@ACB,
ACB wrote:
1. Knowledge is justified true belief.
2. We cannot be absolutely certain of any facts about the world.
Therefore, when I say "I know that Paris is the capital of France", I mean "I justifiably believe that Paris is the capital of France beyond reasonable doubt". In other words, "I justifiably believe it is so, but I could (theoretically) be wrong".
But I only know that Paris is the capital of France if it actually is. So if I say that I know it, I am asserting the following:
(a) Paris is the capital of France.
(b) I believe Paris is the capital of France, but I could be wrong.
Thus I am asserting:
(a) Paris is the capital of France.
(c) It may be false that Paris is the capital of France.
But (a) and (c) are contradictory. Necessarily, if Paris is the capital of France, it is true that it is the capital of France.
Therefore, if we assert that we know (rather than just "probably know") some empirical fact, we are implying a contradiction. We cannot meaningfully make a bald assertion that we know an empirical fact.
Let me be clear that if Paris is indeed the capital of France, then we do in fact know it. But, since there is theoretical doubt, it is contradictory to assert that we know it.
Any comments?
But of course
saying that you know that Paris is the capital, but then adding that you could be wrong, is giving with one hand, and taking with another. But what has that to do with whether it is true that you can know that Paris is the capital and nevertheless, you could be wrong? Nothing at all. As an example, consider this: If I
say "It is raining, but I do not believe it" I would be talking nonsense. But it surely could be true that it is raining but I do not believe it is raining. So, my saying something may be nonsense, but the proposition, or the fact, may still be true. So, the mere fact that it would be nonsense to
say that p does not mean that p is not true. For there may be conditions for
saying p, which are extraneous to whether or not p is true.
Now, to get to the nub of your point. Can I know that p, and yet it could be that p is false? Let's distinguish this question sharply from a different question: Can I know that p, and p (actually) be false? The answer to this latter question is obviously-no. But how about the question, can I know that p, and it be
possible that p is false? Well, of course. It is possible that Paris is not the capital of France since it is not self-contradictory that Paris is not the capital of France. That is, Paris is the capital of France is a contingent statement, and a contingent statement is (by definition) a statement whose negation is possible. Again, Paris is the capital of France, all right, but that does not mean that it would be
impossible for future information to show that is (and was not) true. We can imagine the possibility of disconfirming evidence. But that, of course, in no way is any reason to think that such disconfirming evidence will occur, and thus, no reason to think that it is not true that Paris is the capital, and, thus, no reason to think that I do not know that Paris is the capital. So, the (mere) possibility that I am mistaken is, in no way, any reason to think that I am (in fact) mistaken. The difference is between possible error, and actual error. And they are not the same. Let me add this: another source of the confusion is that the term "possible" is ambiguous. It has a modal sense, and an epistemic sense. It is possible that p is false, means, in the modal sense either: a. the negation of p is not self-contradictory, or b. some future disconfirming evidence may arise. (I talked about these above). However, "possible" also has an epistemic sense. "It is possible that p" means (in this epistemic sense of "possible") something like, "for all I know, p is true". (For instance. "Is Joanne coming to the party?" "It is possible" = For all I know, Joanne is coming to the party. Now, if someone says, "I know that p, but it is possible that p is false" and if we understand him as using "possible"
not in the modal sense of "possible", but in the epistemic sense of "possible", then we'll understand him as saying, that I know that p, but for all I know, p is false. And that certainly sounds wrong. But, we have to remember that when we say that I know that p is true, but it is possible that not-p, we are using "possible" in its modal sense, but not in its epistemic sense.
I hope the above (long-winded) answer, help to clarify what I think is going on here.