Can Any Two Things Be Identical???

@mark noble,

mark noble wrote:

Hi Everyone,
Can you think of any two things that are identical to one another in every way?
This is an ongoing research question, and all your answers will be gratefully received.
Thank you.
Mark...

It depends on what you mean by "thing" and what you mean by "identical"

If by "thing”, you are referring to a logical state then I suppose you could say that some things are identical as long as by identical you meant that the similarity equalled 1.

On the other hand, if the "thing" you are referring to is material then I would have thought the probability of there being another thing that is completely identical to it would be vanishingly small unless you include the possibility of an infinite universe, in which case everything that can be will be.

However, we then get into an arguably even deeper issue of what exactly we mean by “identical”. If I make a perfect logical copy of my windows operating CD, to be sure it is a logical copy and, even possibly a material one as well, though very unlikely. However, it is still a copy and is not the original, no matter how perfect that copy might be.

A problem from the physics of Star Trek springs to mind by way of illustration of the above. Imagine you have a teleportation system whereby you take a perfect record of the entire physical structure of a person at one end of the system (the Heisenberg uncertainty principle notwithstanding). You then destroy the original whilst at the same time simultaneously creating an absolutely perfect copy on the surface of the planet you are beaming the person to.

However, on this occasion, the system breaks down and, although the new copy is created on the surface of the planet, the original version is not destroyed. The first issue here is which one might be legitimately described as being the true version since they are completely identical in all respects? Secondly, how will the original feel when they are reliably informed that they should not worry too much about the malfunction as their destruction has merely been delayed by a few seconds and so should occur any time soon?.

Finally, we might wish to consider the context of existence of any given material phenomenon. In other words, to be truly identical, the copy must occupy precisely the same time and space as the original. If we take this into account, what we are arguing is that for something to be completly identical to an original it must be the original.

Looking at everything I have just worked through in my own head and have written here, I am beginning to conclude that it is not possible for something to be materially identical to another, in the sense that to be both "identical" and "other" is a logical impossibility

1 Reply

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

Two separate but identical leaves could only occur in an otherwise totally empty universe.

Does anyone here disagree with the above? If so, I'd like to know your reasons. (I am using the word "identical" to mean "exactly the same as each other", not merely "of the same class". Let's not get sidetracked by an argument over language.)
[/quote]

Hi ACB!

I agree with it all, and with your the usage of "identical".
I have a problem with this last bit though. If the two leaves are seperate - How can they be identical? They are in two seperate locations (being seperate) are they not?

Thank you for attempting to return this thread to the point before it became laced in literal correctitude.

Have a splendid day, Acb.
Mark...

2 Replies

@stevecook172001,

Hi Steve,
Good post!

Yet the copy is now in a different location. Ergo, it is not identical (agreeing in every detail) to the original because it occupies an alternate location in said universe. Two things cannot occupy the same point in space and time, else they would be "one thing".
Every moment that passes "I", indeed, all things become seperated from the preceding essence therof.

Have a terrific day, Steve.
Mark...

1 Reply

@mark noble,

mark noble wrote:

Hi Steve,
Good post!

Yet the copy is now in a different location. Ergo, it is not identical (agreeing in every detail) to the original because it occupies an alternate location in said universe. Two things cannot occupy the same point in space and time, else they would be "one thing".
Every moment that passes "I", indeed, all things become seperated from the preceding essence therof.

Have a terrific day, Steve.
Mark...

Hi Mark

Yes, the issue you have raised is crucial. As it happens I was re-editing my post to take this into account while you were posting. Take a read and see if you agree or not.

2 Replies

@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

Two different objects cannot be identical.
If (Fx and ~Fy) then ~(x=y).

x has the space-time location (a,b,c,d) entails that a different object y does not have the same space-time location (a,b,c,d).
That is, (Fx & ~Fy) is true for the property F ..having the same space-time location, therefore, ~(x=y).

(some F: Fx & ~Fy) => ~(x=y).

I did not know you were taking into account space and time. Even though time is not a necessary factor as both objects need not be separated by it, Indeed if we are to implement the "aether" if you will, for the un-unifying of physical entities than of course no two things can possibly be identical. However, not only is this effectuation dull, but it rather stupendously falls apart when we go into the quantum, would you not agree?

0 Replies

@stevecook172001,

Hi Steve!

Absolutely!!! Spot on! And in agreement with the majority of opinions so far on this thread. I don't believe anyone has disagreed on anything other than literal definitions of the correct usage of "identical" anyway.

Thank you Steve - Great to have a fellow thinker in the affray.
Mark...

