There's no requirement that everyone be able to articulate their own moral preferences, just as there's no requirement, in social contract theory, that everyone express consent to the social contract. It is, however, necessary that someone in the category has moral agency.
There you go again. Wanting to have you utilitarian cake and eat it too.
I'm not asking if there are higher-order rules in the event of a tie. I'm asking why some entities' rights are calibrated against some other entity's rights. For instance, why should a dog have 75% of a human's rights, on the assumption that a dog has 75% of a human's capacity to suffer? Why not make the same comparison between humans?
Thomas wrote:On our capability to imagine different possible futures for ourselves for years out, on our obvious capability to suffer or rejoice in those imaginations, and on the inability of animals to do the same, to the best of our zoological knowledge.
Have you asked a dog what it thinks about that?
As Thomas Nagel would point out, you have no idea what it would be like to be a tree.
I'm pretty sure that [Rawls] does want a society with rights for the mentally disabled. I'm also pretty sure that he would justify them from an original position that accounts for the possibility of us being born mentally handicapped.
Yep. But that doesn't mean that we should also take into account the possibility of being born a dog.
This argument doesn't address the problem. It evades it by using the term "category" as a weasel word: Comatose humans have rights because they are "in the same category" as noncomatose humans. Who placed them in the same category, and by what standard? By contrast, nonhuman animals have no rights because they are not in the same category as human animals. Again, who placed them in a different category, and by what ethically-relevant standard? How is your argument from categories any more than fancy-worded question begging?
There you go again, failing to distinguish between the claims "X is not an axiom within logical system S" and "X is not a true proposition within logical system S".
I am making the same comparison between humans, and the obvious result is that a human has 100% of a human's rights.
But then, maybe I don't understand what you're asking. I don't see how the relative weight of rights would ever be relevant if there was no conflict between different entities' rights.
No I haven't. I also haven't asked that question to any comatose patients, or any humans with severe mental handicaps. Why should that stop me from recognizing that comatose patients and the mentally handicapped should have rights?
Then maybe I'm mistaken in my factual assumptions about trees. The same problem occurs, at some point, in every ethical system. In this case as in others, I'll just do the best I can: make my best guess and take the risk of guessing wrongly.
It also doesn't mean that we shouldn't.
As I've said before, moral rules are made for human communities.
Rights? What are these things you call "rights?"
I'll make it simple. I say "you only have 87% of my rights because you only have 87% of my capacity to suffer." My guess is that you'd dispute that, because you think you have the capacity to suffer as much as you can, and you don't understand why any lack of capacity on your part should affect your moral standing in the world.
And I imagine Rover and Fluffy would have a similar reaction.
I also haven't asked that question to any comatose patients, or any humans with severe mental handicaps. Why should that stop me from recognizing that comatose patients and the mentally handicapped should have rights?
You tell me. You haven't stated whether you would accord any moral standing to comatose patients.
We can, after all, make some pretty informed guesses about what humans are like.
As I've said before, moral rules are made for human communities.
Rights? What are these things you call "rights?"
I'll make it simple. I say "you only have 87% of my rights because you only have 87% of my capacity to suffer." My guess is that you'd dispute that, because you think you have the capacity to suffer as much as you can, and you don't understand why any lack of capacity on your part should affect your moral standing in the world.
And I imagine Rover and Fluffy would have a similar reaction.
I also haven't asked that question to any comatose patients, or any humans with severe mental handicaps. Why should that stop me from recognizing that comatose patients and the mentally handicapped should have rights?
You tell me. You haven't stated whether you would accord any moral standing to comatose patients.
We can, after all, make some pretty informed guesses about what humans are like.
Don't kid yourself. Of course you're presupposing some sort of ethical theory. You're presupposing morality, so you have to have some sort of theory. You may not know which one, but have one.
Why are "interests" morally significant?
Liberty is necessary for morality? Really?
Just because you haven't found a good argument to distinguish a comatose human from a dog doesn't mean there aren't any.
No doubt. But then we also have an interest in liberty (as you point out above), yet we own animals without any moral compunction. How do you explain that discrepancy?
You're confused. That's not about animal's rights, that's about human obligations.
No, not really. As I've pointed out, from a utilitarian perspective, it's utile to have a rule protecting infants and the cognitively impaired because to do otherwise would set a bad example. A Rawlsian would approach it from the original position and arrive at the same end. A Kantian would say that one cannot adopt a rule allowing some people to be killed without willing the end of all prohibitions against murder.
Not necessarily. See above.
Who defines those interests?
No doubt you've consulted the animals about their interests before making this statement.
Why is it contestable? According to you, if an animal has interests, then those interests are morally significant. Who gets to decide whose interests are important and whose are not?
That's debatable.
joefromchicago wrote:As I've said before, moral rules are made for human communities.
Alright, then we have a fundamental disagreement on what moral rules are for. Although I agree that moral rules are made for humans to live by (where "humans" is shorthand for self-aware, rational beings), I disagree that they are made exclusively for the benefit of humans.
When a culture postulates moral rules that hurt humans to serve the benefit of their purported gods, these are nevertheless moral rules. Likewise, when a culture postulates moral rules that hurt humans to serve the benefit of animals, or of "the environment", they are nevertheless moral rules. Wrong-headed perhaps, but moral rules nevertheless.
To me, a "right" is an individual's claim against a society of self-aware, conscious beings that is worth enforcing consistently, given the total happiness and suffering caused by enforcing it consistently.
As a matter of ethical theory, I accept that, assuming you had sufficient evidence to establish your greater capacity to suffer. But as a matter of ethical practice, you don't have evidence to support it, so I'll stick with the rebuttable presumption that your capacity to suffer is equal to mine.
