unions that now roils American politics.
Collision Course sets the strike within a vivid panorama of the rise of the world's busiest air-traffic control system. It begins with an arresting account of the 1960 midair collision over New York that cost 134 lives and exposed the weaknesses of an overburdened system. Through the stories of controllers like Mike Rock and Jack Maher, who were galvanized into action by that disaster and went on to found PATCO, it describes the efforts of those who sought to make the airways safer and fought to win a secure place in the American middle class. It climaxes with the story of Reagan and the controllers, who surprisingly endorsed the Republican on the promise that he would address their grievances. That brief, fateful alliance triggered devastating miscalculations that changed America, forging patterns that still govern the nation's labor politics.
Written with an eye for detail and a grasp of the vast consequences of the PATCO conflict for both air travel and America's working class, Collision Course is a stunning achievement.
Editorial Reviews
"The Air Traffic Controllers strike of 1981 was one of the most important struggles in American history, and by breaking the union, Ronald Reagan dealt a blow to organized labor from which it has still not recovered. If you care about the labor movement, you need to read Collision Course and even if you don't, you'll be transfixed by the drama of McCartin's story-telling." - E.J. Dionne, syndicated columnist and author of Why Americans Hate Politics
"The signal event in the evisceration of the American middle class was Ronald Reagan's breaking the air traffic controllers' strike in 1981. In Collision Course, Joe McCartin brilliantly and compellingly tells this tragic tale, and situates it in the broader narrative of middle-class America's long and sickening decline." - Harold Meyerson, Editor-at-Large of The American Prospect and op-ed columnist for The Washington Post
"The air traffic controllers' strike in August 1981 was a defining moment for the Reagan presidency and the American labor movement. By firing the air traffic controllers, and successfully replacing them, Reagan heralded the end of a political era when labor unions - and the workers they represented - were an integral part of the American social contract. Joseph McCartin tells the story in gripping detail. It's must reading for anyone interested in the recent history of American politics and labor relations." --John B. Judis, author of The Folly of Empire
Review: "takingadayoff" (Las Vegas, Nevada)
This review is from: Collision Course : Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike that Changed America (Kindle Edition)
Anyone who remembers 1981 remembers the day the air traffic controllers went out on strike. President Reagan ordered them to report back to work within 48 hours or else. Those who didn't (only 10% of those striking returned to work) were fired.
In Collision Course, labor historian Joseph McCartin has written an account of the formation of PATCO (the Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization), the strike, and what happened after Reagan fired the controllers.
Collision Course is no dull labor history. It's told almost like a thriller. McCartin refers early in the book to Arthur Hailey's novel Airport. I think he may have been inspired by Hailey to keep it punchy, because even though you know how the PATCO story ends, it's still quite exciting to read about the events leading up to the inevitable clash of union and employer.
McCartin tells many sides to the story that I wasn't aware of at the time. Reagan's decision to act tough had just as much to do with foreign policy as it did with labor relations. He was dealing with the Soviets and needed to appear decisive and ruthless.
McCartin also tells how the controller population was overwhelmingly male, white, and ex-military. The chapters on how the black controllers and the women controllers created ways to succeed despite the institutional prejudice they faced is actually quite inspiring. It's possible that the tendency for the white men of PATCO to see things from a narrow point of view was part of their downfall. PATCO dismissed the concerns of the few blacks and women among their numbers, and they also failed to consider how their increasing demands might appear to the American taxpayers.
As gripping as the story is, what does it have to do with us today? Lots, according to McCartin, and he makes a convincing case. Unions were reluctant for decades after the PATCO strike to push back against a steady loss of benefits and wages, because employers figured if the president could break a strike, they could too. Even in 2011, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker invoked Reagan's memory to justify his successful bill to eliminate bargaining rights for public workers. Never mind that Reagan acknowledged PATCO's right to bargain and only drew the line at the illegal strike. After the mass firing, unions became less and less popular, and the balance of power between employer and employee tilted heavily in favor of the employer.
"They can't fire all of us." What had been a rallying cry for the PATCO controllers before the strike became gallows humor to post-PATCO workers, an ironic reminder that yes, they can fire all of us.
About the Author
Joseph A. McCartin is Associate Professor of History at Georgetown University and Director of the Kalmanovitz Initiative for Labor and the Working Poor.
@BumbleBeeBoogie,
Interesting commentary about an interesting subject. However, I believe the analysis offered contradicts important facts about the post 1981 labor movement in this country.
1. The rapid decline of the U.S. manufacturing industry started in the late 1970s, driven by a combination of factors including; cheap labor in Asian and South American countries that were throwing off the socialist models that had been holding them back for so long; the energy crisis here and the growing limitations associated with environmental law in this country (a major factor for our steel industry); and the rise of high tech industries. This decline alone cut the core out of the U.S. Labor movement, and it had nothing to do with the air traffic control strike.
2. From 1975 to today we have seen a decline even in the relative share of unionized private sector and remaining manufacturing/industrial enterprises. Even as our industrial base declined, unions were increasingly less successful in organizing the industries that remained - because workers were increasingly rejecting their organizing efforts. The Air Traffic Controller issue may have been a factor here but it is neither clear nor evident that it was.
3. During the same period the portion of the local, state and Federal government that was unionized grew very significantly. If PATCO 's demise in the dispute with President Reagan is argued to be a setback with pervasive and lasting effects for unions, surely these effects would be seen most among government unions. However, exactly the opposite happened. Government unionization expanded dramatically, chiefly through political action, and not the usual organizing process . Today the vast majority of union members in this country are the employees of government agencies at some level, and a very large number of these unions have no bargaining power over wages and benefits (makes one wonder just what they do for their money - in fact they are merely conduits for the transfer of public funds to the Democrat party and the widespread corruption of state legislatures).
@BumbleBeeBoogie,
Lets not forget the most important reason, IMHO, for Reagan firing the controllers and eliminating PATCO. The strike was ILLEGAL! !!
When PATCO violated their contract by going on strike, they gave up any expectation of having the govt abide by the contract.
@mysteryman,
Typical conservative answer. Screw safety, im going to show everyone ive got balls!!
@RABEL222,
Are you referring to the safety of aircraft in the air? The fact is the system worked better during the strike than before - in terms of the statistics for controller errors and in flight deviations. During the years leading up to the strike the FAA added numerous new controllers while the union constructed the public fiction that theirs was an unusually stressful job - sitting there in air conditioned comfort working a radar scope and computer console and communicating with the aircraft they were controlling. The chief result was a sudden but persistent increase in the number of them who got early retirement on tax free "disability". During this period the quality of their service markedly declined - I know this from personal experience flying Navy fighters through the system.
Once the strike started, Reagan fired all the controllers who didn't show up for work; put otherwise idle supervisors back to work controlling aircraft and supplemented them with Navy and Air Force controllers skimmed from various Air Force control centers and Navy Aircraft carriers. I was on USS Dwight D, Eisenhower at the time - we gave up two of about 15 controllers and other ships did the same. The system worked far better then than before the strike, and the strikers were never hired back.
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