Are Philosophers lost in the clouds?

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then in must be possible, although not conversely.

If you stop to think about what you just said (although I doubt you will), then you will see that you have just stated that possible monitors exist and are distinct from actual monitors. Think: if something can be possible without being actual, which is what you have just asserted it can, then its existence as a possibility must be different from its existence as an actuality, no matter how many times you decree otherwise.

Sure. There are possible monitors. They are identical with monitors. I did not say that anything could be possible unless it was actual. Indeed I said that necessarily, whatever is actual is possible. Read what I wrote, not what you think I wrote. Nothing exists as only a possibility. But, of course, necessarily, whatever exists possibly exists. I think you are confusing saying that something is possible, with saying that something is only possible. Nothing only possible exists. But whatever exist must be possible. Only possibles don't exist. But if something exists then it possibly exists. See the difference?

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then it must be possible, although not conversely.

Why not conversely? Aren't all possible things that exist also actual?

2 Replies

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then in must be possible, although not conversely.

If you stop to think about what you just said (although I doubt you will), then you will see that you have just stated that possible monitors exist and are distinct from actual monitors. Think: if something can be possible without being actual, which is what you have just asserted it can, then its existence as a possibility must be different from its existence as an actuality, no matter how many times you decree otherwise.

Sure. There are possible monitors. They are identical with monitors. I did not say that anything could be possible unless it was actual. Indeed I said that necessarily, whatever is actual is possible. Read what I wrote, not what you think I wrote. Nothing exists as only a possibility. But, of course, necessarily, whatever exists possibly exists. I think you are confusing saying that something is possible, with saying that something is only possible. Nothing only possible exists. But whatever exist must be possible. Only possibles don't exist. But if something exists then it possibly exists. See the difference?

It is you that are forgetting what you said, which was:

In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then in must be possible, although not conversely.

It is precisely that part after the comma that means that something can, yes, exist as only a possibility.

0 Replies

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then it must be possible, although not conversely.

Why not conversely? Aren't all possible things that exist also actual?

By "although not conversely" he means precisely what he wants to deny: non-actual possibilities.

0 Replies

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
A possible monitor is not a different kind of monitor. It is not a monitor at all.

You agree that an actual monitor must remain possible, don't you? Then an actual monitor "is not a monitor at all," since it is also a possible monitor. Or are you saying that for you a possibility must never be an actuality? Unfortunately, a possibility that cannot be an actuality is rather an impossibility. And how about the necessary possibility of an actuality? Let me guess: you will say it is not a possibility at all. This would be nice.

Sure, whatever is actual is possible. But that does not imply that there is such a thing as a possible monitor over and above a monitor. All monitors are both actual and possible. You keep thinking that actual and possible monitors are different kinds of monitors. They are not. There are different kinds of monitors. Different sizes, for example. Or different colored monitors. But not actual and possible monitors. (I have no idea what a necessary possibility of anything would be). It may be that in modal logic there is a theorem that states that whatever is possible is necessarily possible. I am not sure, but that sounds right. There is a theorem that states that whatever is necessary is necessarily necessary. (The reiteration of necessity). You seem to be interested in modal logic. Why not learn some? You can find some elementary discussion on the Internet.

This is a list of some S5 theorems, that seem relevant.
<> -- possible, [] -- necessary, = -- strict equivalence, -> -- strict implication.

<>p = [] <>p.
[]p = [][]p.
<>p = <><>p.
[]p = <>[]p.
p -> <>p.
(p & <>p) = p.
[]p -> p.
p -> []<>p.
<>[]p -> p.
etc.

3 Replies

@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
A possible monitor is not a different kind of monitor. It is not a monitor at all.

You agree that an actual monitor must remain possible, don't you? Then an actual monitor "is not a monitor at all," since it is also a possible monitor. Or are you saying that for you a possibility must never be an actuality? Unfortunately, a possibility that cannot be an actuality is rather an impossibility. And how about the necessary possibility of an actuality? Let me guess: you will say it is not a possibility at all. This would be nice.

