kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 04:24 pm
@LordScroop,
LordScroop;170135 wrote:
I believe he could:lol: be lying but I do not see him contradicting himself.


He is contradicting himself, since what implies a contradiction is a contradiction, and the supposition that there is a barber who shave everyone who does not shave himself implies that such a barber both shaves himself and does not shave himself. And so, that supposition implies a contradiction. Therefore, whether or not you see someone who supposes such a barber as contradicting himself makes no difference. He is contradicting himself. End of story.
0 Replies
 
Reconstructo
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 04:27 pm
@Fido,
Fido;116821 wrote:
Glad you asked; and since the hour is late, let me be brief...Numbers seem ideally suited for the expression of physical reality, again, to such an extent that The pythagoreans thought numbers preceeded reality; but number is simply a concept...
Number is a single class of abstraction used to conceive of all physical, tangible, sensible reality... How can that be applied to people??? We can count our selves, measure ourselves, think of our selves as a form of reality and apply science to ourselves... But we, human beings have always conceived of ourselves spiritually, and this applies even to physical reality, and to all the spiritual forms which we find essential to our lives... Numbers, math, is logic... We do not concieve of ourselves logically...We cannot conceive of life, morality, virtue, freedom, justice, love, or hate logically; though it has not been for want of trying...So if I say moral reality, I am using the term rather as the word morale is applied to the military, to distinguish it from physic, which is the material condition of the army opposed to the spiritual condition...Moral reality is not reality in the sense of res, or thing.. Rather, all moral forms point to a certain meaning without being... Justice means even while it, justice, cannot be shown..Hope that helps....

Damn, brother, this is good!
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 06:42 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;170142 wrote:
Damn, brother, this is good!


Ugh.......................
0 Replies
 
TuringEquivalent
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:13 pm
@fast,
fast;104143 wrote:
P1. Some propositions are true.
P2. Some statements are true.
P3. Some sentences are true.

I believe most of us would agree that some propositions are true, and hopefully many of us would agree that some statements are true, but how many among us agree that some sentences are true? My position is that some sentences are true. How about you?



Many sentences can express the same proposition. If you say " some proposition are true", then you have to commit to "some sentences are true".



On the other hand, what do i even mean by "express"....?
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:22 pm
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;170189 wrote:
Many sentences can express the same proposition. If you say " some proposition are true", then you have to commit to "some sentences are true".



On the other hand, what do i even mean by "express"....?


If you say " some proposition are true", then you have to commit to "some sentences are true".

Can you explain why you think so? If propositions are "truth-bearers" but not sentences, why would that be true?

To say that the same sentence can express several different propositions is (I think) to say that a sentence may be ambiguous, and have a number of different meanings. For instance, the sentence, "The old men and women sat on the bench" can mean to things (express two propositions) depending on the scope of "old". Similarly, different sentences may express the same propositions (two different sentences may be synonymous). For instance, "John is older than Jill" and "Jill is older than John", express the same proposition.
TuringEquivalent
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:28 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;170194 wrote:
If you say " some proposition are true", then you have to commit to "some sentences are true".

Can you explain why you think so? If propositions are "truth-bearers" but not sentences, why would that be true?

To say that the same sentence can express several different propositions is ...



where did i say "different"?
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:31 pm
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;170195 wrote:
where did i say "different"?


I don't know that you did. It was difficult to know just what you said. But why do you have to commit to the truth of sentences? That is what I asked.
TuringEquivalent
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:45 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;170198 wrote:
I don't know that you did. It was difficult to know just what you said. But why do you have to commit to the truth of sentences? That is what I asked.


This is what i said "Many sentences can express the same proposition." According to the book, propositions carries meaning. There can be different sentences in different languages, and different ways of expressing the same thing, but they are have the same meaning. This is why "many sentences can express the same proposition" for it is the proposition that carries the meaning of all those sentences. The weight of a single proposition carries the weight of an infinite many sentence for there are infinite many ways of construct the same meaning.