1 Reply

@stevecook172001,

stevecook172001 wrote:

mark noble wrote:

Hi Steve,
Good post!

Yet the copy is now in a different location. Ergo, it is not identical (agreeing in every detail) to the original because it occupies an alternate location in said universe. Two things cannot occupy the same point in space and time, else they would be "one thing".
Every moment that passes "I", indeed, all things become seperated from the preceding essence therof.

Have a terrific day, Steve.
Mark...

I agree that two different things cannot occupy the same space. But now the question is how do we determine whether or not there are two things?

Hi Mark

Yes, the issue you have raised is crucial. As it happens I was re-editing my post to take this into account while you were posting. Take a read and see if you agree or not.

0 Replies

@mark noble,

mark noble wrote:

Hi Steve!

Absolutely!!! Spot on! And in agreement with the majority of opinions so far on this thread. I don't believe anyone has disagreed on anything other than literal definitions of the correct usage of "identical" anyway.

Thank you Steve - Great to have a fellow thinker in the affray.
Mark...

I don't believe anyone has disagreed on anything other than literal definitions of the correct usage of "identical" anyway.

But doesn't that seem to you to be an important issue? I think that knowing what you are talking about is always quite important, and I hope I am not alone in that belief. There seem to be at least two different meaning of the term, "identity", so it seems to me a matter of some importance which of those meanings we are using when we say of two things that they are identical. Wouldn't you agree?

2 Replies

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

mark noble wrote:

Hi Steve!

Absolutely!!! Spot on! And in agreement with the majority of opinions so far on this thread. I don't believe anyone has disagreed on anything other than literal definitions of the correct usage of "identical" anyway.

Thank you Steve - Great to have a fellow thinker in the affray.
Mark...

I don't believe anyone has disagreed on anything other than literal definitions of the correct usage of "identical" anyway.

But doesn't that seem to you to be an important issue? I think that knowing what you are talking about is always quite important, and I hope I am not alone in that belief. There seem to be at least two different meaning of the term, "identity", so it seems to me a matter of some importance which of those meanings we are using when we say of two things that they are identical. Wouldn't you agree?

Hi Ken

What is your opinion on the view that for something to be completely identical it must not only posess identical physical properties but must also be identical in terms of the context of its existence. Thus, it's location, both temporally and spacially, needs to be identical aswell. The trouble with this view, of course, is that for one thing to be completely identical to another it must be the other.

The inevitable conclusion following from the above is that it is not possible for identical material phenomena to exist.

The above view, is where I find myself after thinking about this for a while

0 Replies

@kennethamy,

Hi Ken,
Of cousre, I agree. And I find your contributions very informative. I learn a lot from you, on a philosophically literal level.

But sometimes threads can get completely side-tracked from the issue at-hand. This one being - To identify if every "Thing" is, indeed, "Unique" in and of itself.

Have a great day Ken.
mark...

0 Replies

I personally don´t do a distinction between accidental property´s and fundamental property´s in relation to what something is as a Whole given it is more then one thing in several different contexts...this all meaning, that is the function, to which something is directed, that will be the criteria to separate this two types of property´s and ultimately not the object as a Whole...

So to my view the question is instead, can a given something feat perfectly an expected role to some function ? What are the characteristics that it must have ? And more importantly, how do the other characteristics and particularity´s on that meta-object interfere with the Whole of the object to that expected role function ? where are the parasite variables ? How do they interfere ?

Saying that the Moon is a satellite is not saying that the Moon is Sputnik...of course, one is a natural one and the other it is n´t...but even if we compare Io with the Moon even as equal Natural Satellites that alone does n´t make them equal by any means even as actual natural satellites...for starters one has the Earth as reference and the other Jupiter...Both are planets but of course different ones...the bottom line is that the issue is sensitive to the degree of accuracy of what we are asking from the concept which is limited in meaning and Information in relation with the actual object...so the distinction must be made.

This kind of error, of gross failure, is the prime reason to confuse the meaning of identity with equality in relation to the nature of property´s themselves...who know´s, maybe Godel would say they are Infinite...

Again, to my view, all we have is an infinite possibility of approximation between any two given things in relation to an asked function which is mainly an artificially separated constructed concept or abstraction but that cannot be truly isolated in reality...if really possible, that would make it transcendent to the Universe and therefore not relational to anything...so, once more, no such thing as isolated variables can exist in the actual world, less alone equals...Everything should be therefore a Monad somehow...and the World itself as a working set, a correlative Meta Monad were causality must be, who knows maybe, a simulated phenomena , or better, Meta-Phenomena .