Sure, whatever is actual is possible. But that does not imply that there is such a thing as a possible monitor over and above a monitor. All monitors are both actual and possible. You keep thinking that actual and possible monitors are different kinds of monitors. They are not. There are different kinds of monitors. Different sizes, for example. Or different colored monitors. But not actual and possible monitors. (I have no idea what a necessary possibility of anything would be). It may be that in modal logic there is a theorem that states that whatever is possible is necessarily possible. I am not sure, but that sounds right. There is a theorem that states that whatever is necessary is necessarily necessary. (The reiteration of necessity). You seem to be interested in modal logic. Why not learn some? You can find some elementary discussion on the Internet.

This is a list of some S5 theorems, that seem relevant.
<> -- possible, [] -- necessary, = -- strict equivalence, -> -- strict implication.

<>p = [] <>p.
[]p = [][]p.
<>p = <><>p.
[]p = <>[]p.
p -> <>p.
(p & <>p) = p.
[]p -> p.
p -> []<>p.
<>[]p -> p.
etc.

Thank you. Have you any helpful references on the Internet? The symbolization frightens those who have suffered from symbol shock in their early years.

2 Replies

@kennethamy,

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/

Quote:

A list describing the best known of these logics follows.

Logic Symbols Expressions Symbolized

Modal Logic
□ It is necessary that ..
◊ It is possible that …
Deontic Logic
O It is obligatory that …
P It is permitted that …
F It is forbidden that …
Temporal Logic
G It will always be the case that …
F It will be the case that …
H It has always been the case that …
P It was the case that …
Doxastic Logic
Bx x believes that

0 Replies

@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
A possible monitor is not a different kind of monitor. It is not a monitor at all.

You agree that an actual monitor must remain possible, don't you? Then an actual monitor "is not a monitor at all," since it is also a possible monitor. Or are you saying that for you a possibility must never be an actuality? Unfortunately, a possibility that cannot be an actuality is rather an impossibility. And how about the necessary possibility of an actuality? Let me guess: you will say it is not a possibility at all. This would be nice.

Sure, whatever is actual is possible. But that does not imply that there is such a thing as a possible monitor over and above a monitor. All monitors are both actual and possible. You keep thinking that actual and possible monitors are different kinds of monitors. They are not. There are different kinds of monitors. Different sizes, for example. Or different colored monitors. But not actual and possible monitors. (I have no idea what a necessary possibility of anything would be). It may be that in modal logic there is a theorem that states that whatever is possible is necessarily possible. I am not sure, but that sounds right. There is a theorem that states that whatever is necessary is necessarily necessary. (The reiteration of necessity). You seem to be interested in modal logic. Why not learn some? You can find some elementary discussion on the Internet.

This is a list of some S5 theorems, that seem relevant.
<> -- possible, [] -- necessary, = -- strict equivalence, -> -- strict implication.

<>p = [] <>p.
[]p = [][]p.
<>p = <><>p.
[]p = <>[]p.
p -> <>p.
(p & <>p) = p.
[]p -> p.
p -> []<>p.
<>[]p -> p.
etc.

Have you noticed that whenever you are caught contradicting yourself you change the subject? Again, you ran away giving no answer to post http://able2know.org/topic/153710-23#post-4289155. Perhaps this is another theorem of your list:

c ===> d

Which reads: whenever caught in contradiction (c), dissimulate (d). Do not be frightened by the symbol "===>" : it is just you running away.

0 Replies

@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

This is a list of some S5 theorems, that seem relevant.
<> -- possible, [] -- necessary, = -- strict equivalence, -> -- strict implication.

<>p = [] <>p.
[]p = [][]p.
<>p = <><>p.
[]p = <>[]p.
p -> <>p.
(p & <>p) = p.
[]p -> p.
p -> []<>p.
<>[]p -> p.
etc.

I like the "etc." Consider this:

It was possible that Obama had never been elected president, which is a past non-actual possibility. Past because it is no longer possible that Obama has never been elected president. And non-actual because it was the possibility of a non-actual event, which never became an actuality. Now I propose you an exercise: to express this using those nice theorems and symbols you like so much. Perhaps you succeed in making it easier to read.

0 Replies

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Thank you. Have you any helpful references on the Internet? The symbolization frightens those who have suffered from symbol shock in their early years.

What is a "symbol chock"? All I can imagine is you crossing the street while a big Y made of concrete fall from the sky on your head. Perhaps you have a better image (although I doubt it).

PS: I'm still waiting for your answer to post http://able2know.org/topic/153710-23#post-4289155.

0 Replies

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then it must be possible, although not conversely.

