Definition of Reality

This is a difficult one I think. I can only say what I think but others may think differently. Belief is probably the easiest to categorise.
Belief is something that relies on faith (not necessarily in the religious sense) and probably could be construed as "a matter of opnion". Someone may have a firm and committed belief in an afterlife but another person may "believe" that is nonsense.
Knowledge is that which is given to us via data input (via the senses) and, regardless of whether we "believe" it or not, it is all we can ever know.
I agree that knowledge implies truth. You are also right, I think, about truth not implying knowledge because knowledge must come before truth (I think).
Is it possible that there is a hierarchy that runa along the lines of:
A. Belief
B. Knowledge
C. Truth
I don't know if this is right. Opinons?
By the way I didn't realise this thread was going to explode like this, I'm about 3 pages behind and I only viewed it last night.
Thanks to all who have posted.

Better reread Kant. The noumenon is the unknowable. We can know it exists, but not what it is.

though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.

You can believe what is true, but truth is not another "stage' upwards from belief.

... I think Kant's position was more along the lines that the noumenon is not directly knowable (an object of perception, i.e., representation) but only inferentially knowable (an object of reason) ... that is, for a subject to know the thing-in-itself requires that the subject make (justified) inferences from his perceptual representations of the thing-in-itself:



(note that Kant uses "know" here more in a common-usage meaning of the word than the technical meaning that you prefer)



---------- Post added 02-11-2010 at 09:10 AM ----------



... perhaps it would work better as:

A. Belief
B. Knowledge
C. Certainty

... then we can treat them as grades of probability of the possession of truth.

Of course not, but we wouldn't understand the concept of cliffness, so we would attribute these disappearings to supernatural phenomena.

Supernatural phenomena that we encounter today, such as aliens, is merely that in which we can't understand. That doesn't mean these phenomena do not exist; just probably not how most people believe they exist.

ticktockman
I haven't encountered any aliens lately. You? Even if I did encounter some, in my head, I'm not sure I would claim they were real.
Graham Hancock argues that aliens came from the naturally and widely occurring substance DMT. But what does any of that prove about the nature of what is real?

But Kant specifically argues that the noumenon is not an object of reason. That is just what his Antinomies of Reason are designed to prove. That is why, in his famous phrase, Kant tells us that he as "removed reason to make way for faith". I think you had better reread, or read Kant.

What is the common usage of "know" which Kant uses. I thought that mine was the common usage. Isn't it? No one uses the word "know" unless he believes it, he has justification for it, and he believes it is true.

Belief, knowledge, and certainty, are on the same plane. Since all of them are epistemic concepts. But what would work better?

... I think that to point out the antinomies of reason - that is, the limits of reason - is nothing more than what Godel has demonstrated with formal systems and does not imply that the thing-in-itself cannot be an object of reason ... the implication of Godel's proof is that some mathematical truths cannot be proved and can only be accepted; Kant's claim appears to be along similar lines only with respect to reasoning about a thing-in-itself ...



... personally, I almost always use the word "know" in one of its dictionary definitions and almost never in its technical definition as Justified True Belief (only in discussions with you, in fact) ... I dunno, maybe I'm atypical, but the number of times that you end up having to debate the meaning of the word appears to say otherwise ...



... I don't know, as I'm not quite sure what work Houseby wants to put this hierarchy to ...

Reality is what the strongest grants.

But what does understanding, or not understanding, the concept of something have to do with its being real? I'm sorry, but I'm unsure what you are arguing in favor of. Or against.


I haven't encountered any aliens lately. You? Even if I did encounter some, in my head, I'm not sure I would claim they were real.
Graham Hancock argues that aliens came from the naturally and widely occurring substance DMT. But what does any of that prove about the nature of what is real?
The Official Graham Hancock Website: Supernatural

Are you currently under the impression that we are aware of everything that will ever be discovered?

Kant claims that the antinomies show that reason is impotent regarding the noumenon. It is one thing to understand what Kant holds the antinomies mean. Another thing to disagree with him. I am simply telling you that you are wrong about what Kant says.

I don't know what dictionary definition you are talking about.

But when someone claims to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador ...

... I think Kant's ink-blot style of writing can at best be interpreted - the polar difference between Schopenhauer's interpretation and Hegel's being a case in point - Schopenhauer would strongly assert that Hegel was wrong about what Kant says, and vice versa ...



... try Webster's: Know - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary ...



... but with the technical definition of "know" as justified true belief, is it even logically possible to attribute knowledge to oneself? ... that is, isn't saying "I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador" the same as saying "I am certain that my belief that Quito is the capital of Ecuador is both justified and true"? ... so with the technical definition of "know" as justified true belief, at most a person can say "I think I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador", or "I am confident that I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador", yes? ...

I don't have to know I satisfy the conditions of knowing in order to satisfy them and know, anymore than I have to know that I satisfy the conditions of being checkmated in order to be checkmated. I don't have to know I know in order to know, although perhaps I have to know I know in order to claim that I know. In an earlier post I already mentioned how one ought not to confuse the conditions of claiming to know, with the conditions of knowing. And here you have illustrated exactly that confusion.

... f ... on the other hand, for me to attribute knowledge to myself without qualification requires certainty - I need to be in possession of truth in order to claim "I know" (as opposed to making the qualified claim "I think I know" or "I know I know") ...

You can be in possession of the truth without knowing you are. You may be on the top of a mountain enshrouded in clouds so that you do not know you are on top of the mountain, but you may believe you are on top of the mountain, nevertheless. Therefore, you do possess the truth (for you believe you are on top of the mountain, and, in fact, you are on top of the mountain) but you do not know you possess the truth.

Believing you know is enough for you sincerely to claim you know, and be right.

... which is yet another qualification: "I believe I know" ... but when someone says "I know", is "I believe I know" implied? - or is it a stronger implication than that? ...

... an old philosophical question ... so are "why" questions like this ("Why is there gravity?" "Why is there a strong nuclear force?") part of a philosophical definition of reality? ... that is, is a definition of reality that restrains itself from going beyond the limits of science a philosophical definition or a scientific definition? ...

Is science itself founded upon "first science"?

Perhaps you will agree that even science doesn't answer Why there is gravity but rather describes gravity by means of equations and associated concepts that indicate how these numbers connect to measuring devices and objects whose behavior we intend to predict.

This Why question (or "beingquestion") doesn't seem practical but somehow significant, poetic, quite human. Of course Heidegger is all over this. Perhaps this Why enables to sense our contingency, opens a space. It also allows us an astonishment that merely practical questions might obscure. Probably closer to poetry than science. But perhaps poetry and science are branches of the same trunk.