Proof that God is morally good & other properties of God

I also enjoyed the chats I had with Alan Watts.

Thanks for the blessing.

Yes, it is the latter: it is satire rather than gullibility. I am 79 and have perhaps seen a little more of the world and of life than some. I am glad I made you laugh.

This is a Philosophy site and in the o.p. I gave an argument as to why God - as I defined it - would be moral. I am waiting to read an argument for your position.

Or perhaps you don't believe that there is anything in the Universe bigger in importance than an individual human.

Richard Dawkins (in The God Delusion) gave an argument, but in a talk on this topic he said the following: "An American student asked her professor whether he had a view about me. 'Sure,' he replied. 'He's positive science is incompatible with religion, but he waxes ecstatic about nature and the universe. To me, that is religion!' Well, if that's what you choose to mean by religion, fine, that makes me a religious man. .... As the distinguished American physicist Steven Weinberg said, 'If you want to say that 'God is energy,' then you can find God in a lump of coal.' "

Well played sir, well played... /QUOTE]

Thank you.

Kielicious;89793 wrote:

If you want to define things into existence then so be it. I, nor anyone, can argue against that. If you want to say god is energy, or god is love, the only thing I can say is: why would you redefine god as energy when we already have a word for energy? I understand you 'contend god is much, much more..." so what is god then?

I can't just define things into existence. That was the mistake made by The Rationalists, such as Spinoze.

I did not redefine God as energy, despite the poor wording in Theorem One, but meant that one of God's defining characteristics is Energy, along with Love, Integrity, Beauty, Compassion, etc. Only one of God's properties is energy.

You ask, "What is God then?"
See the original post in this thread. Supplement it with the second post that I entered. This should give the careful reader a pretty-good idea.

---------- Post added 09-13-2009 at 03:24 AM ----------

William;88008 wrote:

Simply outstanding analogy from my point of view ...

...become a "friend" not a "foe" to that God. Complimentary not aggravating; harmonic not chaotic; peaceful not warring; alive not dead; dynamic not static, forward not backward, positive not negative; optimistic not pessimistic; understanding not skeptical and so on and so on and so on and so on.

Now, if I might ask, what do you think of my assessment. Did I enhance it or aggravate it? Ha.

William

You enhanced it.

Thank you for that.

I can't just define things into existence. That was the mistake made by The Rationalists, such as Spinoze.

You have to prove that God exists before you can prove that he is morally good.

deepthot wrote: "I can't just define things into existence. That was the mistake made by The Rationalists, such as Spinoze."

And Descartes, and Anselm, and Plantinga, and Godel, and all the other ontological arguments.

Sure you can. What Russell found is that references such as "The present king of France" that fail to refer to anything, yet still have meaning, can be real descriptions. They just fail to refer to anything.

Just like if you define God as "The necessary being that exists" - it could fail to be a referent.

I stand by what I said. I cannot follow what you are asserting here, leafy.
A description - I agree with Russell - does not have to be an existent.
Are you attempting to argue that it can be?

As far as my having to prove existence.... Do you believe that energy exists? That is a component of my definition of God. Have you seen any evidence of goodness in this world? If yes, would you say that goodness exists? Let us know.

That again, as you know, is how I define God. So what exactly do I have to prove. Did you read my analysis of the concept "existence" at the Epistemology Forum? It is only an Extrinsic Value. As you know, I derived from my axiom (the definition of God) the conclusion that God is the Reality of all realities. Isn't that better than mere existence? I would say so. In my life (and perhaps some others) God certainly does refer to somethisng. Are there natural forces?
God is The Force.
And, leafy, I pray that it will always be with you.

You aren't too selfish not to do the same for me, are you? I trust you're not.

I would argue that references can be made to non-existent things such as the present king of France. I would also agree with Russell that merely using these references does not entail or presuppose the existence of the referent.

God of classical theism is not the same as your abstracted definition. I'm arguing against that god.

,,, I prefer to keep "existence" to mean things that are physical. I'm a materialist, at least I think so. Haven't seen any persuasive arguments for any other metaphysical position.

Then what, exactly, does "God" refer to, other than energy and goodness? If it's the qualities themselves, then you aren't talking about an entity but rather a property.

God is Beauty, Truth and Goodness. These are all high values Hence, they are part of God.

