Re: Is the push towards privitization all it's cracked up to
Ima goan start with the end, because besides it being the most relevant point it's also the place where we agree:
IronLionZion wrote:I never said that in all cases the lower price was the ideal.
I also never said that in all cases privatization is the ideal.
The correct answer is that privatization is good in some areas and not in others.
Emphasis mine.
I agree wholeheartedly and have perhaps misunderstood and mischaracterized your position.
But now that that's out of the way we can disagree.
Quote:The fact that higher water prices in developing countries often means people can no longer afford to acccess clean water. Death, disease, etc.
I agree, but the flip side is also important to consider. While in one such developing country (Brazil) I experienced first-hand what this means.
While it's true that pricing water outside of the reach of the average citizen can be dangerous I'd note that this is usually combatted by said citizens simply stealing the water and no reasonable person wishes to punish them.
In Brazil, turning off someone;s water supply is illegal. If you don't pay your bill there are fines etc that can be meted out but your water is a legal right regardless of whether you pay.
Many people simply "steal" it.
But the artificially low prices also hurt. In Brazil the sanitation of the water is such that one dare not drink it because cheap water is unhealthy water.
In Brazil the dought and underfunded infrastructure has sometimes meant no water at all. In São Paulo I had to spend a few days a week with no water while it was being rationed.
I also experienced the same with electricity. Brazil had a huge energy crisis due to lack of investment and electricity for all was rationed. Prices had to be raised and everyone was given a limit. Exceed the limit and they would cut off your electricity.
Even though I paid the increased price my limit was based on an average useage period that included months in which the apartment was vacant, so my quota was unrealistically low.
So my electricity was shut off 4 times (I simply reconnected it).
So while I agree that affordable utilities are important in a developing nation my experience with artificially low prices and failure to invest in the infrastructure has shown that it can also cause the total cessation of said services.
IronLionZion wrote:
Many economists would beg to differ. Argentina followed the principles espoused by the likes of the World Bank and IMF with some success for many years, followed by a complete collapse. Admittedly, I have not studied the issue in depth, but the evidence speaks for itself and it is only one example of a much broader pattern being played out all accross the developing world.
Ok, I must admit that it was unfair to state my position as if it weren't subjective issue. You are right to say that many wise people disagree.
But I
do have a lot with which to base that opinion on, once again from close observation.
Argentina's problems can't easily be summarized but their dramatic collapse isn't something that can easily be pinned on IMF policy either.
I'm no fan of the IMF, they are too willing to loan and too unwilling to restructure (for developing countries, though this is slowly changing).
And it's true that the IMF tries to push certain financial policies that many disagree with. Especially so in South America.
But Argentina is an interesting case study, because Argentina has traditionally ignored the IMF demands.
The US/IMF has long demanded that Argentina slash expenditures drastically. Another crucial demand was to unpeg their currency.
Argentina resisted these changes and thier pegged currency was a ticking time bomb. They cultivated foreign investment but all said investors did so with the knowledge that the money was artificially overvalued and should that change the money would make a hasty exodus.
The US/IMF did indeed deal a nasty blow by getting impatient and Bush entered the White House with a "No bail out" policy and in essense pulled the rug out from under Argentina.
No further loans were forthcoming and since Argentina had yet to move toward fiscal responsibility they could not survive without said loans.
So Argentine rushed to comply with the demands. While it's true that they were following some IMF demands prior to their collapse it's also true that their disregard to some real key ones (like having a floating currency) helped toward their demise.
Thei big mistake was in trying to be part of a free market while having an artificial market. Pegging to the dollar helped ward off the demon of hyper-inflation but also made their trade with South American trading parters hard on their economy.
Their cultivation of foreign investment was silly, given that all the investors knew they were buying overvalued currency, and when the value changed an economy-breaking exodus was inevitable.
So when Argentina was refused loans they collapsed. They unpegged from the dollar and watched their currency plummet like a stone. The foreign investment beat a hasty retreat and the people made a run on the banks.
They were used to being guaranteed the value of their money in dollars, but when the inevitable unpegging occured everyone suddenly lost much of their money (as the plummeting value made their money worthless).
To counter this they had to put a limit on bank withdrawals, as very soon the banks were going to go under.
This drove the people nuts as the limit was basically ensuring that their money would continue to devalue while they could not pull it and buy dollars.
Those who did buy dollars helped contribute toward the devaluation and the country collapsed. The people went to the streets banging pots and pans and the government collapsed several times.
After several governments and multiple tries they got their loan. But even after their collapse their proposed measured for fiscal sanity took several runs by the IMF.
In short, Bush's sudden policy shift was a blow, and ideological arguments about IMF policy might, indeed, have merit. But it's also realistic to assert that Argentina only started to really follow IMF proposed policy after all of that happened.
And it's also true that their avoidance of a balanced budget and their insistence on a pegged currency in a floating market contributed great;y to their fall.
I consider the pegged currency their greatest mistake, and it's something the IMF had long cautioned about and a lesson they should have learned from neighbours (Brazil had killed hyper-inflation by changing a bank law and pegging to the dollar, but they unpegged in time and have been making progress within IMF's general guidelines).