Knowledge without Certainty

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

I am still digesting your reply, but please note the following:

kennethamy wrote:
1. is true
2. is contradictory. For it is inconsistent to say that I know that p, and also that for all I know, p is false.

You have misread (2). I said "I believe that p...."

Yes, I did. Sorry. But I don't think it matters here.

There is a moral to be draws from all the above. Philosophy, when done properly (which is to say, carefully, and in detail, or as some might have it, boringly) is not thrilling. It is hard. For, as the old black spiritual goes, "You can't get to heaven on roller skates, 'cause you fly right past those pearly gates!".

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@kennethamy,

but even without skates, is there an outcome from this discussion? What would a resolution look like? What are we trying to establish in this? The same discussion seems to be going on all the time, in this and every other forum, and I can't see it ever being resolved. Sorry if I sound cynical.

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs wrote:

but even without skates, is there an outcome from this discussion? What would a resolution look like? What are we trying to establish in this? The same discussion seems to be going on all the time, in this and every other forum, and I can't see it ever being resolved. Sorry if I sound cynical.

Whether knowledge implies certainty- or, rather, since I believe it is false that knowledge implies certainty, what are the arguments that motivate people to believe (falsely) that knowledge implies certainty. And that is, of course, on the negative side. On the positive side, why it is true that knowledge does not imply certainty, and why knowledge is "fallibilist". You are wrong to think the issue is not resolved, since I have given decisive argument to show that the major arguments in support of the view that knowledge implies certainly are all fallacious. And I have also argued cogently that not only is there no good reason to believe that knowledge does imply certainty, but that there are excellent reasons to believe that knowledge does not imply certainty.

It is one thing, as I am sure, you are aware, for you to believe that the argument is unresolved, and another thing for it to be true that the argument is unresolved. It does not follow from the fact that the various arguments are not understood, or followed closely enough, so that it can be seen that the argument is resolved, that the argument is unresolved. Now, if you believe that the arguments that I and others have produced to show that: (1) the arguments for the view that knowledge implies certainty are fallacious, or 2, that there is good reason to believe that knowledge is fallibilistic have flaws in them, then it is, of course, open to you, to raise objections to 1 and 2, and I will do my best to reply to those objections. But, to repeat, your impression that the argument is unresolved is merely an impression. For you are mistaken. The argument is resolved, although it may very well be true that some do not think it is resolved. But that kind of thing is quite common. For example, the argument as to whether the world is flat or round has been resolved, but there may be some people who think it is unresolved. They are clearly mistaken.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

thack45 wrote:

If we are to restrict the idea of truth to mathmatics, then one can never be sure that Paris is the capitol of France. Likewise, one could never be sure that the capitol of France is not Asia.

Being sure has little to do with the kind of certainty in issue. I am as sure as can be that Paris is the capital of France, but I am not infallibly certain that it is. For I might be mistaken that Paris is the capital of France. And what makes you think that math. is certain? I make mistakes in addition all the time.

Thank you Ken. I should have said "certain" rather than "sure". And I'll admit that I was throwing an idea out there from not an academic frame of mind (as, sadly, I do not have one). Perhaps I am misguided, but theoretical scenarios seem mathmatical to me. In any case, the OP said:

Quote:

(a) Paris is the capital of France.
(b) I believe Paris is the capital of France, but I could be wrong.

Thus I am asserting:

(a) Paris is the capital of France.
(c) It may be false that Paris is the capital of France.

But (a) and (c) are contradictory. Necessarily, if Paris is the capital of France, it is true that it is the capital of France

If all I can be certain of is (b) and (c), then I cannot state (a). So, with (b) and (c) in mind, (a) would be unreasonable. If I can not be certain of what the capitol of France is, then theoretically I can not be certain of what the capitol of France isn't.

1 Reply

@thack45,

thack45 wrote:

kennethamy wrote:

thack45 wrote:

If we are to restrict the idea of truth to mathmatics, then one can never be sure that Paris is the capitol of France. Likewise, one could never be sure that the capitol of France is not Asia.

Being sure has little to do with the kind of certainty in issue. I am as sure as can be that Paris is the capital of France, but I am not infallibly certain that it is. For I might be mistaken that Paris is the capital of France. And what makes you think that math. is certain? I make mistakes in addition all the time.

