Craven de Kere wrote:Really? I know quite a few who do not consider death the worst punishment.
We obviously do not share the same social circles.
Craven de Kere wrote:Not if their convictions preclude torture. You simplified a bit too much there. Convictions are not as unitary as you would portray them.
If their convictions preclude cruel and painful executions but endorse capital punishment, they are inconsistent.
Craven de Kere wrote:I disagree. I do not think capital punishment serves only two possible purposes any more than I think spanking a child does. But I will not push this point.
You are wise not to push the point,
Craven, as it is indefensible.
Craven de Kere wrote:My analogies were a direct reference to your claim that if one states something as a goal (in your case deterrence of crime through capital punishment) they must act in no way that can possibly work against that goal or be a hypocrite.
No, I claimed nothing about "something" as a goal, I only made a claim about employing capital punishment as a means to the twin goals of deterrence and retribution. Your attempts to fashion analogies that go well beyond the limited scope of my position is a textbook strategy for creating strawmen arguments.
Craven de Kere wrote:You assume that those who support capital punishment have as their only goal the deterrence of crime.
I'm not sure why you'd willfully misrepresent my position in this way, and I'm completely baffled as to why you'd do it in this type of forum, where the contrary evidence is directly at hand. But, to refresh your memory, here is what I said about the goals of capital punishment (with emphasis added):
Post 454538: "...if we are really serious about the value of capital punishment as a means of deterrence
and as a demonstration of the state's interest in justice."
Post 454831: "Proponents of the death penalty typically cite
two rationales: (1) deterrence;
and (2) retribution."
Post 455230: "What I'm saying is that people who support capital punishment do so for
two major reasons: deterrence
and retribution."
Post 456708: "Capital punishment is unique, in that it serves only
two possible purposes: deterrence
and retribution."
In short, I have
never said, or assumed, that deterrence is the only goal of capital punishment. Once again, you're battling strawmen.
Craven de Kere wrote:For example, if one supports the death penalty as a deterrent but also supports the laws forbidding cruel and unusual punishment their goal is not to simply make the capital punishment the greatest deterrent possible. It is to make it a deterrent that fits within their other goals.
Then their goals are inconsistent. As I said before, they want semi-deterrent deterrence and semi-retributive retribution.
Craven de Kere wrote:If one of their goals is a society free of barbarism suggesting that they should accept barbarism for the goal of deterrence (which you isolate) or be a hypocrite is to suggest that they do not have any conflicting criteria. Now the conflicting criteria in itself might be cause to allege hypocrisy but only if the notion that capital punishment is already barbaric is accepted.
No, their conflicting criteria can lead them to hypocrisy even if we do not concede that capital punishment, in itself, is barbaric.
Craven de Kere wrote:Explain how the barbarism would serve as a deterrent. The execution without the barbarism will do so in the same manner to an arguably lesser degree.
You do not give the proponents of capital punishment their due.
They are the ones who argue that execution is a deterrent,
they are the ones who think that the specter of death is enough to deter criminals. Yet
they are the ones who, in the end, want the executions to be as "humane" as possible. Surely, though, if death deters, painful, cruel death deters more (especially if, as you have suggested, there are even worse punishments than death).
Craven de Kere wrote:Because it would only make sense if they had a singular goal, to deter crime. They could easily have goals that include crime deterrence and the lack of barbarism in society.
Then their goals are inconsistent.
Craven de Kere wrote:And it only makes sense if said barbarism is not a crime.
No. Because cruel and painful executions are currently outlawed, those who
should (if they were true to their convictions) want such executions ought to try their best to repeal that prohibition. As I have said before, the fact that cruel and unusual punishments are outlawed under the Eighth Amendment is sufficient reason for proponents of capital punishment to advocate the repeal of that amendment.
Craven de Kere wrote:Because deterring crime is not the only goal that exists.
I agree. Retribution is the other goal. But I'll be generous,
Craven: since you've hinted at "other" goals served by capital punishment, without ever spelling them out, I'll let you get by with naming three.
Craven de Kere wrote:Because the barbarism you advocate for them is itself a crime and this would contradict the goal of deterring crime.
It would not be a crime if the laws were rewritten. This is an inconsequential objection.
Craven de Kere wrote:Incorrect. I cited a prudential dilemma on the part of the individuals who support the death penalty.
After re-reading this several times, and after seeing your explanation, I think I finally understand what you're trying to say.
And you're still wrong.
If a person is driven to a prudential dilemma, in part, because he holds inconsistent positions, it does not make him any less inconsistent. If death penalty proponents want capital punishment to be both deterrent and retributive, but they are under prudential constraints to favor a type of capital punishment that fulfills neither goal in a satisfactory manner, then the prudential consideration does not mitigate the inherent inconsistency of the position -- indeed, it merely
highlights it.
To give an example: suppose a president favors fiscal restraint and budget surpluses, but, because of political considerations, is constrained to favor policies that lead to fiscal irresponsibility and massive budget deficits. We are, I think, entitled to say that such a president is inconsistent -- indeed, that such a president is a hypocrite -- even though his choices are driven by prudential considerations.
So there is no logical inconsistency in saying that people who favor a position, but who are constrained by prudential considerations to adopt a policy contrary to that position, are inconsistent, especially when they claim that the original position is
consistent with the contrary policy. Your charge that I erred by committing a logical inconsistency, therefore, must fail.
But, as I mentioned before, I'm a fair guy,
Craven: I'll give you one more chance to show that my argument is
logically flawed. After that, though, I'm afraid I can do no more to assist in your education. You'll have to hit the books on your own.