Goodness doesn't exist at all, or at least in the sense that I mean exist. I prefer to keep "existence" to mean things that are physical. .

If the concept "goodness" has no universal truth for you,

No, these are not merely relative; they are also universal concepts.

In that case you are just defining things out of existence, which seems to me making the same mistake as defining things into existence, of which you disapprove. The idea of existence should be neutral as to what things exist or do not exist so that the definition of "existence" should not presuppose what does or does not exist.

In that case you are just defining things out of existence, which seems to me making the same mistake as defining things into existence, of which you disapprove. The idea of existence should be neutral as to what things exist or do not exist so that the definition of "existence" should not presuppose what does or does not exist.

Originally posted at FRDB.

Panpsychist;6163248 wrote:

The answer to these arguments is clear - a definition cannot establish existence. These arguments invariably prove trivial truths (for example - that "all existing things" is a sum that exists), or jump from the possible to the existant.

When reading Logic and Theism by Jordan Sobel, I came in agreement with him with Kant's defense from the ontological argument.

Quote:

5.1. It is sometimes said that Kant's criticism of ontological arguments is that
they count existence as a predicate that can be included in concepts and def-
initions, whereas existence is not a predicate and cannot be included in any
concept or definition. In fact, Kant does not say that existence is not a pred-
icate. What he says is that, although a logical predicate, as is "[a]nything we
please," it is not a real or determining predicate that when "added to the con-
cept of [a] subject ... enlarges it" (Kant 1958, CPR, p. 504 - A598/B626). The
suggestion here is not that the predicate of existence cannot be added to a
concept, but at most only that there can be no point to adding it to a concept.
[...]
5.2. What is, however, presently more important than Kant's view about the
peculiar character of the predicate of existence is that Kant does not suppose
that including existence in a concept is tantamount to defining into existence
an object answering to this concept. He was concerned to oppose this view,
which he considered to be importantly mistaken: "So great, indeed, is the
deluding influence exercised by this logical necessity that, by the simple device
of forming an a priori concept of a thing in such amanner as to include existence
within the scope of its meaning, we have supposed ourselves to have justified
the conclusion that because existence necessarily belongs to the object of this
concept - always under the condition that we posit the thing as given (as
existing) - we are also of necessity, in accordance with the law of identity,
required to posit the existence of its object, and that this being is therefore
itself absolutely necessary" (CPR, p. 502 - A594/B622). Deluded, Kant says,
we suppose that because, when we include existence in the scope of a thing's
concept, existence then necessarily belongs to any object of this concept, we
by this inclusion secure the existence of an object of this concept as something
that is itself absolutely necessary. But, Kant says, including existence in the
concept of a thing has no such effect. Of course, if existence is included in the
concept of a G, then necessarily, for any thing that is a G, this thing exists.
However, that is not to say, or to provide a reason, in contrast with an excuse,
for thinking that there is a G that necessarily exists. Observe that in making
these points Kant allows existence to be a predicate included in concepts of
things. He says that it is only a confusion to think that such things must exist, a
confusion I would add that is served by the uncertain identity of this thought:
'Such things must exist' can mean that any such thing would necessarily exist
(for it is part of its concept that it should), and it can mean that necessarily
some such thing does exist.

In other words, Russell's distinction between subjects and their descriptions is at hand. A description of God, its definition, can contain the concept of existence. For example, God can be defined as "the being such that it is omnipotent, and exists". This doesn't entail that there are any beings such that they exist, it just means that for any being that would be a God under this definition would be an existing one.

How about another example? If we define "trees" to be "existent tall perennial woody plant having a main trunk and branches forming a distinct elevated crown; includes both gymnosperms and angiosperms", that doesn't mean that there necessarily is a tree. All this description entails is that any tree would be existent, as per the first quality mentioned.

concepts do not have truth. Propositions have truth-values.


Please support this with evidence or argument.

The title of this thread alone is laughable.

as Anselm pointed out, it is inconceivable to imagine a true God that would not exist. If a god is really going to be God surely it must at least exist!

The point is that, as Anselm pointed out, it is inconceivable to imagine a true God that would not exist. If a god is really going to be God surely it must at least exist!

I agree that definitions do not as a rule bring anything into existence. But my notion of a concept entails an extension.