Thank you Ken. I should have said "certain" rather than "sure". And I'll admit that I was throwing an idea out there from not an academic frame of mind (as, sadly, I do not have one). Perhaps I am misguided, but theoretical scenarios seem mathmatical to me. In any case, the OP said:
Quote:
(a) Paris is the capital of France.
(b) I believe Paris is the capital of France, but I could be wrong.

Thus I am asserting:

(a) Paris is the capital of France.
(c) It may be false that Paris is the capital of France.

But (a) and (c) are contradictory. Necessarily, if Paris is the capital of France, it is true that it is the capital of France
If all I can be certain of is (b) and (c), then I cannot state (a). So, with (b) and (c) in mind, (a) would be unreasonable. If I can not be certain of what the capitol of France is, then theoretically I can not be certain of what the capitol of France isn't.

I am sorry, but I do not understand what point you are trying to make.

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i thought F was the capital of France

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@djjd62,

djjd62 wrote:

i thought F was the capital of France

No, the word, "France" begins with the capital letter, 'F'.

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

I don't see how doubt has anything to do with it.

But it is not inconsistent for me to assert I believe that p, and for all I know there will be disconfirming evidence in the future. I think that the difference between modal and epistemic possibility is a difference in kind, not in degree. It is logically possible that the US will declare war etc. and since it is highly unlikely (given all I know) that the US will declare war, it is false that for all I know the US will declare war.

Right, let's concentrate on epistemic possibility. It is false that for all I know the US will declare war in the next five minutes. Why? Because the possibility is negligible. But it is true that for all I know the US will declare war within the next 100 years; the possibility of this is not negligible, because I have no way of being confident one way or the other. Over a 100-year period, there must be significant doubt about continued peace. That is why it seems to me that doubt is relevant to the issue.

But my original point remains. Where the doubt is negligible for practical purposes (as in the Paris example), we have a choice. We can speak practically, and say "I know that p" and ignore the doubt. Or we can speak philosophically, acknowledge the doubt, and say "I probably know that p" (i.e. I believe I know that p, but I could theoretically be wrong). What I think we cannot do is to fall between the two positions and say "I know that p, but I could theoretically be wrong". That (as I pointed out) implies a contradiction, even if I do in fact know that p. It is like saying "p is true, but I am not sure about that".

1 Reply

@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

If p is analytic, then ...
If p is known, shown to be true, then ~p is a contradiction.
If (p is known to be the case) then ~p cannot be shown to be true.
[]p -> ~(<>~p)

(|-p) -> ~(<>(~p)). If p is shown to be logically true, then ~p is logically false.

For synthetic, contingent, propositions: If p is known to be true, eg. It is raining is confirmed by scientific methods, then ~p cannot be shown to be the case by scientific methods.

Perhaps there is a sense of physical necessity which has application here, but I am not clear about the meaning of physical necessity, are you?

Fine, but this doesn't answer my question. If we say "agent A knows P and possibly not-P", how is the "possibly not-P" relevant? As far as I can see, it is trivial.

1 Reply

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

Owen phil wrote:

If p is analytic, then ...
If p is known, shown to be true, then ~p is a contradiction.
If (p is known to be the case) then ~p cannot be shown to be true.
[]p -> ~(<>~p)

(|-p) -> ~(<>(~p)). If p is shown to be logically true, then ~p is logically false.

For synthetic, contingent, propositions: If p is known to be true, eg. It is raining is confirmed by scientific methods, then ~p cannot be shown to be the case by scientific methods.

Perhaps there is a sense of physical necessity which has application here, but I am not clear about the meaning of physical necessity, are you?

Fine, but this doesn't answer my question. If we say "agent A knows P and possibly not-P", how is the "possibly not-P" relevant? As far as I can see, it is trivial.

Just as long as you don't think that I know that p, but possibly not p, is not self-contradictory, aid am gloriously happy, since that is one objection to the notion of fallibilist knowledge. For, it is argued that since I know that p, and possibly not p, is contradictory, knowledge is certain. But your triviality objection (in so far as it is an objection) does not affect that point at all. Shall we try to keep our eye on the ball here? The issue is whether knowledge must be certain. If it is possible that A knows that p, but (even if) not-p is possible, then knowledge need not be certain.