Why not conversely? Aren't all possible things that exist also actual?

If it is actual then is is possible, is valid. p -> <>p, is a theorem.
If it is possible then it is actual, is not valid. <>p -> p, is not a theorem.
For example: It is possible that my car is blue, implies, my car is actually blue ...fails if my car is red.

2 Replies

@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

If it is actual then is is possible, is valid. p -> <>p, is a theorem.
If it is possible then it is actual, is not valid. <>p -> p, is not a theorem.
For example: It is possible that my car is blue, implies, my car is actually blue ...fails if my car is red.

This has nothing to do whatsoever with what we were discussing, which was the real existence of non-actual possibilities - the possibilities of non-actualities - which I was asserting that really exist. And I used the following assertion to show that even those who disagree confirm that:

kennethamy wrote:

In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then it must be possible, although not conversely.

This means to say there are possibilities of non-actualities, or non-actual possibilities (the emphasis is mine).

1 Reply

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

Owen phil wrote:
If it is actual then is is possible, is valid. p -> <>p, is a theorem.
If it is possible then it is actual, is not valid. <>p -> p, is not a theorem.
For example: It is possible that my car is blue, implies, my car is actually blue ...fails if my car is red.

This has nothing to do whatsoever with what we were discussing, which was the real existence of non-actual possibilities - the possibilities of non-actualities - which I was asserting that really exist. And I used the following assertion to show that even those who disagree confirm that:

kennethamy wrote:
In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then it must be possible, although not conversely.

This means to say there are possibilities of non-actualities, or non-actual possibilities (the emphasis is mine).

Is that what it means: I really couldn't say since I have not idea what you mean. But it is true that actuality implies possibility, but possibility does not imply actuality. And since what I just said is simply to understand, and since what you said is impossible to understand, and since according to you, they mean the same thing, then have you any good reason for choosing to say what it is impossible to understand rather than what is easy to understand?

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

Owen phil wrote:
If it is actual then is is possible, is valid. p -> <>p, is a theorem.
If it is possible then it is actual, is not valid. <>p -> p, is not a theorem.
For example: It is possible that my car is blue, implies, my car is actually blue ...fails if my car is red.

This has nothing to do whatsoever with what we were discussing, which was the real existence of non-actual possibilities - the possibilities of non-actualities - which I was asserting that really exist. And I used the following assertion to show that even those who disagree confirm that:

kennethamy wrote:
In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then it must be possible, although not conversely.

This means to say there are possibilities of non-actualities, or non-actual possibilities (the emphasis is mine).

Is that what it means: I really couldn't say since I have not idea what you mean. But it is true that actuality implies possibility, but possibility does not imply actuality. And since what I just said is simply to understand, and since what you said is impossible to understand, and since according to you, they mean the same thing, then have you any good reason for choosing to say what it is impossible to understand rather than what is easy to understand?

From one being unable to understand something does not follow that anyone is also unable to understand it. Besides, before trying to understand my reasons to chose to express anything, you must understand whatever I have chosen to express.

1 Reply

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

Owen phil wrote:
If it is actual then is is possible, is valid. p -> <>p, is a theorem.
If it is possible then it is actual, is not valid. <>p -> p, is not a theorem.
For example: It is possible that my car is blue, implies, my car is actually blue ...fails if my car is red.

This has nothing to do whatsoever with what we were discussing, which was the real existence of non-actual possibilities - the possibilities of non-actualities - which I was asserting that really exist. And I used the following assertion to show that even those who disagree confirm that:

kennethamy wrote:
In fact, as already noted, if it is actual then it must be possible, although not conversely.

This means to say there are possibilities of non-actualities, or non-actual possibilities (the emphasis is mine).

Is that what it means: I really couldn't say since I have not idea what you mean. But it is true that actuality implies possibility, but possibility does not imply actuality. And since what I just said is simply to understand, and since what you said is impossible to understand, and since according to you, they mean the same thing, then have you any good reason for choosing to say what it is impossible to understand rather than what is easy to understand?

From one being unable to understand something does not follow that anyone is also unable to understand it. Besides, before trying to understand my reasons for choosing to express anything, you must understand whatever I have chosen to express.

0 Replies

@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

If it is actual then is is possible, is valid. p -> <>p, is a theorem.
If it is possible then it is actual, is not valid. <>p -> p, is not a theorem.
For example: It is possible that my car is blue, implies, my car is actually blue ...fails if my car is red.