Best Regards>FILIPE DE ALBUQUERQUE

1 Reply

Now the challenge is to understand how can a monad in the hell be relational...how can something that is infinitely unique, still be part of something ?
...that´s the irrationality of infinity´s...

0 Replies

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil Albuquerque wrote:

I personally don´t do a distinction between accidental property´s and fundamental property´s in relation to what something is as a Whole given it is more then one thing in several different contexts...this all meaning, that is the function, to which something is directed, that will be the criteria to separate this two types of property´s and ultimately not the object as a Whole...

So to my view the question is instead, can a given something feat perfectly an expected role to some function ? What are the characteristics that it must have ? And more importantly, how do the other characteristics and particularity´s on that meta-object interfere with the Whole of the object to that expected role function ? where are the parasite variables ? How do they interfere ?

Saying that the Moon is a satellite is not saying that the Moon is Sputnik...of course, one is a natural one and the other it is n´t...but even if we compare Io with the Moon even as equal Natural Satellites that alone does n´t make them equal by any means even as actual natural satellites...for starters one has the Earth as reference and the other Jupiter...Both are planets but of course different ones...the bottom line is that the issue is sensitive to the degree of accuracy of what we are asking from the concept which is limited in meaning and Information in relation with the actual object...so the distinction must be made.

This kind of error, of gross failure, is the prime reason to confuse the meaning of identity with equality in relation to the nature of property´s themselves...who know´s, maybe Godel would say they are Infinite...

Again, to my view, all we have is an infinite possibility of approximation between any two given things in relation to an asked function which is mainly an artificially separated constructed concept or abstraction but that cannot be truly isolated in reality...if really possible, that would make it transcendent to the Universe and therefore not relational to anything...so, once more, no such thing as isolated variables can exist in the actual world, less alone equals...Everything should be therefore a Monad somehow...and the World itself as a working set, a correlative Meta Monad were causality must be, who knows maybe, a simulated phenomena , or better, Meta-Phenomena .

Best Regards>FILIPE DE ALBUQUERQUE

"The Moon is a satellite" means that the Moon is an element (member) of the class of satellites. Other members of that class are the moons of Jupiter. As I have pointed out several times, the term "is" has at least two meanings. 1. The "is" of predication. where X is y means that X is a member of y (where y is a class). 2. Then there is the "is" of identity, where the sentence, "X is Y" means that X and Y are one and the same thing. An example of that would be, "William Shakespeare is the author of "Hamlet" (meaning that William Shakespeare and The author of "Hamlet" are one and the same person). These are simply two different senses of the word "is" and should not be confused.

1 Reply

Ken...you surely know that a unit, a bit, whatever that bit may be is mathematically infinitely dividable...Godel explains it quite well, just peak any number and do it...

So this raises a problem to the OP. How can two infinities be equal ?
A infinite dynamic process of definition that can´t ever end imply´s that something is not ever really concluded objectively...

...Are you now in my wave frequency ? Mr. Green

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

Hi Ken,

Are you sure that under-educated William Shakespeare is the Author of Hamlet? There is a great deal of information that leads us to believe that Francis bacon, amongst others is/are the genuine author/s of Will's works.

Kind regards
mark...

0 Replies

@mark noble,

mark noble wrote:

ACB wrote:
Two separate but identical leaves could only occur in an otherwise totally empty universe.

I have a problem with this last bit though. If the two leaves are seperate - How can they be identical? They are in two seperate locations (being seperate) are they not?

In an otherwise empty universe, there arises the issue (mentioned earlier) of the unreality of absolute space. If there are no other objects, I think it can plausibly be argued that two identical but separate leaves are possible. The argument would be as follows:

If there is no absolute space, all properties of objects are either (a) intrinsic, or (b) relational to other objects. Two identical leaves have the same intrinsic properties, and their mutual relations (distance from each other, forces exerted on each other, etc) must also be the same. If there are no other objects, there is nothing to which they can have dissimilar relations. Therefore, even though there are two leaves, they can have exactly the same set of properties. They do not need to be in the "same place", since if there is no absolute space the concept of the "same place" does not apply; you cannot specify an independently existing place P and say: "Leaf A is at P but leaf B is not". You cannot say "Leaf A is not where leaf B is", because there is no such thing as "where leaf B (or A) is".

However, the two-leaf universe is a special (and purely theoretical) case, and there may be reasonable counter-arguments. The point I originally wanted to argue was that in a universe such as ours, with many objects, there can be no qualitative identity without numerical identity. This is because two separate objects must have dissimilar relations to other objects.

2 Replies

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

mark noble wrote:
ACB wrote:
Two separate but identical leaves could only occur in an otherwise totally empty universe.

