Tunesia, Egyt and now Yemen: a domino effect in the Middle East?

"The American people did not choose this fight. It came to our shores, and started with the senseless slaughter of our citizens.

After nearly 10 years of service, struggle, and sacrifice, we know well the costs of war.

These efforts weigh on me every time I, as Commander-in-Chief, have to sign a letter to a family that has lost a loved one, or look into the eyes of a service member who's been gravely wounded.

We will be true to the values that make us who we are.

I'm sick and tired of hearing Obama call Israel a "democracy." He doesn't understand the term.

BERLIN - At the height of the giddiness over the fall of the Mubarak dictatorship in Egypt, leading German politicians were putting themselves through the wringer. Too long had the West dealt with Arab despots based on the false assumption that only they could guarantee “stability” in the explosive Middle East. From now on, support of human rights and democracy had to form the basis of a values-oriented foreign policy.
Only a few months later, these views, at least as far as government parties are concerned, appear to have been erased from memory. It’s as if this spring’s revolutions, which didn’t shake up just the Arab world, had never taken place. Now, it’s all about the controversial planned sales of tanks by Germany to Saudi Arabia. That golden oldie, “realpolitik,” is back. Of course, “human rights considerations must play a role, but international security interests take priority,” says German Minister of Defense Thomas de Maizière, adding that Saudi Arabia is “one of the most important anchors of stability in the region.”
The opposition would be a good deal more credible in its indignation about the tank deal if it had also complained when the German government refused participation in the military intervention to protect Libyan revolutionaries against mass murders perpetrated by Muammar Gaddafi’s forces. Or if it kicked in full-on about the West’s ongoing inaction in the face of Syrian death and torture squads acting against its own people.
Western political elites are secretly hoping there may be some respite, just a short breather, from the Arabic revolution, which is becoming overwhelming. This second phase of the “Arab Spring” bears no resemblance to the high-flying expectations awakened by those great marches to freedom spawned by the overthrow of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments.
From Bahrain to Yemen, Libya to Syria, those first bursts of exhilaration have turned to bloody conflict, and there is widening dissatisfaction among Egyptians with the transition. It has also become clear that the irreversible changes in the region have not ushered in a peaceful and prosperous Golden Age, but rather years if not decades of volatile and potentially extremely violent fights to establish new – and unknown – orders.
The mood of the public in the West is shifting from projected, and often exaggerated, hopes for the Middle East to fatalism. Because NATO bombing in Libya has not yielded instant capitulation from Gaddafi, and Libyan rebels haven’t yet come up with a road map to ensure liberal democracy after Gaddafi is gone, many Western pundits have taken to reflecting on a supposedly senseless war. The tenacity of NATO’s involvement has, however, brought Gaddafi’s fall that much nearer, although admittedly what happens afterwards as Libya tries to forge its future will be no piece of cake. Yet who would seriously argue that Gaddafi should have been left to his own murderous devices to quell the situation so that, order restored, the West could sit down at the same table with him again?
Democratization is more important than stability
As the despotic Sunni regimes fall, the West is increasingly aware of the extent of strategic changes in store for the Middle East. Fear is growing that Iran (and even more, an Iran with atomic weapons) will have the most to gain from this. There is much to be said for ensuring balance by equipping the Saudis with modern weapons – an approach reflected in recent U.S. policy as well.
It would be disastrous to bind realpolitik at any price with the recent fetishistic fixation on “stability.” Going back to the old order is not in the cards -- but neither is the drafting of a master plan that would give the West a way to drive future developments in the region. The situations in the various countries concerned are far too diverse and volatile for that.
However, instead of running after situations as they develop, the West must actively steer the inevitable changes in the direction of freedom and the rule of law. It must establish and focus on priorities that have a positive influence on the global development of the region, such as the further democratization of Egypt through strong civil and secular government and institutions, and binding Libya to the West once Gaddafi is gone.
Among the rampant risks of the present Middle Eastern situation also lie unsuspected opportunities. Israel is presently under much less international pressure than it had before the various regional uprisings. No longer are Western governments alone in seeing Israel as an island of stability in a sea of excessive violence and threatening unpredictability.
Even Turkey, eager to boost its image as a hardboiled opponent of “Zionism“ and protector of the Palestinians, has at least temporarily de-escalated its tone with regard to Israel. That’s the only way to interpret Turkey’s withdrawal from the “Gaza Flotilla.“ Only a year ago Turkish authorities were using the flotilla as an anti-Israel propaganda tool. Ankara’s Islamic government has also had to come to terms with the fact that it bet on the wrong horses by wooing Syria and Libya – at a cost of billions to the Turkish economy. To normalize business dealings with Israel would certainly be more lucrative.
This situation offers the West the chance to involve Turkey in joint strategic plans for the Middle East. Tragically, it is just at this decisive period of transition in the region that the United States and Europe are in the throes of massive debt crises that not only reduce their scope for negotiation but make financial support increasingly unpopular. Yet for the West to turn its back on the Middle East could, in the long term, cost it infinitely more than any investment in the future they might make now.

