Animals, Eating Meat and Moral Standing

First, I don't see why that it is unreasonable- it may just be intuition that animals should be directly considerable in a morally relevant sense, but a strongly held intuition nonetheless that needs to be accounted for by any ethical theory in order to be coherent.

Second, I think you should supply a moral rule against animal cruelty that you find persuasive, since you require me to go into greater depth regarding the justification for my position.

Oh and excuse my ignorance, but what exactly is the difference you mean between moral rules and a system of morality? I think this is related to my confusion regarding the above.

What moral rules (and how) can adequately account for direct, moral considerability regarding animals?

I do (for the moment, perhaps I'm wrong). I don't think consensually based custom can give rise to universal moral norms. Something other than consent and custom is needed.

What you can't do, however, is to say "this is wrong" without some ethical theory to back it up.

What would change? I mean, even with a fully developed ethical theory, how does one get to assert something is wrong.

It seems like a good idea to build a ethical theory, but in the end I was unaware a person gets to declare something in such a manner.

More to the point, even if he did create said theory, I think you'd still find an objection. Either to the theory not being developed enough, or to some other new criteria.

If vegetarians observe animals to have moral standing, it does not require them to base it on a long industrious effort to craft some complex moral theory. Certainly the moral standing we grant to other humans does not require each of us to develop such a thing.

You can always say "that's wrong" without backing it up with any kind of ethical theory. People do it all the time. If you do that, though, there's little to distinguish the statement "that's wrong" from the statement "I don't like that." And if those two statements are interchangeable, then the statement "that's wrong" is not an expression of moral disapprobation, it's merely a statement of esthetic disapproval.

Ding, ding ding. We have a winner, even making the connection that it's aesthetic. I'm impressed. You've just described the correct meta-ethical theory.

failures art wrote:

What would change? I mean, even with a fully developed ethical theory, how does one get to assert something is wrong.

It's really quite easy. You just say "that's wrong." I'm sure you do it all the time.

failures art wrote:

It seems like a good idea to build a ethical theory, but in the end I was unaware a person gets to declare something in such a manner.

Now you are aware.

failures art wrote:

More to the point, even if he did create said theory, I think you'd still find an objection. Either to the theory not being developed enough, or to some other new criteria.

There's always that possibility. But nothing ventured, nothing gained.

failures art wrote:

If vegetarians observe animals to have moral standing, it does not require them to base it on a long industrious effort to craft some complex moral theory. Certainly the moral standing we grant to other humans does not require each of us to develop such a thing.

You can always say "that's wrong" without backing it up with any kind of ethical theory. People do it all the time. If you do that, though, there's little to distinguish the statement "that's wrong" from the statement "I don't like that." And if those two statements are interchangeable, then the statement "that's wrong" is not an expression of moral disapprobation, it's merely a statement of esthetic disapproval.

Sure. It's called sharing an opinion. It is not a declaration of moral authority.

I guess you get to choose when to recognize this and when not to.

I think we've been venturing. So far, you've been outright dismissive of any of his assertions on this level. I don't think you really care for this idea unless it's you who gets to assert things.

So when people "don't like" the inconvenience of something, they can simply refuse to recognize any moral arguments. Hell, they might even declare something is outside of the scope of morality. That's awfully easy.

That's correct, and I have no problem with you saying "to me, this is intuitively wrong" without first deciding on some ethical theory to confirm your intuition. What you can't do, however, is to say "this is wrong" without some ethical theory to back it up

You're the one who said that you'll be "defending the view that animals ought to obtain direct moral standing." I've seen very little of that. You're arguing against the status quo, it's your job to convince me that you're right, not the other way around.

I have no clue what "direct moral considerability" means.

What is that extra something?

My only concern is that direct moral standing for animals is a requirement any ethical theory should account for.

If I punch you in the face, it is wrong because you suffer. The reasons for the wrongness of that action pertain directly to your well being, not something else. Ethical theories will reason that out in different ways, but you get the picture.

If I punch you in the face, it is wrong because you suffer.

I bet you force the cat to use a different bathroom and don't let it use your dishes....

Can an animal have "direct moral standing" without having rights?

When a veterinarian spays or neuters a cat or dog, the animal surely suffers. Would you therefore conclude that the veterinarian has committed a wrongful act toward the animal?

If I kept a human indoors in my home and prevented him from leaving, I'm sure you'd agree that I'd be committing a wrongful act toward him. On the other hand, I keep my cats indoors in my home all day, every day, and prevent them from leaving. Am I committing a wrongful act toward my cats?

What about in the case that you punch someone in the face thinking that they will suffer but by chance they don't suffer, say, because they have an extra strong face or diminished pain sensitivity?

I don't think the consequences entirely matter. If you throw a knife at me but I duck in time for the knife to miss me but kill the bear behind me about to attack, have you saved my life?

Any 'interest' theor can account for the interests animals have, albeit in different ways. Perhaps we can have moral obligations that take into account the standing of animals, without a notion of rights.

There are interests that definitely conflict here, just like when you mentioned what shoe to put on. It becomes a situation of which interests are more important, and for what purpose. Normative debate will have to be applied here.

Depends on the interests.