That is without a doubt an argument that their happiness and suffering should count the same as that of humans---as opposed to the, say, 1% they're getting under current law. But your position seems to be that it shouldn't count at all. How does your imagination support your position?
I would---but only because most humans in our society would foolishly freak out about the prospect that doctors might kill them if they should become comatose.
In other words, if Terri Shiavo's doctors had shot her in the head, I think they would have wronged millions of non-comatose Americans, but they wouldn't have wronged Terri Shiavo.
You are way more optimistic on that point than I am. My own guesses, especially the ones about what women are like, turn out to be notoriously ill-informed.
Your right, but I only am trying to suppose an ethical theory at a general level. I think all ethical theories (no matter which one you a re a proponent of) must be interpreted in a manner that animals ought to fall within the scope of morality.
Because some interests are necessary for a things well being. Without them you suffer. I think most people would agree that the avoidance of pain is a fact that most value. How that value is interpreted in an ethical manner depends on what theory you propose.
VERY generally, if liberty is synonomous with auntonomy, and auntonomy has to do with being able to further one's interests (or choices if you want to stick with humans), and since interests are morally siognificant, then liberty must have at least a minimal moral component to it. The right is derived from the value we place on one being able to further their interests.
Quote:Just because you haven't found a good argument to distinguish a comatose human from a dog doesn't mean there aren't any.
And does this not aply to you? What persuasive arguments have you put forth that reasonbly rejects the similarities between the two?
I don`t see how owing a domestic pet slave inpinges the interests of an animal individual, if that pet`s person's interests are properly taken into account.
A non domestic animal is a different case, considering it has interests which are quite different from a domestic cat or dog.
This is where we part. We have duties to animals, because we accord them with basic rights.
You might think this is nonsense animals lack duties, but like I`ve mentioned before, extending rights to an object of moral concern need not require it has the capacity to acknowledge duty. This is too high of a standard, given marginal cases.
But are these good arguments?
We do, as a matter of normative discussion, of course.
Why must one "consult" with animals? Do I need to hear my cat say "yes" when I ask whether it would rather not be electrocuted?
Can`t we rationally agree that similarities which exist between animals and humans are sufficient enough reasons to claim similar interests exist between the two?
Yeah, just like I said: it's a rule that is generally regarded as utile. Your "claim against society," therefore, is contingent on the rule continuing to be utile. In other words, it's a right until something better comes along.
Why you can't take the additional step in assuming that two humans can have different capacities to suffer is beyond me.
Thomas wrote:In other words, if Terri Shiavo's doctors had shot her in the head, I think they would have wronged millions of non-comatose Americans, but they wouldn't have wronged Terri Shiavo.
Say what??? That doesn't follow from your previous sentence. Are you sure you have that right?
Well, there's one characteristic that humans possess and that non-human animals lack: humanity.
That's not about animal's rights, that's about human obligations.
As I've said before, moral rules are made for human communities.
Humans are included in the category because they're humans.
It's not begging the question to say that moral rules apply to humans, just as baseball rules apply to baseball players, even though they might sit on the bench the entire game.
Show me a dog or a horse that lives by a moral code and I might be inclined to change my position.
Until then, it's simply nonsense to speak of morality outside of the human context.
I disagree that they are made exclusively for the benefit of humans. When a culture postulates moral rules that hurt humans to serve the benefit of their purported gods, these are nevertheless moral rules.
I don't think that's distinctive of my position. Once upon a time, you yourself may have taken a similarly-changing position on the property rights of slave owners, or on the right of husbands to control their wives. If you had lived in the 19th century, you may well have believed in those rights. Then something better came along---the idea of race and gender equality---so you may have given up on them. That's how moral rules change, and for the most part it's a good thing, too.
That's hyperbole, not counterargument. I just told you that I can take this additional step---but I won't actually take it unless you present persuasive evidence that two particular humans do indeed have different capacities to suffer.
Fair enough. If it helps resolve the confusion, replace "wronged" with "caused suffering to". The legal right not to be killed belongs to Terri Shiavo. The utility of that right, which justifies its existence and enforcement, accrues to non-comatose Americans who might find themselves in Shiavo's position.
What is the significance of humanity in moral standing? You seem to assert this in a way that you would reject something like interest or suffering being asserted.
If we can assert our own authority our right to live, then why can't the same authority (our) assert other being's right to live? Also, in what way would you accept another being asserting it's own right to live? It seems you want this on human terms exclusively.
joefromchicago wrote:
As I've said before, moral rules are made for human communities.
The moral rules you choose to observe, yes.
Can't we do better than that?
And if a football player enters the game, they are still protected by baseball rules right?
What kinds of behaviors would you accept? If I said that an animal protecting it's offspring or one of its pack was an example, it's not hard to imagine a reply to the extent that this is mere animal instinct. If so, then is it also a non-moral that a human would protect its offspring or another human? Is it then, just animal instinct?
I think Thomas made a good point about this:
failures art wrote:What is the significance of humanity in moral standing? You seem to assert this in a way that you would reject something like interest or suffering being asserted.
Humanity is important because only humans are capable of acting morally.
failures art wrote:If we can assert our own authority our right to live, then why can't the same authority (our) assert other being's right to live? Also, in what way would you accept another being asserting it's own right to live? It seems you want this on human terms exclusively.
I have no problem with person A asserting that person B has a right to live. That's because it makes sense to talk about humans having rights. In contrast, it makes no sense to talk about non-human animals having rights. So yes, I see morality exclusively in human terms. Those are the only terms in which morality makes sense.