What do i mean by construct? Eg Catman is construct from cat, and men
eg: GHIN express gay male under 18, who like to wear pick pants.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:47 pm
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;170205 wrote:
This is what i said "Many sentences can express the same proposition." According to the book, propositions carries meaning. There can be different sentences in different languages, and different ways of expressing the same thing, but they are have the same meaning. This is why "many sentences can express the same proposition" for it is the proposition that carries the meaning of all those sentences. The weight of a single proposition carries the weight of an infinite many sentence for there infinite many ways of expressing the same meaning.


So why are we committed to the truth of sentences because we say that propositions are true?
TuringEquivalent
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:50 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;170207 wrote:
So why are we committed to the truth of sentences because we say that propositions are true?


because some sentences express the same proposition.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:52 pm
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;170209 wrote:
because some sentences express the same proposition.


How does it follow from that, that sentences are true?
0 Replies
 
TuringEquivalent
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:52 pm
@TuringEquivalent,
or perhaps, some sentences express the same meaning.

---------- Post added 05-28-2010 at 08:53 PM ----------

kennethamy;170210 wrote:
How does it follow from that, that sentences are true?


because some sentences express the same proposition. propositions bear truth values.
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:54 pm
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;170211 wrote:
or perhaps, some sentences express the same meaning.


I am lost, since you jump around. Question: If sentences express propositions, and if propositions are true, why does it follow that sentences are true?
TuringEquivalent
 
  1  
Reply Fri 28 May, 2010 07:58 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;170215 wrote:
I am lost, since you jump around. Question: If sentences express propositions, and if propositions are true, why does it follow that sentences are true?


see that:

If S express P,
P is true.
--------------
S is true.

The reason the above is true is that 'express' is designed to do that.

Express can be a binary relation such that

E( S, P)
P is true
--------------
S is true.


Is interest talking to a life computer..
0 Replies
 
Fido
 
  1  
Reply Sat 29 May, 2010 06:05 am
@Fil Albuquerque,
Fil. Albuquerque;169954 wrote:
Can you see now how they relate ???

---------- Post added 05-28-2010 at 09:19 AM ----------



The question is a formal problem on Set theory and obviously is does not came from me, plus I sincerly doubt you never heard from it before...

Once more, does the Set of all sets who do not contain themselves contains itself ???

How does humanity survive its paradoxes... We can only consider the boxes we put ourselves in from the outside... So what??? Does insight not always stand outside of reason??? Our lives are a chicken without an egg... Isn't consciousness what makes us human, and have we not always been conscious, and so always human??? Reason says one thing and insight says another... What can we believe???
0 Replies
 
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Sat 29 May, 2010 08:14 am
@fast,
It is fallacious to think that the meaning a word has now is the meaning it originally had, since meanings change through time. Still, it is seldom that the etymology of a word cannot shed light on its meaning. The etymology of the word "paradox" is from the ancient Greek words "doxa" and "para", which meant "common opinion" and "contrary to" respectively. So, a paradox would be something that was "contrary to common opinion" or, against what we ordinarily believe is true. So, for instance, of of Zeno's paradoxes is that if Achilles and a tortoise engaged in a race, Achilles could not win against the tortoise. That is, of course, contrary to what we ordinarily believe is true. We believe that Achilles would win such a race, hands down. In the present instance, the paradox is known as the Barbershop paradox. It begins by supposing a barber who shaves all, and only, those who do not shave themselves. And it asks the innocent seeming question, does that barber shave himself or not. And quickly (I hope) we see that supposition implies a contradiction, for if the barber were to shave himself that would be contrary to the supposition, and it the barber were not to shave himself, then that would be contrary to the supposition. It would then follow that such a barber (supposing, of course, there were one) would have both to shave himself and (also) not shave himself. But that, of course is a contradiction. Literally, no one can perform a contradictory action (not even God). So, in the light of all this, what is the answer to the question, supposing there were such a barber, would he shave himself or not? The only answer there can be is that the supposition is, itself, false. That it is impossible that there should be such a barber, because the supposition of such a barber implies a contradiction, and therefore, the supposition is, itself, a contradiction, since what implies a contradiction is itself a contradiction. So, the paradox is that it would be ordinarily believed (doxa) that there could be such a barber, but it turns out, upon analysis, that there could not be such a barber, and so, paradoxa, a paradox!