If your car is possibly blue but actually red, even then it remains possibly blue: non-actual possibility still exists. However, you cannot express that possibly-blue-despite-actually-red car with symbolic logic. Why? Because it makes all possibility (the blueness of your car) become an actuality (the redness of your car): it leaves no room for the possible color of your car as being both its redness and its blueness, but leaves room only for the possibility of either the former - the redness of your car as a present actuality - or the latter - the blueness of your car as a present possibility - as if they were two independent "presents," hence disregarding the question of how one can be the past of the other. Which is why, within symbolic logic, there is no representation of time: within it, possibility will either be possible or actual, which not only contradicts the "theorem" by which actuality must also be possible, but also makes the possibility of any actuality become actually nonexistent - since it is that actuality alone - rather than coexistent with its actuality (which precisely allows one to deny the reality of possibility): for any coexistence to be possible, some otherness must still exist, which requires a representation of time. We, the users of symbolic logic, are aware of time, but symbolic logic itself is not: if we do not keep it as only a tool, then we lose our grip of reality.

1 Reply

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

If your car is possibly blue but actually red, even then it remains possibly blue:

You are right. If the car is possibly blue, then it is possibly blue. You are very good with tautologies. Not only that, but this time, modal logic supports not only: Necessarily, if the car is possibly blue, then it is possibly blue, but also if the car is possibly blue then the car is necessarily possibly blue. (For possibly p entails necessarily possibly p) and that should make you very happy.

2 Replies

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

If your car is possibly blue but actually red, even then it remains possibly blue:

You are right. If the car is possibly blue, then it is possibly blue. You are very good with tautologies. Not only that, but this time, modal logic supports not only: Necessarily, if the car is possibly blue, then it is possibly blue, but also if the car is possibly blue then the car is necessarily possibly blue. (For possibly p entails necessarily possibly p) and that should make you very happy.

Are you going blind? What happened with the rest of the sentence, as well as with the rest of the paragraph? You just forgot a part of the sentence you commented on, which is just essential to its meaning, as well as to the very point of the post I was commenting on, which is the same point we have been discussing so far:

If your car is possibly blue but actually red, ...

That is, the whole paragraph is about how possibility coexists with actuality and how symbolic logic ignores that, which you, understandably, have ignored completely.

0 Replies

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

If your car is possibly blue but actually red, even then it remains possibly blue:

You are right. If the car is possibly blue, then it is possibly blue. You are very good with tautologies. Not only that, but this time, modal logic supports not only: Necessarily, if the car is possibly blue, then it is possibly blue, but also if the car is possibly blue then the car is necessarily possibly blue. (For possibly p entails necessarily possibly p) and that should make you very happy.

Let me ask you something: what is the symbolic-logical equivalent for the adversative conjunction "but"?

2 Replies

@guigus,

guigus wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

guigus wrote:

If your car is possibly blue but actually red, even then it remains possibly blue:

You are right. If the car is possibly blue, then it is possibly blue. You are very good with tautologies. Not only that, but this time, modal logic supports not only: Necessarily, if the car is possibly blue, then it is possibly blue, but also if the car is possibly blue then the car is necessarily possibly blue. (For possibly p entails necessarily possibly p) and that should make you very happy.

Let me ask you something: what is the symbolic-logical equivalent for the adversative conjunction "but"?

There are a number of symbolic equivalents depending in which symbolic notation you are using. For instance, . & etc. But the term "but" is one of the terms for the logical connective, conjunction. And is equivalent to "and". (But you ought to know that, since you received such a fine grade from Quine's son-in-law). In any case, the statement, that the car is possibly blue, but it is actually red, entails the statement that the car is possibly blue. So, as I noted before, you are excellent with tautologies, for: if the car is possibly blue, but actually red, entails, that the car is possibly blue. Which is a tautology. And, as I noted too, if the car is possibly blue, but actually red, then it is possibly blue, since it is a tautology, it is a necessary truth. So, necessarily, if the car is possibly blue, but actually red, then it is possibly blue. And, as I added, if the car is possibly blue, then it is necessarily possibly blue. (But I am sure I am just telling you what you already know, since you are a model student of Quine's son-in-law).

1 Reply

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