I have a problem with this last bit though. If the two leaves are seperate - How can they be identical? They are in two seperate locations (being seperate) are they not?

In an otherwise empty universe, there arises the issue (mentioned earlier) of the unreality of absolute space. If there are no other objects, I think it can plausibly be argued that two identical but separate leaves are possible. The argument would be as follows:

If there is no absolute space, all properties of objects are either (a) intrinsic, or (b) relational to other objects. Two identical leaves have the same intrinsic properties, and their mutual relations (distance from each other, forces exerted on each other, etc) must also be the same. If there are no other objects, there is nothing to which they can have dissimilar relations. Therefore, even though there are two leaves, they can have exactly the same set of properties. They do not need to be in the "same place", since if there is no absolute space the concept of the "same place" does not apply; you cannot specify an independently existing place P and say: "Leaf A is at P but leaf B is not". You cannot say "Leaf A is not where leaf B is", because there is no such thing as "where leaf B (or A) is".

However, the two-leaf universe is a special (and purely theoretical) case, and there may be reasonable counter-arguments. The point I originally wanted to argue was that in a universe such as ours, with many objects, there can be no qualitative identity without numerical identity. This is because two separate objects must have dissimilar relations to other objects.

Hi ACB!

I'm totally lost in the otherwise empty universe and the absence of absolute space thing. They are just beyond my comprehension.
Give me parallel universes, m-theory, sub-sub-quantum and I have a chance, but these examples??? I'll just have to take your word on them.

Anyway - Back to the actual world criteria. I fully agree!

Thank you, ACB, and have a smashing weekend!
Mark...

1 Reply

@mark noble,

mark noble wrote:

I'm totally lost in the otherwise empty universe and the absence of absolute space thing. They are just beyond my comprehension.
Give me parallel universes, m-theory, sub-sub-quantum and I have a chance, but these examples??? I'll just have to take your word on them.

Don't worry. I was just picking up a point that kennethamy made earlier in this thread (post 4,186,911). I was disagreeing with the main thrust of his argument, while conceding that it was (perhaps) correct in the special case of an otherwise empty universe, which is however just a theoretical construct of no practical application.

0 Replies

@ACB,

ACB wrote:

mark noble wrote:
ACB wrote:
Two separate but identical leaves could only occur in an otherwise totally empty universe.

I have a problem with this last bit though. If the two leaves are seperate - How can they be identical? They are in two seperate locations (being seperate) are they not?

In an otherwise empty universe, there arises the issue (mentioned earlier) of the unreality of absolute space. If there are no other objects, I think it can plausibly be argued that two identical but separate leaves are possible. The argument would be as follows:

If there is no absolute space, all properties of objects are either (a) intrinsic, or (b) relational to other objects. Two identical leaves have the same intrinsic properties, and their mutual relations (distance from each other, forces exerted on each other, etc) must also be the same. If there are no other objects, there is nothing to which they can have dissimilar relations. Therefore, even though there are two leaves, they can have exactly the same set of properties. They do not need to be in the "same place", since if there is no absolute space the concept of the "same place" does not apply; you cannot specify an independently existing place P and say: "Leaf A is at P but leaf B is not". You cannot say "Leaf A is not where leaf B is", because there is no such thing as "where leaf B (or A) is".

However, the two-leaf universe is a special (and purely theoretical) case, and there may be reasonable counter-arguments. The point I originally wanted to argue was that in a universe such as ours, with many objects, there can be no qualitative identity without numerical identity. This is because two separate objects must have dissimilar relations to other objects.

But to say that something is possible is just to say that there is some universe in which it occurs. In any case, putting aside spatial relations (since it is at least controversial whether location is a property) there is no objection to qualitative identity without numerical identity. It is at least clear that location is a relative, and not an absolute property. Therefore, two things can have all their absolute qualities in common.

1 Reply

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

But to say that something is possible is just to say that there is some universe in which it occurs. In any case, putting aside spatial relations (since it is at least controversial whether location is a property) there is no objection to qualitative identity without numerical identity. It is at least clear that location is a relative, and not an absolute property. Therefore, two things can have all their absolute qualities in common.

I am not sure whether a sharp distinction can be drawn between relative and absolute properties. Consider my earlier example of a leaf with a raindrop on it. Is "having a raindrop on its surface" an absolute property of the leaf? Or is the raindrop to be thought of as a separate object, to which the leaf has only a spatial relation? What if the raindrop has not yet hit the leaf - does the leaf have the absolute property of "being in contact with a volume of air containing a raindrop"?

It seems problematic to define "identical" as "having all their absolute properties in common" if the distinction between absolute and relative properties is so arbitrary.

0 Replies

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