There are several lessons to be drawn from this example. Two of them are: 1. That reason can show that something does not exist. That is something that inspired the epistemology of Rationalism which is the view that thought (what Kant called, "pure reason") that demonstrate that something does not exist, and therefore, it is reasonable to believe that is can demonstrate that something must exist. (But this argument is fallacious). 2. Closer to home, is that we see that a person can hold a self-contradictory belief without realizing that he does. That should make us all more modest.
ughaibu
 
  1  
Reply Sat 29 May, 2010 08:21 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;170352 wrote:
It is fallacious to think that the meaning a word has now is the meaning it originally had, since meanings change through time.
I guess that what you're trying to suggest is that truth is independent of the symbols, including phonemes, by which it's expressed, yet you expressed this by such a means, a means independent, according to you, of truth. Accordingly, I wonder, if your words themselves aren't true, how do I access that which you suppose to be true?
kennethamy
 
  1  
Reply Sat 29 May, 2010 08:31 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;170354 wrote:
I guess that what you're trying to suggest is that truth is independent of the symbols, including phonemes, by which it's expressed, yet you expressed this by such a means, a means independent, according to you, of truth. Accordingly, I wonder, if your words themselves aren't true, how do I access that which you suppose to be true?


Actually, I wasn't trying to suggest that with this example. And I don't really see how what I posted does suggest that. Of course, I do believe that there can be unexpressed truths, and I cannot imagine why anyone would not believe that. It was a truth in the 14th century that water was H20, but no one did, or could have expressed that truth.

Words are neither true nor false. To say they are is a category mistake.
ughaibu
 
  1  
Reply Sat 29 May, 2010 08:37 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;170355 wrote:
Actually, I wasn't trying to suggest that with this example. And I don't really see how what I posted does suggest that. Of course, I do believe that there can be unexpressed truths, and I cannot imagine why anyone would not believe that. It was a truth in the 14th century that water was H20, but no one did, or could have expressed that truth.

Words are neither true nor false. To say they are is a category mistake.
None of which has anything to do with what I said. If sentences are neither true nor false, and the meanings of words are unstable, how is truth transmitted by words?
Owen phil
 
  1  
Reply Sat 29 May, 2010 08:45 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;169933 wrote:
No idea what the halting problem is. What about the set paradox. What has it to do with the barbershop paradox save they are both paradoxes?


The Barber Paradox and the Russell Paradox, share a common formulation.

EyAx(x is shaved by y <-> ~(x is shaved by x)) and
EyAx(x is a member of y <-> ~(x is a member of x)),
are both instances of the proposition:
EyAx(xRy <-> ~(xRx)).

There is a y such that: Ax(xRy <-> ~(xRx)), is a contradiction.

Proof:

Ax(xRy <-> ~(xRx)) -> ((yRy) <-> ~(yRy)), ...when x=y.
But, (yRy) <-> ~(yRy), is of the form (p <-> ~p) which is a contradiction for all p.

That is, Ax(xRy <-> ~(xRx)) implies a contradiction, therefore, Ax(xRy <-> ~(xRx)), is false for all y.
That is to say, ~EyAx(xRy <-> ~(xRx)) is a theorem, for all R.

Therefore, neither the Barber nor the Russell class exist.

Does the Barber shave himself? No, it cannot 'do' anything because it does not exist.
Is the Russell Class a member of itself? No, it cannot be a member of any set, because it does not exist.

Note: There are instantiations of the predicate ~(x is a member of x) but there is no such class as {x's:~(x is a member of x)}.

For example, the class of cars is not a member of itself, ie. it satisfies the predicate ~(x is a member of x), but....the class of cars is not a member of the class of those classes which are not members of themselves.

It is false to say: if a predicate is instantiated by some individual then that individual is a member of the class determined by that predicate, for all predicates.
 

Related Topics

How can we be sure? - Discussion by Raishu-tensho
Proof of nonexistence of free will - Discussion by litewave
Destroy My Belief System, Please! - Discussion by Thomas
Star Wars in Philosophy. - Discussion by Logicus
Existence of Everything. - Discussion by Logicus
Is it better to be feared or loved? - Discussion by Black King
Paradigm shifts - Question by Cyracuz
 
  1. Forums
  2. » True Sentences
  3. » Page 5
Copyright © 2024 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.03 seconds on 10/03/2024 at 07:38:11