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@ACB,

Who we are is in a way, a culmination of everyone else, since we are social creatures, so with that in mind we can even start to question the validity (in reference our own collective understanding) of what we "independently" think. However each individual perception must be assumed to be "valid" , at least with respect to the "individual" experiencing it...

1 Reply

@Homomorph,

Homomorph wrote:

Who we are is in a way, a culmination of everyone else, since we are social creatures, so with that in mind we can even start to question the validity (in reference our own collective understanding) of what we "independently" think. However each individual perception must be assumed to be "valid" , at least with respect to the "individual" experiencing it...

Whatever that happens to mean, what has that to do with the OP?

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@kennethamy,

Quote:

have given decisive argument to show that the major arguments in support of the view that knowledge implies certainly are all fallacious

And I think you're probably correct in many ways. I was just reading a recap of Popper's response to Hume's skepticism. Popper says that even though it is true that inductive reasoning has no demonstrable logical basis, the fact is that it works, and furthermore we are constitutionally inclined to expect it to work. So I guess Popper's view is a kind of pragmatism, in that, we will have a hypothesis, which, if not representing absolute truth, is at least sufficiently robust to account for a wide range of phenomena. So whether it provides or constitutes certainty is a moot point - and I guess this is what you are saying also, is it not?

But I also think that the whole discussion is very context-sensitive. For example it is possible to be certain beyond any reasonable doubt about facts such as the capital of France but this is not necessarily paradigmatic for all kinds of truth statements.

1 Reply

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

But my original point remains. Where the doubt is negligible for practical purposes (as in the Paris example), we have a choice. We can speak practically, and say "I know that p" and ignore the doubt. Or we can speak philosophically, acknowledge the doubt, and say "I probably know that p" (i.e. I believe I know that p, but I could theoretically be wrong). What I think we cannot do is to fall between the two positions and say "I know that p, but I could theoretically be wrong". That (as I pointed out) implies a contradiction, even if I do in fact know that p. It is like saying "p is true, but I am not sure about that".

Any objections to the above?

1 Reply

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

ACB wrote:
But my original point remains. Where the doubt is negligible for practical purposes (as in the Paris example), we have a choice. We can speak practically, and say "I know that p" and ignore the doubt. Or we can speak philosophically, acknowledge the doubt, and say "I probably know that p" (i.e. I believe I know that p, but I could theoretically be wrong). What I think we cannot do is to fall between the two positions and say "I know that p, but I could theoretically be wrong". That (as I pointed out) implies a contradiction, even if I do in fact know that p. It is like saying "p is true, but I am not sure about that".

Any objections to the above?

Yes, of course there is an objection. It depends on what motivates the doubt. If the what motivates the doubt is just the possibility that what you believe is false, that is not inconsistent with your knowing that what you believe is true. So, the mere fact of doubting has nothing whatever to do with whether of not you know. Of course, what you are talking about is not whether or not you know, but rather about saying you know, and you may be right about the conditions under which you would say (or claim) to know. Now, that is an interesting issue. But is is not the issue under discussion, which is not under what conditions one should claim to know (or not claim to know) but rather the conditions under which one knows (or does not know). I have already, several times. talked about the difference between the conditions under which it is proper to claim to know, and how they they differ from the conditions of knowing. For example, it may very well be that I ought not to claim to know when I have the least doubt that my belief is true (as Descartes held). But that is different from holding that I do not know when I have any doubt that my belief is true. You do not seem to have picked up on this crucial distinction between the conditions of claiming to know, as contrasted with the conditions of knowing. So that you continue to thing that they are the same. But they are not the same.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

Now, that is an interesting issue. But it is not the issue under discussion, which is not under what conditions one should claim to know (or not claim to know) but rather the conditions under which one knows (or does not know).

On the contrary. I started this thread in order to discuss specifically the conditions of properly claiming to know - not the conditions of knowing. I have been at pains to make this clear, both in my OP and my most recent post - see the italicised passages. It is claims of knowledge that I wish to discuss - and, as far as they are concerned, it seems that you agree with the points I made.

1 Reply

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

kennethamy wrote:
Now, that is an interesting issue. But it is not the issue under discussion, which is not under what conditions one should claim to know (or not claim to know) but rather the conditions under which one knows (or does not know).

