@wayne,
You neatly dismiss the mice as collateral damage, yet are unwilling to accept factory farming, based solely on the premise that humans don't need to eat meat.
Reason being is that there is a contextual difference between the two. My argument against factory farming is that it involves unnecessary cruelty to animals for the purposes of eating meat, which is also unecessary.
Plowing a field, and harming mice isn't necessarily cruel in the above sense. Where mice take up residence isn't the same as systematiclly subjecting farm animals to factory farm conditions.
Your right, human's dont need to drive cars, but if a deer is accidentally hit, just like if a mouse is accidentally killed, is any moral wrong committed in an intentional sense?
Growing food is necessary, and perhaps steps can be taken to try and mitigate the effects of animals that might be affected, but lets be practical and reasonable here. Your standard of perfection might be pushing the limit a bit much.
Quote:
Morals are not anything other than a social contract between members of our own species. You, yourself have just reduced them to the opinion of most people in the deer example.
While I find contractualism an interesting moral/political theory, it is definitely contestable in the fields of both ethics, meta ethics, and political philosophy whether morals are anything but contracts.
My reference to most people is simply to recognize the intuitions of people, and what they would find reasonable. This is a normative argument remember. Remember, direct interests is compatible with contractualist principles, that is, under certain conditions we all agree to certain rules for an ideal outcome. I don't see how recognizing the interests of animals is precluded by that. If you are going take a Hobbesian line of contracting, well, there are many problems associatted with that as well...
Quote: You call the mice collateral damage one moment then want to say there's nothing wrong with giving them moral consideration the next. It is quite obvious that morals, for you, are subject to personal preference with a little added support from most people. Just who gets to weigh in on these morals, do most field mice get an opinion?
Maybe you should try demonstrating that morals are anything other than a social contract first.
Of course mice are subject to moral deliberation. If we recognize their interests, as we do other humans, then we need to take into account how our actions affect them. Your plowing example is a good example of a hard case, where the benefits in certain circumstances may out weigh the costs, but the outcome relies on good reasons.
Are you familiar with Tim Scanlon's contractualism? Here is the essence of what he argues:
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement.
I don't see how this pre cludes the moral consideration of animals, as a matter of normative debate. Further, I don't want to side track this discussion with ethical theory. You'll notice in my OP that I advanced a incompletely theorized argument, and that though particular issues may be debateable one way or the other (like your mouse case), we can agree on general principles (animal cruelty/factory farming is wrong) without pre supposing a major ethical theory. It happens all the time in law.