It seems Silly Female Impersonator can not see any reason why a different way of saying something would be better or worse .

Much is usually qualitative, and when it is used as a quantitative word it is similar to saying "more better" ....the world has already experienced superlative overload....most best....even the Old Spice man needs to up the ante by saying..fresh...fresher...freshest....freshestshist .

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I'm sick and tired of hearing Obama call Israel a "democracy." He doesn't understand the term.

So it is only a democracy if you approve of the result of the election ?

Is this finally end of Gaddafi?

As Tripoli was surrounded from three sides - east, south and west - government forces precipitously collapsed.

What at first might have been mistaken for a tactical withdrawal into urban areas, emerged more clearly as the disintegration of the government's most feared fighting units.

The vaunted Khamis Brigade - commanded by a son of Col Gaddafi - saw its barracks raided with impunity. Rebel convoys punched deep into Tripoli, meeting virtually no resistance.

Why did battle-hardened Libyan soldiers, fed on a diet of anti-rebel propaganda and willing to fight in the face of overwhelming Nato air power, melt away so suddenly?

The answer can only be speculative at this stage, but there are a few possibilities.

First, there was an element of retreat rather than a rout. Tripoli is unevenly pacified and the euphoria of Green Square obscures the continuing fighting in several suburbs.

Western parts of the city are being progressively secured but enduring sniper fire shows that loyalists still remain willing to risk their lives for a crumbling regime.

Underground groups

Second, where soldiers did lay down their arms, the much-maligned NTC deserves some credit.

Col Gaddafi's presidential guard surrendered in line with agreements it had earlier reached with the Benghazi leadership.

Over the past three months the NTC reportedly worked with Nato to arm underground groups in Tripoli.

As the noose tightened around Tripoli, these and other dissidents felt empowered to begin confronting the city's security forces.

Hence the weekend's patchwork urban revolts, some of them possibly cued by messages sent from mosques.

A remarkable amphibious assault on Tripoli demonstrated the extent of planning that underlay rebel operations, both in and outside of Tripoli, in recent days.

Third, Nato's relentless pounding of armour and artillery east of Zawiya greatly softened up government units, breaking down much of the resistance that would otherwise have slowed the rebel path.

As the war began to revolve around the periphery of the capital, Nato could concentrate its surveillance assets (including Predator drones) and firepower on smaller areas, exploiting intelligence transmitted directly by rebels on the ground.

On Saturday, three-quarters of all Nato targets were in the capital.

The role of Western special forces in forward air control (to guide air strikes) and rebel training is not yet understood, but seems likely to have been extensive.

This detracts nothing from the organic character of the NTC, but underscores the decisive impact of Nato's decision to serve as the rebel air force.

What about the aftermath? The possibility of ad hoc retributive justice is inevitable in post-revolutionary environments.

It would be naive to discount the possibility of serious violence, but talk of a bloodbath looks overblown. The hundreds of rebels who flooded the streets of Tripoli have so far shown no interest in mass vengeance.

Nonetheless, the NTC is under unprecedented international and Libyan scrutiny, and will be held responsible even for isolated abuses by forces nominally under its command.

Even small provocations could see the group outflanked by political competitors with their own claims to representing aggrieved groups.

Liberal constitution
Nato member states have little appetite for a peacekeeping force. They believe that a Western military footprint would inflame regional tensions.

Nor is the NTC eager for something that would further complicate efforts to establish its authenticity and independence.

The UK and France know that this revolution requires ownership, particularly as details of Nato's expansive role trickles out over the coming months. But unobtrusive and discretely supplied advice on urban policing and the disarmament of militias would be helpful.

One crucial task is the swift repair of damaged oil and gas infrastructure. The restoration of export revenues would finance reconstruction and provide the transitional government with the resources to meet high expectations.

But even this requires sensitive policy - any suggestion that an interim and unelected government was apportioning revenue unfairly could poison the process of institution building. Iraq's difficulties in this regard should furnish important lessons.

In the longer-term, there is a paradox to Libya's revolution. The same factors that gives rise to a power vacuum - the absence of national institutions and an independent military establishment - could also enable the creation of a new Libyan state, free from predatory vested interests of the sort that are buffeting Egypt's democrats.

The NTC's draft constitution is an impeccably liberal document, promising to fill that vacuum with inclusive and pluralistic structures of government.

That promise may flounder on the cross-cutting tribal, religious and regional fault-lines of Libya's war, but its best prospect of redemption lies in persuading the wary that their best chance of equitable treatment lies in the restoration of political authority.

In the longer-term, there is a paradox to Libya's revolution. The same factors that gives rise to a power vacuum - the absence of national institutions and an independent military establishment - could also enable the creation of a new Libyan state, free from predatory vested interests of the sort that are buffeting Egypt's democrats.

I believe that the leadership vacuum will be the biggest problem facing the rebels.