On the contrary. I started this thread in order to discuss specifically the conditions of properly claiming to know - not the conditions of knowing. I have been at pains to make this clear, both in my OP and my most recent post - see the italicised passages. It is claims of knowledge that I wish to discuss - and, as far as they are concerned, it seems that you agree with the points I made.

Since if I claim to know, I may be wrong, since claiming that anything is true does not entail that what I claim is true, then obviously, there is no contradiction between claiming to know and being mistaken. So, the entailment between knowledge and truth, which is a necessary condition of knowing does not exist between claiming to know and truth. So that the issues of claiming to know, and knowing, may be related, but are clearly quite different. The issues of claiming to know have to do with the conversational feature of our language, and these are not what Plato, Descartes, and other philosophers were interested in. It is not clear why you are interested in exploring the conversational features of language, which appears to be related to the topic of the pragmatics of language rather than the semantic issues which are raised by the knowledge and its relation to certainty. Actually, I have not thought much about the pragmatics of how we talk about knowledge, although I am ready to allow that they may be interesting. It is just that the pragmatics of our talk about knowledge is not really the topic of this thread, and probably deserves its own thread.

By the way, to return to your earlier post: you write:

What I think we cannot do is to fall between the two positions and say "I know that p, but I could theoretically be wrong". That (as I pointed out) implies a contradiction, even if I do in fact know that p. It is like saying "p is true, but I am not sure about that".

But, as the English say, "to get back to our muttons":

I am not sure just what you mean by "being theoretically wrong". But if you mean by that phrase that it is possible that I am wrong, it is simply not true (as I have already pointed out) that the statement, I know that p, but it is possible that I am mistaken, is contradictory. For, as I have pointed out, in the modal sense of "possible" I can know that p, although it is possible for p to be false. What is a contradiction is the statement that A (whoever A is) knows that p, and that p is (in fact) false. Knowledge does not imply the impossibility of error. Knowledge implies the inactuality of error. After all, it is possible that Quito is not the capital of Ecuador, since another city in Ecuador, say it second city, Guyaquil, might have been designated at Ecuador's capital. It was not, of course. And Quito is the capital. But suppose I claim to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Would it be an objection to my claim for someone to say, "You do not know that Quito is the capital, since although it is the capital, it might not have been the capital"? As I am sure you can see, such an objection would be preposterous. It is an objection to my knowing that p, that p is not true. But it is not an objection to my knowing that p, that p might not be true (even if it is true). Now, it is an objection to my claim that I am certain that p, that p might not be true. But, of course, as you can see, the claim that I know that p, and the claim that I am certain that p, are two entirely different claims. The latter stronger than the former, since the latter implies the former, but the former does not imply the latter.

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there certain things that are absolute with have nothing to with perception or pshycology

all beings need for water , air and food

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@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

It is just that the pragmatics of our talk about knowledge is not really the topic of this thread, and probably deserves its own thread.

So I am mistaken about the topic of my own thread? It's a bit like being mistaken about the content of one's own thoughts.... Shocked

Let me be quite clear about this: I am not arguing that knowledge implies certainty. This point has been discussed ad nauseam in these forums, which is why I am not seeking to discuss it now. I fully agree with you that knowledge does not imply the impossibility of error.

What I am concerned with - in the context of epistemology - is the analysis of statements consisting of two contradictory (though possibly both true) parts. Consider the following:

1. It is raining, but I don't believe that.
2. It is raining, but I am not sure about that.
3. Paris is the capital of France, but I am not (absolutely) sure about that.

Do you agree that all the above sentences are self-contradictory, even if both parts of them are individually true?

Now consider the following dialogue:

A: Do you know that Paris is the capital of France?
B: Yes.
A: Does that imply that it is the capital of France?
B: Yes.
A: Is it the capital of France?
B: Yes.
A: Are you absolutely sure about that?
B: No.

Do you agree that B's last answer is inconsistent with his first three?

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@ACB,

ACB wrote:

Do you agree that B's last answer is inconsistent with his first three?

I think this problem is imported with the JTB model of knowledge, because we cant know what's true, under that model.

2 Replies

Knowledge without Certainty

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