True Sentences

If it's true that a sentence can express a true proposition (which is something I believe is true, sort of), then how would a sentence that expresses more than one proposition change the fact that it's true that a sentence can express a true proposition? That blows me away. You said, "a sentence is true [if and only if] it expresses exactly one proposition and that proposition is true. I don't understand the reasoning behind the "exactly one" condition as you have worded it. An implication of what you said is that a sentence that expresses more than one proposition (hence, not exactly one proposition) is not true because you said, "if and ONLY if", but I don't see why you would think that.

If a sentence expresses two propositions, and if at least one of the propositions are true, then why can't a sentence be true?

Is it because if one of the propositions is false, then the sentence is both true and false and that's a contradiction?

P1. Some propositions are true.
P2. Some statements are true.
P3. Some sentences are true.

I believe most of us would agree that some propositions are true, and hopefully many of us would agree that some statements are true, but how many among us agree that some sentences are true? My position is that some sentences are true. How about you?

Sentences are linguistic expressions that express a thought.
Statements are declarative sentences.
Propositions are statements which are true or false.

Of course there are some sentences, namely propositions, which are true or false.

As a reference, consider philosophypages.com:
"What is conveyed by a declarative sentence used to make a statement or assertion. Each proposition is either true or false, though in a particular instance we may not know which it is"

I still think the word, "what" makes the definition lacking.

From the link you provided:
[INDENT]Propositions are distinct from the sentences that convey them. "Smith loves Jones" expresses exactly the same proposition as "Jones is loved by Smith," while the sentence "Today is my birthday" can be used to convey many different propositions, depending upon who happens to utter it, and on what day. But each proposition is either true or false. Sometimes, of course, we don't know which of these truth-values a particular proposition has ("There is life on the third moon of Jupiter" is presently an example), but we can be sure that it has one or the other.
[/INDENT]In reference to the bold, I ask, why is that? My answer is that because both sentences mean the same thing.

So, what is expressed by a declarative sentence if not the meaning of the sentence?

Thus, although it may be true that a proposition is "what is expressed by a declarative sentence," I think we can make "what is expressed" more explicit by saying that a proposition is the meaning expressed by a declarative sentence.

Any thoughts, anyone?

That's an objection?--there can't be sentences that express meaning if there are no sentences? Yeah, I kinda figured that, but who doesn't think there are sentences?

Moving on to rehash old ground yet again, telling me that a proposition is what is expressed by a declarative sentence is akin to telling me that a proposition is something expressed by a declarative sentence, but unless you tell me what that something is, I still don't know what a proposition is; instead, I only have an idea of it's relationship to sentences.

A baseball is something hit by a baseball bat, but the definition of "baseball" isn't "something hit by a baseball bat."

I do have a simpler question though. Is a bearer of truth at least somewhat synonymous with fact (or state of affairs)?

They seem to express the same proposition.

That's an objection?--there can't be sentences that express meaning if there are no sentences? Yeah, I kinda figured that, but who doesn't think there are sentences?

Moving on to rehash old ground yet again, telling me that a proposition is what is expressed by a declarative sentence is akin to telling me that a proposition is something expressed by a declarative sentence, but unless you tell me what that something is, I still don't know what a proposition is; instead, I only have an idea of it's relationship to sentences.

A baseball is something hit by a baseball bat, but the definition of "baseball" isn't "something hit by a baseball bat."

I do have a simpler question though. Is a bearer of truth at least somewhat synonymous with fact (or state of affairs)?

They seem to express the same proposition.

Also, careful not to quote Swartz with my name as you did before.

But I don't know any good condition for propositional identity. Being logically equivalent is a necessary condition but not a sufficient.

.

Thanks.

I take it then that a truth bearer (or bearer of truth) is something that is true or false. For example, a proposition (assuming they exist) is something that is true or false. An argument, on the other hand, is not something that is true or false, so an argument is not a truth bearer (or bearer of truth).

A second example of something that is true or false is a statement. Yes, the difference between the two may be obscure to some people, but that should not render it false that statements are either true or false. I think what I mean by "proposition" and what I mean by "statement" is inconsequential. I mean just what they mean, no more, no less.

Pretty close?

---------- Post added 12-31-2009 at 10:30 PM ----------


Some people are true to their spouse, but that use of the word "true" is much different from how we have been using the word.

Propositions are posited to explain how different sentences can have the same meaning, and how the same sentence can have different meanings.So, propositions are meanings The question is whether there is is a better explanation than that of propositions. Quine, who thinks there are no such things as meanings ("creatures of darkness") thinks we can simply do with sentences.

Do propositions have something in common with electrons?